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ABSTRACT 
 
THE SPIRIT AS THE LORD AND THE GIVER OF LIFE: RECOVERING 
RELATIONAL PNEUMATOLOGYAND ITS SIGNIFICANCE 
FOR BEING CHURCH IN POSTCOLONIAL NIGERIA 
 
 
 
By 
Okechukwu Camillus Njoku  
May 2012 
Dissertation supervised by Professor Gerald M. Boodoo 
 This dissertation seeks to recover the relational quality of the Holy Spirit who is 
the Lord and the Giver of life as enshrined in the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed (381). 
Neo-Scholastic theology had utilized the conceptual categories of Aristotelian 
metaphysics with its orientation to foundationalism and immobility in a manner 
destructive of difference, plurality, and the relational language of the Spirit as witnessed 
in the Bible. One of the upshots became the totalizing bent of Western epistemology 
which eventually found concretion in colonialism and the slavery of Africans among 
others. This dissertation utilizes the category of “relationality,” a core tenet of West 
African Weltanschauungen, as an organizing and interpretive device for reinterpreting the 
creedal affirmation in a way that allows for new understandings of the Spirit. In our 
 v 
world in which there is an increasing awareness of the simultaneity of the dialectic of 
differences and interconnectedness due to the process of globalization, we are compelled 
to seek ways of living together without subordinating difference to the regime of 
sameness. The thesis is that relational pneumatology provides template for negotiating an 
other discourse on the Triune God which recognizes and respects equality-in-difference. 
To develop this thesis, I utilize an anthropological, interdisciplinary, critical, and 
descriptive approach. I argue that relational pneumatology invites that subalternized 
epistemic potentials be foregrounded and legitimized in a manner that fosters “solidarity 
of others.”  I also draw the implications of this perspective for the Nigerian church with 
regard to ecclesial structures and authority, interreligious dialogue, and the question of 
holistic liberation that fosters justice and peace. 
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Introduction  
0.1The State of the Question     
           This dissertation is inspired firstly by my experience of how the question of 
difference has not too infrequently been used negatively as a tool for oppression, 
domination, and exclusion. The tragedy of colonialism and African slavery substantiate 
this view. How was it that in relating to the African other, Europeans saw Africans as less 
than human, a legacy which has continued to be perpetuated by neocolonial elites? 
Another, is the dominance of Spirit-experience in West African Christianity that invites 
an investigative and critical theological articulation. Currently, no theological work exists 
from an Etche-West African pneumatological perspective specifically with regard to the 
question of rearticulating difference for the purpose of a greater enrichment of the church 
and of humanity. This work, therefore, seeks to fill the gap. This dissertation attempts a 
reinterpretation of the Third Article of the Niceno-Constantinopolitan (381) creedal 
affirmation of the Holy Spirit as: “The Lord and the Giver of Life.” In order to do this, I 
draw on “relationality,” a core tenet of Etche (West African) cosmo-religious tradition, as 
an interpretive and organizing framework for this task. In connection with this 
interpretive tool, I seek to understand the Lord and Giver of life as the relational Spirit 
who not only creates our differences but also enriches same through communion.   
 In the making of the modernity/coloniality world system culminating in the 
phenomenon that has come to be known today as globalization, we are confronted with 
its ambivalence. Firstly, it pertains to the stark reality of fragmentation and of plurality 
stemming from an increased awareness of differences (in culture, religion, gender, class, 
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sex, ethnicity, and so on). Secondly, we come face to face with the reality of the 
interconnected and interdependent nature of the world. In this seemingly “antithetical 
dialectic of simultaneous differentiation and interdependence,”1 we are compelled to find 
a way of negotiating the boundaries of difference in a non-totalizing manner. This 
unlocks the door to theologies in a World Church that would no longer be a matter of 
unidimensional consumerism of Western global designs but of a plurilateral and 
pluriversal collaboration. More precisely, this study seeks to understand “the reign of 
God” inaugurated and proclaimed by Jesus as good news to mean, among others, that 
those on the margins and the excluded have become part of the larger conversation.
 Let me briefly historicize the modern/colonial world system
2
 mentioned above in 
order to focus our understanding of the Etche/West African context that informs our task 
of reinterpreting the creedal appellation of the Holy Spirit. The Medieval synthesis and 
neo-Scholastic theistic theology had utilized Greek metaphysical and epistemological 
categories in talking about God-human relationship. But because Greek philosophy 
thinks in terms of substance and causality, God was conceived as the First Uncaused 
Cause in a series of chain of causes. God was seen through the prism of absolute 
foundation. And God’s relation to humans was understood in terms of an instrumental, 
mechanical, productionist causality of an impassible, immutable, and All-Perfect Being 
without any personal relationality.
3
 Hence, from the very beginning, Greek philosophy as 
                                                 
      
1
 Anselm K. Min, The Solidarity of Others in a Divided World: A Postmodern Theology after 
Postmodernism (New York and London: T & T Clark International, 2004), 1. 
      
2
 For a detailed explication of the contours of modernity/coloniality world system, see below Chapter 4, 
sec. 4.5, of this work below.  
      
3
 See William J. Hill, The Three-Personed God: The Trinity as a Mystery of Salvation (Washington, 
D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1982), 210. 
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the progenitor of Western epistemological thought has always been oriented to thinking 
in terms of foundations, stasis, absolutes, and thus, totality.  It is this thinking in absolute, 
“delocalized and ahistorical” terms (if at all, there is such a thing) that would ground the 
epistemological production of the modern/colonial world system between the 16
th
 and the 
late middle of the 20
th
 centuries climaxing in global colonialism.    
 The 15
th
 through the 18
th
 centuries marked the consolidation of the 
modern/coloniality world system driven by capitalism and European frontier 
expansionism. This was facilitated through the “coloniality of power”4 and active 
colonialism which created peripheries all over the planet outside the metropolitan centers 
in Europe. Structurally, the modern system, created the inside borders (that is, inside 
modernity) and the outside borders (outside modernity). This “outside” of modernity is 
what decolonial thinkers have described as the “colonial difference.”5 In this connection, 
Eurocentric epistemologies emanating from the Greek legacy and refined as the 
Enlightenment instrumental, pure, objective, “zero-point” rationality, were invented, 
exported, and imposed on the populations classified as outside modernity as the only 
normative way of knowing. Those categorized in the region of the colonial difference 
were dislocated, their own local histories/epistemologies disdained and discredited as 
inadequate, unscientific, and irrational, and hence, they were forcefully taught to discard 
them. Besides, the populations inhabiting the outside of modernity along with their 
                                                 
      
4
 The coloniality of power has been described as a “conflict of knowledges and structures of power.” 
See Walter Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border 
Thinking (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), 16. The clarification of the cluster of 
terms used here, such as: coloniality, colonial difference, global designs, pluriversal, and so on, can be 
found in Chapter 4, sec. 4.5. 
      
5
 Ibid., ix. 
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cultures and traditions were only of interest as objects (not subjects) of study and 
knowable only through the normative matrix of Eurocentric totalizing episteme. In this 
way, the epistemic potentials of the outside borders of modernity were subalternized and 
silenced philosophically, theologically, and otherwise. Worse still, because the 
populations in the outside of modernity were viewed as objects, some of them (such as 
Africans) were oppressed, repressed, and exploited through slavery. But even after the 
era of active colonialism and slavery, coloniality, sadly enough, is still alive and well in 
the form of global coloniality (socio-economically, politically, and even ecclesiastically) 
which continues to wield and structure the discourse of power and the modern totalizing 
project under the guise of universal (but only Eurocentric local knowledges) assumptions. 
 This work is therefore, a contribution to the endeavor in intellectual 
decolonization
6
 which entails an exploration in an “other paradigm” of thinking that is 
non-totalitarian. My thesis is that relational pneumatology provides a template for 
negotiating differences through the fostering of a “solidarity of others”7 that is respectful 
                                                 
      
6
 See Chukwudum B. Okolo, Toward Decolonizing the Church: An African Liberation Theology 
(Onitsha, Nigeria: Tabansi Press, 1976); see also David J. Bosch, Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts 
in Theology of Mission (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1991), 448. 
      
7
 Throughout this work, I will maintain the expression “solidarity of others” rather than “solidarity with 
others.” My use of solidarity of others, an expression that, of course, is grammatically correct, is beholden 
to the insight of Anselm Min cited above. He makes a subtle distinction between the two expressions. 
Accordingly, the expression “solidarity with others” implies some underlying vantage point from which 
“we look at others as other and choose which others to enter into solidarity with. Furthermore, we tend to 
look at these others as victims needing…our assistance; we tend to be paternalistic.” Whereas solidarity of 
others “implies that there is no privileged perspective, that all are others to one another…and that all are 
subjects, not objects.” The word “Other” is to be understood in the Levinasian sense, and is used here in 
referring to human beings whose alterity forbid any reduction to the regime of sameness or totality. And 
sociologically, it refers to those who have actually been excluded, dislocated, subjugated, and subalternized 
through the “coloniality of power.” Solidarity of others, therefore, serves as a critique of the socio-political 
and religious structures that create subalternity as areas to be studied and subalterns as objects of study 
rather than to be seen and treated as subjects with equality-in-difference. Solidarity of others thus calls for 
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of equality-in-difference in a life-affirming way.The study aims to unsubjugate and 
foreground silenced African local knowledges/histories, and to legitimize the region as an 
authentic epistemic location with subjects who possess epistemic potentials that should 
no longer continue to be silenced. I argue in this work that African Christian theology, a 
branch of which is pneumatology, occupies the same local epistemic status as any 
European theologies (which are also local theologies). It should thus be recognized 
according to the framework of equality-in-difference. Besides, it is also an authentic 
contribution from a subaltern perspective which expands the dimensions of the gospel 
and enriches the living (not static) tradition of the church. Sometime ago, Aylward 
Shorter, echoing Jean-Marc Èla, underlined that “The church in Africa…may be growing 
in numbers, but it is not growing in awareness.”8 While there may be elements of truth to 
this statement, what it ignores to highlight is that since the era of Independence in most of 
Africa in the 1960s, there has continued to be an increasing awareness of the huge social 
changes taking place in Africa, of the efforts to contextualize and decolonize both 
ecclesial structures and theology.But then we are still existing in the modern/colonial 
world system in which coloniality of power is still alive and well.   
0.2The Scope and Methodology      
 The scope of this project is limited to a particular hermeneutical retrieval of the 
ancient appellation of the Spirit as the Lord and Giver of Life to articulate a relational 
pneumatology. My aim is to reinterpret this Third Article in a way that allows for new 
                                                                                                                                                 
many differences and many worlds living and fitting together in one world without reduction to sameness. 
See Ibid., 82. 
      
8
 See Aylward Shorter, Toward a Theology of Inculturation (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 
1988), 247. 
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understandings of the Person of the Holy Spirit in the light of contemporary African 
situation. It is, therefore, not an exercise in rehearsing the old apologetics and polemics 
with regard to the procession of the Holy Spirit either from the Father alone 
(Monopatrism) or from the Father and the Son (Filioquism). An important area I hope to 
explore in the future is the place of the relational Spirit with regard to ecology. 
 Methodologically, my approach is focused by the anthropological assumptions of 
Etche/West African cosmo-religious world-views. Using the Etche tradition as a 
reference point allows me to utilize its core tenet of relationality as my interpretive and 
organizing framework for an alternative template in arguing for a better insight into 
pneumatology. Through this framework, there emerges to view a new understanding of 
the Triune God’s transcendence as dynamically creative of harmony through differential 
relations. Let me also be clear that the Etche cosmo-religious world-view is 
predominantly an oral tradition. I will, therefore, be drawing on its rich repository of 
symbols, art, proverbs, rituals, folktalks, and so forth, as well as on my personal local 
experience as one who inhabits that world-view. Since our context and space fall within 
the modern/colonial world system, my method shall also include a critical socio-cultural 
and historical analysis of the African context. In the light of the outcome of this analysis, 
our interpretive tool will allow us to critically reread the Bible and Christian traditions so 
as to have new understandings of the Person and proprium of the Holy Spirit that are 
liberative. Moreover, I shall also draw on the insights of postcolonial and decolonial 
thought and from the social sciences and history as well. My approach is, therefore, 
archaeologico-critical, anthropological, hermeneutical, interdisciplinary, and descriptive. 
And finally, my adoption of the framework of relationality which abhors absolutism 
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allows me to seek the best in both the African and non-African traditions shun of 
romanticism or essentialism in order to challenge systemic and systematic structures of 
evil that have continued to be life-denying for Africans.  
0.3 The Value of the Study       
 This dissertation will be relevant to theology in several ways. As an effort toward 
creating a pathway for negotiating differences and engendering harmonious living amidst 
differences, this work holds great potentials for: Trinitarian theology, communion 
ecclesiology, interreligious/ecumenical dialogue, ecology, Feminist theology, 
intercultural hermeneutics, soteriology and Liberation theology, theological 
anthropology, missiology, and Public theology (since our understanding of the Spirit 
would be crucial for the transformation of African imagination and the social 
transformation of Africa as well). These are some of the important areas that need 
continual expansion in relation to African Christian theology, and this dissertation 
provides building blocks for such a prospect.                        
0.4The Structure of the Dissertation     
 This dissertation is divided into five chapters. The first chapter historicizes the 
loss of the relational quality of the Triune God—mediated by the Spirit—in Western 
Latin theological tradition by tracing its root back to the legacy of Greek metaphysics. I 
contend that caught up in the trap of ahistorical absolutes in matters of God-Spirit talk, 
Western theology assumed a totalitarian bent and thereby undermined relationality and 
the dignity of equality-in-difference. I also argue that the loss of relationality (hence, the 
forgetfulness of the Spirit) enthroned Eurocentric absolutism used to legitimate and 
justify colonialism and the slavery of Africans. This constitutes a crisis in Latin theology, 
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and hence, the need for an “other paradigm of thinking.”    
 Chapter two digs into the Etche cosmo-religious world-view in search of an 
“other paradigm” and an interpretive tool. The concept of relationality which is a core 
tenet of the Etche religious universe would be explored as helpful for overcoming the 
dualism between the sacred and the mundane, the supernatural and the natural, and hence, 
the involvement or engagement of the divine (mediated by the Universal Holy Spirit) in 
the world of human beings. In this way, absolutism which led to the dislocation and 
subalternization of Africa is dismantled and the dignity of difference and plurality is 
restored.            
 In chapter three, utilizing relationality as an interpretive device, certain biblical 
and Patristic tropes on the Holy Spirit are critically reread and reinterpreted to allow for 
new understandings of the relational Spirit as the Giver of life. I argue that the relational 
Spirit gives life and bestows differences as a gift. Yet, the relational Spirit as Lord resists 
and subverts whatever negative forces that try to diminish the Spirit-given life and/or to 
destroy differences. I draw on contemporary theological sources to illustrate this stance.  
 The fourth chapter envisions hospitality/friendship as practical ways to concretize 
relationality in relating to others who may be different from us (due to religion, gender, 
ethnicity, and so forth). My main interest here is in evincing the subversive, resistant, and 
interpellatory nature of hospitality in confronting the structures of power configurations 
that exclude, oppress, subjugate, and silence the other. I submit that solidarity of others 
require that genuine relationships of friendship be enacted on the basis of a balance of 
power shun of paternalism. As members of the body of Christ who have been befriended 
by the hospitable God, we are to embody God’s dance of love for the world. It remains an 
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excellent model for an African theology.         
 Chapter five is an effort toward constructing an African Christian pneumatology. 
Utilizing the valuable resources from the Etche and West African dimensions of spirit-
experience, I rearticulate and rework an understanding of the Universal Holy Spirit 
whose manifold operations are manifested through the instrumentality of the “many 
spirits” of African ancestral religions. I draw on and at the same time expand the insights 
of African Independent Church’s (AICs). Finally, the implications of this new 
understanding along with suggestions for being church today in Africa as a whole and 
particularly in Nigeria, is treated.  
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Chapter 1 
 
The Crisis of Pneumatology in Western Systematic 
Theology 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
This first chapter unpacks the knapsack of the crisis that has for too long plagued 
pneumatology in Western (Latin) systematic theology.
1
 The chapter makes the case that 
the tragic encounter between Africa and the West culminating in slavery, colonialism, 
neocolonialism, and the current experience of globalization is not entirely unconnected 
with the inadequate and lopsided attention to the person, autonomy, and proprium of the 
Spirit in Western theology. Some of the key factors that fomented the said crisis, 
including neo-Scholastic substance-theistic ontology and the subordination of the Spirit 
in Christology would be examined among others. The neo-Scholastic bent toward 
absolute abstraction—a heritage of Greek metaphysical tradition—paved the way for the 
logocentrism of the modernity/coloniality world system. Modernity which arose from the 
ashes of the breakdown of medieval synthesis played a key role in the furtherance of the 
eclipse of the Spirit will equally be investigated. It is my contention here that a recovery 
of the understanding of the Spirit as relational would be helpful in the negotiation of the 
boundaries of difference and in overcoming the use of difference for oppressive and 
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 It is worth noting that there was a rich tradition of spirituality especially in the medieval era which 
focused more on the action of the Spirit in the spiritual life.However, there was a lack of the same 
concentration in systematic theology to express the proprium of the Spirit.For a detailed consideration of 
the place of the Spirit in the spirituality of the Middle Ages, see Elizabeth A. Dreyer, Holy Power, Holy 
Presence: Rediscovering Medieval Metaphors for the Holy Spirit (New York and Mahwah, New Jersey: 
Paulist Press, 2007); Stanley M. Burgess, The Holy Spirit:Medieval Roman Catholic and Reformation 
Traditions (Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 1997).  
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exclusionary purposes. It would also provide a template for negotiating “an other” 
discourse on the Trinitarian God that recognizes the Spirit as person and not just force or 
energy. This approach will, thus, allow for an opening of new and enriching possibilities 
and vistas in the “Self – Other” encounter, individually, institutionally, and communally. 
To be treated also are certain clarifications of some key terminologies that will feature 
frequently in this work.   
1.2 The Inadequate Attention to Pneumatology 
 
For too long a certain crisis has dogged the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the 
history of Western theology. This crisis borders predominantly on the inadequate and 
unbalanced attention paid to the third person of the Trinity in comparison to the Father 
and the Son. Even the Creeds of Nicaea 325 and Constantinople 381 in comparison with 
the Father and the Son, could not use homoousios for the Holy Spirit.
2
  About the Father 
and the Son, volumes have been written, specifying their proper character, personhood, 
and function, but the same has yet to be elaborately accomplished with respect to the 
Holy Spirit. The neglect of the Spirit in whom God relates to the world through Christ 
led, among other things, to a very transcendentalized and abstract conception of God that 
clearly severed the supernatural from the natural. Such neglect of the Holy Spirit is not 
without consequences for both Western theology, the general history of the church, and 
Western relationship with non-Western “Others.”      
                                                 
      
2
 Gary D. Badcock, Light of Truth and Fire of Love: A Theology of the Holy Spirit (Grand Rapids, 
Michigan, and Cambridge, U.K.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997), 45-61; Walter Kasper 
comments that this “lack of use of homoousios in the article of faith on the Holy Spirit as it is used in the 
article on Jesus Christ is, indeed, striking.” Kasper, nonetheless, observes that “churchmen had learned a 
lesson from the confusion that followed on Nicaea; and so it is likely, therefore, that they deliberately 
avoided this disputed term, which was open to misunderstanding and was not attested in scripture.” Walter 
Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (New York: Crossroad, 1989), 213. 
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 The Spirit is variously depicted as the principle of relationality,
3
 the bond of love, 
and the source of unity within God’s Triune identity.  An understanding of God as 
essentially relational or otherwise shapes an understanding of who we are and what kind 
of vocation we have in the world we inhabit. As a loving communion and loving 
relationality, the Triune God, in opening out to the other calls into being creation and 
human beings who have the potential for realizing loving relationality. As the principle of 
relationality and mediation, the Spirit safeguards not only the equality-in-difference 
between the Father and the Son, but also that between humans in their communion with 
the Triune God. To talk of the Triune God as relational is simply not the product of 
human speculation or construction. It is rather an inference—to the question of “who” 
God is—drawn from God’s self-revelation as is evident in the oikonomia, in the missions 
of the Son and the Holy Spirit as enshrined in the Scriptures. This rich biblical 
understanding and important ancient Christian insight into the identity of the Spirit and 
God as relational was lost sight of in the Western (particularly Latin) theological tradition 
in later centuries.          
                                                 
      
3
 For a consideration of a number of theologians who call attention to the category of relationality and 
its importance to God’s identity, see Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ; Elochukwu E. Uzukwu, A Listening 
Church: Autonomy and Communion in African Churches (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books and Reprint 
Enugu, Nigeria: SNAAP Press, 1996); Eberhard Jüngel, God As the Mystery of the World (Grand Rapids, 
Michigan: Eerdmans, 1983); Clark H. Pinnock, Flame of Love: A Theology of the Holy Spirit (Downers 
Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1996); Ted Peters, God as Trinity: Relationality and Temporality in 
Divine Life (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/ John Knox, 1993); Catherine M. LaCugna, “The 
Relational God: Aquinas and Beyond,” Theological Studies 46 (1985): 647-63; idem, God For Us: The 
Trinity and Christian Life (San Francisco, California: HarperCollins, 1992). Also some feminist 
theologians have stressed on the meaningfulness of loving relationality as a fundamental character of God 
and reality: see Rosemary Radford Reuther, Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1983); Elizabeth A. Johnson, She Who Is:The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological 
Discourse (New York: Crossroad, 1992). Also John D Zizioulas, Being As Communion: Studies in 
Personhood and the Church (Crestwood, New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985); William C. 
Placher, Narratives of a Vulnerable God (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/John Knox, 1994). 
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 To gain some appreciation of the situation, it may be helpful to briefly highlight 
what constitutes a crisis. According to Wilfried Härle: a crisis can be seen as comprising, 
inter alia, the following characteristics: [1] it constitutes a threat to the being of an 
individual or a community which can concern its very existence, validity of its meaning 
system and its identity; [2] it is necessarily ambivalent, its outcome is still open; [3] it 
does not come unprepared, but is the culmination of often hidden factors and forces 
which have been there for a long time; [4] it divides the past and the future so that the 
appropriation of the past in the present determines the possibilities of the future; and last 
but not least, [5] it necessitates change.
4
 All of the above aspects of a crisis apply to the 
current state of pneumatology. The crisis may truly be profound; it is, nonetheless, in the 
nature of a crisis to be ambivalent and so open to new possibilities and change. Such 
characteristic ambivalence which holds out promise, in some respects, is a reason for 
hope and for the present effort at recovering relational pneumatology. But a 
reconstruction of pneumatology that will be relevant for our current context can only be 
achieved by a successful identification and clarification of the causes of the crisis ab 
initio. One key factor, among others, that led to the eclipse of the Spirit in Latin theology 
is the theological framework of neo-Scholasticism.      
1.2.1 The Medieval Synthesis and Neo-Scholastic Substance-Theistic  
        Theology 
     
The emergence of Christianity from the Jewish subculture and its incarnation into 
the more dominant culture of the pure Greco-Roman world was not just a boon but also 
                                                 
      
4
 Wilfried Härle, “Krise in theologischer Sicht,” in Wege Zum Menschen28(1977): 408-16 cited in 
Christoph Schwöbel, “Christology and Trinitarian Thought,” in Trinitarian Theology Today: Essays on 
Divine Being and Act, ed. Christoph Schwöbel (Edinburgh: T. &T. Clark, 1995), 114.   
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problematic for the Christian faith. In the long history of Greek philosophical thought, it 
is clear that the divine is characterized as an eternal, impersonal, impassible, immutable, 
perfect, stable, and transcendent principle. The divine, for instance, for Plato is the Idea, 
Form, or the Good—which, as a universal—manifests or mirrors itself only dimly in the 
many subordinate particular alterable entities in the cosmos but itself remains 
unalterable.
5
 Aristotle calls it the Unmoved Mover or Pure Act. In Aristotelian 
metaphysics—the finest articulation of Greek genius—the Pure Act is characterized as 
changeless, simple,
6
 having no personal relation with the world, and simply contemplates 
itself, hence, a self-thinking-thought or substance.
7
 The self which thinks itself lacks 
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 See Plato, Republic 7. 509b. 
      
6
 For Aristotle, the pure act precisely as pure act is devoid of potentiality and, hence, outside the sphere 
of numerical plurality. It is pure simplicity devoid of individuation. According to Aristotle, “all things that 
are many in number have matter.” But the unmovable first mover is one both in definition and in number. 
In this way, Aristotle attempted to dissociate part of the religious beliefs of his time, precisely, that the 
divine encloses the whole of nature, from philosophical discourse. Aristotle in his treatise “On the Soul,” 
reports the religious and theological statement of Thales that “all things are full of gods,” a statement which 
Aristotle thought was inspired by the commonplace opinions then that “the soul is diffused throughout the 
whole universe.” See De Anima, I, 5, 411a 8-9.  For Aristotle, then, to assert the intermingling of the divine 
and nature is to introduce matter into the divine rather than seeing it as pure essence. In other words, the 
divine is diametrically unrelated to matter. See Aristotle, Met, XII, 8, 1074
a
 34, 36, 1074
b
 2.  
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 Aristotle maintains that “the divine substance which thinks nothing but itself does so because, if it 
were to think of something other than itself, then that means that the divine substance itself does not 
constitute the act of thinking, and therefore, is a potency, and not the best substance; there would then 
evidently be something more precious than itself, namely, that which it thinks. It is, therefore, not possible 
for the Aristotelian divine substance to think of matter which would be like thinking the worst thing in the 
world. Therefore, it must be about itself that the divine thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of 
things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking.” The divine self contemplation excludes everything that 
is not God. God in Aristotle exists apart and lives in isolation. See Met, XII, 9, 1074
b
 15-23, 29-34. Again, 
because the pure act is the most excellent of things, it is the most desirable and because it is the most 
desirable, its relation to the cosmos in Aristotelian metaphysics is not in the mode of efficient causality. 
The cosmos relates to pure act only in the manner of finality. Indeed, God in Aristotelian philosophical 
theology does not know a world he did not create. This is contrary to the Christian claim that the triune God 
is the creator, the life-giver, the sustainer, and redeemer of the world, as well as the eschatological end and 
consummation of the world; God is “the Alpha and the Omega, the First and the Last, the Beginning and 
the End” (Rev 22:13), for it is “in him we live and move and have our being” (Acts 17:28).  
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relationality or openness to the other outside itself. At best, the self-thinking-thought is 
deistic whose function is limited precisely to being the first/unmoved mover which 
ignites a series of other movers. Thus, Divinity’s relation to the world and humans was 
conceived in terms of mechanistic causality. From the outset, this conceptuality is 
irreconcilable with the Christian claim that God—whose self-communication or self-gift 
understood as grace which is a gracious and gratuitous non-object—is essentially 
relational and personal. As represented by both Plato and Aristotle, it is obvious that the 
Hellenistic depiction of the divine essentially entails unchangeability and impassibility.
8
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 It is important at this point to make some clarifications with regard to those inherited Hellenistic 
attributes used to qualify the divine, particularly, transcendence, immutability/perfection, impassibility, and 
omnipotence. I aim here to a re-conceptualization of these attributes in the light of recent scholarship. To 
begin with, William Placher, in his illuminating book, The Domestication of Transcendence, makes the 
case that it was modern (more precisely, seventeenth century) philosophers/theologians rather than 
medieval/neo-scholastic or classical theologians who domesticated transcendence. They Domesticated 
transcendence in the following ways: first, by their vigorous confidence and optimism about the capacity of 
human reason to comprehend God perfectly, and secondly, by their conceptualization of God as an utter 
otherness, radically different and unrelated to the created order; hence, their contrastive understanding of 
transcendence—saying that God is distant, remote, unaffected—and immanence, meaning that God is close 
and involved. See William C. Placher, The Domestication of Transcendence:How Modern Thinking about 
God Went Wrong(Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), 1- 17, especially chap. 7.  
While I concur with Placher that seventeenth century theology which shared the same epistemic back-
ground with modern philosophy was theistic, I do, however, have reservations on his position with regard 
to classical theism. It is fair to admit that classical theologians were aware that it was about the living God 
of the Bible that they attempted to make intelligible utilizing the Greek categories of Perfect Being, 
immutability, and necessity, and others. But it is also true that their “ passion for intelligibility meant, 
historically, an overemphasis upon the categories of nature and substance, a consciousness of cosmos to the 
neglect of history, a preference for the universal and the necessary over the individual and undetermined.” 
See William J. Hill, The Three-Personed God: The Trinity as a Mystery of Salvation (Washington, D.C.: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1982), 210. Indeed, there is no gainsaying the fact that medieval and 
classical theology so radicalized divine omnipotence and freedom as to turn God into a tyrant. This view 
was no more evident than in medieval Nominalism which “carried the idea of God’s omnipotence and 
freedom to an extreme, turning God into an absolutist deity who acts in an arbitrary manner.” See Kasper, 
The God of Jesus Christ, 17. Not surprisingly, it is this classical idea of God who is oppressive to human 
freedom that is in part, the presupposition for the revolt in modern thought to liberate the autonomy of 
subjectivity from the tyranny of theonomy. Of course, the conceptualization of omnipotence of deity was 
mirrored in the power of the one emperor, one church, one theology, one tradition, one Pope. Challenge to 
these hierarchies by way of alternative conceptualities was under penalty of death by burning on the stakes. 
To this extent, I maintain that classical theism is a fact.        
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 In current scholarship, there is a growing change of understanding with regard to the categories 
under consideration. Marcel Sarot in his breathtaking opus has not only carried out a fascinating research 
on God’s passibility but has also provided an intimidating bibliography on the subject and other 
concomitant issues. See Marcel Sarot, God, Passibility and Corporeality (Kampen, The Netherlands: Kok 
Pharos Publishing House, 1992). To begin with, it is important to make a distinction between impassibility 
and immutability. The term impassibility from the Latin “impassibilitas” or the Greek “apatheia,” 
originally means “incapable of being acted upon by an outside force.” On a little expansion, the meaning 
includes incapable of being acted upon either by an outside or inside force (Sarot, 26). This outside or 
inside force may include passions, feelings, suffering, etc. It is in this sense that impassibility is often seen 
as synonymous with immutability. Sarot, utilizing Vincent Brümmer’s conceptualities, nicely distinguishes 
between: being affected in a personal way and being causally influenced. Causal influence engenders a 
necessary reaction in that which is acted upon; e.g., causally influencing a bell to ring, or hypnotizing 
someone to carry out the hypnotist’s suggestion. But to affect someone in a personal way, even though such 
an affecting may be persuasive, the affected, to some extent, still has a choice as to the manner s/he allows 
herself/himself to be affected. Many passibilist theologians maintain that the second distinction, more than 
of humans, is true of God who is supremely master of himself. For passibilists, therefore, God can be 
influenced in a personal way only and never in a causal way since God can never be under causal constraint 
(27-9). For the advocates of this position to which I incline, God can be influenced by what happens in the 
world but only in a personal way, in that God remains master of his own reactions, as well as remains 
immutable in his nature, will, and knowledge. The passibilist position flies in the face of the classical ideals 
of apatheia and ataraxeia—which see certain experiences: suffering, sympathy, etc., as evil and as such, 
incompatible with the divine perfection (32). But it must be admitted that the passibilist ascription of such 
experiences to God is somehow by way of analogy or metaphor. An impassible God is not able to 
adequately express divine concern for his suffering creature. An impassible God is not capable of 
vulnerable love, because love involves vulnerability. Since a genuinely personal love is essentially 
sacrificial and costly, it is then difficult if not impossible to love in an invulnerable manner (156-9).  
Vulnerability entails “susceptibility to unpleasant and noxious experiences. A vulnerable person is not able 
or not willing to protect herself against these experiences, and is therefore easily wounded by them” (176). 
The “pathos” of the triune God entails God’s involvement in history and engagement in the plight of 
humanity. Such terms as “pathos” and “passio” are often combined with other terms to denote passibility in 
God: such terms include sym-patheia/sun-paschein – suffering with, em-patheia – sharing in another’s 
feelings or emotions, and compassio/compati – suffering with. William C. Placher in his Narratives of a 
Vulnerable God: Christ, Theology, and Scripture (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 
1994), captures the purpose served by divine impassibility in its Hellenistic context; it was the same 
meaning that was transposed into classical Christian theology. According to Placher, “Divine impassibility 
served two functions. It ruled out vulgar passions: no more rapes, no more private vengeance. At the same 
time, it preserved divine power. Part of what power…[means] is that one can affect others for good or ill 
but yet remain unthreatened by them, invulnerable. It is the most powerful ruler who is safe and secure 
from external threat…without any risks from outside. For God, then, impassibility guarantees 
omnipotence” (5). What is significant here is Placher’s notice of how impassibility was an expression of 
omnipotence. Such a powerful God was an utterly transcendent God, uninvolved in human predicament, 
lest he become passible, and whose power is for domination, and if need be, through violence.  
 But the Christian God of revelation, the Triune God, and the God who is encountered in the 
narratives of the Bible, is a God who is vulnerable in love (Ibid., 6-7), and a God whose power is manifest 
in weakness and self-giving, and not a power to dominate others. Thus, God is both transcendent and 
immanent and at the same time is beyond transcendence and immanence. God as the truly infinite is not 
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It was this Greek metaphysical legacy that the Christianity of the first six to thirteen 
centuries inherited to articulate the faith.        
 This inherited Hellenistic matrix was problematic for the patristic and medieval 
periods and remains so for modern theology. It is so when considered in light of the 
Christian claim that the God who revealed himself through Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit 
is, in fact, a personal God who is present to humans in the world and actively involved in 
their history. It became a matter of struggle for the patristic period to reconcile the 
discrepant Greek metaphysical presupposition and the Christian claim. This struggle in 
the patristic tradition came to a climax: “first in the creed of 325 confessing that the Son 
was ὁμοούσιος with the Father, secondly in the creed of 381 which then drew the 
conclusion from that first symbol and the subsequent debates about the Holy Spirit that 
God was a Trinity of Father, Son, and Spirit, and finally at Chalcedon in 451 where the 
doctrine of the two natures of Christ was affirmed.”9 It is historically obvious that the 
differing interpretations of the Hellenistic conceptualities employed by the councils and 
enshrined in the creeds have been church-dividing. In all these councils and creeds the 
Greek philosophical conceptuality, undoubtedly, provided a framework for articulating 
the Christian claim. Nevertheless, both traditions remained unreconciled.    
                                                                                                                                                 
simply the opposite of the finite but also transcends such opposition. God cannot just be fully 
conceptualized in the binarisms that have been constructed to comprehend him. God, in his self-
determination, out of love freely chooses his manner of relationality with humans. Granted, God is 
immutable by nature; however, in his freedom of self-determination, God personally and freely decides in 
love to be passible.In the God of revelation, what Christians encounter is not so much about ‘what” as 
about “who” God is. And God is Love; a communion of persons. See Hill, The Three-Personed God, 211. 
To claim that God is not passible is to deny freedom to God and to ascribe necessity to him as if God 
cannot freely choose to be vulnerable in love.    
      
9
 Bradford E. Hinze and D. Lyle Dabney, eds. Advents of the Spirit: An Introduction to the Current 
Study of Pneumatology (Milwaukee, Wisconsin: MarquetteUniversity Press, 2001), 13. 
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 It was not until the medieval epoch that a synthesis would be worked out. Some 
philosophers cum theologians of the medieval era readily employed the Platonic/ 
Aristotelian metaphysical categories for the construction of their theologies. This was 
achieved in Western theology starting earlier with Augustine of Hippo (using Platonism 
prior to the medieval era); others who furthered the synthesis include, Boethius, Anselm 
of Canterbury, Thomas Aquinas (using Aristotelianism proper), Duns Scotus, William of 
Occam, and others.
10
 But even with the forging of such synthesis, the Christian God was 
more or less posited as a philosophical postulate and not really as the personal, relational 
God of the Bible.         
 With this medieval synthesis between the Christian tradition and the Greek 
cultural and philosophical architectonic, the path was already charted for what would 
eventually emerge as classical neo-Scholastic theism. With its substance ontology and 
theism, neo-Scholasticism presented God as static rather than dynamic, as transcendent 
and almost uninvolved in and untouched by the world. In attempting to prove God’s 
existence, for instance, God became the Unmoved Mover, the Perfect Being, and Pure 
Simplicity with no room for complexity “whereas in the gospel the divine nature is 
essentially a dynamic communion of love and a transcendence capable of immanence by 
virtue of it.”11 Its preoccupation became the unity of “what” God is in his essence rather 
than “who” God is as revealed in the missions of the Son and the Spirit. Conceived as the 
Perfect Being, the Being of beings, the God of revelation was reduced to the god of 
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 See Ibid. 
      
11
 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1991), 21-
32, 61-79. See also François-Xavier Durrwell, Holy Spirit of God: An Essay in Biblical Theology, trans. 
Sister Benedict  Davies, O.S.U. (Cincinnati, Ohio: Servant Books, 2006), 21.  
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philosophy, hence, the emergence of ontotheology.
12
 Solicitous to preserve divine 
transcendence, neo-Scholastic ontology consequently espoused theistic rigidified 
dualisms like—supernatural-natural, sacred-profane, spirit-matter, soul-body, and so 
forth—as separate substances with no commonality whatsoever between them. But God’s 
relation with humans through Christ in the Spirit remains an en-worlded and embodied 
experience as Philip Clayton affirms.
13
 God is permanently pervading the universe. God 
in his freedom has radically permeated humanity in the mystery of the incarnation, the 
self-gift of God to the world. Thus, we can rightly talk of the humanity of God; God who 
exists, walks with, and is involved in the vagaries and sufferings of his people. God’s 
humanity is, indeed, “a radical affirmation of divine Self-definition as Deus pro 
nobis.”14In the neo-Scholastic substance framework, therefore, the Spirit stopped 
                                                 
      
12
 Jean-Luc Marion regards such ontotheological assumptions about the God of revelation as idolatrous 
and rather proffers the metaphor of icon for speaking about the disclosure of the divine. To speak of God in 
terms of Being as Being is delimiting and essentializing because God is beyond being or otherwise than 
being. See Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1995) and Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, 
trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1998). 
      
13
 Philip Clayton, “In Whom We Have our Being: Philosophical Resources for the Doctrine of the 
Spirit,” in Advents of the Spirit, 200.   
      
14
 Michael J. Scanlon, “Trinity and Transcendence” in Transcendence and Beyond: A Postmodern 
Inquiry, ed. John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 2007), 75. Also Karl Barth in his later writings realizes and emphasizes the importance of the 
“humanity of God” for us which was more or less discounted in his earlier works where he feared the 
magnification of human beings at the expense of God or the conflation of God with humanity, and thus, 
God confronts humanity as the totaliter aliter ‘totally other.’ Hence, his earlier theology was essentially 
dialectical. But in his mature theology, Barth starts with confession of faith in Jesus Christ the God-man as 
the basis of talk about God. In this way, Barth came to understand the failure of his dialectical theology to 
comprehend God in the sense that who God is does not consist in his being totally other but rather in his 
being for humanity; that “the divinity of the living God has its meaning and power only in the context of his 
history and of his dialogue with humanity, and therefore in his togetherness with humanity.” Thus, “god’s 
divinity rightly understood includes his humanity.” See Karl Barth, The Humanity of God, trans. John 
Newton Thomas and Thomas Wieser (London: Collins, 1961); Badcock, Light of Truth and Fire of 
Love,172-175; also Eberhard Jüngel speaks of God as essentially relational and radically involved in the 
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speaking to human embodied experiences.       
 Since for Plato, matter/body was considered the prison of the spirit from which 
the spirit ceaselessly seeks release; and for Aristotle, matter was considered the principle 
of individuation and hence, of numerical plurality, and therefore, inferior, then God must 
have nothing to do with bodiliness since God must be viewed as pure simplicity. It is 
against such a backdrop that the divine, especially in the late medieval period became 
over-spiritualized, over-intellectualized, and indeed, platonized. Since how we conceive 
God also affects how we view ourselves, it is not surprising that the epoch in question 
depicted the person as “individua substantia naturae rationalis,” (an individual substance 
of a rational nature). This is the Boethian definition of person. In this understanding, 
person was divorced from relationality and salvation was limited to saving rational souls 
rather than the human person. The imago Dei was construed as present only in the human 
soul since God could not be identified with matter or body. That this is unsurprising is 
also partly because of the Western religious heritage which witnesses a bifurcation of 
thought/intellect and feeling/affectivity, theology (neo-Scholastic) and piety, spiritual 
experience and reflective tradition. English theologian, Sarah Coakley poignantly 
captures the situation in the later medieval period, precisely, in the fourteenth century:   
there was a discernible, and tragic, disjunction occurring between intellect- 
 ual, scholastic approaches to God on the one hand, and pietistic feeling-and 
 -body-oriented approaches on the other. This was carried over in a different 
 way into theories of prayer, so that, for instance, ‘contemplation’ could be 
 construed either as the pure ‘intellect’ communing with God or, quite differ- 
 ently, as a deliberate shutting down of the mind in favour of the will or ‘affe-
                                                                                                                                                 
world. See Eberhard Jüngel, The Doctrine of the Trinity: God’s Being is in Becoming (Edinburgh: Scottish 
Academic Press, 1976). 
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 ctivity.’ In a variety of ways piety and theology were being rent apart in the  
 West.
15
 
 
The observations of Coakley only confirm the ossified theistic dualisms of neo-
Scholastic theology especially between body and spirit. The human body and its 
passions were seen as inimical to the spirit, as evil, and inclined to iniquity, and hence, 
not a dimension of God’s involvement because inferior to the spirit.16 But Christian 
experience and practice indicate the contrary. In the communion of the church the Spirit 
has already effectuated a unity of the divine and the human, the inner and the outer, soul 
and body. This is most exemplified in the Eucharist, the other sacraments and practices 
of the church. The task of theology is to discern, follow, reflect upon, and clarify this 
antecedent action of the Spirit with the awareness that neither the church nor theology 
constructs or constitutes this communion or unity. On the contrary, just about the same 
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 Sarah Coakley, “Charismatic Experience: Praying in the Spirit,” in The Holy Spirit: Classic and 
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2009), 72-3. 
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the Fall (his lapsus), construes the body as fallen which can only be elevated through grace. This ideal of 
moderating and mortifying the body is well exemplified in monastic ascetic traditions. But it is the case that 
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the Church, 2
nd
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time in the Eastern Orthodox tradition, Gregory Palamas was championing the defense 
“of ‘hesychast’ practices…defending the use of the body in prayer and effecting in the 
East an extraordinary and unexpected synthesis (emphasis original) of ‘affective’ and 
‘intellectual’ traditions of prayer in that context, [while] the West was busy driving a 
wedge between them.”17 Palamas understands the need to view the human person more 
holistically. Since for the West, the spiritual or intellectual dimension trumped the 
corporeal, God was associated with the soul or spiritual aspect instead of the whole 
person. Again, in the Orthodox tradition, the question of iconography remains prevalent. 
This tradition recognizes the fact that divine activities and realities are always mediated. 
Thus icons become the possible material means and symbols through which the divine 
self is personally communicated in the Spirit and as such the pledge of our 
sanctification.
18
 All in all, the nature of the revelation of the Triune God does not call for 
such sclerotic dualisms that have plagued Western theistic theology.   
1.2.2 The Subordination of the Spirit      
 More than anything else, theism as described above was the matrix that 
undergirded Christian theological discourse on the Triune God spanning from the 
medieval era, the Reformation through the modern period. In the wake of the 
Reformation and in the Post-Tridentine theology, the Spirit was not only assimilated into 
Logos (Christology), subordinated to the mission of the Son, but also confined to the 
margins of ecclesiastical juridicism. Granted, the Spirit is self-effacing, in the sense that 
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rather than drawing attention to the self, the Spirit always reveals Christ and his work 
culminating in the glory of the Father. To be sure, this type of conception of the Spirit 
has led many a theologian both past and present to neglect the characteristic proprium 
and person of the Spirit. It is this tendency that has more often than not, led to what 
Yves Congar describes as the christologization
19
 of the Spirit with a consequent 
disavowal of the Spirit’s autonomy. Besides, by revealing Christ, and through Christ 
revealing the Father, the Spirit reveals the Spirit as the means or medium of revelation. 
It is in the light and transparency of the Spirit that we see the Son and the Father. There 
has also been a propensity to conflate the Spirit with the glorified Christ. Admittedly, 
intimations of this tendency are present in the Scripture, for example, the Pauline 
references to Christ as the last Adam who has become a life-giving spirit (cf. 1 Cor 
15:45); “the Lord is spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom” ( 2 Cor 
3: 17), and “the Lord who is spirit” (1 Cor 3: 18). The seeming identification of the 
glorified Christ and the Spirit is, as Congar puts it, “functional, that is to say, it is an 
operative unity.”20 It is not ontological, since both Christ and Spirit have their distinct 
identities (hypostaseis) though inseparably and mutually related. No doubt, the Spirit is 
the Spirit of the Lord, the Spirit of the Son (Gal 4:6), and the Spirit of Christ (Rom 8:9; 
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Phil 1:19). At the same time, Jesus is also of the Spirit, not only in his conception, but 
also in his messianic activity and in his being raised to the quality of ‘Lord.’21 Indeed, 
Christ and the Spirit, as Scriptures attest to, are always inseparably linked together but 
should not be confused. In the words of Walter Kasper, “the famous formula: ‘The Lord 
is the Spirit’ (2 Cor 3:17) means that the Spirit is the effective mode of presence and the 
present effectiveness of the exalted Lord in the Church and in the World.”22 The Spirit 
continues to make the exalted Christ present without being identical with him.   
 Central to the pneumatological crisis in Western theology is the fact that the Spirit 
was not studied in the Spirit’s own personhood. Indeed, during this long history of 
subordination, the Spirit had come to be known as the “silent” or “shy” member of the 
Trinity.
23
 As Kilian McDonnell puts it, “pneumatology…was… constructed in…[a] 
way…that not even the available biblical witness was utilized and [as such] no real 
theological reflection took place. Divine life and revelation were all bound to the 
Logos.
24
 Thus, as much as possible, “one should not tie pneumatology to Christology in 
such a manner as to deprive the Spirit of a proper, specific personhood and function.”25 
The eclipse of the distinct identity and autonomy of the relational Spirit meant 
fundamentally the obliteration of difference, the consequences of which are historically 
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obvious.          
 With regard to ecclesiastical juridicism the Spirit merely functioned as a 
guarantee of magisterial teachings while enabling the religious assent of Christians to 
such teachings. Indeed, at some point, it appeared the Spirit and the function of the Spirit 
were supplanted and overshadowed by the Pope, the Eucharist, and the Virgin Mary.
26
 
In this perspective, the Spirit was perceived to be under the authority of the church; the 
Pope rather than the Holy Spirit became the source of church unity, and the Eucharist 
was simply confected by the power of the priest and the pronunciation of the words of 
institution devoid of epiklesis. Ecclesiastical juridicism, as Donald L. Gelpi has 
succinctly expressed, “attempts to direct the action of the Spirit into channels that are 
socially proper and canonically acceptable to ecclesiastical bureaucrats [and rigidified 
structures]; but it ends by stifling Spirit consciousness in predictable religious routines. 
[It domesticates]…the divine and…[keeps] it within the realm of the familiar, the 
predictable, and the controllable.”27 Consequently, the neglect of the Spirit who is the 
source of unity and communion amounted to the obliteration of difference by reducing 
otherness to the regime of sameness. And since at the time, there was intimate 
identification of church and state, equality-in-difference degenerated into a calcified 
uniformity. The idea of diversity and plurality in the one church was lost and, as a result, 
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the theology of the local church was lost until rediscovered by Vatican II.
28
 A particular 
Western inculturated Christianity and local theology and epistemology, became 
absolutized and exported to all parts of the planet as the only form normal for all. 
Abstract speculations grounded in Greek foundationalism that ended only in concepts 
with no bearing to quotidian lived reality became the stock-in-trade. The Christian 
confession became distanced from the tensions that form the fabric of existential 
situations and contextual experiences. Since Europe was predominantly Christian at the 
time, European humanity, Christianity, history, and indeed, Eurocentricism came to be 
viewed as normative—not only as the quintessential humanity as such— but also as the 
apex of universality and historicity.        
 Western epistemological framework (which undergirds Western theology) lays 
claim to totality as universality. Such a claim is traceable to Plato’s epistemological 
construal as anamnesis.
29
 For Plato, every particular knowledge comes merely as a 
recollection of its universal which is eternal, immutable, absolute, and transcendent, and 
of which only a certain category of people capable of the highest exercise of reason, can 
grasp. This view holds that the experience of a particular perception only recalls to mind 
its universal since all knowledge is already immanent in oneself; and therefore, one 
always already knows in advance all that one intends to know. Knowledge as episteme is 
absolute as opposed to doxa which is the realm of opinions. In this sense, there is no 
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room for newness or spontaneity. Newness is suppressed to fit into the regime of the 
already known categories so that all will be just the same. Even when alterity, otherness, 
or difference is recognized, it is always only in order to possess, suppress, or incorporate 
it within the empire of sameness.
30
 There is no room for genuine encounter with the 
other since the other is always condemned to objectification in order to be appropriated. 
This is tantamount to totalization because the subject/self or sameness objectifies and 
assimilates every other thing but is itself not open to receiving or learning anything from 
outside that it does not or cannot know or have. This dualistic framework between the 
‘same and the other’ is inimical to the operations of the Spirit who blows spontaneously 
wherever, whenever, and however the Spirit wills; it is destructive of equality-in-
difference, communion, creativity, and hence, of relationality. Such dualism 
domesticates the Spirit in a manner quite contrary to the Pauline injunction: “Do not 
stifle the Spirit” (1 Thess 5:16).       
 As stated earlier, the abstract speculations of the Schoolmen using Hellenistic 
conceptual framework imprisoned God in concepts with no real relation to reality. 
Indeed, at the time in question, abstract concepts were taken for reality. This easily 
brings to mind the issue of the well known controversy in the later medieval era between 
Nominalism
31and Realism. According to Kasper, “Nominalism carried the idea of God’s 
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omnipotence and freedom to an extreme, turning him into an absolutist deity who acts in 
an arbitrary manner.”32 It is this idea of God that is rebelled against in subsequent 
modern thought. The architectonic of modernity was, therefore, poised to dethrone this 
arbitrary God in order to liberate the subject’s freedom, autonomy, and thus legitimate 
self-legislation and self-assertion. Modern thought got rid of nominalists’ preoccupation 
with conceptualism and replaced it with a concentration on the human subject and 
subjectivity. It is a revolt against “an overwhelming transcendence that enslaves human 
beings, as well as against ecclesiastical structures that had become rigid, reactionary, 
and repressive.”33 Theism as articulated by neo-Scholasticism was pushed up to the hilt 
by the Enlightenment and modern philosophers. The said philosophers no longer saw 
any relevance in the explanation of reality through the mode of such abstractions which 
by default severed the relation between the natural and the supernatural. It may not be 
far from the truth to say that the dualism and theism of the neo-Scholastic epoch became 
the seedbed of the agnosticism, atheism, and the imperial ideology that characterized 
modernity. Indeed, scholars like J. B. Metz, M. Weber, K. Löwith, and a host of others 
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suggest that modern secularism is the consequence of Christianity;
34
 that the 
transcendent conception of God/Spirit as separated from the world paved the way for an 
immanentistic worldly conception of the world. The issues that have been x-rayed so far 
are not to be viewed as a polemic against medieval and neo-scholastic substance 
theology. The point is rather to indicate its inadequacies in order to characterize a 
theology that is more relevant and more adequate to our contemporary situation. Above 
all, it is to point out how such theology also prepared the way for what would eventually 
emerge as domination of the “other” by the “same” under the disguise of civilization 
with the collusion of Christianity in the making of the modern/colonial world system.     
1.3 Dialectical Philosophy, Europeandom, and the Modern/Colonial  
    World System 
           
 The dialectical philosophies of history which dominated the discourse of 
difference from the time of European expansionism through the second half of the 
twentieth century did not emerge from a vacuum. Rather the way was already prepared 
for them by the medieval vision of reality and the sterile Scholastic/neo-Scholastic 
abstractions and conceptualism.
35
 These dialectical philosophies which shaped the 
ontology and epistemology of the said centuries got stuck in the dualisms they created. 
To a large measure, this was because they lacked the capacity to sustain the dialectic 
without letting it collapse into absolutism, normativity, or homogenization. Some 
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distinguished moments of this dialectical landscape include: the theistic contentions of 
Descartes, Voltaire, Rousseau, Hume, Kant, and Hegel; the positivism and socio-cultural 
evolutionism of Auguste Comte, M. Schlick, Herbert Spencer; and the proponents of 
African primitivism—primitive native and primitive monotheism—such as Placide 
Tempels. In what follows, we shall establish how such philosophies furnished a powerful 
rhetorical device that served the justification for colonialism and slavery in which the 
Western church to a large extent colluded with the state. We shall focus here on R. 
Descartes, D. Hume, I. Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, A. Comte, H. Spencer, and P. Tempels as 
representative of this development.        
1.3.1 René Descartes        
 With the groundwork of the severance of the supernatural from the natural already 
hatched out in neo-Scholastic theology, if anything, by default, it remains only for 
modern philosophers to stretch it to its logical conclusion. Descartes (1596-1650) 
subjects the medieval foundation (authority) of knowledge to a methodic doubt in order 
to establish another basis that is clear and distinct. He registers his dissatisfaction with the 
medieval sterile abstractions and numinous conception of reality. He regards such basis 
for knowledge (which he captures in the metaphor of the evil genius – genius malignus) 
as deceptive and incapable of guaranteeing certainty. While doubting the apparent 
deceptions of the body (senses)—which for him means everything that has the quality of 
magnitude or extension—Descartes comes to the conclusion that the only thing that 
affords him clarity and certainty is consciousness. From this, Descartes devises his 
famous axiom “Cogito ergo sum” (I think therefore I am). In this way, Descartes 
radicalizes the medieval substance ontology not only by an exhaustive dualism between 
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res extensa and res cogitans but also between religion and science. With the Cartesian 
mathematical style axiom, the immanence of consciousness with its innatism or 
nativism
36
 becomes the basis for knowing and explicating the corporeal world rather than 
the long held prejudices of sensory experience and doctrinal abstractions of the previous 
epochs. By asserting the self as primarily “a thinking being,”37 Descartes privileges the 
subject and subjectivity over every other consideration and foundation.
38
 Consequently, 
religion, ethics, the question of God and the Spirit come to be subject to the arbitration of 
the mind while being divorced from any causal relation to the material world. Put 
differently, the question of God and Spirit arises only within the compass of human 
subjectivity and interiority devoid of any reference to real objectivity.    
 As a matter of fact, having arrived at the certainty of the cogito, Descartes 
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examined a cluster of other ideas present in his mind with the hope of ascertaining other 
truths that possessed the same sort of clarity and distinctness as the cogito. One of such 
ideas in his mind was the idea of a supreme God who is eternal, perfect, immutable, 
infinite, omnipotent, omniscient, and creator of all things that exist apart from him.
39
 
Descartes’ idea of a perfect God is for the purpose of arguing that such a God is not 
deceptive since he must be immutable unlike other ideas that are prone to change and 
illusion. From this, Descartes infers that such a God must exist. Anchored on such sure 
foundation then, Descartes convinces himself that if he uses the faculties that this non-
deceptive God has given him accordingly, then, he (Descartes) will not be deceived. It is 
only from such an intramental certainty that Descartes is able to recover most of the 
extramental world. It is, therefore, from the perfect, immutable, and non-deceptive nature 
of God as conceived by Descartes that he is able to argue for the certainty of the world. 
 God as understood by Descartes surely becomes an idol of metaphysics just for 
the functional purpose of serving as the sure foundation of his whole system of scientific 
and certain knowledge.
40
 God is no longer seen as the Triune God who reveals God’s self 
at God’s own instance but only as God whose nature is clearly captured as perfect and in 
the concepts of subjectivity. Although, Descartes claims to have an idea of a perfect, 
infinite, and creator God, he ends up positing God as merely a guarantee for the certainty 
of the sensible world. The world comes to be explained mechanistically on the basis of its 
own immanentistic principles as perceived by subjectivity. The supernatural, including 
God and the spiritual, is completely other and has no commonality with such immanent 
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principles of the natural realm. Precisely because in Descartes the ens cogitans enjoys 
priority as opposed to the pre-Cartesian period when God was understood as Ens 
Subsistens (Self-sufficient Being) and the necessary ground of every ens non subsistens, 
God has been displaced and relegated to the ambience of pure thought. In both Descartes 
and post-Cartesian philosophy, both God as the Creator and the created world would 
remain to be understood only within and through the ambit of the cogito and purely as the 
content of human consciousness. Reduced to an element of the cogito (consciousness), 
God could no longer be considered the ultimate cause and explanation of the human sum 
and all of existence. Henceforth, modern philosophy became preoccupied with “beings 
qua content of consciousness and not qua existing independently of it.”41  In this way, the 
Triune God of revelation and faith, the hidden God, and the God who contains and 
pervades the whole world, is eclipsed. Invariably, the Cartesian claim to clear and distinct 
knowledge including the purported grasp of God’s perfect nature with precision, only 
amounts to the subject’s self positing, and ultimately, as Friedrich Nietzsche opines, will 
to power.            
 The Cartesian cogito thus lies at the explicit source of the autonomous 
individualism distinctive of the modern Western construal of person.  No doubt, this 
Western view of person is legitimate as it is based on particular contextual cultural 
experiences and philosophical assumptions. But then, it is only one perspective among 
others and its legitimacy does not grant it a claim to be the sole conception of person as 
eventually became the case. With the Cartesian radical catapulting of God and the 
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spiritual merely to the realm of the symbolic and the metaphoric with no real relation to 
the material world, Cartesianism is essentially suffused with Godlessness.
42
 In this radical 
conceptual framework, “the world becomes godless; God becomes worldless,”43 as 
Kasper vividly puts it. Henceforward, Religion and the God/Spirit-question would be 
reduced to a private matter of subjectivity, and would thus become superfluous in the 
coherent explication of the world, life, and reality.
44
 Henceforth, Western mentality 
informed by Cartesianism becomes associated with pure rationality and homogeneity; it 
imposes predictability and foreseeability upon reality. Since religious categories such as 
God/Spirit resist such predictability, such categories are relegated to the domain of 
subjectivity, irrationality, implausibility, and the exotic.
45
 In modernity the Holy Spirit 
matters little less than an empty promise and an intellectual construct, a by-product of 
mental fiction and fantasy. Without a doubt it is in part on this axis that the entire 
subsequent history of Western modern thought revolves. And where the question of 
God/Spirit is eclipsed, human beings easily become gods, and for that matter, tyrannical 
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Theology After Wittgenstein (Oxford and New York: Blackwell, 1986). 
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and oppressive gods as was witnessed by the succeeding centuries. With the Cartesian 
self positing of subjectivity, God becomes merely a sublimation or projection of the 
human subject in the philosophy of Feuerbach. But as has become obvious from the 
preceding section, the way was already paved for this autonomous self-positing of the 
modern subject way back in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.    
1.3.2 David Hume        
 Although Descartes, the father of modern Western rationalism locates the basis of 
knowledge in his theory of innatism, Hume (1711-1776), taking his cue from John Locke, 
the father of empiricism, situates the basis of knowledge in his theory of “impressions.”46 
Knowledge actually comes about by the association of different ideas arising from the 
impressions in the mind. This comes about due to the power of the mind to combine, 
compound, transpose, and augment the different ideas emanating from the impressions 
afforded us by the senses. For example, to think of a golden mountain for Hume is merely 
to combine two ideas, gold and mountain, ideas with which we are already acquainted. 
The exercise of mixing and composing reality thus belongs alone to the mind. Following 
this line of thinking, therefore, Hume asserts that, “the idea of God, as meaning an 
infinitely intelligent, wise, and good Being, arises from reflecting on the operations of our 
own mind, and augmenting, without limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom.”47 In 
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this way, God is no longer viewed as a supernatural reality but merely as a construction 
of the mind. And since the idea of Spirit appears abstract, faint, and obscure, all that one 
is required to do is to enquire from what impression the supposed idea is derived; and 
where it is impossible to assign any, then such an idea must be held suspect or to be 
erroneous. Hume holds that this manner of knowing is universal. It is important to note 
that the universality Hume refers to here is distinctive only of Europeans.   
 Thus, Hume maintains that some categories of people, because of their natural 
deficiency in terms of intelligence, may not be able to compose such ideas just as a blind 
man cannot form the idea of colors and a deaf man the idea of sound. But if you restore 
either of them the sense in which they are deficient, then they will be able to form the 
ideas. Extrapolating from this, Hume conceives negroes as naturally intellectually 
deficient and unable to form great and universal ideas. But what emerges to view is that 
once the Humean claim to universality is denied a certain group of people, then it is no 
longer universal. Hume writes in the footnote to his essay “On National Character”:  
I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to whites. There sca- 
 rcely ever was a civilized nation of that complexion, nor even any individu- 
 al eminent in action or speculation. No ingenious manufacturers, no arts, no 
 sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the whites…ha- 
 ve still something eminent about them…. Such a uniform and constant diff- 
 erence could not happen…if nature had not made original distinction betwixt  
 these breeds of men.
48
  
      
What is significant to note here is how this Humean philosophical framing of 
“difference” placed African humanity outside the realm of “normal” (European) 
humanity. Hume not only imposes his naïvely conceived notion of inferiority on 
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Africans, but what is even more absurd is his simplistic conclusion that the purported 
inferiority is natural. Armed with such conclusion, Hume holds that just like the blind 
man who can form universal ideas only by the healing and restoration of his deficient 
sense, so the negroes can become capable of intelligence only by conquest and 
colonialism. This type of philosophically formulated bias against Africans easily became 
the stock-in-trade within the circle of European modern philosophers. This marks the 
metaphysical negation of the difference, the identity, and humanity of the non-European 
“other.”              
1.3.3 Immanuel Kant        
 The Cartesian enthronement of subjectivity over and against all traditional 
authority and sources of knowledge, as well as the severance of the supernatural from 
the natural in the explanation of the constitution of the order of the world was further 
radicalized by Kant (1724-1804). While for Descartes, the principal philosophical 
question is subjectivity, for Kant, it becomes an epistemological question.  For Kant, the 
philosophical problem becomes: how does reality relate to the subjective processes of 
consciousness? In order to resolve this problem, Kant rejected both the rationalism of 
Descartes (including Leibniz and Spinoza) and the empiricism of Hume (including 
Locke and Berkeley). In their place, Kant rather sought a method that would guarantee 
the limits and use of reason. In his Critique of Pure Reason Kant challenged the 
possibility of human reason knowing noumenal realities, or Ding an sich, the “thing-in-
itself” such as the existence and nature of God, the immortality of the soul, and freedom. 
According to him, human reason can only know phenomena. Devising his famous 
Copernican revolution as a strategy to move beyond the problems of metaphysics, Kant 
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compares his own anthropocentricism in philosophy and Copernicus’ heliocentricism in 
astronomy.
49
           
 According to Kant then, human experience and reasoning are limited to 
phenomena. But knowledge of phenomena is obtained not simply through sense 
perception. Kant holds that the human mind possesses a priori structures (that is, 
logically prior to the materials they synthesize and unify) which constitute the necessary 
components of the human mind. These synthetic a priori forms not only synthesize and 
unify the data of sense, they, in fact, constitute the necessary conditions of experience, 
and are valid in experience only. Since their validity is confined to experience only, 
these a priori structures cannot be applied to objects transcending experience. Since to 
be known is to appear in consciousness, noumenal reality cannot be known by pure 
reason. Kant’s critical philosophy disavowed the possibility of metaphysics. The 
intuition of God cannot be given in sense perception since the idea of God cannot be 
given in cognition a priori. Therefore, such noumenal realities as God and Spirit, 
likewise other metaphysical concepts, are rationally unknown and unknowable by pure 
reason. Since it is possible to think what is not known or knowable, noumena are 
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thought but not known.
50
 The notion of God, for Kant, can only be posited by practical 
reason in order to guarantee the ground for moral discourse. The Kantian understanding 
of the “practical” merely associates the Spirit with a cipher for enabling the engagement 
of moral and spiritual valuation. The result becomes an autonomous morality grounded 
on subjective convictions with no reference to the reality of the objectivity of God’s 
being. Reality as such no longer has any relation to God except only as it is posited by 
the aprioristic categories of the human mind. For Kant, the question of God or the Spirit 
is a sterile and dull discourse. Hence, the Spirit of God was domesticated and simply 
reduced to human consciousness as a cipher for guaranteeing the religio-ethical ideals of 
the Kantian kingdom of ends and universal brotherhood of man. With the elimination of 
God from rational discourse, the Cartesian cogito becomes the Kantian autonomous self-
legislating subject who legislates for himself or herself (and not dependent on any 
outside source of verity, lest there be heteronomy) universal and universalizable 
categorical imperatives. The point being made here is not that Kant’s categorical 
imperatives are non-rational. Rather, it is that, for Kant, they are allegedly purely 
rational (that is, based on rationality qua rationality), disengaged from any concrete 
tradition, delocalized, and having a zero-point neutrality and objectivity for every 
rational subject. But it remains a truism that this Kantian perspective is necessarily 
grounded in the tradition of liberalism. As such, it is not really free-floating as Kant is 
wont to suggest. With Kant as with Descartes, the certainty of truth no longer depends 
upon the relation and interaction between things and the subject but upon the structures 
of consciousness and the mind. American Ethicit, Stanley Hauerwas captures the 
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ramifications of the situation when he writes: “Ethics now becomes an autonomous area 
of human behavior that can be distinguished from religion and etiquette. Just as we can 
only know X or Y is true insofar as we are able to divorce our knowing from any 
concrete tradition, so morality can only be a correlative of an account of rationality qua 
rationality.”51 Indeed, with Kant, ethics or morality must now be relegated to the space 
of the autonomous. By the same token, religion (and, therefore, God/Spirit-talk) is 
henceforth relegated to the domain of the private.       
 With the Kantian anthropologization of metaphysics and autonomous morality, 
the human subject becomes properly the “homo mensura.”52 Without doubt the 
beginning point of Kant’s categorical imperative is the dignity and freedom of the 
human person. The imperative is expressed in two forms. The first is: “Act only 
according to a maxim by which you can at the same time will that it shall become a 
universal law.”53 And the second is: “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, 
whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but 
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always at the same time as an end.”54 To be sure, these Kantian categorical imperatives 
seem to give due priority to the human person in the moral order, in the social 
intercourse with others. It goes without saying, however, that these Kantian maxims 
were merely formalistic and good only de jure. De facto in concrete existential situation, 
the maxims with their orchestration of one’s freedom and that of others who should 
never be treated as means to an end but as ends in themselves, fell flat in Kant’s 
discourse on race. The scope of the humanity which should be treated with dignity and 
respect, whether in one’s own person or in the person of any other appears in Kant to be 
limited to only European humanity.       
 With the enthronement of the Kantian autonomous subject, the self-legislating 
individual universalizes his interior cognitions and imposes them on the other outside of 
himself. Small wonder Nietzsche unmistakably declares the death of God
55
 as a mark of 
the decadence of both modernity and Christianity. Truly, along with the “death of God” 
also comes the death of humanity and its inalienable rights and freedom, as well as the 
obliteration of difference. The purported Kantian (Western) universal rationality became 
the yardstick and the norm for judging others who are different. Hume who Kant 
acknowledges as the one who woke him from his dogmatic slumber is directly appealed 
to by Kant in his discourse on race. Thus Kant asserts that “so fundamental is the 
difference between the two races of men (following Hume who claims that negroes are 
naturally inferior to whites), and it appears to be as great in regard to mental capacities 
                                                 
      
54
 Ibid., 271. 
      
55
 For more on the death of God, see Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, ed. W. Kaufmann (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1974); Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 
1966). 
  
33 
 
as in color.”56 For Kant, therefore, a clear proof of the evidence of rational capacity or 
the lack of it becomes skin color (white or black).
57
 In keeping with this particular 
Western conception of universal rationality, the position of Kant further justifies 
colonialism and slavery on the grounds of the supposed inferiority of negroes to whites. 
Kant’s claim that, “I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my 
maxim should be become a universal law,” proves duplicitous since he (Kant) would not 
wish that anyone should dehumanize him.          
1.3.4 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel      
 In the wake of classical theism culminating in modern philosophical theism which 
introduced a hiatus between the supernatural and the natural, Hegel (1770-1831) comes 
on board to once again recover the question of spirit (Geist) and spirit-language. He 
actually sees himself at the explicit beginning of a shift from substance ontology which 
dominated the medieval and early modern period to a philosophy of spirit. Hegel is said 
to be the first to characterize his philosophical approach as a phenomenology. He 
realizes this by conceptualizing reality not as “Being-in-Itself” (as substance) but as 
“Being-for-Itself” (as Absolute Spirit). In his magnum opus, The Phenomenology of 
Spirit, Hegel asserts:   
everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as Substan- 
 ce, but equally Subject…. Further, the living Substance is being which is in 
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 truth Subject, or, what is the same, is in truth actual only insofar as it is the 
 movement of positing itself, or is the mediation of its self-othering with itself.
58
 
     
Hegel thus conceives being as Geist and as movement which posits itself, becoming 
other with itself or as a relation to itself. The contour of this movement is a triadic 
dialectic between thesis and antithesis which resolves itself in a synthesis, and which in 
turn becomes another thesis. The dialectic moves from identity to the negation of that 
identity, then to a negation of the negation at which point the Spirit achieves a synthetic 
reconciliation. In this unfolding movement, Spirit posits itself in each moment towards 
its goal of becoming the Absolute Spirit. In the different moments of Spirit’s unfolding 
movement, every reality becomes a self-expression or manifestation of Spirit.
59
 The 
Absolute Spirit—which is the highest synthesis—is the apex and fullest expression of 
Spirit’s movement in relating to or becoming itself. The Hegelian Spirit thus becomes 
the necessary ontological unification of all reality and the ultimate principle of all 
rationality. Because all reality is the necessary expression or unfolding of the Absolute 
Spirit, according to Hegel’s conceptualization, then, even creation becomes a necessary 
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creation. Again, because everything eventually becomes the Absolute Spirit, the 
Hegelian spirit is totalizing and assimilating.
60
 This Hegelian position representing the 
height of the articulation of German Idealism
61
 is problematic on further examination.
 In a move from Kantian subjectivity to history, Hegel extrapolated from his Spirit 
philosophical concept and applied it to his understanding of history and humanity. Hegel 
sees history and humanity as the phenomenal dialectic of the self unfolding and 
expression of Geist within consciousness. For Hegel then, European humanity, culture, 
and historicity constitute the highest and fullest phenomenal manifestation of Weltgeist 
(world-spirit and world-historical process). European humanity becomes not only 
universal but the avatar and the norm of humanity as such. This Hegelian view, as 
Kirsteen Kim rightly suggests: “tended to tie the Spirit to Western civilization as 
representing the best ethical standards, the most developed consciousness, and the 
highest reaches of human development.”62 The movement of the Spirit was not 
considered to be evidenced in cultures other than the European. Understood in this light, 
different categories or species of humanity other than the European came to be depicted 
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as sub-human. In his Lectures on Philosophy of History,
63
 Hegel placed Africa outside 
the historical beginning of the unfolding of Geist. Since the movement of spirit also 
entails the unfolding of rationality, and since Africans are outside of the history of spirit, 
Africans were thus depicted as lacking in rational thought and moral conduct, as 
cannibals with no laws, and as enmeshed in fetishism. Moreover, since European culture 
and humanity become the highest manifestation of Geist—which itself is essentially and 
necessarily totalizing and assimilating of everything in its unfolding movement—then 
colonial and capitalist expansionism becomes the logical necessity for the actualization 
of the purported universal European historicity and humanity.     
 Indeed, in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Right, Hegel silhouettes in detail the 
theoretical architectonic that serves the justification and explication of colonialism as the 
ineluctable outcome of the unfolding of spirit in history (European, of course).
64
 
Because Africans have been depicted as irrational, it is unsurprising that Hegel denies 
them rights as he clearly points out: “the civilized nation (and by this, Europe) is 
conscious that the rights of the barbarians (Africans) are unequal to its own and treats 
their autonomy as only a formality.”65 By thus negating at the metaphysical level the 
cultural difference and humanity/historicity of the non-European African other, Europe 
is able to posit the particularity and specificity of its own culture, historicity, and thus its 
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own humanity as the ideal one. Whereas Europe represented itself as the ideal of 
rationality and its understanding of spirit (God) as the only possible way, irrationality 
and savagery, primitivism and fetishism were philosophically projected unto Africa. 
Whereas Africans are demonized as half-devils and denigrated as half-children, Africa 
then required the putative civilizing and Christianizing colonialism of European soldiers 
and missionaries to dominate it, exorcise it, impose order, law, and morality, and bring 
the child to maturity using the European as the norm of human existence as such. For 
Hegel, Africans as sub-humans deserved to be enslaved in order to benefit them by 
cross-pollinating them with European rationality, culture, and morality. The negation of 
the humanity and the cultural difference of the African other aptly capture the violence 
and oppressiveness that characterized the colonial, capitalist, and missionary expansion 
of Europe.           
 All in all, Hegel’s attempt to recover spirit philosophically veered toward 
dialecticism which degenerated into the abstraction of absolute spirit and with the 
dialecticism collapsing into totalization and domination of the other. The absolutization 
of European humanity and historicity constitute a certain form of idolatry. Such idolatry 
entails the absolutization of a finite reality―European humanity, nation, race, and so 
forth. As Kasper notes: “Such an absolutization…does in fact by its nature lead to 
morally reprehensible actions and to the alienation not only to human beings from God 
but of human beings from one another and of the individual from himself.”66 This 
Hegelian construal became recycled among many subsequent European philosophers 
who simply reinstated and re-inscribed it without much originality.    
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1.3.5 Auguste Comte        
 The revolution began by Descartes to account for the natural world with no causal 
relation to God found expansion in later positivist and evolutionary theories. Auguste 
Comte devised positivism as a rational and scientific foundation for ethics and social 
system. Of particular interest to us here is Comtean social philosophy. Comte conceives 
that in the development of social and political organization, humans have to go through 
three stages which he identifies as: the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive. 
Accordingly, during the theological stage, humans on account of their ignorance and 
haste to organize society based their first moral order and social discipline on a 
theological explication of the universe by referring the constitution of nature to a supreme 
Creator of the world. For Comte, the trajectory of the theological is from Fetishism to 
Polytheism and then to Monotheism. Comte views this contour from Fetishism through 
Polytheism to Monotheism as really the gradual withdrawal of theological explication of 
the universe to pave way for a more general and abstract approach—the metaphysical. 
Metaphysical abstractions which were taken to be real entities thus substituted the 
theological transcendent explanation of the universe. But for Comte, even the 
metaphysical was merely disguising the abandonment of all transcendent explanations 
whatsoever, while charting the course for the burgeoning strength of positive science for 
positive explanations of the universe. Comte concludes that in the existing order of the 
universe, the cause of phenomena is not supernatural but natural. Thus, God, the Spirit, 
and the spiritual no longer have any relation to the material world. To backtrack a little 
bit, in the Comtean exposition of the theological stage, certain so-called races were 
identified as belonging to that milieu. Particularly, Comte says: “we are not aware that in 
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any tribe of savages or negroes who have been observed, Fetishism has been found 
totally unmixed with polytheism, and it is probable that the two coexisted from the 
earliest period.”67 Thus, in his social philosophy, Comte conceives that society courses 
through a certain trajectory from: magic through religion to positive science; from 
promiscuity through matrilineal to patrilineal system of family, and from savagery 
through barbarism to civilization.The enormous influence of this Comtean view of the so-
called “savages” on later Western philosophers, colonizers, anthropologists, and even 
Christian missionaries, cannot be overemphasized.      
1.3.6 Herbert Spencer       
 Spencer revolutionized sociology through the extension of Charles Darwin’s 
evolutionary theory. Taking Darwin and the intellectual climate of the late mid-
nineteenth century as his point of departure, Spencer posits that the “law determining the 
effects of contact of species [both intra and inter], races, varieties [and so forth,] among 
many animals may be summed up under the formula of ‘the struggle for life [existence] 
and the survival of the fittest.’”68 Spencer was the first to use the expression “the survival 
of the fittest” and applied it to social evolution.69 Although, Darwin may have had a 
socio-political agenda in his theory of evolution, he concentrated more on biological 
evolution.  It was Spencer and his cronies who, however, popularized what in the middle 
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of the nineteenth century came to be known as social Darwinism which played a very 
significant part, and not without unparalleled but unfortunate ramifications, in the history 
of social and political ideas. Spencer transposed the evolutionary concept of adaptation 
from biology to sociology. He agrees with Darwin that the relationship between 
organisms (predators and preys) in the light of the availability of the means of subsistence 
and the condition of the environment was an incessant cause of mutual adaptation which 
produced improvements in senses and organs.
70
 In this struggle and rivalry for resources 
between organisms which engender adaptation and the growth of organs, the organisms 
that fail to adapt or improve their organs face extinction by natural selection, whereas 
“successful modifications were inherited by subsequent generations, leading to 
cumulative and progressive development.”71      
 Just like all organisms, Spencer conceives warfare as analogous to predation 
among animals with the potential of engendering the survival of the fittest and the 
strongest. Although violent aggression and warfare between societies were not to be 
permanent, they evolve into what Spencer calls the industrial war which, nevertheless, 
sustains the survival of the fittest: “after this stage [of violent aggression] has been 
reached, the purifying process, continuing still an important one, remains to be carried on 
by industrial war – by a competition of societies during which the best, physically, 
emotionally, and intellectually, spread most, and leave the least capable to disappear 
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gradually.”72 In this way, Spencer constructed two distinct models of human interaction 
in the process of social organization in the world—the militant and the industrial—and 
both of which are the by-products of the distinct stages of the evolving human nature.
73
 
According to his conception of the different stages of human evolution, Spencer 
distinguished between the higher race and the lower race, with the former always 
assuming control because advanced and superior and the latter always subordinated 
because inferior, and like savages, remained fixed at primitive evolutionary levels. 
Spencer characterized the so-called lower and primitive race with the traits of a child. 
The members of the barbarous race, due to their rudimentary moral and intellectual 
capabilities had no concept of abstract ideas including any conception of truth, while their 
imagination is but poorly developed.
74
 Thus, the so-called negro race was conceived as 
still in childhood and, hence, constitutionally incapable of looking after itself as it has not 
yet learned to walk alone in the paths of civilization.
75
 These characters of the lower race, 
like the negro, which indicate that it is at the primitive or early stage of evolution, warrant 
that slavery was appropriate for its subordination. Spencer opined that for the continued 
survival of the higher race, war, brute force, and aggression were required to facilitate the 
creation of larger social units through conquest and slavery to benefit the higher race. 
Thus, through force, smaller groups were to be wielded into larger tribes and the latter 
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into small, and then large, nations. These developments were also to engender the 
expansion of morality which Spencer claims the savages are incapable of in the first 
place.
76
 From the foregoing, it is obvious to see how the construction of Social 
Darwinism has been harnessed as an expository device to justify imperialist ideological 
policies that have oppressed, marginalized, and negated the humanity, cultural difference, 
and historicity of the African other.         
1.3.7 Placide Tempels        
 In 1945, Father Placide Tempels, a Belgian missionary who worked for many 
years in the Democratic Republic of Congo wrote a book entitled Bantu Philosophy.
77
 
Tempels’ aim was to furnish the colonial rulers and missionaries with an understanding 
of indigenous African “philosophy.” Equipped with such an understanding, he hoped it 
would be easier to implant the missionary message and civilizationary project right into 
the subjectivity and interiority of Africans in a more sustainable fashion. Tempels’ work 
is thus predominantly an exposition of the Baluba (an ethnic group in Congo) ontology 
which grounded and regulated the daily ethical, political, economic, and religious 
existence of Baluba Africans. Although, one of Tempels’ objectives was to enable the 
success of European colonial missionary and civilisational enterprise in Africa, his work 
holds great significance for African thought specifically his use of “philosophy” (ethno-
philosophy) to characterize African ontology.  Tempels conceived the Bantu world as 
undergirded by “vital-force” which can be strengthened or diminished. The Bantu’s daily 
struggle appears to be to overcome other forces that may diminish this vital force.  
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 As it has become obvious from the preceding sections, nearly all European 
philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists, and even ecclesiastics spoke of Africans in 
terms of savage mentality, incapability of rational thought, and a lack of moral content.  
Others managed to speak of primitive thought that is permanently fixed at the lowest rung 
of the evolutionary scale. In his groundbreaking book, Tempels spoke, however, of 
philosophy, a term which to the Western mind symbolizes the highest exercise of reason. 
The book’s title by default amounted to an admission of the existence of an African 
reason; and by inference, the existence of an African humanity. However, since Tempels 
could not completely extricate himself from the intellectual climate of the time, he only 
recognized African Traditional Religion (hereafter ATR) as some form of primitive 
monotheism. This recognition is very much akin to the Comtean sense of paving way for 
something higher and better.
78
 Valentin Mudimbe is probably correct in saying that 
“Perhaps one should also evaluate Tempels’s enterprise within the context of an era in 
which Lévy-Bruhl’s dogmas were congruent with the colonizing objectives as well as 
with the Christian mission expressed in an evolutionary grid.”79 For Tempels, Bantu’s 
vitalistic (non-static) world-view was to be assimilated into European thought and culture 
which became synonymous with the Christian tradition in order to become perfected and 
civilized. Religious language within the missionary context in Africa became transcoded 
for imperial and assimilationist purposes. Hence, Tempels could say: “our civilizing 
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mission alone can justify our occupation of the lands of uncivilized peoples.”80 Tempels 
has his critics especially from the Bantu hermeneutical and linguistic school who accuse 
him of establishing equivalence between force and being as a simulacrum.
81
 For such 
critics, the framework adopted by Tempels makes the Bantu force unthinkable without 
instrumentalizing Western conceptuality. This is as Tempels himself grants, that “Bantu 
ontology can be thought of and made explicit only because of the conceptual frame of 
Western philosophy:” “It is we [Europeans] who will be able to tell them [the Bantu 
Africans] in precise terms, what their inmost concept of being is.”82    
 By and large, Tempels is not without disciples. His work has inspired significant 
philosophical and theological production in the Bantu nations (in the Central African 
region). Such disciples include Rwandan philosopher, Alexis Kagamé, and pioneer 
African (Congolese) theologians, Vincent Mulago, Tharcisse Tshibangu, etc.
83
 They have 
argued for the pertinence of Tempels’ insights particularly with regard to the question of 
dynamism (how every created being is an active dynamic force in interaction with a 
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multitude of other forces and each influencing one another), life-force perpetuating 
lineage, family (Jamaa), and community. Again, a group of African priests published Des 
Prêtres Noirs s’interrogent (Paris, 1956) which drew on the achievements of Negritude 
and African Personality while incorporating Tempels’ philosophical insights.  
 At any rate, the unmitigated colonial violence (occupation) with its economic, 
political, and its other concomitant forms of exploitation was delusionally validated under 
the disguise of a civilizing and Christianizing mission. Thus, in colonizing, Christian 
Europe saw itself as carrying out the divine mandate to spread the faith to all parts of the 
world and to impose on all, God’s law as incarnated by European culture.84 To 
accomplish these, God, therefore, legitimates the employment of all possible means 
including the use of violence.     
1.4 Appraisal of Modernity and its Promised Utopia 
By way of synopsis, Kasper clearly accedes that the reasons for the eclipse of the 
Spirit in modern Western tradition lie in the intellectual climate of the time. According to 
him, “after the passing of Goethe, Hegel, and Schleiermacher this philosophy of spirit 
suddenly collapsed. Since that time the idealist interpretation of spirit has largely yielded 
the field to a materialistic and evolutionary interpretation.”85 Kasper goes on to say:  
reality is no longer viewed as a manifestation of spirit, but rather spirit is un- 
 derstood as an epiphenomenon of reality, being conceived as a superstructu- 
 re built on the economic and social process or as a surrogate and sublimation 
  of man who is defined as a being made up of needs. Finally, a positivist and  
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 supposedly ‘exact’ understanding of science demanded the renunciation of  
 the concept of ‘spirit’ because of its multiplicity of meanings and the impossi- 
 bility of providing an exact definition of it; it demanded that we remain silent 
  regarding that which we cannot define with precision.
86
 
 
Such evolutionary and positivistic progress became a utopian vision which transformed 
into oppressive binarisms between superior and inferior, civilized and savage, white and 
black, higher and lower, advanced and fixed, better and worse, mature and childish, and 
so on. These binarisms which were determined by the presence of physical, 
physiognomic, and psychic characteristics were hammered out merely on the anvil of 
unrealistic theories that ignored the data of experience of the victimized; they became the 
barometers used to calibrate the racial worth of African peoples, institutions, and socio-
cultural organizations.        
 Whenever the formulation of God/Spirit-language is crafted in complete 
metaphysical abstraction or is substituted by wholesale subjectivity, it often leads to 
dualism—either between spirit and body or a thoroughgoing dualism between the divine 
Spirit and humans which in turn places the imago Dei under erasure. In the case of the 
latter, the divine Spirit/God becomes merely a sublimated subjectivity.  We see this 
process which radically started with Descartes through Kant, and all the way to Hegel, 
become theoretically formulated in Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872). Feuerbach opines 
that the notion of God is just a projection of man’s desire for infinity on to God; hence, 
“man makes a god of what he is not but would like to be.”87 The indelible importance of 
Feuerbach is obvious, for instance, in K. Marx, J.-P. Sartre, M. Merleau-Ponty, but 
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expressed most aptly in Sigmund Freud’s (1856-1939) psychoanalytic explication of 
religion. A sublimated subjectivity in turn asserts “will to power” in order to lord it over 
others. If there is any diagnostic index of modern culture, it is clearly the “death of God.” 
But the displacement of God always entails a replacement with human ideology.  
 As John Paul II notes, beginning with the Enlightenment through Descartes to 
post-Cartesian era, man (Western) has remained alone: “alone as creator of his own 
history and his own civilization; alone as one who decides what is good and what is bad, 
as one who would exist and operate etsi Deus non daretur, even if there were no God.” 
Put another way, the modern autonomous subject can know as true only phenomena 
which are given within the matrix of consciousness, thus all noumenal realities, including 
God or Spirit, can only be postulates as demanded for moral conduct. In this connection, 
because God becomes only a postulate, modernity creates a social order in which ethics is 
dependent on the autonomy of the individual subjectivity under the presumption that God 
does not exist or even if God exists, the autonomous individual must live as if God does 
not matter. Continuing, the Pope clearly and logically argues that “if man can decide by 
himself, without God, what is good and what is bad, he can also determine that a group of 
people is to be annihilated [and by extension through the violence of slavery and 
colonialism].”88 Thus, where sublimated human subjectivity becomes God, then the death 
of God and the death of humans, to a large extent, go together. As Badcock underscores, 
“The preachers of freedom, in short, have not delivered their promised utopia. Indeed, 
quite the reverse has occurred. The age of freedom has been the single greatest era of 
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human barbarity in history.”89 It is crystal clear especially from the historical events 
during the twentieth century that the purported ideal of freedom as construed by modern 
objective rationality has in fact been violently dehumanizing.    
 With the eclipse of God/Spirit, human freedom actually dies along with human 
inalienable rights. Civilization transmutes into barbarism. According to Chinua Achebe in 
“An Image of Africa,” citing Irish Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, the West uses 
Africa to define itself and to establish its own superiority as civilized as opposed to 
primitive Africa.
90
 Showing how crucial this kind of constructed dialectic is to European 
self-definition, Edward Said notes, “if colonized people are irrational, Europeans are 
rational; if the former are barbaric, sensual, and lazy, Europe is civilization itself, with its 
sexual appetites under control and its dominant ethic that of hard work.”91 The goal of 
such dialectic is to portray the non-European other as not the kind of people that “we” 
(Europeans) are. With this “self-deceiving moral smugness,”92 the colossal brutality and 
violence that accompanied the colonial project were simply explained away to serve 
European interests.         
 Because the dialectical and dualistic philosophies spawned by the 
modernity/coloniality project failed to sustain the dualisms it created without collapsing 
into homogenization, assimilation, exclusion, and domination, they ended up serving the 
justification of colonialism and slavery of the African other. The language of “difference 
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in kind” was introduced by Europeans “as a way of justifying unspeakable exploitation 
and denigration of Africans.
93
 The worst evil and “the most harmful harm” is often the 
one perpetrated against the other by the “good” [and the so called civilized] who have the 
luxury of power and the apparatus to exercise domination.
94
 In the light of contemporary 
awareness of our pluralistic contexts and historical consciousness, it becomes necessary 
to broach a different category that is capable of enhancing a better appreciation and 
integration of “difference,” “identity,” and “alterity.” This work aims to establish that 
relational pneumatology would do just that. The recovery of relational pneumatology is 
even more urgent today as oppressive ideologies and new forms of marginalization have 
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been reconstituted in other ways especially in the form of neocolonialism and 
globalization.         
1.5 A New Turn to Pneumatology     
 Beginning from the second half of the twentieth century, ample evidence indicates 
an increasing attention to pneumatology from a smorgasbord of perspectives and 
traditions. This phenomenon has been described by some scholars as: “a new advent of 
the Spirit in both the theology and the life of the churches.”95 This is not to imply that the 
Spirit has been completely absent. Rather, as has been abundantly made clear in the 
foregoing section, the Spirit who is the Lord and Giver of life, whose presence fills the 
whole world and the church, and who indwells humans, has for too long been neglected 
due to inadequate and unbalanced attention. Obviously, neo-Scholastic theology had so 
absorbed a static understanding of God inherited from classical Greek metaphysics that 
the dynamism and communal love that characterize the Triune God were lost sight of.
96
 
This work seeks to recover and explicate the relationality and self-giving love of the 
Triune God as it is actualized through the ceaseless activity and creativity of the Spirit, 
and what it may mean for relating to those regarded as other and for the construction of 
identity. This approach resonates with contemporary understanding of reality as no longer 
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a static and mechanistic entity constituted by disparate and atomized parts, but as a web 
of dynamic communion, interconnectedness, and complex relationships. It is redolent 
with the overall thrust of “Systems Theory,”97 personalist philosophy, chaos theory, and 
above all, West African world-views which conceive relationality as a key characteristic 
of reality. The question then becomes how the Church may effectively safeguard both the 
identities of Africans—their cultural, socio-political, and religious difference—and the 
specificity of the Christian faith, and thus become a credible agent of change in the social 
transformation of Africa.         
 The Trinitarian communion of persons and self-giving love as effectuated by the 
Spirit serves as a paradigm for an understanding of identity in relation to otherness to be 
pursued in this work. The Spirit of fellowship safeguards the Persons of the Trinity from 
indulging in self-enclosed love. At the same time, the Spirit of fellowship and 
relationality who sustains the nonself-enclosed love of the persons of the Trinity creates 
space in God for fellowship with humanity, as well as fellowship and communion among 
humans. In the Trinity, as Miroslav Volf puts it, “The one divine person is not that person 
only, but includes the other divine persons in itself; it is what it is only through the 
indwelling of the others.”98  Nevertheless, this mutual indwelling of the persons neither 
results to the dissolution of the particularity of the self into some form of indistinct 
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identity nor the absorption of the others into the self, such that the self becomes all of 
reality. This paradigm of relational pneumatology will be explored subsequently with 
attention to its implications for Christian practice of relating to its neighbors and to those 
viewed as different. At this juncture, however, it is of decisive importance to clarify how 
the person of the Holy Spirit is to be understood herein.      
1.5.1 The Person and Proprium of the Spirit     
 In various ways the idea of the identity and Person of the Holy Spirit had been 
relegated to a secondary position, if the Spirit is not even completely denied any 
personhood in Western theology. Besides the Latin tradition, one also finds this 
phenomenon to be prevalent in Process and certain Protestant Theologies, which in one 
way or another, wield influence on some Catholic theologies. Process Theology, for 
instance, views the Holy Spirit not as Person (as a distinct hypostasis in the mystery of 
the Triune God) but as a term to designate the necessary immanence of God in the world. 
The Spirit becomes simply a metaphor for expressing religiously an attribute of God’s 
nature, as a “mode of God’s universal presence” in the cosmos.99   
 Again, Karl Barth, who, in some ways, influenced Karl Rahner, understands the 
Holy Spirit as a “mode of being” of God both in the inner-trinitarian relationship between 
the Father and the Son, and the realization of God’s self-revelation in the human being. 
Put simply, the Holy Spirit is the event of divine self-relating. Barth’s perspective not 
only leads to the eclipse of the Holy Spirit’s distinct identity but is also beset by a 
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modalist tendency.
100
 Truly, Barth allots centrality to the Trinity in his theology, yet he 
“gives the appearance of thinking of God as a single Person existing in three unidentified 
modes.”101 Looking at the immanent Trinity in such agnostic manner has definitely 
landed some of Barth’s disciples into Unitarianism.102 In his critique of Barth, Robert 
Jenson reads that in Barth, the Holy Spirit is reduced to the power of Jesus Christ’s being; 
the Spirit is what happens when Jesus Christ exercises his power. In this way, the Spirit is 
explained as something rather than as someone.
103
    
 Hendrikus Berkhof toes the line of Barth but introduces a nuance in the 
understanding of the Spirit as person. According to Berkhof:      
The triune God does not embrace three persons; he himself is person, meeting us  
 in the Son and in his Spirit. Jesus Christ is not a person beside the person of God.  
 In him the person of God becomes the shape of a human person. And the Spirit is  
 not a person beside the persons of God and Christ. In creation he [the Spirit] is the 
  acting person of God, in re-creation he [the Spirit] is the acting person of Christ,  
 who is no other than the acting person of God. Therefore, we must reject all pres- 
 entation of the Spirit as an impersonal force. The Spirit is person because he is 
 God acting as a person. He is a person in relation to us, not in relation to God; for 
  he is the personal God himself in relation to us.
104
  
  
Berkhof’s affirmations seem to deny any genuine inner differentiation in the identity of 
the persons of the Trinity, and as such inclines toward Sabellianism or modalism. He, 
therefore, conceives God as a single Person or Subject with different modes of outward 
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expression and not as a Tri-unity of persons. Equally, in accordance with Geoffrey 
Lampe, the Spirit is neither an “impersonal influence nor a divine entity or hypostasis 
which is a third person of the Godhead, but God himself, his personal presence, as active 
and related.”105 For Lampe, then, the Holy Spirit simply refers to God himself and not to 
a distinct person, the third person of the Trinity. These perspectives that have been 
considered here undermine the missions of the second and third persons in the economic 
Trinity since they tend to deny any authentic inner distinctions in the immanent Trinity 
which grounds the missions in the economic Trinity.      
 There is no doubt that if distinctiveness can be ascribed to the Father and the Son, 
it is also ascribable to the Spirit. If the three members of the Trinity are described as 
persons, are they equally persons in the same way? Yet, because of the familiar family 
imageries associated with the terms, Father and Son, it is easier to have at least, a tangible 
sense of the designations in terms of persons. The Spirit, however, presents a unique 
challenge because of the absence of a similar familiar family imagery to designate her 
personhood.
106
 So in what way can the Spirit be said to be a person? The objection to use 
the term person to designate the trinitarian hypostases, and especially in the identification 
of the third hypostasis is made much more formidable by Western understanding of 
person, beginning from Descartes, as a stable, autonomous, and independent center of 
consciousness. Going by this construal of person, the trinitarian persons may amount to 
tritheism, as three gods and three centers of consciousness. It is in view of such modern 
sensibility that Barth prefers the alternative term “mode of being” to person whereas 
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Rahner speaks of “Subsisting Relations,” “three relatively distinct ways of existing,” or 
“ways of being.”107 It is true as Rahner grants that the category of person is not a biblical 
concept but a theological construct which is one of his reasons for pushing for setting it 
aside. Rahner hopes that consciously dropping the concept of person would not 
jeopardize our understanding of the Trinity as it is revealed.
108
 Rahner’s concepts act as 
functional analogies rather than personal ones for delineating the complexity of God’s 
being.
109
 The fact, however, remains that Rahner’s alternative terms still suggest some 
form of neomodalism as Hill contends.
110
 If Rahner accepts the term “Trinity” in order to 
articulate its mode of existing, is it not also the case that the term is non-biblical and a 
theological construct? To be sure, Rahner knows that the term Trinity, although not a 
biblical concept, justifiably preserves the truth of Scripture (that the Godhead comprises 
the Father, the Son, and the Spirit; three but one and only true God) than a mere 
preoccupation with words of Scripture. So how then can we continue to speak of three 
persons but one God?         
 Apart from the sensibility towards the modern construal of person, which is a 
genuine concern, is it sufficient to dismiss the term “person” on grounds of its non-
biblical status but only a theological construct? I suggest that it would still be helpful to 
retain the term “Person” notwithstanding its non-biblical foundation to preserve the 
biblical truth that the members of the Trinity co-exist in mutual relationship of reciprocal 
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self-giving and receiving love and are more than mere “manifestation of God in three 
roles”111 as any functional analogies tend to suggest. God is not merely a single 
undifferentiated unity but a triadic complex communion of persons in love.
112
 It is not 
within the scope of this work to trace the long development of the term “Person” as much 
of that has already been done by other scholars.
113
 Suffice it to say that in this corpus, the 
term “person” should be understood as a distinct identity who enters into relationships 
with otherness and does not exist without or apart from the others. So understood then, 
the term Person makes sense only in terms of relationships/relationality. As a distinct 
identity, a person is uniquely centered but not necessarily self-enclosed or self-centered. 
Persons, as Paul Fiddes nicely points out, “are ‘ecstatic,’ that is self-transcending in 
communication with others, especially in the movement of love. …the person lives from 
openness beyond itself to others; it is a centre in the sense of being a centre of 
communication. What is primary is not self-reflection [in the sense of the Cartesian 
cogito], but action in relationships.”114 To be person, therefore, transcends simply being 
an individual but one who is not apart from otherness. It is in this sense that we would 
understand person as used with regard to the Trinity. It is thus, in this light that we speak 
of the Spirit as a distinct Person, indeed as the third Person of the Trinity. Ultimately, 
Fiddes’ caveat is to be heeded, that “personal language for God remains an analogy, but it 
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has the capacity to be a language of participation, pointing to engagement in God and 
drawing us into such involvement.”115 The language of person and relationality in God 
resonates with what we do in worship, for instance, and so is significant for “the 
corporate life of a community.”116  
1.5.2 Biblical Testimony to the Personhood of the Spirit    
 As noted earlier, there has been a tendency in Western theology to deny 
personhood to the Spirit and view her simply as the power of Christ. It is not right, as 
Gregory of Nazianzus rightly warned, to “give Essence to the Father and deny 
Personality to the Others, and make Them only Powers of God.”117 In the biblical stories 
of the New Testament, we can easily recognize the three Characters, Father, Son, and 
Spirit, interact and relate among themselves, at least in the oikonomia which is about the 
mission of the Son and the Spirit from the Father in the world.
118
 At a minimal level, the 
concept of person suggests a “being who can say ‘I’ with self-reflexivity or… with 
awareness.”119 Instances abound in the Bible in which God is presented as speaking in the 
first-person singular pronoun. A typical example, among several others, is found in 
Exodus 3:14 where God says “I AM.” Again, at the baptism of Jesus in which the 
trinitarian persons are seen to be interacting, the Father says “You are my Son, this day I 
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have begotten you” [(Lk 3:23), emphasis mine].  The case of Jesus is not difficult to 
discern since he became human with a human face and spoke human language. But 
among several instances of where Jesus uses the first-person pronoun, one that has a tinge 
of emphasis to it has to do with his response, at his trial, to the crowds’ chorused 
interrogation, “‘So you are the Son of God?’ And Jesus said to them, ‘You are right, I 
am’” (Lk 22:70).  In the case of the Holy Spirit, there is clearly a paucity of instances 
where the Spirit speaks in the first-person. However, one obvious evidence is found in 
Acts 13:2 where the Holy Spirit speaks in the first-person when giving direction to the 
church at Antioch to commission Barnabas and Paul for mission work, “Set apart for me 
Barnabas and Paul for the work to which I have called them (emphasis mine).” This first-
person perspective with regard to the Holy Spirit is, as Cole concurs, “a sufficient 
condition for personhood;” while admitting at the same time its slenderness as a basis on 
which to establish a robust doctrine of the personhood of the Spirit.
120
   
 In any case, the New Testament is replete with evidences that indicate the 
construal of the Holy Spirit as a Person. John’s Gospel, more often than not, speaks of the 
hypostatic Holy Spirit that Jesus would send to his disciples in the wake of his departure 
to return to the Father. Thus, in what is described as his Last Discourse, Jesus promises to 
send “another Comforter” (paraklētos); also “Helper” or “Advocate” or “Counselor.” By 
saying “another Comforter,” Jesus appears to imply that the Comforter would be “another 
of the same kind as Jesus”121 himself; someone “who is equi-hypostatic in relation to the 
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hypostatic Logos.”122 Just as mentioned above, apart from the one clear instance where 
the Holy Spirit speaks in the first-person, other references that speak of the Spirit as a 
person, particularly, the Johannine Last Discourse, use the third-person personal pronoun. 
 The following instances, therefore, suggest that the Holy Spirit can be spoken of 
as a person: “I will ask the Father and he will send you another Comforter to be with you 
forever, that Spirit of truth whom the world cannot receive because it neither sees him nor 
knows him. But you know him, for he is with you and will be in you” (Jn 14:16-17); “But 
the Comforter, the Holy Spirit…he will teach you all things” (v. 26); “When the 
Comforter comes…the Spirit of truth, he will testify about me” (15:26); “I will send him 
to you and when he comes, he will convict the world” (16: 7-8); “when he, the Spirit of 
truth comes, he will guide you into all truth. He will not speak on his own; he will speak 
only what he hears, and he will tell you what is yet to come. He will bring glory to me by 
taking from what is mine and making it known to you” [(vv. 13-14), all emphasis mine]. 
Sergius Bulgakov contends that all these references can be understood only if we view 
them “as spoken with reference to a person [not mere personification] and, moreover, to a 
person who is perfectly similar to the person of the other Comforter, Christ.”123 We 
should make no mistake about this. Bulgakov is not suggesting that Christ and the Spirit 
are identical without any distinction. Of course, for Jesus’ promise of “another” implies a 
second after the first, and hence, a distinction in identity. It is on the basis of this promise 
of another Comforter with a personal coefficient that Bulgakov argues that the event of 
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the Pentecost could be nothing other “the descent of the third hypostasis Himself into the 
world; not of spirit but of the Spirit, not of the gifts only, but of their Source, the 
Paraclete.”124 An understanding of the personhood of the Spirit as articulated above is 
helpful in avoiding the reduction of the Spirit to just God acting or simply “an impersonal 
force from God.”125 As Gregory of Nazianzus points out about speaking of the Spirit as 
God’s action or act, “act language reduces the Spirit to an accident of God.”126 
 Other New Testament testimonies that allude to the personal character of the Holy 
Spirit include, inter alia, the following: in the epistle to the Romans, Paul writes of the 
witness of “the Spirit [who] assures our spirit that we are God’s children” (8:16); “the 
Spirit helps us in our weakness. …the Spirit himself intercedes for us with groans that 
words cannot express. And he (God) who searches our hearts knows the mind of the 
Spirit, because the Spirit intercedes for the saints in accordance with God’s will” (vv. 26-
27). It is only a person in the true sense of the word that can pray or intercede for another; 
that can be said to have a mind, and that can intercede according God’s will. A sheer 
impersonal force cannot perform any of such personal acts. The “mind” of the Spirit (to 
phronēma tou pneumatos) can only be spoken of a person rather than of a blind force or 
power. The Spirit must then be a person in order to perform such actions. Again, in 1 
Corinthians 2:10, “The Spirit searches all things, even the deep things of God.” 
Furthermore, the text, “All these are the work of one and the same Spirit, and he gives 
them to each one, just as he determines” (1 Cor 12:11) also confirms the personal 
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character of the Spirit. Again, if God is personal, it is legitimate to say that by the same 
token, the Spirit of God belongs in some sense to the same nature as God’s from whom 
she proceeds. As proceeding from the Father (as in an “act” of the Father) who is the 
origin of divinity, since “act” follows “the manner of being,” then the Spirit who 
proceeds from the Father belongs to the nature of God who is Person. As Paul says: “only 
the Spirit of God searches the depths of God” (1 Cor 2: 10-12); for the Spirit to search the 
depths of God, then she must be a Person in a sense and not merely power or an 
impersonal force. Moreover, Ephesians 4:30 characterizes the Holy Spirit as a person 
who can be grieved and so warns: “do not grieve the Holy Spirit of God, with whom you 
were sealed for the day of redemption.” One can grieve only a person but not a sheer 
force. The fact that Holy Spirit remains invisible does not necessarily militate against her 
personality; “that…belongs to the category of Paraclete―Teacher, Director, Protector, 
[and] Counselor―this invests…[her] with all the essential attributes of that which we 
understand by personality.”127       
 We have so far established that the Holy Spirit is a Person rather than an 
impersonal force. Yet, the Bible is replete with impersonal metaphors used to describe 
the Spirit and her activities. For example, the Spirit is spoken of as wind, fire, breath, 
dove, water, and so on.  How do we reconcile such impersonal metaphors with the 
identity of the Spirit as a person who is also personal?  Ralph Del Colle has argued for 
the “complementarity of impersonal and personal images of the Holy Spirit.” He 
contends that a trajectory that moves from the category of “presence to power to 
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personhood”128 would generate a more robust trinitarian pneumatology. According to Del 
Colle, “The Spirit’s presencing is donative and life-giving but self-effacing in regard to 
the Spirit’s own Person.”129 Thanks to her self-effacement, in both economic and 
immanent Trinity, the Holy Spirit manifests the Persons of the Father and the Son and is 
constituent of their distinction from each other.
130
 Thus, the Spirit of relationality 
prevents the Triune Persons from either collapsing into each other or remaining self-
enclosed without openness to the other. In this way too, the Spirit creates space in the 
Trinity into which she ushers humans to participate in Trinitarian love. It is only as 
person, as Del Colle notes, that the Spirit “can recreate persons in community ecstatically 
oriented to the other.”131 The Spirit sustains the ecstasy of the divine life, the loving 
relationships within the Trinity, as well as its overflow in creation and history. Even 
though in the traditional Trinitarian taxis, the Spirit appears as a third Person, she 
nevertheless, remains the contact Person in whom God through Christ reaches out to the 
world in love, as well as in whom we have access to the Father through Christ.
132
   
1.5.3 The Spirit and Gender       
 As hinted at earlier, gender identity has for too long been one of the ways by 
which difference has been used negatively to suppress and dominate the other. There is 
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no question that gender discourse is a very sensitive issue in almost every area of 
contemporary studies, more so, in theological scholarship.
133
 Masculinity has often been 
conceived as superior to femininity which, by the same token, has been consistently 
deemed inferior, and hence, the frequent mistreatment and marginalization of women by 
men. Such construal has had several implications for women who have been suppressed 
variedly: economically, politically, socially, culturally, religiously, and so on. Gender 
issue calls for cultivation of sensitivity and attention to the language of gender about 
God, and more particularly, about the Holy Spirit. The revolution in gender scholarship 
has, among other things, engendered the use of inclusive language currently in speaking 
to issues of general concern as well as a reconsideration of patriarchy.  
 Some feminist theologians have vehemently interpellated the dominant and 
exclusive use of male metaphors for the Triune God. According to such view, the 
exclusive use of male metaphors for God does not offer women a horizon within God; it 
makes women find no place of belonging in God.
134
 In order, therefore, to provide a 
horizon for women in God, and to make for what some regard as equality of genders, 
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some other feminist theologians have advocated for making one of the Persons of the 
Trinity, precisely the Holy Spirit, feminine; or more radically, to use exclusively female 
metaphors for all the trinitarian Persons.
135
 A possible strong reason for all this push 
about gender language in God is that an equilibration of God’s gender would go a long 
way in accounting for the equal dignity of men and women. Without trivializing this 
argument for the equal dignity of men and women since patriarchy has been dominant for 
too long, the fact remains that God is neither male nor female. God is essentially 
genderless or transgender.          
 Again, even the question of making one of the Triune Persons feminine in order 
to foster the equality of men and women is still not sufficiently balanced since the other 
two members remain males. Moreover, pushing for wholesale female metaphors for the 
Triune Persons ends up excluding men entirely. In that sense, it reinscribes what it is 
trying to overcome. The point is that we must cultivate sensitivity to the fact that God is 
beyond all gender distinctions. At best, the language of gender distinctions in God is due 
to the limitation of human language which speaks about persons in terms of sexual 
distinctions as either male or female. Indeed, the current revolution in sexual orientations 
problematizes language of sexual distinctions in God: is God male or female, 
homosexual, heterosexual, bisexual, transsexual, and so on? Since God is beyond all 
gender, “gendered language about God should not be used to legitimize a particular 
construction of gender identity”136 such as masculinity is superior because God is male 
whereas femininity is inferior because God is not feminine. “All employment of God 
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language for construction of gender identity is illegitimate and ought to be resisted. 
…Whether we use masculine or feminine metaphors for God, God models our common 
humanity, not our gender specificity.”137 God mirrors qualities characteristic of both 
fatherhood and motherhood. Volf maintains that whereas gender identity is rooted in our 
sexed bodies, its content is culturally and socially constructed, interpreted, negotiated, 
and re-negotiated over time and space.
138
      
 Going by the traditional metaphors used for the trinitarian persons, while the 
Father and the Son are specifically male metaphors, the Spirit is not gender-specific. In 
Hebrew, the term Spirit (rûah) is said to be usually but not always grammatically 
feminine. The Spirit, rendered as (pneuma) in Greek is grammatically neuter. But in 
Latin, the word Spirit (spiritus) is grammatically masculine, whereas in Syriac, Spirit is 
also feminine. In the Johannine Gospel, the Spirit (paraklētos) is masculine, hence, 
John’s use of the pronouns “he,” “his,” and “him,” when speaking of the Holy Spirit. 
From the foregoing, it is obvious that the question of the metaphorical gender of the 
Spirit is far from settled but remains an open one. Thus, one can use any of the 
pronouns―he, she, or it―for the Holy Spirit.139 But since we have already established 
beyond reasonable doubt that the Holy Spirit possesses personhood, using the pronoun 
“it” detracts from that personhood, thingifies or reifies it, and thus renders the Spirit as an 
impersonal force or power. Furthermore, since the Spirit can be viewed as both feminine 
and masculine, using exclusively feminine metaphor for the Spirit would tend to ossify 
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gender distinctions in God and gloss over or even deny the feminine dimensions of Father 
and Son. While it remains imperative for us to be sensitive to gender issues especially as 
gender differences have for a long time been used to totalize and suppress others, it is, 
nevertheless, far from being clear that the ascription of feminine metaphor to the Spirit 
solves rather than creates more problems. The fact that it is obvious that different 
Christian traditions use different genders for the Spirit, implies that God transcends 
gender. This is a fact to which we must be sensitive. Since God is genderless, any gender 
language about God must be very sensitive to this fact and must not use gender 
differences to legitimate such oppressive binaristic hierarchies as superior/inferior, 
strong/weak, diligent/lazy, and so on. Since the Spirit can be spoken of using different 
gender metaphors depending on the context and tradition, this work will be faithful to the 
gender pronoun for the Spirit when making reference to any of the said traditions. But 
overall, we shall just use the term “Spirit” and particularly when referring to the work of 
the Spirit as the one who births life, we shall use the female pronoun. All in all, “The 
Spirit of God gives rise to a multiplace force field that is sensitive to differences. In this 
force field, enjoyment of creaturely, invigorating differences can be cultivated while 
unjust, debilitating differences can be removed in love, mercy, and gentleness.”140  The 
“unity of the Spirit” is not destructive of differences but rather effectively cultivates and 
sustains such differences in the differentiated community that is the body of Christ.
141
 
This action of the Spirit with regard to differences inspires sensitivity to difference and 
challenges all manner of “uncontrolled generalizations made from a specific, typical 
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perspective.”142 The unity of the Spirit is not, therefore, a simplistic monohierarchical 
uniformity but rather entails an enriching, life-giving, “life-enhancing, invigorating 
pluralism of the Spirit.”143 Admittedly, within the equality-in-difference cultivated by the 
Spirit, equality does not obliterate differences; “men do not become women and women 
do not become men,”144 Greeks are not Jews and Jews are not Greeks. Yet each enriches 
and benefits from the other in a relationality that yields openness to identity construction.  
1.6 Terminological Clarifications       
1.6.1 Alterity/Other and Same/Self     
 Etymologically, the term alterity is derived from the Latin alter – těra – těrum 
which has a number of semantic possibilities. It could mean “one of two;” as a numeral, it 
means “second;” of similarity, it means “another” or “a second,” and, of difference, it 
means “other.” The term is further related to the Latin alteritat; alteritas which means 
“the state of being ‘other’ or ‘different.’”145  Other synonyms of the term include: alter 
ego, alternation, and so forth. Thus, the term alterity points to the particularity, 
distinctiveness, and irreducibility of the “other.” It is a matter of saying that the other as 
one of two, as the second in the set cannot simply be reduced or collapsed into the one or 
the self. The identity of the other cannot be annihilated.     
 Western philosophical tradition especially under the aspects of modernity 
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constructed “an ontology of ‘sameness.’” Such ontology was embedded on the 
immanence of consciousness as the matrix for knowledge and signification. Since the 
time of Descartes, Kant, Husserl and others, the essences of objective reality (noemata) in 
the world have to give themselves to consciousness and its acts (noesis) in order to 
constitute knowledge and meaning making. In this way not only were phenomena but 
also human beings were reduced to concepts in order to be objects of knowledge. In 
Husserlian phenomenological tradition of eidetic or egological reduction, for instance, 
what is knowable and known, is that which in intentionality becomes one with 
consciousness as the object intended.
146
 To speak of knowledge of the other then, all that 
the subject or the self has to do is simply to solipsistically return to self devoid of any 
relation to the exteriority and objectivity of the other as other. In this solipsistic noetic 
movement, the other is only realized by the self as an objectified and thematized 
“included self” and who thus brings the other into presence via intentional consciousness. 
The other becomes merely a duplicate of the self and is not related to as a subject. This 
amounts to ontological violence and epistemic imperialism.     
 Until Levinas, in Western philosophy, the other has always been suppressed and 
reduced to the regime of sameness. Sameness in this sense is that which assimilates both 
actually and potentially everything which lies outside it.
147
 The same, going by this 
construal totalizes the other par excellence; it incorporates alterity within the hegemony 
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and empire of sameness.
148
 Against this backdrop, Levinas’ intellectual breakthroughs 
aimed at not only a break with this imperial ontology in order to preserve the 
irreducibility of alterity but equally at the preservation of the relationship between the 
same and the other without the dissolution of either.
149
 Whether or not Levinas succeeded 
in such an attempt is a matter of debate. Nevertheless, it is to his credit to have pointed 
out this subterranean but insidious current prevailing in Western production of 
knowledge.          
 In current philosophy especially since Levinas, the term alterity has shifted the 
focus on the other from being conceived merely as an epistemic other― the other whose 
significance merely lies in the extent to which s/he can be known as the object of 
consciousness―to the particular, objective, and concrete other “who is actually located in 
a political, cultural, linguistic or religious context.”150 Since genuine encounter is possible 
only where an other is recognized as such, it is such a recognition that can engender the 
possibility of “a transference across and between  differences of culture, gender, class, 
[religion], and other social categories.
151
 The other is to be recognized as an other and not 
merely tolerated. For operative under toleration is the assumption that the self is still 
superior to the other who happens to be different from the self; thus the self merely 
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tolerates the other without actually acknowledging the difference of the other.
152
 In this 
work, therefore, the “other” is to be understood as one who is always located and 
sedimented within a particular context and may not be subsumed under some form of 
universal and universalizing category.         
1.6.2 Identity and Difference       
 As seen from the foregoing, especially in modernity, conceptions of ontology and 
epistemology seem to gravitate around a stable self who interpellates reality by subjecting 
it to the categories of the mind in order to arrive at the truth of knowledge. This essential 
self perseveres in being in the manner of Spinoza’s essendi. But identity is not about 
essentialism or nativism. Identity is about the self, while maintaining an “I” becomes an 
“I” that is able to be open to an other in an encounter. Without being destroyed, the “I” in 
the encounter with the other in a milieu of “giving and receiving” is rather transformed 
and enriched as well as the other. In order to shed some light with regard to how identity 
is to be understood in this work, a cursory look at one way of understanding identity 
according Homi Bhabha would be helpful. In his innovative work, The Location of 
Culture,
153
 Bhabha specifies three conditions that underlie the process of identification 
from the perspective of postcolonial discourse.      
 The first is that “to exist is to be called into being in relation to an otherness, its 
look or locus.”154 Bhabha here brings out the importance of locatedness and context in 
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the forging of identity. Genuine identity can only be forged in relation to an other who is 
different in a space that holds the possibility of the inversion of roles like those between a 
host and a guest. Identity is, therefore, not about perseverance in being, insistence on 
essendi or stable essence, but an openness to the giving of self to the other as well as 
receiving the other into the self. The self necessarily has to step out of its consolidating 
essence in openness to the other “and undertake a re-adjustment of its identity in light of 
the other’s alterity.”155 In this process, identity construction is “constantly in statu 
nascendi rather than essendi, brought over again into being.”156 Such a process often 
creates differing identities not only by repetitive encounters with the other but also when 
there is a change in the complex social structuration of relationships in the space that the 
self and the other inhabit.         
 In the second condition, Bhabha notes that “the very place of identification…is a 
space of splitting."
157
 The insight of Bhabha here is suggestive of the ambivalence of 
identity construction especially under such oppressive and repressive condition as 
colonialism. The colonized and totalized other asserts his irreducibility to the same by 
subverting the self’s artifice inscribed on the body of the other.158 The other mimics the 
same without actually becoming the same. Depending on the situation, there is a certain 
masking or personage that goes with the process of identification which in turn points to 
the agency of the other. Thus, identity is always negotiated and renegotiated in the 
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interstitial space of encounter. The other is one who cannot simply be completely 
totalized; the other possesses a surplus of meaning and possibilities that can never be 
completely known or simply be incorporated into sameness. There is no such thing as 
absolute knowledge of the other as totality claims.      
 Finally, the third is that “the question of identification is never the affirmation of a 
pre-given identity, never a self-fulfilling prophecy – it is always the production of an 
image of identity and the transformation of the subject in assuming that image. The 
demand of identification, that is, to be for an Other – entails the representation of the 
subject in the differentiating order of otherness.”159 This reinforces the point that identity 
production is not merely a return to a native pre-originary essence but always a 
transformation of the subject in the encounter with the other at distinct levels of 
differential relationships in the space of the “in-between.” More than perseverance in 
being, identity production is about ways of existing, about how relationships are forged 
through constant negotiation, splitting, repetition, and re-adjusment in the third space or 
interstice.           
 The phenomenon of difference is indicative of the fact that all reality is 
differentiated. There seems to be a subtle distinction between diversity and difference. 
Whereas, according to Letty Russell, “Diversity is about variety in general. …difference 
refers to concrete elements in our lives that distinguish, contrast, or separate one group or 
person from another.”160 As Al Condeluci has pointed out, “Difference can come in all 
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shapes and form. Some people are different in appearance, or skin color, or culture [or 
race, or religion, or gender, or class]. Others are different in the way they think, or act, or 
relate. Still others are different because they are poor, inept, or unhealthy; tall, short or 
squat.”161 Understood in this sense, difference is a given. Indeed, “Differences 
themselves are a God-given gift.”162  In itself, difference alone is not necessarily cause 
for negative experience, hostility, or rejection. As a matter of fact, the reality of the 
mosaic of differences makes interrelationships and relationality possible. For it is from 
within the riches of one’s difference that one is able to step out into the space of the “in-
between” to enrich the other and be enriched by the other. Difference can be used either 
as a tool for, or a weapon against fostering communication and understanding one 
another. Put another way, difference can be used either for good or for ill. It is used as a 
weapon when, “the notion of difference is…experienced from its shadow side.”163 That 
is, when it is used as a rationale to oppress, downgrade, exclude, and denigrate the other. 
This is usually the case when a particular understanding of difference is viewed as the 
norm and serves as the standard for otherizing and measuring other particular differences. 
In that case, difference becomes “constructed as a tool for oppression and 
manipulation.”164 It is little wonder Canadian Jesuit theologian, Lonergan, rebukes “those 
people and cultures who read themselves as normative, while they assume that ‘the rest 
of the world is made up of strangers and the strangers are totally strange, totally 
                                                 
      
161
 Al Condeluci, Beyond Difference (Delray Beach, Florida: St. Lucie Press,1996), 5. 
      
162
 Russell, Just Hospitality, 35. 
      
163
 Condeluci, Beyond Difference, 5. 
      
164
 Russell, Just Hospitality, 35. 
  
74 
 
odd…inscrutably Oriental’ [or African].”165  This normativity is used to essentialize, 
otherize, inferiorize, distantiate, and exclude those other particular differences―peoples, 
cultures, religions, gender, and others―that are found, or thought to be outside of the 
norm. To put it differently, those that fail to fit into the normative matrix are construed as 
abnormal. Such construal of abnormality usually becomes a justification to subjugate the 
other who because of the question of being different from the self or the same is viewed 
as evil.          
 Absurdly enough, there is often an assumption that persons who are different are 
bad, evil, savage, lazy, and inept because it is their responsibility and fault to have 
allowed the difference to occur. Since such persons who are different fall outside the 
canon of the constructed parameter or norm, they are often treated in negative, hostile, 
and shunning ways. The “other” is simply despised as an object of scorn, excluded and, 
regarded as an inferior person. As A. Kohn has put it, “Rivalry and cruelty thrive on 
distance because distance allows us to turn people [the other] into abstractions.”166 When 
difference is essentialized, people are treated and marked out as having no common 
nature with those who set the yardstick for normality.      
 Another strong reason for alienating the other who is different is fear which may 
be embedded in ignorance of the other. As Russell rightly points out, “The problem that 
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we face is not that we are different, but that we often fear that difference and reject those 
outside our church, our community, our nation, [our race, our class, and so on].”167 There 
could also be another subterranean reason for the fear and the consequent avoidance of 
the other. Simply avoiding or alienating the other is always the easier alternative than to 
deal with such feeling more appropriately by unmasking the undergirding rationale for 
such trepidation. Lonergan, who is good at deciphering the root of our various sensations, 
such as love, fear, jealousy, anger, attraction, and so on, when encountering another, has 
offered us a reasonable approach. Accordingly, a better approach is to interrogate at a 
more conscious level the subject’s experience in the encounter with the other in order to 
ascertain if the other actually poses any danger or whether the simple reason for the fear 
is bias.
168
 Bias is a flight, and indeed, an aberration of understanding. Where bias is 
allowed to scuttle understanding, the demands of concrete situations on intelligence and 
morality in practical living become distorted. “Bias creeps into one’s outlook, 
rationalization into one’s morals, ideology into one’s thought.”169 Consequently, a 
corruption of values occurs, “So one may come to hate the truly good, and love the really 
evil. Nor is that calamity limited to individuals. It can happen to groups, to nations, to 
blocks of nations, to mankind. It can take different, opposed, belligerent forms to divide 
mankind and to menace civilization with destruction.”170 Lonergan’s contention is that 
bias prevents the subject from gaining self-understanding through the insights that may 
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arise in the encounter with another. Indeed, bias leads the self to censor and suffocate any 
new insights emanating from the encounter that appear to pose a threat to the self’s 
identity, certitudes, and securities. In Lonergan’s terminology, this type of disposition is 
called scotosis which leaves the self with a blind spot—scotoma—which s/he can come 
to see only through the eyes of the Other.
171
 Bias thus fosters misunderstanding both in 
the subject and in the other leading to alienation. Because of this bias which stems from 
fear and leads to misunderstanding, differences which are ordinarily good come to be 
essentialized and reconstituted in a negative manner. Such fear could also be the fear of 
losing one’s privilege of being the dominating group or person.     
 Lonergan further contends that bias deprives oneself of the possibility of realizing 
oneself in self-transcendence. One only “achieves authenticity in self-transcendence. One 
can live in a world, have a horizon, just in the measure that one is not locked up in 
oneself.”172 Authentic self-transcendence is manifested in not simply living for oneself 
and satisfying one’s own personal desires, but in actually bringing about the good of 
others. It is only in relationality, in the encounter with the other that one’s self-
understanding and horizon can be tested. This is because encounter entails “the meeting 
of persons, appreciating the values they represent, criticizing their defects, and allowing 
one’s living to be challenged at its roots by their words and by their deeds.”173 Thus, if 
bias is the reason for the subject’s feeling of fear toward the other, then one really needs 
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to appreciate how that bias hinders appropriate engagement with the other in ways that 
are life-affirming. If the bias is not properly addressed, the dialectic between the self and 
the other easily degenerates into interpersonal estrangement and/or violence.
174
 
Conversion is therefore, realized through authentic self-transcendence. It is a long 
process that allows for the overcoming of bias, be it individual or group bias. Lonergan 
challenges the subject―individual and social―to conversion on three levels: intellectual, 
moral, and religious. The goal of this conversion is to overcome bias which prevents the 
subject from understanding the other, which understanding leads to a shift in horizon 
regarding the other, and resulting in authentic living for others and bringing about their 
good and well-being. Overcoming bias, therefore, repositions the subject from engaging 
the other in dialectical conflict and normality to solidarity of others in friendship and 
love.
175
          
 As noted above, differences are for interrelationships and interdependence. It is in 
this sense that Volf describes “differentiation” as the “creative activity of ‘separating-
and-binding’ that results in patterns of interdependence.”176 The idea of separating-and-
binding is very insightful. It points to the ambiguity and complexity involved in identity 
production. While the aspect of ‘separating’ highlights the distinctiveness of the self and 
the other, the aspect of ‘binding’ underscores the interrelationship between them. 
Separateness entails that the other must be recognized in his/her otherness without being 
assimilated into sameness or be subjugated to the self. Separateness also means that 
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particularities, boundaries, and distinctness “are part of the creative process of 
differentiation”177 and identity production. Volf is right when he contends that “without 
boundaries there would be no discrete identities, and without discrete identities there 
could be no relation to the other.”178 Thus, identity includes at the same time, 
difference/particularity/distance and connection/relatedness/intimacy, and, indeed, 
heterogeneity. As Volf aptly puts it, “we are who we are not because we are separate 
from the others who are next to us, but because we are both separate and connected, both 
distinct and related; the boundaries that mark our identities are both barriers and bridges 
(emphasis original).”179 Identity, therefore, arises out of the complexity of differentiation 
in which both the self and the other step out of their enclosed boundaries into the space of 
the in-between to negotiate their identities via relationality. The “selfhood of oneself 
implies otherness to such an intimate degree that one cannot be thought of without the 
other.”180         
 Nevertheless, in spite of the definitive intimacy and proximity involved in the 
process of identity production, the otherness with which the relationship is imbued calls 
for respect and responsibility of care rather than domination and control. It is this 
challenge to recognize the otherness of the other that currently drives the thrust of the 
“politics of difference” which is a campaign against the continuous assimilation of the 
distinctiveness that marks the other into a dominant or majority identity either overtly or 
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covertly.
181
  It is in this sense of stepping out of the enclosed totalizing self in openness to 
the other; in the recognition of the unique identity of the other, and in the mutual 
interaction of self-giving and receiving that identity is to be understood in this work. 
1.6.3 Relationality as an “Other Paradigm”    
 Relationality is the overarching conceptual framework through which the fabrics 
of the different aspects of this oeuvre are woven together. Let me be clear from the outset 
that relationality should not be understood as the polar opposite of the dualistic 
framework that has already been debunked. The paradigm of relationality we have in 
mind here is not so much an entirely new construction as the recovery and foregrounding 
of a relegated and subalternized value. The turn to the paradigm of relationality is rather 
important because it allows us to understand reality from an “other or different 
perspective” as not necessarily structured according to rigidified hierarchies where one 
end of the polarity stands as superior to the other conceived as inferior. The framework of 
relationality that I envision here is one whose operational logic is conjunctive (that is, 
both/and) rather than disjunctive (that is, either/or) which is the logic of empire; either 
you homogenize or get excluded. According to the disjunctive logic, for instance, 
“Whiteness” would be normative and thus superior while “Blackness” would be outside 
the norm and, therefore, inferior. The conjunctive logic of relationality, which recognizes 
that genuine differences should be respected and can live together, helps us to challenge 
and resist all dehumanizing hierarchies. Relationality recognizes the fact that reality is 
not merely a simple unity but rather a complexity which implies the idea of difference, 
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plurality, multiplicity, and diversity. Thus reality is characterized by a certain degree of 
fluidity, dynamism, and flexibility rather than stasis which finds expression in rigidified 
and polarized hierarchies that have no relations to each other. It is on this ground that the 
paradigm of relationality we envisage creates openness for inclusivity whereby those who 
have been consistently denigrated, pushed to the margins, silenced, or excluded can be 
recognized, respected, and included on the grounds of equality-in-difference. 
Relationality pulls down barriers while perforating boundaries for interaction and cross-
epistemological conversation. That is why I would be hesitant to use such an expression 
as doing theology from below to represent our vision. The simple reason is that the 
language of “below” and its correlate “above” reinstitutes the notion of rigidified 
hierarchies.
182
          
 It must also be pointed out that relationality is not another normative gaze from 
which vantage point otherness is viewed. This is because relationality rather valorizes the 
interconnectedness, interdependence, and complementarity inherent in reality. Through 
relationality, even dichotomous and seemingly contradictory perspectives instead of 
being seen simply as binaries are rather considered as paradoxes, ambiguities/promises 
for creativity out of which the emergence of newness might blossom forth. Two 
conflicting approaches may not necessarily mean that one is true and the other false. It 
may well mean (and quite often) that each simply represents a different perspective and 
vision of producing reality informed by social location, culture, and context. Even where 
tensions are irresolvable, relationality enables us to consider that the opposing relations 
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could still exist in a healthy tension as long as one side does not assimilate the Other into 
Sameness, or absolutize one position as universal for all. This has been the core of 
Western universalism—that ghost of Plato—that has, ever since, haunted the Western 
imagination. In this approach, conclusions about complex systems of reality are drawn 
from a particular and local epistemic standpoint and then universalized to be the same for 
all (global designs, à la Mignolo). This approach consistently reduces relationships in the 
complex system to conditions in the simpler (particular) system and then reconstructs 
them from there. A particular system, be it religious, cultural, epistemological, socio-
political, and so on, becomes ideological and totalitarian when it claims that it possesses 
all the truth, that it enjoys a monopoly of the truth and approach, and thus resists and 
fights against diversity and difference. Universalism usually turns the truth claims of one 
single group or culture into the norm for measuring the humanity of others. As this is a 
caricature of human dignity, it more often than not results in tragic situations as people 
are ready to kill and destroy others because they believe that they are in possession of the 
right truth while others who disagree with them are in error. All the religious wars and 
skirmishes in human history with all the blood letting, be it between Christians and 
Muslims, Catholics and Protestants or Orthodox, boil down to one specific: the belief that 
there is one and only one correct truth and that one possesses it oneself
183
 or only one’s 
religious Founder has and embodies it all. No doubt, heavenly truth transcends space and 
time but human perception and interpretation of that truth is always bounded by space 
and time, and hence, the light of that truth must be refracted through finite human 
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understanding.
184
 But the approach of relationality that we are foregrounding here 
recognizes that the complex cannot simply be reduced to the particular. Rather the 
particular as an aspect of the complex because it is capable of being integrated by the 
more complex system functions to shed light on and to expand the dimensions of the 
complex.
185
 Truth, as Immanuel Wallerstein succinctly puts it, lies in “explaining [the] 
ever greater layers of complexity.”186 And quite frankly, there is no one universal way of 
looking at and explaining reality. Relationality as understood here is conscious of the 
particularity of every truth claim and of the social context of all value judgments. This is 
why, the relationality thus proposed prizes mutual listening and empathetic Verstehen 
(understanding) in an encounter with the other, collaboration, solidarity, and valuing the 
perspectives and contributions of all groups especially those that have been historically 
and consistently denigrated and silenced. Relationality necessarily requires inclusivity. 
 Additionally, relationality should not be understood as relativism. For relativism 
radically emerges only where and when each group claims that its own truth claims are 
the only valid ones and hence, universal for all while at the same time relativizing and 
excluding others without allowing room for communication. In such a situation where 
every claim and even every innovation not based in some sort of tradition assumes 
unparalled universal validity without any relation to something of a more holistic reality, 
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the result is radical relativism.
187
 Relationality rather grants that there may be a universal 
ideal but that it is always ungiven, not present in its raw factualness. Reality is never 
unmediated. We have to search for it and interpret it.  But even when it impinges itself on 
us, we still need to interpret it based on the categories available to us in order for meaning 
and understanding to take place. And since we have to find a way of articulating and 
describing reality that is not a given, we necessarily have to fall back on utilizing 
categories that do not exist in a vacuum but form part and parcel of particular linguistic 
repertoires in order to engender understanding. Consequently, there is no such thing as a 
presuppositionless and absolutist conception of reality. As Rabbi Jonathan Sacks rightly 
puts it:   
Each language is the product of a specific community and its history, its   
 shared experiences and sensibilities. There is no universal language. There  
 is no way we can speak, or communicate or even think without placing   
 ourselves within the constraints of a particular language whose contours   
 were shaped by hundreds of generations of speakers, storytellers, artists   
 and visionaries who came before us, whose legacy we inherit and of   
 whose story we become a part.
188
 
  
 Because we cannot but utilize linguistic categories that we already know in order to 
describe that which is ungiven, we definitely then bring our own perceptions and 
presuppositions informed by our social contexts and epistemic repositories to our 
production of reality. Thus, unmediated reality becomes mediated for us through the 
medium of language which is always particular with its own specific symbols, meaning 
systems, and context. This is also partly because of the characteristic epistemic potential 
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of every language to be able to say something new from the wellspring of the already. 
That is why relationality requires openness, respect, honesty, and humility as we 
approach others’ perspectives. Solidarity of others is the atmosphere in which a more 
holistic truth could be attained and in which we can also learn from and be enriched by 
other perspectives in the spirit of mutual respect. In this way, through the paradigm of 
relationality, we are able to live together without destroying our differences but which 
rather become valuable assets for mutual enrichment. Relationality, therefore, creates a 
space of the “in-between,” for “border thinking,”189 where difference is negotiated, 
identity reconfigured, and where we are transformed through mutual openness to learning 
from the other. Relationality thus overcomes the logic of the domination system, the logic 
of discriminatory hierarchies, and the logic of hegemonic epistemology which translates 
into the process of homogenization or reduction of otherness to sameness. The litmus test 
of any order—religious, political, socio-economic, and indeed, any civilization—is 
whether or not it makes room for otherness and recognizes the dignity of equality-in-
difference. It is on this note that the relational pneumatology we propose here would help 
us to tap into ways that would affirm the beauty and importance of difference of all 
people and the whole creation while equipping us with valuable tools for navigating the 
boundaries of difference in the spirit of hospitality and deference.This is all the more 
important in the light of our globalized and interconnected society which “calls us to join 
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across differences [in recognition of our common humanity and] in our common work of 
sharing in God’s creation.”190 And this is solidarity of others par excellence.  
1.7 Conclusion         
 We have so far investigated the crisis that has bedeviled pneumatology in the 
Western theological tradition. Among other things, we saw how the neo-Scholastic 
substance-theistic ontology prepared the way for modernity/coloniality world system. 
With its concentration on subjectivity, modern thought excised the objectivity of the 
Triune God, and, therefore, relegated God/Spirit-language to the realm of human 
subjectivity and construction. With the eclipse of the relational Spirit and the consequent 
metaphysical negation of the historicity, humanity, and difference of the non-European 
African other, colonialism and slavery were formally justified. The church to a large 
extent colluded in such legitimation. The recognition of this crisis invites a recovery of 
relational pneumatology. Relational pneumatology ensures that the unity of the Spirit is 
not inimical to difference and plurality. Relational pneumatology guarantees that human 
subjects, irrespective of their differences on the basis of race, gender, sex, class, ability, 
culture, religion, and so on, can fit together in one world. They can do so while enriching 
and complementing each other by learning something new about the self or otherwise via 
the transformative encounter with the other. Relational pneumatology, therefore, provides 
an other template for negotiating another discourse on the Trinitarian God and, hence, on 
difference, and for identity production in a way that enables us to participate in God’s 
love and hospitality toward all people and all of creation in a globalized world.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Dimensions of Spirit Experience in African 
Weltanschauungen 
 
2.1 Introduction         
 In the first chapter we investigated the crisis of pneumatology in Western 
Systematic Theology. The issue that emerged to view was the loss of the relational nature 
of God and the Spirit especially as articulated in neo-Scholastic substance ontotheology. 
The consequences of that loss include the deployment of difference for exclusionary, 
oppressive, and exploitative purposes culminating in slavery and colonialism. In the light 
of these preliminary considerations, this second chapter aims at examining the Etche
1
 
cosmo-religious weltanschauung. It is one example of West African world-views whose 
focus on relationality as the core mode of being-in-the-world can be harnessed for 
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negotiating the boundaries of difference. Such relationality characterized by dynamism, 
multiplicity, and flexibility, and which aims at the well-being of human beings and the 
community is more glaring in no other than the dimensions of spirit experience. The 
Spirit may have been relegated to the background in much of Western historical/ 
systematic Christian thought. By contrast, The Etche religious universe has been and is 
still suffused with spirit phenomena, for the dimensions of spirits is the horizon within 
which life is possible and lived. We shall, therefore, examine the structure of the Etche 
world-view; the taxonomy of the deities and the problems their relationships pose to the 
conception of One (Supreme) God. The relational understanding of person and the 
importance of mediation/spirit-possession will be discussed as well. Finally, we shall 
evaluate the pitfalls and strengths of the Etche relational religious anthropology for 
religion and society in our globalized world. Overall, our contention here is that relational 
pneumatology provides a template for negotiating difference and another discourse on the 
Trinitarian God.    
2.2 Etche-African Cosmo-Religious World-View   
 A people’s world-view consists not only, on the conscious level, in the complex 
of their belief systems, concepts, institutions, shared history and attitudes, language, and 
their general outlook on the universe around them. Even more so, it fundamentally 
consists, on the unconscious level, in the underlying symbolic and philosophical order. It 
is the symbolic dimension, the order of root-metaphors and root paradigms that 
determines the superstructure of belief systems, meaning-systems and rituals, social 
organizations and institutions, laws and ethics, and all other aspects of a people’s life. 
What is of ultimate value which determines and shapes a people’s measure of other 
  
88 
 
values, life itself, and what is worth living for, is disclosed through their symbolic 
universe expressed in symbols, myths, folktalks, narratives, art and music, proverbs, 
customs, and so on. In the Etche religious ontology, the mould of being is undergirded by 
relationality; it is the magnetic field around which everything gravitates; it is indeed the 
cardinal characteristic of reality.
2
 All beings in this religious world-view belong to either 
the visible or invisible world but with constant interaction between the two realms. While 
my concentration is on the Etche world, I shall also point to similarities or draw support 
from other West African groups especially, the Akan (Ghana) and the Yoruba (Nigeria). 
Let me at this point isolate some key component elements that have generally been 
identified by scholars as structural to West African religious universe, namely: goodness 
of creation, dynamism, harmony, holism, and humanism.
3
 I will summarize them briefly. 
 Goodness of Creation: The world either as created by God or as originally 
intended by God through a demiurge, is fundamentally good. Imperfection or evil in the 
world is not ultimately attributable to God and can only be comprehended within a 
relational framework thereby granting evil only a moral but never an ontological status.
4
   
 Dynamism: West African world-views abhor stasis. They are characterized by 
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dynamism, flexibility, flux, motion, and relationality. These qualities undergird the 
relationships among the different beings that populate these world-views as we shall see 
shortly. Hierarchy or order in this universe is conceived in fundamentally relational 
terms. Every being is a dynamic entity; each is always a part and parcel of a multiplicity 
and plurality of relationships, all of them influencing each other with nothing being 
absolute. Such dynamic interactivity can either strengthen or diminish life; forces could 
be deployed or instrumentalized for good or for ill.      
 Harmony: In this universe, all beings are interlinked and constantly interact with 
one another in a dynamic way. To be, in this world-view, is to be related, and the 
overriding goal of relationships is to establish harmony. The possibility of the 
deployment of power for negative and antisocial purposes invites the need for constant 
checks and balances. This calls for a balance of power relations in the socio-political 
process and for mediators at the mystical/spiritual level who under the guidance of the 
right deities function therapeutically for the realization of human destiny and the 
restoration of wholeness.       
 Holism: The West African universe is one that abhors dichotomy and 
departmentalization of the world into the sacred/profane, spiritual/material, etc. Rather, 
the sacred and the profane, the invisible and the visible why conceived as distinct, they 
are not separated but overlap into each other.      
 Humanism: Without a doubt, the West African world-views focus fundamentally 
on the well-being of the human person. The actions of the divinities are geared toward the 
divinization of human beings as well as the humanization of the world by working out 
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human flourinshing, destiny actualization, and so enhance and promote solidarity of 
others and non-violent negotiation of differences in a way respectful of human dignity.  
2.2.1 The Taxonomy of Spirits in the Etche Religious Universe   
In order to gain a better appreciation of how relationality operates in the Etche 
universe, it is necessary to examine its understanding of the structuration or organization 
of beings that populate its universe. According to Nwogu et al., the Etche religious 
universe is organized around five component elements. These are: “(1) belief in a 
Supreme Deity (God), (2) belief in deities, (3) belief in spiritual forces, (4) belief in 
ancestral spirits, and (5) practice of charms and medicines.”5 Let me briefly talk about 
each of these components.         
 God: This term is used to refer to the Creator, the Unoriginate Origin of all 
existents, and who enjoys an overall supremacy in a dynamic relationship with all other 
beings as their Ultimate Source. Among the Etche, this belief enjoys a diachronic and 
pre-originary status as rooted in folktalks and narratives. In the Akan traditional religion, 
John Pobee writes: God (Onyame) “the Supreme Being has delegated authority to the 
abosom [deities which derive from Onyame as rivers from their source]…and to the 
mpanyinfo (the ancestors)….”6       
 Deities/Divinities: Emefie Ikenga-Metuh observes that the terms deity and 
divinity “refer to that ‘which has the quality of being divine,’ in a comprehensive sense 
                                                 
      
5
 Nwogu et al., The History of Etche, esp. chap. 5: “Etche Traditional Religion.” See also Bolaji E. 
Idowu, African Traditional Religion: A Problem of Definition (London: SCM Press, 1977), 139; Elechi 
Amadi and W.O. Weneka, “Divinities and their (sic) Ikwere Religion and Culture,” in Studies in Ikwere 
History and Culture, ed. Otoni Nduka (Port Harcourt: Kraft Books, 1993), 106. 
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and also to a particular divine being.”7 He equally points out that certain African world-
views regard the deities as manifestations, refractions, servants, or intermediaries of God. 
For the Akan, the deities are viewed, according to Pobee, as Nyame mba (children or sons 
of God which highlights both their derived nature and derived power).
8
 Among the Fon 
of Dahomey, “Mawu-Lisa (God) gave birth to all the deities (Vodu) and assigned to each 
a part of the universe to govern [like Sakpata, incharge of earth; Sogbo, incharge of 
atmospheric phenomenon; Agbe-Naete, incharge of the sea, and Age, incharge of the 
waters and the wild fields].”9 In the Etche world, the deities are generally described as 
Umu-Mmuo. According to Nwogu et al, in the Etche religion, Umu-Mmuo are perceived 
to be “in their domain where they play specialized roles.”10 It is legitimate to say that the 
deities collaborate with God in their assigned but competent areas of specialization 
toward the realization of God’s purpose and the dispensing of divine beneficence for the 
well-being of humanity and the world. But they also enjoy independence of their own 
within the logic of a flexible, dynamic, and relational divine hierarchy. They are also 
sometimes referred to as “nature deities” because they are often associated with natural 
symbolic objects or phenomena like rock, rivers, sun, thunder, and so on. It, however, 
amounts to a category mistake to extrapolate from such “association with” to 
“identification of the deities with” the said natural objects or phenomena. The deities are 
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powerful beings who can either bring good fortunes by ameliorating human destiny or 
misfortunes if their laws are contravened. The deities are usually grounded, having their 
own sacred groves, cults, dovotees, and priests. They also have their own personal names. 
 Spirit-Forces: This term is used to refer to non-human spirits which are not the 
deities in the sense that “generally they have not acquired a distinct personality and cult 
like the deities.”11 The Etche call them arushi. Among the Ashanti of Ghana, they are 
designated asuman (derived from the deities). The spirit-forces can act irrationally and 
can be manipulated or instrumentalized by spirit adepts for good or for ill.
12
   
 Ancestors: This refers to the “living-dead” who have acquired the highest 
spiritual status. Because their spiritual status brings them into closer proximity with God, 
they are able to bring blessings and benfits to their kins and the community. Their 
nearness or closeness to their families and the community is highlighted in such rituals as 
libation and through Eshe music in the Etche world. The pouring of libation is one of the 
cultural practices of the Etche which is a reminder about the intertwinness of the people 
with God, Ala deity, the spirits, and the ancestors.
13
 Eshe is “a high spiritual music loaded 
with messages for the…[living-dead] whose spirits are believed to be present, when 
played.”14 The ancestors are never treated with contempt but always held in reverence. 
There is an ongoing interaction between the living and the living-dead.  
 Finally, Charms and Medicines:  Both charms and medicines are called by the 
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same name in the Etche world as Ogwu. The Akan refer to them as suman, the Ewe call 
them gbo, the Baluba term them bwanga, and so forth.
15
 Ogwu is believed to possess 
mystical powers that could be used for good or for ill. Adepts in the field of African 
medical practice (dibia—medicine man or diviner—in Etche, babalawo in Yoruba, 
nganga in Bantu, etc.) who possess the requisite knowledge and ability can tap and use 
the natural potency of ogwu for good or for ill. Ogwu is understood as medicine when it 
is used for therapeutic purposes. As charms, ogwu could be used for self-protection (like 
amulets, talisman) or negatively for harming others especially one’s enemies (like poison 
– nshi). Here, we see the convergence of the material and the spiritual/mystical.16 
Through divination, the dibias are able to diagnose the spiritual cause of sickness and 
determine the potency and efficacy of a particular ogwu that would ameliorate the 
situation.
17
 These are, therefore, the five component elements that constitute the Etche 
spiritual universe. In what follows, I draw on Metuh’s work to show the certain models of 
the organization of West African religious world-views.      
2.2.2 Models of West African Religious World-Views    
 Metuh has helpfully articulated four models that one may encounter in African 
world-views, namely, the pyramidal, ecological, cosmic, and social.
18
 A brief summary 
of these models is in order.         
 The Pyramidal: Drawing on the insights of Edwin.W. Smith, Metuh relates how 
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some African societies understand the structure of the invisible world in the form of a 
pyramid or triangle. According to this vision, four categories of spiritual beings are 
recognized: God, nature deities, ancestors, and magical powers. While God is at the apex, 
nature deities and ancestors are on the opposite sides of the triangle, and magical powers 
at the base.
19
 Metuh does observe, following Smith, that whereas the Bantu speaking 
societies of East and Central Africa do not have places for nature spirits in their 
cosmologies, they are prominent in West African cosmologies which, therefore, 
recognize five rather than four categories of spiritual beings.
20
 Suggestively, the 
pyramidal model tends to give the impression of a top-down command and unilateral 
hierarchical structure. But we shall show that in the Etche world-view, hierarchy is 
conceived in a relational and dynamic sense.  
 The Ecological: In this model, Metuh samples the Asante of Ghana and the 
Kalabari of Nigeria. The former inhabit an area whose many parts are watered by a 
network of rivers, lakes, and seas, whereas the latter occupy the creeks of the Niger 
Delta. Both, therefore, use the ecological model in classifying the spiritual beings in their 
cosmologies. Particularly, in the Asante myth, Onyame (God) is imaged as the source of 
all beings including the divinities or deities (Abosom) who are conceived as the sons and 
manifestations of God. In a dynamic fashion, the deities flow from Onyame as rivers 
derive from their source. They are sent by God to the earth in order to receive blessings 
that they are in turn to confer upon humankind. There on earth, these deities as sons of 
God become manifest as rivers, lakes, and seas: we have Tano (the great river), Bea 
                                                 
      19 Ibid., 52. 
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(river), Bosmtwe (lake), and Opo (sea). Again, the distributaries of these rivers become 
spirits or spirit-forces (Asuman) as offsprings of the river deities. All these deities and 
spirit-forces together with ancestral spirits flow dynamically into the human community 
to interact with human beings where also charms (suman) and malevolent spirits/witches 
work to disorient relationality and threaten human life. In this vision, as Metuh observes, 
God (Onyame) has placed each deity, as his intermediaries, “in charge of a different 
section of the universe or human need.”21 They work together with the ancestors 
(Samanfo or mpanyinfo) for the realization of divine purpose for human destiny.   
 The Cosmic: According to Metuh, the Igbo of Nigeria use this model. In this 
vision patterned on the heaven-earth relationship, Chukwu (the Great God) or Chineke 
(the Creator God) dwells in the heavens and is surrounded by sky deities such as the Sun-
deity (Anyanwu), Thunder-deity (Amadioha), and Sky-deity (Igwe). On the earth aspect, 
Ala (the Earth Mother) presides on earth and over the deities that inhabit that domain. 
The main earth deities include the Yam-deity (Ajoku ji incharge of Agriculture), 
Divination-deity (Agwu incharge of medicine and health), Fortune-deity (Ikenga), 
Coercion-deity (Agbara), War-deity (Ekwensu), and so on. Ala together with ancestral 
spirits oversees morality, the adjudication of justice, the guardianship of traditional laws 
and customs. There is also a host of malevolent spirit-forces, witches, and sorcerers who 
instrumentalize mystical power for anti-social ends. According to this vision, different 
deities are believed to be agents of God assigned different spheres of influence to meet 
different human needs.
22
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 The Social: This model is exemplified by the Yoruba of Nigeria. Their world-
view is patterned on their socio-political structuration which is centered around a 
centralized administration under a supreme chief (oba). In this model, Olodumare or 
Olorun (God) is resident in the sky where he controls the world from a distance. 
Although ultimate authority resides in Olorun, he does not get involved in the details of 
administration. Rather Olorun entrusts such responsibility to the major divinities called 
Orisha and understood as his sub-chiefs, ministers, or agents. These major deities include 
Orishanla or Obatala (the arch-divinity or demiurge entrusted with the task of creation); 
Oduduwa (mythical hero and founder of divine kingship at Ile-Ife); Onile (Earth Mother); 
Orunmilla or Ifa (deity of divination, medicine, and health); Ogun (Iron and war deity); 
Shango (Thunder deity); Eshu (messenger of the deities and incharge of 
communications). These major deities (Orisa) also have their subordinates called the 
Ebora.
23
 By and large, Metuh acknowledges that these models are by no means 
exhaustive. The reason is that there are still certain West African world-views that 
display more complexities and overlappings than what has been described above. What is 
important is that the models described are representative of some of the typical West 
African world-views.           
 Let us now proceed with the Etche world-view. From the outset, I should perhaps 
underline that the Etche cosmo-religious world-view fits well into the cosmic model as 
described by Metuh. The Supreme Deity (a terminology which is, however, no longer 
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fashionable for its deistic connotation)
24
 is called Chukwu (the Great God), Chineke (the 
Creator), or Ekemkere-Uwa (God who created the universe). The deities include both sky 
and land divinities. The sky ones are Anyanwu (Sun-deity), Amadioha-di-Nwanyiomugwo 
(Thunder-deity), and Igwe-ka-ala (Sky-deity). In the Etche pantheon, “There is no known 
deity associated with the moon.”25 Among the land deities are Ala (Earth Mother), Ekii 
(deity of harvest), Ahajoku ji (deity of yam), Otamiriochhe (River deity), Agwushi (deity 
of divination and medicine), and so on. These major deities (whether sky or land) have 
been grounded and so they have their sacred groves, cults, votaries, and priests as well as 
their images iconized.
26
 The Etche believe that the spirit-forces may be benevolent or 
malevolent in that they may benefit or threaten human life and the community.
27
 The 
ancestors together with the major deities function to ensure health, wealth, and good 
fortune for humankind.
28
 This appears to be the major concern of religion in the Etche 
universe. Now that we have established the structure of the Etche religious universe, let 
me proceed to examine the nature of interaction among the different beings that populate 
this universe. 
2.3 The Nature of Interaction of Beings in the Etche World-View 
                                                 
      24 When I use the terminology “Supreme Deity” (God) here, it is with the understanding that avoids the 
connotation of “Unmoved Mover” as in the sense of First in a series of movers or causes as it was used in 
the 19
th
 century Natural theology. The term is, therefore, used with caution to conceptually underline that 
God as the Unoriginate Origin is the Creator and Originator of all existents and, therefore, enjoys an overall 
supremacy in a relational and dynamic fashion as the Ultimate Source of the beginning of all. 
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 The first point that has to be made is as it has been stated earlier, that relationality, 
dynamism, or flexibility guide interaction among the multiplicity of beings that populate 
the Etche religious universe. It is a universe that abhors stasis. In this religious universe,  
as Ozo-Mekuri Ndimele correctly observes, the spirit and human worlds are reputed to 
maintain a pendulum fluid network of relationships.
29
 It is a religious universe in which 
every being is interconnected with others in a plurality of relationships. In this universe, 
nothing stands alone, to use the Igbo proverb popularized by Chinua Achebe: “ihe kwuru 
ihe esobe ya”—Wherever Something stands, Something Else will stand beside it. In this 
way, Achebe underlines how the Igbo universe abhors absolutism; “Nothing is 
absolute.”30 It is this dynamism and relationality that allow access to the divine.  
 That relationality, duality or multiplicity, and dynamism undergird the essential 
hallmark of being in the Etche world is illustrated in its art and sculpture, music and 
masquerade, among others. One such prominent site in the Etche world that enshrines 
this question of twinness and dynamism is the famous mbari houses. Mbari houses which 
are found in many parts of Etcheland (especially in such towns as Mba, Umuoye, Ozuzu, 
etc.) provide us with significant insight into something beyond the aesthetic value of the 
Etche world. The word mbari literally means “decorated.” Usually, the construction of 
mbari houses takes the effort of the whole community in the spirit of  a’we-ethos” that 
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fosters solidarity.
31
 Such houses contain art works and sculptures by the communities’ 
artists which, inter alia, “depict the portraits of great men of the past…or the conception 
of the activities of the…[deities].”32 What is interesting to note is that through mbari art, 
the Etche world attempts to aesthetically ground an alien or powerful force (spiritual or 
otherwise) in a physical figure that captures its conceivable attributes or qualities with the 
aim of interpreting that force. This explains why mbari figures are not only depictions of 
deities but could also be of alien human figures perceived as a threat to the safety of life 
and the community, like certain colonial officers. Since the Etche world is flexible and 
open to the irruption of alien spiritual forces, mbari art figures serve a mediating role 
especially in the face of a major crisis
33
 by aesthetically capturing the attributes of such 
forces in order to overcome the element of strangeness and threat and to ameliorate 
relationships. This implies that mbari art forms are characterized as a process of an 
ongoing artistic creation not only because the Etche world is flexible but also because 
new spiritual forces are always likely to surface in the scene.
34
 Mbari is, therefore, a 
transitional shrine erected to capture the attributes of forces in order to bring wholeness to 
the community especially after a major crisis.
35
 The prominent figure of Ala (a feminine 
symbol of fertility, justice, life, and human flourishing), for instance, is a creative way of 
transmuting the sinister power of evil and human suffering into the power of life, love, 
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and human flourishing. Thus, mbari is an artistic process that represents the coomunity’s 
attempt to bring about renewal and to fashion an alternative history that enshrines the 
desired experiences of the community. So, even art abhors stasis. Because the likelihood 
of the irruption of new forces was a real one in the Etche world, art becomes an ongoing 
process with a continuing recognition that tension, change, and movement are constant; 
that they form a part and parcel of life and that new visions of other relationships are 
always possible. Indeed, the dynamism, relationality, and openness to flexibility 
prevalent in the Etche world endorse the maxim that no condition but only change is what 
is inexorably permanent. Mbari art figures provide a significant clue to how the Etche 
world attempts to wrestle with and think through the paradoxes and ambiguities of 
relationships in life. Therefore, mbari art entrenches an ongoing process of retelling and 
recreating in search of an alternative history in the face of the ambiguities of life in the 
community in order to restore wholeness and harmony.     
 With regard to duality, twinness as underpinning the Etche world, the observation 
of Amaury Talbot, a colonial historian, provides important and insightful evidence:   
In nearly all towns of importance in the Etche country, elaborate Mbari  
 shrines are to be found, built in honor of the Thunder God. In most, just  
 within the principal entrance, may be seen seated figure of the deity, while  
  from head to foot and bearing in the right hand a sword, spear or bayonet,  
  and in the left an initiation of one the old or one of the long iron scepter 
 —rattles, or possibly another sword or dagger. By his side sits his consent, 
 to whom various names are given, most of them apparently synonyms for  
 the earth goddess, Ale, Ala, Ana, Aja. At Ibodo [Igbodo]…the figure repre-
 sented Ala—Bride of the Bladed Thunder.36 
                                                 
      
36
 P. Amaury Talbot, Some Nigerian Fertility Cults (London: Oxford University Press, 1927; London: 
Frank Cass & Company, 1967), 39. 
  
101 
 
Perhaps it is necessary to dwell a little bit on this observation of Talbot. Although the 
Etche believe that Chukwu or Chineke is the Creator of everything, they do not have an 
elaborate creation myth of origin.
37
 They do not also have mbari depictions or images of 
Chukwu but only of the deities. Prince Amaele correctly notes that among the Etche, 
“there is a general belief…that God is too majestic to be always approached directly. To 
this fact, He (God) became worshipped through the different things He created. The most 
important pantheon in Etche…is the Amadioha…in Ozuzu…. Ala, the deity of the land 
also falls within the hierarchy….”38  When Amaele speaks of God being “worshipped 
through the different things He created,” one is persuaded to understand this to suggest, 
especially in the context of the mention of pantheon, that the deities are intermediaries of 
God in ameliorating harmony in the world and ensuring human well-being. After Chukwu 
(the Creator of all), the most powerful deities known in Etche are Amadioha with his 
greatest sacred grove in Ozuzu and Ala. Indeed, Amadioha Ozuzu became so popular and 
powerful a deity that he more or less eclipsed Chukwu. This is corroborated by Ndimele’s 
submission that “Among the Etche, especially those to the West of the Otamiri River, 
Amadioha Ozuzu has practically usurped the place of Chi (meant Chukwu)…and reigns 
as supreme deity.”39 Amadioha together with his Bride, Ala (Earth Mother) presides over 
justice, morality, and the protection of humans and the community. How powerful 
Amadioha was in dispensing justice, as Nwogu et al grants, won him such a popularity 
that “even extended to other parts of the Lower Niger from where visitors trooped to his 
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shrine to seek justice and protection.”40 In a December 20, 2000 interview, Eze Monday 
Amaechi acknowledged how Amadioha not only assumed the status of a national deity in 
the Etche world but also how, to the present, it still has votaries across various 
communities in Etche.
41
         
 From the evidence provided above, it is clear that in the Etche religious universe, 
Chukwu (God) is neither gendered nor has a wife; Chukwu has no daughter or son. Ala, 
the powerful Earth Mother who presides over all the earth deities, is the bride of 
Amadioha rather than of Chukwu as depicted in the mbari art as seen above. There do not 
exist any mbari arts (or houses) figuring Chukwu (who, by the way, is imageless because 
never represented in any concrete form)
42
 seated with Ala by the side as bride. Only the 
deities and others form the Etche mbari pantheon; Chukwu is not one among them. This 
complete absence of any patrilineage ascribed to Chukwu in the Etche universe is very 
instructive. It preserves the real transcendence of God as the wholly, albeit, relational 
other. We shall return to this later. But suffice it for the moment to underline that the 
mbari art figure of Amadioha with Ala by his side, as documented by Talbot, highlights 
the fact of relationality and twinness as the hallmarks of the Etche pantheon which entails 
a mixed community of divinities of both female and male. For nothing stands alone, 
nothing is absolute. Twinness as the ground of relationality fosters a balancing act in 
ameliorating harmony of interrelationships in the Etche spiritual universe. Amadioha’s 
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influence as the powerful male Sky-deity seems to be counterbalanced and checked by 
the powerful Ala as a female deity. This has enormous implications with regard to the 
experience of power relationships between women and men in the different areas of life 
in the society, be it politics, economy, religion, and so on. In her book, Daughters of 
Anowa, Mercy Amba Oduyoye studied some Ghanaian and Nigerian myths of origins 
and religions (precisely, Yoruba, Ijaw, and Ibibio of Nigeria). She drew attention to the 
prominent role played by female deities, some of which assumed the status of the 
Supreme Creator God. By and large, she systematically came to the conclusion that in 
male-dominated cultures, the only women who are given a modicum of respect are those 
who do not resist letting themselves be sacrificed for the follies of men with the reward of 
deification (as in the case of Aiyelala who became the Okitipupa deity of sexual morality 
and fair play).
43
 Thus when twinness, flexibility, dynamism, and relationality are 
distorted or corraded, it introduces disharmony, marginalization, oppression, and 
subjugation in women-men relationship. Such a corraded relationality lets the men off the 
hook while making women the sacrificial lambs. Imperative is, therefore, the need to 
maintain a delicate balance between matrifocality and patrifocality as evidenced not only 
in world-views but even currently as practiced in certain West African societies such as 
the Akan of Ghana. Oduyoye is on the mark when she writes:    
Neither patriarchy nor matriarchy alone can transform relationships betwe- 
 en men and women. Indeed, these relationships comprise a good deal of  
 what we mean by living fully. If we view patriarchy and matriarchy with  
 the image of a pendulum, we see them at opposite sides, and we know that 
 the pendulum eventually will stand still in the middle. If, instead, we look  
 at the relations between men and women as a spiral, we see that life is move-
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 ment and being, a continuum of dynamic creative and empowering relation-
 ships moving ever upwards.
44
 
Oduyoye’s insight here is very pertinent. Unlike radical Western feminist resistance 
rhetoric that calls for the supplanting of patriarchy with matriarchy as an only alternative, 
it is germane to underline that neither patriarchy nor matriarchy alone suffices. Etche-
African motif of relationality abhors absolutism. Difference is only found, strengthened, 
and enriched in relationality.        
 In the Etche religious space, all the beings that populate it are enmeshed in a 
constant movement of interrelationships. There is continual flow of traffic between the 
visible world inhabited by humans and the invisible realm inhabited by God, the 
divinities, other spirit-forces, and the ancestors as shown in the cosmic model above. As 
Justin Ukpong notes, “while these [dimensions] are [recognized as] distinct spheres of 
life, they are to be seen as interrelated and mutually influencing one another.”45 It is 
evident from the taxonomy of spirits in the different models described above that each 
deity is assigned a different competent area of human need. The numerous spirits, 
therefore, play specialized roles or functions (in their areas of competency/agency) within 
the overall framework of divine economy. The goal of interaction of the different beings 
in the Etche world-view is for the realization of divine purpose for human well-being and 
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cosmic harmony.
46
 The holistic quality of the Etche world-view (which abhors dichotomy 
but not distinction between the sacred and the profane) shows that dynamic relationships 
bear resonances in the social, economic, religious, and political concerns of the Etche 
society.
47
 Because of the constant traffic between the sacred and profane realms of 
existence in the Etche universe, every aspect of quotidian everyday life becomes not only 
a sanctified but also a spiritualized experience.
48
 One area in the Etche universe that 
evidences the interactivity and interconnectedness of the two realms is in the diagnosis of 
disease by dibias (medicine men or diviners). As Robin Horton has illustrated:    
Through the length and breadth of the African continent, sick or afflicted  
 people go to consult diviners as to the causes of their troubles. Usually, the 
 answer they receive involves a god or other spiritual agency, and the rem- 
 edy prescribed involves the propitiation or calling-off of this being. But this 
  is very seldom the whole story. For the diviner who diagnoses the interven-
 tion of a spiritual agency is also expected to give some acceptable account  
  of what moved the agency in question to intervene. And this account very 
 commonly involves reference to some event in the world off visible tangible 
 happenings.
49
     
It is clear from this that for the Etche (African), the spirit world and the material realm 
form a spider-like web of relationships such that what happens in one realm has impact 
on the other. For the Etche, the two worlds cohere and interweave and the human being is 
at the center of it. It can be described as anthropocentric. Metuh is right in observing that 
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“the dichotomy which is so characteristic of Graeco-Christian world-view is strikingly 
absent in African world-view. There is no…opposition between the visible and the 
invisible, the material and spiritual, the temporal and non-temporal, the sacred and the 
profane.”50 This belief is exemplified, inter alia, in the association of deities with material 
objects (like rocks, rivers, trees, mountains, sun, moon) and natual phenomena; and this 
association should not be understood to mean identicality as some who would be quick to 
term it animism
51
 are wont to do.  Contrary to this view is the Durkheimian functionalist 
reduction of the soul of religion to the idea of society and communal (social) needs which 
has nothing to do with the material/profane order reduced to the realm of private and 
personal concerns.
52
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2.4 God as Transcendent-Immanent      
 Although, as mentioned above, the Etche do not have any elaborate myth of 
creation, yet it is believed that there exists One (Supreme Deity) God who is the creator 
of all. According to Amaele:           
The acknowledgement and worship of God in Etche right from origin has  
 not been in doubt. It did not come as a result of Western interference as 
 some…hold. Hence, Chukwu (big God), Ekemkere-uwa (the creator of the 
 universe), Chineke (the spirit that creates), Onyenwe-uwa (the owner of the 
 world), are among the different names of God in Etcheland. These names  
 have been in use before the coming of the missionaries.
53
    
There is no account of how this God created whether directly or indirectly through a 
demiurge (as in the case of the Yoruba cosmology in which Olorun assigns Obatala with 
the task of creation). But the naming of God in the Etche world-view as in the Igbo 
tradition invites further scrutiny. What does it really mean to say that among the Etche, 
Chukwu, as Amaele points out, has been acknowledged and worshipped right from origin 
without any shred of doubt? How can we justify this stress on the worship of One 
(Supreme) God and the question of a multiplicity of spirits? Why the multiplicity of 
spirits and of what is their use to religion? How can we explain the manner of the 
relationship between God and the numerous deities as well as that between God, the 
deities, and human beings? Is this God the same God that the Etche West African 
Christians also acknowledge and worship as the Trinity of Persons (God-Christ-Spirit)? If 
so, how are they the same and where lies the novelty? These questions will occupy us.
 In the first place, just as the Etche acknowledge Chukwu, the Ashanti Onyame, the 
Yoruba Olodumare, as the One God, no one today seriously believes that the concept of 
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God in ATR is a missionary fabrication or a borrowed one. However, among Igbo 
scholars, matters of controversy over the use of the nomenclatures, Chineke and Chukwu 
(Creator and Supreme Deity), has not been avoided. Achebe has drawn attention to the 
hypothesis that the word Chineke could be a hasty merging of the names of two distinct 
deities Chi and eke by the early missionaries to designate the Creator God of Christianity 
without taking cognizance of the tonality of the Igbo language.
54
 In a non-cosmological 
sense chi refers to the alternation of daylight and night, that is, the going and returning of 
daylight (chi-obubo and chi-ojiji) or to simply day (ubochi). But in a cosmo-religious 
sense Chi may mean God, guardian spirit or deity, or the idea of purveyor of 
destiny/fortune. Whereas Eke is a word which translates several things depending on 
tonality and usage: market day, to tie, to share, to create, snake, a spirit. Thus, the 
meaning of a combination of the two terms “Chi-na-eke” depends on the tonality 
assigned to the word “na” (which could mean who/which, does, or the conjunctive and). 
In the first instance, Chineke would mean Chi who/which creates; in the second, Chi does 
create, and in the third, it becomes Chi and eke. Because of the Igbo penchant to think in 
terms of duality, Achebe is inclined to upholding the missionary hasty fusion of a dual 
deity, chi and eke.
55
 The issue, however, remains unresolved.     
 With regard to the word Chukwu used to refer to the Igbo Supreme Deity, 
Donatus Nwoga and Christopher Ezekwugo, among others,
56
 would prefer that the word 
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be dropped. Against the backdrop of Igbo republicanism, Nwoga contends that the 
concept of Chukwu as Supreme and Absolute Being is an aberration and a stranger to 
Igbo traditional thought. Again, from a pragmatic and utilitarian viewpoint, Nwoga 
argues that Chi (the true Igbo God) satisfied all the needs that the Igbo would expect from 
transcendence and hence rendered redundant the idea of a Supreme God since there was 
no felt need for him.
57
 These scholars claim that the name, Chukwu, was the epithet of a 
local deity of the Arochukwu clan which became valorized and imposed on all of 
Igboland. According to this position, the missionaries to Igboland found the name 
apropros and immediately adopted and uncritically identified it with the Supreme Being 
of deism and with the Yahweh of the Judeo-Christian tradition. With fascinatingly 
documented evidence, these scholars attempt to rather prove that Chi is the only God in 
traditional Igbo thought. Whether or not Nwoga and the others have proved their case 
beyond reasonable doubt remains to be said. Achebe, however, rejects the claims of the 
Arochukwu or missionary invention of Chukwu. From the beginning, “Igbo traditional 
thought in its own way and style,” Achebe writes, “did recognize Chukwu as the 
Supreme Creator, speculating only on the modalities, on how He accomplished the work 
and through what agencies and intermediaries. As we have seen He appears to work 
through chi to create man (emphasis original).”58     
 Whereas Nwoga deems the question of Chukwu (Supreme Being) as 
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irreconcilable with the ethos of Igbo republicanism, Achebe locates their congruity in the 
dynamism, flexibility, and relationality that characterize Chukwu’s supremacy. Thus, in 
recalling the myth of Igbo origin, Achebe draws attention to how Chukwu (God) 
exercised power/authority in a consultative manner with Nri and Adama, the founding 
kings of the Igbo nation:   
Ezenri and Ezadama came from heaven and rested on an ant heap; all was  
 water. Cuku (Chukwu) asked who was sitting there and they answered “We 
 are the kings of Nri and Adama,” thereupon Cuku gave them each a piece  
 of yam; yams were at that time unknown to man, for human beings walked 
  in the bush like animals…59  
This myth narrative did not just end there. Achebe remarks that “Later on Chukwu tells 
Ezenri how to plant and tend the yam, but Ezenri complains that the ground was too wet; 
and Chukwu advises him to send for Awka people—workers in iron—to blow on the 
earth with their bellows and make it dry.”60 The narrative, according to Achebe, 
highlights Chukwu as exercising his power in relational and dynamic way by engaging 
the founding heroes in conversation. To my mind, it is clear from this Igbo (West 
African) myth sample, that God’s power is not exercised to dominate and homogenize 
but is rather respectful of difference. It is exercised as “power-with” rather than as 
“power-over.” Precisely as power-with, it promotes collaboration, participatory 
engagement which encourages genuine plurality. Indeed, the “Supreme God in the 
African religious world view is conceived to be accommodating of other powers as he is 
ecumenical. It is this religious belief in the ecumenical character of God, together with 
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his flexibility, that helps us make sense of the welcoming and accommodating 
character—a spirit of unity in diversity—prevalent in Africa’s traditional religion.”61 And 
what is more, Achebe continues, “Chukwu Himself in all His power and glory did not 
make the world by fiat. He held conversations with mankind; He talked with those 
archetypal men of Nri and Adama and even enlisted their good offices to make the earth 
firm and productive.”62 In this way, Achebe conceives Chukwu’s dynamic, flexible, and 
relational sovereignty as not incompatible with the Igbo ethos of republicanism. Metuh 
has also drawn attention to different parts of Igboland that used Chukwu simultaneously 
as the epithet for God which cannot be traced to either the alleged Aro clan colonialism 
or missionary invention.
63
 At any rate, the pay-off of the thesis of Nwoga’s school is that 
we may not naïvely affirm the supremacy of One God amidst the multiplicity of spirits as 
well as the identity of the God of ATR in relation to the Judeo-Christian God without 
caution or rigorous effort and critical justification.  
 Moreover, on the question of the relationship between God and the deities, some 
theories have been put forward. One such theory is that espoused by Mircea Eliade which 
borders on the withdrawal of the Sky god from the world. Eliade had opined that in 
primitive societies, “the god of the sky seems so far beyond human reach that other 
religious conceptions must come in to replace him. Often these new conceptions are gods 
of the rain and storm, deities who are more concrete and personal, more directly involved 
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in human life because they specialize in one task.”64 Other stories with regard to how 
God used to live in close proximity with human beings in an original state of equanimity 
before withdrawing far away from the world of humans are widespread.
65
 But does the 
myth of the withdrawn God really mean that the God of ATR is otiose? Is God’s 
transcendence or distance coextensive with otioseness? Contra Eliade, I do not think that 
the alleged withdrawal of the so-called Sky god is the condition of possibility for the 
emergence of the deities or, for that matter, of religion in any African world-views. As 
we have seen from the different models of the West African world-views above, God is 
conceived to be the Source of all other beings. For the Etche, Chineke is the Creator of 
all; for the Akan, the deities (Abosom the source of Asuman) derive from Onyame as from 
a river Source; for the Yoruba, Obatala (demiurge) is assigned by Olodumare with the 
task of creating the world and human beings. Yet God’s dynamic and flexible 
transcendence rather seems to allow for the independence of the deities in their 
collaborative agency toward the realization of divine economy for the well-being of 
humans and the world.         
 No doubt, in the Etche world, Chukwu (God) only has a name but not image 
because as we saw above, there is never any artistic representation of the image of God in 
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the mbari houses. It speaks to the mysterious quality of God. It is only the deities that 
figure in the mbari houses. Besides, God, in the Etche world-view is also never depicted 
as having a wife. God is transgender and transsex. Only the deities such as Amadioha and 
Ala have gender and sex ascribed to them. Again, there is no sacred grove or temple 
dedicated to Chukwu in Etche, no cult, no special devotees, and no institutionalized 
priesthood.
66
 This is all a pointer to the transcendence of God which allows God to 
maintain an equi-distance with each and all. Everyone and not merely some special 
devotees or chosen can turn to God in prayer at any time and anywhere. For example, 
Amaele makes this instructive observation:         
In Etche, although God is believed to be everywhere at every time, yet His  
 abode is up the sky. This is why an average man or woman when forced to 
 unbearable circumstances by neighbours raises up his or her two palms to  
  the sky saying: ‘My God see my two palms, they are clean, if I merit what  
 I am suffering you know better. If not, then you that fight for the widow or 
 helpless or childless should please interfere.’ God is perceived as an impart-
 ial judge, overseer, and loving.
67
          
This is a way of saying that the same God who is believed to dwell in the heavens is 
equally present and near, caring and providing, listening and protecting. God can be 
invoked by anybody like the man/woman referred to by Amaele or even by the 
community. In the above instance, the prayer is addressed directly to God without any 
recourse to the deities or ancestors as the case may be. Amaele maintains that one of the 
proofs for the belief in the nearness of God among the Etche is evident in the theophoric 
proper names that they take or that parents give to their children. Such names are, for 
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example: Chukwudi (God exists), Heanyichukwu (nothing is beyond God’s control); 
others are Chinonso (God is near), Chinazo (God protects), Chinwikpe (God is the 
impartial judge), Chibuzo (God is the way), Chibuike (God is strength), Chinaza (God 
who answers), Daberechi (leaning on God), Chimamkpa (God knows a person’s pressing 
need), and so on.
68
         
 Nevertheless, albeit God can be approached directly as in the case of the 
man/woman praying directly to God with uplifted hands toward the sky, yet the deities, 
the ancestors, and other mediums function in their areas of competency assigned to them 
by God for the amelioration of human good and the world. Among the Ashanti of Ghana, 
there is also no temple for Nyame. The closest there is is the “Nyamedua, a three-forked 
branch supporting a pot into which food items are put as offerings to God.”69 The pot 
which also contains rainwater symbolizes how the nearness of God provides for the needs 
of humans. But even at that, it is clear that the Nyamedua (God’s tree) is not an image of 
Nyame but only a symbolic three-pronged branch. And even among the Igbo, Francis 
Arinze has drawn attention to sacrifices made directly to God but they are so rare that the 
ordinary Igboman/woman may not be aware that they are offered at all.
70
 Also, the Nupe 
of northern Nigeria speak of the nature of God as Soko lokpa, which means, “God is far 
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away, yet…he is present always and everywhere.”71 When all is said and done, these 
examples indicate that God is believed to be truly transcendent; yet that transcendent God 
is “still considered to be close enough to be approached formally in worship [like the 
offering of sacrifices], and more especially informally in ejaculatory statements featuring 
the God-name….”72 From all this, it becomes obvious that, according to facts on ground, 
the myth of the withdrawn God in ATR who is ordinarily approached through 
intermediaries or ministers, does not present the entire picture. While the fact of 
mediation is the case, it is clear that direct prayers and sacrifices are also made to God 
without recourse to the intermediary of the deities. Besides, prayerful and worshipful 
attitudes are also exhibited toward the deities and ancestors as though they were self-
sufficient.
73
 One must admit that the issues are complicated and so may not easily be 
resolved or explained away.         
 Transcendence or distance as understood in the Etche African matrix is not 
coextensive with absence. Rather, God as the transcendent is concretely mediated. 
Perhaps this explains why Amaele states broadly that “there is a general belief among the 
people [of Etcheland] that God is too majestic to be always approached directly. To this 
fact, He became worshipped through the different things He created. The most 
important…are… Amadioha…Ozuzu and…Ala, the deity of the land.”74 This suggests an 
understanding of the nature of God’s transcendence as a mediated presence. Although, 
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Amaele admits that direct prayers are made to God as seen above, his position still does 
not say it all since the deities in the Etche world are also often approached (independently 
devoid of any reference to God) in a worshipful attitude suggestive of their autonomy. 
His position, nevertheless, draws attention to the fact that reality is never unmediated. 
Amaele’s reference to divine majesty as the condition for God being worshipped 
indirectly tends to resonate with a particular insight of Evans Zeusse: “Power unmediated 
is terrific and breaks boundaries. Power as it is disseminated in articulated divine order is 
good.” He goes on to remark, “God does not involve himself too directly in the world that 
he sustains, for too particular and intense an involvement might destroy the fabric of the 
divine order he sustains.”75 Is it really because unmediated divine power is terrific and 
perhaps destructive that God becomes distant or withdrawn as Zeusse seems to suggest? 
To my mind, I would rather think that transcendence preserves the holy Mystery which is 
God such that even if God is present, such presencing does not exhaust the reality that is 
God. The holy mystery of God is not provisional by nature so as to veer toward the non-
mysterious once unraveled and elucidated. Mystery is characteristically essential to 
God.
76
 For a God that is completely known and appropriated becomes an idol.
77
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Therefore, the distance which is of the nature of God should rightly be characterized as a 
transcendent-immanent and as a mediated presence but never absence or abdication. 
Bénézet Bujo is right on target when he writes:  
Much of what has been written about Africa’s ‘absent God’ must be consid- 
 ered mistaken. God is not far from the African world. All relationships, bet- 
 ween person and person, living and dead, and between persons and nature,  
 are rooted in God and point towards God and towards the end of all things in 
 God. They (all those relationships) have a sacramental nature, proclaiming 
 that every person’s future lies with God (emphasis mine).78    
         
  One significant point that needs to be made is that the understanding of God’s 
transcendence in a dynamic, flexible, and relational sense carries social and political 
ramifications which bear out in the Etche world. The operational liberty—informed by 
God’s transcendence—with which the deities function in their specialized roles toward 
the realization of God’s provident purpose for the world impacts on the Etche socio-
political organization. As Amaele aptly puts it:       
 In Etche generally, democratic process of administration…is essential be- 
 cause every village is a republic of its own. The local administration is  
 the responsibility of the council of elders…and…community assembly of  
 which  every grown-up is a member. The entire community congregation de-
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 cides important issues affecting the villagers…. Every grown-up…has the  
 right to express his views on any matter raised.
79
  
One sees here how the Etche world-view impacts, inter alia, how life is organized in the 
society. Rather than threatening God’s supremacy and authority, the dynamism and 
flexibility of divine hierarchy promotes, as we have seen above, inclusive and 
participatory relationships in divine administration. In the Etche socio-political 
engineering everyone has the right to express one’s views on any issues. This right which 
is often expressed as “onye kwuo uche ya” (let each say his/her mind on matters of 
concern to him/her) highlights the respect accorded the dignity and independence of 
every human being. Discussion and consensus rather than imposition by absolute fiat are 
ideals held in highest esteem in the socio-political process by the Etche. Social and 
political administration in the Etche world appears to be patterned on such inclusive and 
participatory model informed by its world-view. Amaele is right on target when he 
observes: “It is evident that in Etcheland, political powers are shared among various 
groups, bodies and individuals. The absence of any centralized authority as the basic 
political unit is the feature of the Etche people.”80 It is clear that in this kind of 
administrative structure, authority rather than being threatened is balanced and enhanced 
through the participatory and collaborative genius of all involved in the process. This 
kind of republicanism, no doubt, neutralizes the tendency to dictatoship and autarchic 
unilateralism.           
 Interestingly, it is striking to note that even among the Yoruba who practice a 
                                                 
      
79
 Amaele, The Socio-Political History of Etche, 43-4. 
      
80
 Ibid., 45. 
  
119 
 
centralized political system of administration under a supreme chief (Oba), power is not 
exercised in a strictly authoritarian way. Yoruba myths portray Olodumare as King and 
the Orisa (deities as shown in the social model above) as divine representatives or sub-
chiefs, or administrators of the kingdom. Power and authority in the Yoruba kingdoms 
are “widely dispersed among partly independent town units, whose leaders are chosen by 
the people as counterweights to the central authority.”81 The Yoruba Oba is viewed as a 
divine king. His sacrality shields him from immediate contact with the people since 
sacredness, whether of human or divine, has to be mediated. Hence he rather governs the 
kingdom by a widely dispersed exercise of power through his sub-chiefs in council who 
are closer to the people. Typically, it is an oligarchic monarchy. This kind of 
participatory administration rather than threatening or diminishing or compromising the 
power of the Oba as Metuh is wont to suggest,
82
 enhances it while at the same time 
neutralizing autocratic tendencies. Consequently, “the Yoruba Oba, in spite of the 
religious aura which surrounded him as a divine King, if found unpopular, could be 
deposed…by his council.”83 Thus, despite their centralized socio-political organization 
under a supreme divine king to whom they owe obedience and loyalty, the Yoruba abhor 
absolutism. Neither are they “unquestioning in expressing their allegiance to authority.”84 
These societies we have been considering differ from the Hausa-Fulani societies in 
northern Nigeria, for instance. Islamic jihadists in the late 18
th
 and early 19
th
 centuries 
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championed by Uthman dan Fodio had “brought the North under a centralized authority 
that was vertically hierarchical, despotic in character and highly stratifying of the 
polity.”85 In such autocratic monarchy, as in the case of northern Nigeria, authority is 
given a sacred sanction by the Islamic religion and the Hausa emir could only be deposed 
by his overlord, the Sultan of Sokoto.        
 Perhaps it is also worth noting that prior to the advent of Islam and Christianity in 
Nigeria, for instance, there were no religious conflicts in the name of the Supreme God of 
ATR. As Iheanyi Enwerem underlines, “people in Africa were not involved in religious 
conflicts until the intrusion by the Islamic and Christian religions, each claiming to 
possess the only true God and, consequently, each less than tolerant of other religious 
world views.”86 But as we have seen above, the dynamic, flexible, and relational 
transcendence of God in the Etche (or Igbo, Yoruba, Akan) cosmo-religious universe is 
accommodating of collaborative exercise of power. The dynamic and flexible 
transcendence of God as the condition of possibility for the multitude of deities to freely 
exercise their independent agencies in carrying out the tasks assigned them by God in 
specific areas of human needs within the framework of divine economy precludes 
conflict. In this connection, violent competition is structurally eliminated within divinity. 
Nigerian Nobel laureate, Wole Soyinka, speaking of tolerance and respect for otherness 
as the hallmarks of his Yoruba Orisa religion insists: “the religion of the orisa, abhors 
such principles of coercion or exclusion, and recognizes all manifestation of spiritual 
urgings as attributes of the complex disposition of godhead. Tolerance is synonymous 
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with the spirituality of the black continent, intolerance anathema.”87 Soyinka is here 
condemning the exclusivist monotheistic rhetoric of the two foreign religions that 
intruded Africa, Islam and Christianity, with their penchant for intolerance and 
totalization. God’s transcendence which, as articulated in the Etche world-view, entails 
God’s gender-neutrality, no institutionalized cult/priesthood/devotees, no temple, and no 
image represented in mbari figures, means that God is beyond instrumentalization and 
appropriation. Every religion in and of itself has something good about it. Yet it can be 
abused by its adherents for negative and violent purposes. The multiplicity of deities in 
the West African religions can and have been instrumentalized by their specific devotees 
for negative ends. While Enwerem and Soyinka are right, yet their position veers toward 
romanticism. They tend to ignore the fact that some societies in Nigeria have war deities 
whose services are enlisted to do violence during inter-ethnic and other forms of 
conflicts. For example, the Etche (and Igbo) have Ekwensu
88
 and the Yoruba have Sango. 
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It should be recalled, as we have established, that these deities enjoy operational liberty in 
their responsibilities. But they can be instrumentalized for good or for ill. However, it 
remains correct to insist that God in the Etche and the other world-views we have seen 
does not inspire and could not be instrumentalized for violence thanks to his 
transcendence.   
2.4.1 God’s Transcendence and the Inter-Relational Agency of the Spirits 
 From the models of the West African world-views that have been described 
above, one thing that appears to be suggestive is that the deities are the intermediaries or 
agents of God as Metuh underlined. It is true that the Etche, for example, recognize 
Chukwu as the Creator and who exercises supreme authority over all of creation. Yet 
Amadioha and Ala who preside over justice and oversee morality are revered as the most 
powerful deities. They are so close to and involved in the life and quotidian affairs of the 
people that in certain parts of the Etche country, Amadioha has almost taken the place of 
God as intimated above. According to Ndimele, the ancestors and one’s personal chi also 
have a hand in the tide of a person’s life.89 In the Yoruba cosmology, Olodumare 
entrusted the task of creating the world to Obatala who even introduced imperfection in 
creation because he got drunk with palm-wine. Among the Ashanti, the deities (Abosom, 
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water deities) are sometimes described as sons of God because they derive from him and, 
therefore, share his spirit or nature. They are, not surprisingly, considered by the Ashanti 
as intermediaries or delegated ministers of Nyame.
90
 They are also considered as 
executioners for God since they enjoy the liberty of punishing offenders by sometimes 
bringing death and destruction upon outlaws.
91
      
 But above all, in ritual situations (private or communal), the deities are offered 
prayers following the same modality for praying to God. Arinze has drawn attention to an 
example of morning prayer to Chukwu and the deities in the Igbo tradition: “Chineke 
(Ezechitoke) ekene; Ani ekene, Igwe ekene…. Taani oji; Ogbuefi nnam…taa oji (God 
greetings; Earth, greetings, Sky, greetings…. Take kola all; Ogbuefi my father [ancestor] 
take kola.”92 These examples seem to give a suggestion of looking at the deities as self-
sufficient entities. Do their seeming self-sufficiency rival with God’s? Are they in 
competition with God? There is no easy solution to the question of the relationship 
between the stress on One God and a multiplicity of divinities in ATR. Nonetheless, as 
Kwesi Dickson cautiously suggests: “The most one can say is that God’s self-sufficiency 
is never in doubt, even if other deities may be recognized and worshipful attitudes 
adopted before them.”93 One may deduce from Dickson’s cautious insight that the 
apparent autonomy and independence of the deities do not diminish God’s sovereignty 
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and supreme authority. It is the case that in these West African world-views, the dynamic 
and flexible transcendence of divine hierarchy creates the condition of the possibility of 
the deities exercising their functions in their respective areas of competency with liberty 
for the good of human beings in the world. Indeed, Kwame Gyekye clearly states: 
“Although the deities were created by God, they are considered in Akan theology and 
cosmology to have independent existence of some sort; they operate independently of 
God and in accordance with their own desires and intentions.”94 All this goes to show an 
inclusive relational rather than an exclusive absolutist divine hierarchy as the hallmark of 
the Etche religious universe. While the supremacy of God is not diminished, the 
multiplicity of deities, ancestors, and other mediums independently play specialized but 
complementary roles in the different areas of human need assigned to them within the 
framework of the divine economy. Having seen so far how dynamism, flexibility, and 
multiplicity undergird the relational being in the Etche cosmo-religious universe, let me 
proceed to treat in a more specific way how the multiplicity of relationships structure or 
shape the realization of individual human destiny.    
2.5 The Relational Understanding of Person in the Etche World 
 From the sample models of West African world-views we have seen above, it is 
obvious that the human person occupies the center of a universe (visible and invisible) 
structured by a network of dynamic relationships. There does not exist any elaborate 
myth of the creation of the human person in the Etche cosmology. However, it is believed 
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that the human person comprises the following dimensions:
95
 ahu (the material body); 
ume-ndu (breath or life or breath of life; the animating principle which ceases when the 
person dies); obi (which could mean either heart or soul depending on usage. Understood 
as soul, it is an undying part of the person which only departs from the person and returns 
to God at death); mmuo (the human spirit; it is this part of the person that can leave the 
body at night to wander about and engaging in certain activities while the person is 
sleeping much like in the dream. Before the person wakes up, the spirit returns to the 
body. If it is attacked by witches or other evil spirits or stopped from returning to the 
sleeping body, then the person unable to wake up dies. It is also this spirit that goes to the 
ancestral realm). Then there is chi (the personal deity, destiny or guardian spirit, the 
bearer of fortunes, and the personal creator assigned by God to each person. Chi returns 
to God at death. Through chi, God is ontologically linked to each person). Finally, there 
is eke (ancestral guardian spirit manifested in the form of excellent virtues, character, or 
physical resemblances as received from God).       
 Accordingly, God endows a unique creative agent called personal chi who creates 
each person. One can, nevertheless, draw on the proverbs and beliefs of the Etche. A 
significant Etche proverb says: “Chi abughu otu”96 meaning chi is not one. This maxim 
can enable an insight into the people’s belief. As we have seen above in the analysis of 
the word Chi, it is used here in this maxim in a cosmological rather than non-
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cosmological sense. Cosmologically, it may mean God, guardian spirit, or destiny.
97
 
Since it has already been established that the Etche believe that God is One and Supreme, 
then chi as used in the maxim does not apply to God. To say that chi is not one, therefore, 
means that each person has a unique creator chi. Indeed, an Igbo proverb makes this point 
clearer: “ofu nne n’amu ma ofu chi adi eke”98 meaning one mother may give birth (to 
different children) but each child is created by a unique personal chi. Chi is thus 
responsible for the individuality of each person because no two persons have the same 
chi. It is chi that humanizes each person. Ndimele has remarked that in Etche, “The 
personal deity is commonly called chi. The tide of a person’s life is ascribed to his [or 
her] chi.”99 Chi not only individualizes and humanizes a person but is also dynamically 
connected to personal self-actualization and achievement. Although the tide of a person’s 
life may be controlled by his or her chi (à la Ndimele), it is also true as we have seen 
earlier that the Etche abhor absolutism. That explains why absolute power concentrated 
in one’s personal chi is abhorrent to the Etche, hence the proverb: “Onye kwe chi ya 
ekwe” meaning if a person agrees, his or her chi also agrees. This supports the 
characteristic dynamism, flexibility, and relationality that ground the republican ethos of 
the Etche, the Igbo, and others as we have seen above.     
 According to the Etche anthropological assumption, each person is ontologically 
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linked to God through his or her personal chi. Chi which is the spiritual dimension of the 
self constitutes the intimate point of access into God.  As a personal deity, chi, in the 
traditional Etche world, has a cult in every mgbala (the woman’s hearth) and in ritual 
situation is offered prayers and sacrifice.
100
 Because of the intimacy with one’s personal 
chi and the desire to have one’s destiny realized, there is not infrequently the temptation 
to accord more importance to the personal chi than to God or the deities. Ezekwugo 
provides a sample morning prayer addressed to Chi which, albeit, is for him the true 
name of the Igbo God represented by the ikenga symbol/cult (the male symbol of 
achievement): “Ife-Jioku taa oji; Chi-m taa oji; Nnaa fa taa oji; Chi Okafor taa oji; 
Chusasialanu-m ndi ajo muo (Ife Jioku, eat kola; My chi eat kola; My ancestrs eat kola; 
the chi of Okafor, eat kola; Drive away from me the evil spirits).”101   
 Nevertheless, each person is equally loved and gifted by God. That is why another 
Etche aphorism says: “Chi ana aka ibe ya” which means no one’s own chi is greater than 
another’s. No person is more unique than another. Everyone has the same equal dignity 
rooted in the presence of God in each person through his or her personal chi. Indeed, chi 
is the imago Dei in each human being.
102
 Each person is therefore, considered to be of 
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value. No individual is thus swallowed up in the “we.” This speaks to the irreplacibility 
and irreducibility of every person. By extension, no one community is more unique than 
another. Our gifts may be different but none is more unique than another. According to 
Elochukwu Uzukwu, “Among the Igbo this spiritual element [chi] is the basis of the 
creativity of the individual person in community.”103     
 In fact, the multiplicity of personal chi responsible for the multiplicity of 
individuals as well as distinct gifts and destinies is the condition of possibility for human 
interactivity and relationships in the community. Difference and multiplicity as seen 
through the lens of destiny undergird human interaction for mutual enrichment. The 
identity of a person is constructed and nourished within the framework of complex 
relationships. Indeed, the self becomes a self at all only through living intercourse with 
other selves and within networks of personal, social, cultural, and natural relations.
104
 Chi 
opens a person up to go beyond the self toward others. In the light of this framework, any 
claim to an individual self-sufficiency unto oneself wars against friendship and solidarity 
of others. Charles Nyamiti’s observation is ad rem: “The deeper one’s communion is 
with others, the more fully he or she will be a person. Since personality is nourished by 
communication, the more we communicate to others, the more we deepen and discover 
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our personality.”105 To be sure, relationship is not simply an avenue toward self-
realization. Rather it is essentially a way of being person. Personhood is being as 
communion.
106
 Individualism breaks down communication, participation, solidarity of 
others, and consequently, institutes egoism, stasis, and eventual death. Chi abhors stasis 
(in the Greek sense that views motion, dynamism, or flexibility as imperfection) and 
engenders movement to self-beyondness. In this movement, creativity unleashes newness 
and new possibilities.           
 Now let me further buttress the point made above with an investigation of another 
West African (Akan) notion of person. The Akan anthropology clearly illustrates how 
relationships constitute personhood. According to this anthropology, the human person is 
composed of at least seven elements as summarized by Peter Sarpong.
107
 The first is 
mogya (blood) which is inherited from the mother; the blood which makes the person a 
biological being constitutes the material aspect of the person; it connects the person to to 
the clan system thereby giving him or her status and membership within a lineage, and 
obligations as a citizen in a matrilineal society; this part of the person dies. Then there is 
okra or kra which is the soul (though not simply reducible to the soul); it is the individual 
personality and it has a cult; it is the guardian spirit assigned to each person as well as the 
the humanizing aspect of the person.  It is the undying part of the person which he 
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recieves from the Supreme Being.
108
 Okra or kra can be said to be the equivalent of the 
Etche and Igbo chi. The kra “receives a destiny package from God on behalf of his ward 
and sees to the realization of the content of this predestined lot which is believed to be 
unalterable.”109 Another element is the sunsum (spirit) or a spiritual preexistent principle. 
It is changeable and dynamic and, therefore, subject to either growth or diminution, being 
strengthened or weakened. It can, however, be trained to be heavy instead of being light; 
for to be lightweight is to easily fall prey to the activity of witches.  It is the principle 
which determines the character and individuality of the human person. Gyekye calls it the 
activating principle in the person.
110
 There is the ntoro which is a spiritual element 
received through the father which calls for the respect accorded one’s father. Post-
puberty, the person becomes guided by his or her own ntoro. Accordingly, the sunsum, 
ntoro, and kra make a spiritual being. Then there is the sasa, the avenging part of the 
human person which urges wrongdoers to confess wrongs afflicted on others. And 
finally, there is the saman, which is the form a person assumes after death; it is the form 
in which the spirits of the ancestors exist.        
 Clearly, one can see from the Akan human type how the personal spirit that 
undergirds West African anthropology is structured by a multiplicity of relationships. In 
this connection, by virtue of the ntoro, the person belongs to his father’s kinship group; 
through mogya, the person is linked to his matrilineal clan; through kra, the person is 
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inextricably related to God. Truly, therefore, to exist, to be a person, is essentially to be 
related. It is this interlinked complex of relationships that socially define a person. And 
one can only continue to be a person only by nourishing and deepening these 
relationships. As indicated above, these relationships not only bestow status but also 
accrue obligations to the person which invite the person to go beyond the self in order to 
move toward, to reach out to others. Thus, the West African human type abhors stasis 
which is against motion, change, newness, and the possibility of alternative relationships. 
Relationality lies at the core of sociality and society. Because each person is endowed 
with a unique destiny, then each needs the experience, endowments, services, and 
contributions of others for their comparative advantage
111
 since God did not give all 
destinies to one person, but some to one person and some to others, so that all have need 
of each other. Diversity, difference, and plurality thus invite relationality and sociality. 
Personhood as a nexus of relationships is aptly expressed in the beautiful African 
apothegm, “I am because we are and we are because I am.” To put it differently, a 
person’s existence, worth, and identity are realizable only within the matrix of communal 
and cosmic web of relationships that shape them. At the same time, the order, function, 
and worth of community are only possible because of the personal contribution of its 
individual members.          
 A crucial point worth stressing is the freedom of persons to creatively actualize 
their destinies, albeit, always in collaboration with their individual personal chi 
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(guardian-spirit). The need for destiny realization incites persons unto an ongoing 
movement or process of auto-realization through creativity and diligence toward a life 
that is fully lived. To attain such a fully lived life necessarily entails communion of life 
with others. Francis Njoku lends credence to this vision as he writes:    
Part of the affirmation of human dignity and auto-creation [in West Africa]  
is in doing something in which the self shows itself as living. [This]…auto- 
creation needs not be in manual or intellectual work but an expression of the   
self in its authentic individuality where one communes and shares realistically 
with others no matter how little. As an existent-subject, one contributes to the   
world of humanization and affirmation.
112
  
It is small wonder then that individuals in the Etche world are at least known or 
recognized for something. It could be for their prowess, creativity, success, and 
achievement. For example, a great or master wrestler is di-mgba (di could mean husband 
or master in the sense of adept while mgba means to wrestle); a great yam farmer is eze-ji 
(king of yam); a woman who uses her talents to increase the wealth of her family is 
recognized as okpata-aku; a great peacemaker is “ome udo,” and so on. Everyone is 
recognized by what he/she does best. The individual creativity is recognized and not 
necessarily swallowed up in the “We.” An Etche peoverb that aptly captures this 
perspective says: “Ekobebe ulo, ekota onye ogologo” meaning literally, “when hanging 
the roof of a building, the need for a tall person becomes evident.” Put another way, 
everyone has his or her own irreplaceable place. It can be said that it is the individual’s 
achievements and actualization of destiny within the complex of relationships that 
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enunciate and affirm him/her as a human person.
113
      
 What we have highlighted so far regarding the notion and place of the individual 
person in West African anthropologies flies in the face, for instance, of Robert Schreiter’s 
distinction between individualist and collectivist cultures within an intercultural 
communicative matrix. Drawing on the views of certain sociologists, Schreiter holds that 
in the individualist culture, a member feels affirmed since an intercultural communication 
event that engenders openness and creativity would have displayed the novelty of an 
uninhibited autonomous individual. Whereas within the collectivist position into which 
Schreiter lumps Africans, he suggests that “members…would see ‘openness and 
creativity’ as a potential deviation and a lack of group solidarity. Innovation of any type 
needs to be seen as either rediscovery or a reaffirmation of the group’s knowledge, ethos, 
and solidarity. Hence, collectivist cultures prize the enrichment of new information in a 
way that is different from their individualist counterparts. New information is just a way 
of saying something we already know.”114 Schreiter’s suggestion here appears to 
insinuate that at the long run, there is no element of newness, new possibility, or surprise 
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in the African cultural matrix since whatever an individual comes to know or create 
would merely be a rediscovery, a reaffirmation, or a recollection (perhaps in the Platonic 
sense of anamnesis)
115
 of “something we already know.”      
 This view of Schreiter is counterposed by the Etche (and Akan) anthropological 
conception as has been exposed in the forgoing paragraphs. In these world-views, not 
only does the community, its culture, and principles shape the individual’s values and 
actions, but the community itself, its culture, and values are also shaped by the 
individual’s rational creativity, imaginations, and ingenuity.116 Individual persons are 
self-determined free participants and active collaborators in the pursuit of the 
humanization and bonum commune of the community rather than anonymous, passive, 
and conformist elements used by the community to carry out its own schemes. In this 
context, moral obligation is seen in terms of the duty that persons consciously owe to 
themselves and others in the mutually beneficial relationships that exist in the 
community. Within this mutual and symbiotic relationship between the community and 
the individual, the interests of the community and the individual are not mutually 
exclusive. Rather, they are coextensive. In this light, African communal ethos is not the 
same as collectivism. It is thus, instructive to note that there is a subtle distinction 
between collectivism and African communal ethos which I have described elsewhere.
117
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 As has been made clear, the human person in West African socio-cultural 
matrixes is conceived in terms of a multiplicity and plurality of relationships. A person 
cannot be a person in isolation and as an abstract entity. While one’s individuality is 
irreplaceable and irreducible, a person is always the product of a socio-cultural milieu.
118
 
In the Etche anthropology under consideration, the human person is seen as divine, as 
spiritual, and thus of having dignity and worth on account of being ontologically 
connected to God through a personal chi (or kra for the Akan). It is this spiritual element 
that is fundamentally determinative in the actualization of destinies and hence, in the 
forging of relationships. The personal spirit enables a human subject’s openness to God 
and as well the self-actualization of a person through creativity in openness to others, 
community, and toward the harmony of the socio-cosmic process. Crucially, while one’s 
destiny may not be altered, it is, however, susceptible to the malevolent influence of the 
deities, witches, and sorcerers who use power for ill. Because they have the freedom to 
employ power to act negatively, they can partially marr a good destiny and can even kill 
out of jealousy. This explains the importance aattached to mediation in the Etche 
                                                                                                                                                 
sole source of meaning and value, it arrogates to itself power in order to be in control; since nothing in the 
entire society matters except insofar as it contributes to the collective or carries out its programs, 
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self-determined participation (wherein lies moral responsibility), activity degenerates to response at the 
behest of the collective; rather than personal initiative and creativity,what prevails is passivity and robotic 
acceptance. Indeed, the collective renders its members, nay, its elements, if not similar, homogenized, and 
passive, then anonymous and compliant. Rights are only those granted by the collective, so they offer no 
defense of the individual with respect to it, especially since the code of law and the procedures of 
adjudication that would secure rights are created by the collective on its own behalf and not necessarily 
originating from the dignity of the individual as created by God and imbued with God’s Spirit (chi). 
Consequently, collectivism always tends toward domination of persons, authoritarianism, or totalitarian 
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religious universe. In what follows, I will examine the place and role of mediators and 
spirit possession geared toward the amelioration of human destiny.     
2.6 Mediation in the Etche Cosmo-Religious Universe   
 In view of life as the greatest gift of God and the need to actualize one’s destiny, 
the Etche take seriously the question of protection against the malevolent powers, 
including their human agents. The need for mediation foregrounds the important role 
played by diviners, medicine-men, and other mediums, who come under the influence or 
guidance of the right spirits or deities. Uzukwu is right in pointing out that:   
In African mystical experience the Supreme Being never mounts [that is to  
  say, never possesses] anybody; only His deputies who are emissaries mount 
 and give messages for the good of the community. In this way, God’s dyna-
 mic distance is maintained, and God’s spirit is encountered in inspired or 
 possessed emissaries (emphasis original).
119
  
Guided by this insight, it immediately becomes clear that God’s dynamic transcendence 
as seen previously is the condition of possibility for God’s emissaries to carry out the task 
of possession particularly in their area of expertise. Spirit possession is a common 
phenomenon in most of West African religions.
120
 In the Etche religion someone can be 
possessed by Ekwensu (war-deity), Ala (Mother Earth), Agwushi (divination/medicine-
deity)
121
 for the good of the community and the realization of human destiny. In the 
phenomenon of possession the entrancing deities or spirits temporarily become manifest 
in their chosen and communicate through them. But medicine (ogwu) which engenders 
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cure and healing can also be used in pernicious and antisocial ways to cause harm and 
misfortune to people through, for instance, nshi (poison).    
 Diviners (Babalawo in Yoruba, Dibia in Etche and Igbo, etc) and other mediums 
can be possessed by the deities to equip them with not only power but also knowledge 
and messages for the good of others.  What is interesting to note is that this vocation is 
not the prerogative of one sex or gender. Hence, men and as wall as women can be 
possessed by the deities to serve as priests/priestesses, and to be practitioners of 
medicine, or mediums.
122
 Also, both male and female deities play complementary roles in 
the phenomenon of possession. For example, Ala (female deity), Idemili for the Igbo (the 
deity of peace and daughter of Chukwu and Ala), can mount their elects as much as the 
males deities can. For nothing is absolute. Twinness or multiplicity is also at work in 
spirit possession.          
 Ideally, the purpose of spirit possession is for those entranced to help others and 
restore especially the sick to holistic health and harmony in the community. Spirit 
possession provides access to divine presence and power. Taylor rightly noted: “It is not 
the doctor’s [or diviner’s] expertise as a herbalist or bone-setter which gives healing, but 
the power of God and of the…[spirits] working through him. For a great part of his work 
also consists of spiritual diagnosis, revealing the dividedness that makes patients 
vulnerable or the undetected malice that works as witchcraft.”123 Taylor’s insight can be 
said, among others, to point to the prophetic dimension of spirit possession that 
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empowers persons to engage in responsible praxis on behalf of the oppressed and 
victimized.           
 In order to function effectively as a dibia or diviner, a person does not become 
one overnight. Rather, in Etche religious landscape, for instance, a prospective dibia who 
has discerned the signals of the vocation by Agwushi indispensably undergoes a long and 
rigorous training or apprenticeship. Growing up in this culture, I have personally 
witnessed the apprenticeship of dibias. During this training, the novice is familiarized 
with certain rituals that would not only strengthen him but also facilitate his rendezvous 
with and sensitization to the divinity. At the end of the rigorous training, he goes through 
the complex initiatory rite of isa-anya which literally means the “cleansing of the eyes 
with certain medicines” (empowerment for trances, for seeing and hearing the voice of 
the spirit) which may last for a designated number of days. This ritual symbolizes the 
death of the dibia to the old and a transformative resurrection into a new way or mold of 
being. It transforms the personality of the dibia and activates his/her ability to begin to 
see beyond the physical and the ordinary and to tap into the domain of the spirit’s 
inaccessible to non-initiates. It equips him/her with special knowledge and wisdom 
unavailable to the rest of the people. Worthy of pointing out is that, though, the 
metamorphosis of the dibia grants her/him celestial access and the height of intimacy 
with the spirits, s/he does not cease being a woman/man living under the human 
condition on earth. Thus, the diviners play an agentive role in the fulfillment of the 
greatest goal of ATR, to oblige “God to come down to earth, to renew his closeness to 
man, to descend to him in order to divinize him,”124 and to bring about the realization of 
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His (God’s) benevolent purpose for human well-being and wholeness. The phenomenon 
of spirit possession, therefore, has an overriding social and relational orientation as the 
diviners, the dibias, or priests, henceforth live their lives at the expense of the 
worshippers and community.
125
         
 It is this traditional dimension of spirit experience that has, no doubt, been 
appropriated and assimilated into West African Christianity today. Whether it is in 
Pentecostalism (though it claims to reject all that has to do with ATR as devilish and 
demonic) or in African Independent Churches (AICs), or in Charismatic Renewal 
Movements, or among priest-healers, the dimension of spirit possession has been re-
dimensioned, reformulated, and assimilated into the qualities of the all-powerful God and 
the insurgent Universal Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit now possesses the prophet-diviner, 
evangelist, charismatic and priest-healer figures in order to empower them for the 
mission of liberating those under the clutches of the devil, witchcraft, and of healing the 
sick.
126
 These rebranded diviners claim to be in the fullness of the Holy Spirit and to 
possess spiritual powers to dislodge and undo the activities of evil spirits and of their 
agents. They are successful in this prophetic praxis and resistance struggle against sinister 
forces that diminish life because they take the sufferings, fears, and stories of their clients 
seriously.
127
 The phenomenon of Spirit possession thus becomes an indomitable force 
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that empowers for resistance against evil that diminishes or destroys life in order to 
engender human flourishing, abundant life, and freedom. We shall investigate the 
importance of the AICs as far as the repackaging and rearticulation of the Christian 
gospel in the light of ancestral religious assumptions are concerned in Chapter 5. There, 
we shall also expand the insights of the AICs by reinterpreting the multiplicity of spirits 
and deities in West African religious universe as refractions or manifestations of the 
Universal Holy Spirit in the realization of Divine universal salvific purpose. 
2.7 The Pitfalls and Strengths of the Etche-African Relational  
     Framework  
So far we have established that relationality, flexibility, and dynamism guide 
relationships in the Etche religious world-view. God’s dynamic hierarchy allows for the 
dispersal of power which enhances collaborative and participatory administration of 
divine economy. While this may be its key strength, it at the same time creates room for 
its woes.  
Pitfalls: Perhaps I must point out that the dynamic, flexible, and relational 
structures of the Etche (and likewise Akan, Yoruba, etc) anthropology are not without 
their own pitfalls. [a] One such weakness is the tendency to parochialism, clannishness, 
and ethnicism. While these must be guarded against, I insist that they do not, however, 
detract from the excellence of relationality as a valuable contribution of the West African 
matrix for negotiating difference in our world today. [b] Again, the importance and the 
sometimes near-dominance accorded the cult of chi (kra for the Akan, ori for the Yoruba) 
in a bid to achieve one’s destiny tend to occlude the place of the Supreme God or even 
the deities.  [c] Moreover, the framework of relationality which undergirds all 
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relationships in the Etche religious universe creates the condition of possibility for the 
instrumentalization of the spirits and deities by their devotees and priests/priestesses for 
anti-social purposes. [d] At the same time, the deities can also in turn take advantage of 
their independence to turn malevolent. [e] It also enables agents of malevolent forces like 
witches and sorcerers to tap into mystical power to be deployed for ill. Nevertheless, 
these possible pitfalls should not eliminate from view the significance of relational 
religious anthropology as providing an other paradigm for negotiating another discourse 
on God and difference.       
 Strengths: [a] Relationality as an overriding criterion and core tenet of being in 
the Etche religious universe guards against absolutism, despotism, and autarchic 
unilateralism. In this way, it promotes and enhances collaborative and participatory 
administration. [b] God’s dynamic transcendence is accommodating of plurality, and 
tolerating of difference (male and female deities). This carries significant message and 
implication for ecclesial and socio-political structures and organization. It is also relevant 
for interreligious dialogue. [c] The dominance of the relational understaning of personal 
spirit that undergirds West African anthropology invites a reinterpretation of Trinitarian 
theology from an African perspective. There is no doubt that the question of God as the 
Father of Jesus Christ was a radical novelty introduced to West Africans by missionary 
Christianity.
128
 But it is clear from the discussion so far that the question of One God and 
spirits was no stranger to the Etche and other West African religions prior to the advent 
of Christianity. There is no question that the relational and dynamic understanding of 
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God and the dominance of spirits was easily assimilated into the qualities of the Triune 
God preached by Christian missionaries. This is evident today in the predominance of the 
phenomenon of Spirit possessions and other Spirit-related phenomena that characterize 
West African Christianity. West Africans rearticulated the Christianity they discovered 
with their re-dimensioned traditional dimensions of spirit experience. The functions of 
the multiplicity of spirits (for example, for healing, for protection from sinister forces, for 
favors, and so on) have been creatively reconfigured and subjected to the Holy Spirit in 
West African Christianity. West African relational religious anthropology invites a 
revision of the Trinitarian taxis from the traditional God-Christ-Spirit to God-Spirit-
Christ which fosters pneumatology as the viable entrée into the Triune God. [d] West 
African religious universe is fundamentally focused on the amelioration of human well-
being. [e] The lack of conflict built into the structure of God’s dynamic hierarchy 
precludes war and violence from being deployed in the name of God. This is a 
contribution from which Judeo-Christian and Islamic traditions can learn that violence is 
not to be carried out in the nemae of God. These are some excellent values that West 
African relational religious anthropology can contribute to enrich world Christinianity. 
2.8 Conclusion         
 From what has been said so far with regard to the dimension of spirit experiences 
in Etche-African cosmo-religious world-view, certain clear facts do emerge. Primarily, 
relationality is the fundamental thread that is woven into the warp and woof of the said 
weltanschauung. God’s dynamic and relational hierarchy allows for power-with rather 
than power-over. The human person ontologically linked to God through a personal chi is 
valued as sacred and as having an irreducible and irreplacible worth. The litmus test of all 
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human and non-human behaviors and activities lies in determining whether they enhance 
and promote life or diminish life thereby instituting disequilibrium in the socio-cosmic 
process. In the face of anti-life forces, the spirit mounts persons in order to use them to 
ameliorate health, destiny, and overall wholeness. This is a prophetic praxis against 
oppression and domination. The beautiful values provided by the dimension of spirit 
experiences from West African world-views may be the elixir for relearning hospitality, 
friendship, and solidarity of others in our globalized world.  The ambivalence inherent in 
globalization, rather than abetting the clash of civilizations
129
 (as some are wont to 
suggest) could become a kairos for the “dialogue of cultures and among civilizations” 
according to the United Nation’s 2001 convention marking the Year of Dialogue, for a 
more peaceful pluralistic world. 
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Chapter 3 
The Spirit as the Lord and the Giver of Life: Rearticulating 
Relational Pneumatology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The Niceno-Constantinopolitan creedal profession acclaims the Holy Spirit as the 
Lord and the Giver of life. But the question of how the Spirit has been giving life both 
within and out-side the church remains at issue. From what I have elaborated in the 
previous chapters, it is clear that the Spirit has more often than not been domesticated. 
Thus, structures that should be giving and promoting life have been and continued to be 
used to spawn a spiral of violence and diminution of life. Where has the Spirit been 
giving life? Whose life is it that the Spirit has been giving? Is this life limited to only 
certain group of people or a particular religion? Is one life more important than another? 
As Lord, does the Spirit exercise power to resist violence and anti-life forces and 
structures and to work out liberation on behalf of the oppressed? Does the Spirit abhor 
body and difference? There may be more questions than answers. But this range of 
questions would prove helpful in mapping the contours of a theology that engages our 
contemporary pluralistic age in a fashion that unleashes a redemptive and liberative 
alternative.            
 In this chapter, I will first investigate certain biblical tropes which are helpful for 
rearticulating the doctrine of the relational Spirit as the Lord and Giver of life. Mindful of 
the elusiveness and mysterious nature of the Spirit, we recognize that metaphors are 
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better tools than mere concepts to speak about the Spirit. The next section shall thus focus 
briefly on the import of metaphors as well as certain metaphors or symbols of the Spirit. 
This takes us to the question of Spirit and embodiment. Are they opposed or related? 
Again, we shall examine the universal Spirit as Mediator of both the creative and 
prophetic presence of God who has been giving life to the entire creation and 
empowering humanity even before the incarnation of the Word. In doing this, particular 
attention will be given to an understanding of the work of the biblical rûah. The role of 
the Spirit in the life and ministry of the Messiah, in the church and the question of 
pluralism will be looked into. Equally to be treated is the formulations of embodiment 
within Christian tradition with regard to the Spirit and salvation. Here we shall focus on 
Irenaeus of Lyons and Augustine of Hippo. On the basis of the fruit of these explorations, 
I shall argue in the next section for the need to reclaim the dignity of difference. In the 
final part, I contend that there is need for broadening our concept of sin in a way that 
truly engenders genuine conversion that will promote justice and solidarity of the “other” 
who is a neighbor. All this is inspired and made possible, as we shall conclude, by the 
relational and life-giving Spirit.         
3.2 The Spirit as the Lord and the Giver of Life   
 As already pointed out in Chapter 1, the Spirit has been neglected in Roman 
Catholic systematic theology for a number of reasons. Some of those reasons have been 
clearly marshaled out. But among all the reasons, we noted that it was in order to 
preserve God’s transcendence, and hence God’s freedom as articulated in classical theism 
that the Spirit through whom divine relationality is concretely mediated in the world 
paled into insignificance. Classical theism feared that recognizing relationality in God 
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would detract from God’s utter otherness by predicating necessity and dependence to 
God. But it is significant that from the evidence adduced in the preceding chapters, what 
needs to be stressed is that relation and freedom in God, whether ad intra or ad extra, are 
not contradictory. God in his absolute freedom and transcendence graces God’s other (all 
creation) with God’s self-gift, presence, love, and care,not out of constraint but freely. In 
other words, God’s transcendence and immanence are correlative rather than 
contradictory. God is present throughout the whole world and indwells every human 
being through the pervasive presence of the relational Spirit. Thus in neglecting the Spirit 
in Latin systematic theology, what was actually eliminated from view is “the mystery of 
God’s personal engagement with the world in its history of love and disaster…God’s 
empowering presence…through-out history…calling forth the praxis of life and 
freedom.”1  Indeed, what was neglected is the mystery of the Person and the activity of 
the relational Spirit in the world. For the mystery of the absent-present God, God who is 
ever-coming, ever drawing near, interrupting us, and passing by, God who comes in a 
trace, is experienced as the energy and power of the Spirit. God is in the world and the 
world is in God through the presence of the Spirit.      
 Again, as I noted in Chapter 1, from about the second half of the twentieth-
century, however, a new interest in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit emerged. Some have 
described this new upsurge as a new advent of the Spirit. An interesting feature about this 
new advent has been a spate and profusion of books on the Holy Spirit. Although a good 
number of these books have shed light on the Holy Spirit, most still concern themselves, 
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for instance, with the Spirit’s pro-cession in abstracto and the near-objectified Spirit as 
vinculum amoris. That well taken, how-ever, much still remains to be done and made 
clear with regard to the outreach of the divine Spirit to and in creation in general and 
human beings in particular in their social and historical situatedness. This lacuna is the 
location of my concerns in this section.       
 We may not speak adequately about the Spirit today especially in the light of our 
pluralistic context without factoring in the notion of relationality. The universal pervasive 
presence and cosmic breadth of activity of the Spirit penetrate every spectrum of life 
engendering the interconnectivity and community of all life forces. Because the divine 
Spirit―so-called because she is not estranged from life here but vivifies it―operates 
universally in giving and affirming life, the Spirit could be recognized in everything that 
ministers to life and resists its destruction, says Jürgen Moltmann.
2
 There has been a 
tendency in traditional theology to limit the operation of the Spirit to indwelling the soul, 
to faith, to church institutions and as having nothing to do with the so-called profane 
domain. This spiritualization of the Spirit led to the separation of the Spirit from body 
and embodiment, from nature, politics and economics, and indeed from all that is counted 
to belong to the secular. Yet it is well to note that the Bible is replete with a certain notion 
of the Spirit as the divine power and presence that inter-penetrates all nature and all 
aspects of life. Before proceeding further to elucidate this fact, foremost, however, I 
should like to clarify briefly how the term “Spirit” would be understood here. As also 
mentioned in Chapter 1, to the understanding of the Spirit pursued here must be added 
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both the impersonal and personal characters of the Spirit as they are complementary 
rather than mutually exclusive.         
3.2.1 Spirit: Terminological Clarification     
 Very often, the notion of spirit conjures up that which is immaterial, ghost-like, 
discarnate, invisible, ethereal, vapid, and vacant. This construal might not be entirely 
unconnected with the translation of the Holy Spirit in the King James Bible as Holy 
Ghost. Indeed, the Spirit has been described as amorphous, faceless, shadowy, 
anonymous, and so forth.
3
 It also gets more confusing when the same word spirit can 
refer either to the Spirit of God, Holy Spirit, human spirit, or even to other spirits. All 
such qualifications, no doubt, point to something about the elusiveness and dynamism of 
the reality that the term spirit conveys. Not too infrequently, the notion of spirit has 
played into the hierarchized dualism that plagues Western theological and philosophical 
thought, implying a dichotomy and hierarchy between soul/body, spirit/matter, 
mental/physical, human/nature, holy/profane, male/female, and so on. Peter Hodgson is 
right in his judgment that, more often than not, the “hierarchy reflects a suspicion and 
fear of the suppressed poles: nature, the body, the feminine.”4    
 These suppressed poles are often viewed to be outside the operation of the Spirit 
understood as Holy. In a mistaken impression, the Spirit understood as Holy appears to 
be opposed to the profane and the secular, to nature, body, and the feminine. That this 
type of mentality has spun a spirituality of hostility―Gnostic and Neo-Platonist in 
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character―toward the body and remoteness from nature and the world, and reinforcing 
misogynist bias, is rather evident in the history of Western Catholic spirituality and 
theology. At any rate, notwithstanding the elusive character of the Spirit, biblical texts 
consistently figure the relational dynamism of the Spirit. Such relationality is concretized, 
for instance, in the Spirit’s creative and sustaining activity; the Spirit is: “[the] life-form 
who animates and sustains the natural world. The Spirit makes alive the natural systems 
on which all life depends.”5 As a matter of fact, a cluster of biblical imageries that accrue 
around the Spirit are all corporeal and vital for life. Be it breath, wind, water, fire, or even 
the avian one (dove), each of these is vital for sustaining life and for living as we shall 
see shortly.          
 Therefore, any attempt to make the Spirit antithetical to body, matter, nature, or 
the secular is wrongly headed. Any such alternative would be false, narrow, and fails to 
square with reality which appears as more holistic but dynamically interconnected. The 
Spirit always seeks and rests on bodies; the Spirit always mediates God’s presence in and 
to the world in embodied fashion. The relational dynamism of the Spirit, therefore, 
requires a more radical affirmation of the Spirit as not simply ethereal, immaterial, 
ghostly, vacant, but the very “Spirit of Life,” the “Divine Energy of Life” itself, and 
indeed, the immanence of God in the whole world and in all things.
6
 This very 
affirmation can only be eliminated from view to the detriment of the Christian faith and 
theology. Elizabeth Johnson rightly accedes that this affirmation points “to the gracious, 
furious mystery of God engaged in a dialectic of presence and absence throughout the 
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world, creating, indwelling, sustaining, resisting, recreating, challenging, guiding, 
liberating, completing.”7 All of these seemingly disparate activities of the Spirit, Johnson 
affirms, “are in reality but aspects of the one engagement, the one economy of God with 
the world.”8 Johnson’s fine insight here is a very significant one. There is only one 
economy of God with the world and not two or three as the case may be. The one 
economy spans from creation through redemption to consummation. Creation and 
redemption do not constitute two separate economies. God creates in order to save. There 
may not be such a thing as world history separate from a salvation history. For salvation 
history entails the salvation of this whole created world. Redemption embraces not only 
humanity but the entire cosmos since the Redeemer is at the same time the Creator and 
reconciler of all things.
9
 To look at Christ who became incarnate and was resurrected in 
the power of the Spirit is to see that redemption embraces all the dimensions of existence. 
For in Christ all things hold together and through him (and his redemptive act), God 
reconciles to himself all things, things in heaven and things on earth (see Col 1:16-20; 
Eph 1:3-4). No aspect of reality is left out. Therefore, redemption enfolds all the 
dimensions of being such that it includes not only liberation from the burdens of guilt 
through forgiveness of sins and engendering hope for eternal life, but also from the 
aftermath of sins manifested in sinister economic, political, and socio-cultural structures 
that repress, alienate, and exploit men and women in history. All these aspects belong 
together and to the one and the same history of God’s engagement with the whole 
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world.
10
 It is the relational Spirit who is the agent of this holism. The elusiveness and 
relational dynamism of the Spirit engenders the fruitful correlation between God’s 
transcendence and God’s continuous coming into communion with all of reality. This 
correlation is nowhere more evident than as it is captured in metaphorical language. 
Having said this, let us now examine the significance of the use of metaphors in speaking 
about the Spirit.          
3.2.2 Metaphors/Symbols of the Spirit      
 In human speech, metaphors and/or symbols are used frequently to express 
meanings in a way that concepts are incapable of doing. The use of metaphor entails the 
transfer and application of a descriptive term or name or phrase to a person, an object, or 
action to which it is imaginatively and symbolically (that is, really) but not literally 
applicable. Symbols are imageries that “point beyond themselves and evoke awareness of 
a dimension of human existence [and experience] that cannot be captured in nonsymbolic 
expressions.”11 The revelation or the coming of God to humans is a unique experience of 
interpersonal relationship that human concepts cannot capture adequately. The reason is 
simple. God is a mystery and God is love. In his loving self-gift and communication to 
humans God reveals God’s self as transcendent-immanent, as absent-present. God, albeit, 
is the mysteriously wholly other and yet, God’s self revealing is always mediated in and 
through particular concrete human experiences, situations, and persons. Symbol as a 
particular structure of mediation makes real and present that which is signified without 
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absolute identification.  Symbols function like sacraments. Indeed, sacraments are 
symbols or even icons. Religious symbols as rituals function to bridge and thus overcome 
the distance between the transcendent mystery (vertical dimension) and to draw the past 
(memory) into the present with an eye toward the future (horizontal dimension). In this 
symbolic or sacramental operationalism, the power of human imagination (graced, of 
course) creates an equilibrium of intimacy by converging both the vertical and horizontal 
axes into a continuum that is real and efficacious hic et nunc. 
12
   
 In relation to speech about the Spirit, the use of metaphors or symbols is most ad 
rem. In talking about the first Person of the Trinity, we are helped by such a familiar 
concept as “Father.” With respect to the second Person, the idea of “Son” coupled with 
his incarnation and hence his humanity, help matters. But with regard to the Spirit, we 
encounter some difficulty because even the term “Holy Spirit” is not a proper noun. 
Besides, the elusiveness of the Spirit makes it all the more difficult to grapple with the 
mystery that is the Spirit. It is against this back-drop that we appreciate the series of 
metaphorical ways in which the Old (or rather First) and New (or Second) Testaments 
(hereafter, OT and NT) describe the operation and personhood of the Spirit.  Among 
others, we shall focus on the following metaphors: wind or breath, water or rain, fire or 
light, oil or anointing, and dove. A crucial point worth noting is that all these metaphors 
are natural and material elements, and therefore, corporeal rather than ethereal. This 
unmistakably underscores the point that the Spirit is not antithetical to corporeality, rather 
she intercompenetrates and suffuses it with life. Taking these metaphors one after the 
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other, we shall see how they capture for us the proprium and role of the Spirit.  
 Wind or Breath: In the OT, experiences of God are often presented 
metaphorically as the movement or rushing of the wind. Indeed, wind or breath is known 
as rûah. In a later section, we shall explore a detailed understanding of rûah in the OT, 
but for the moment, suffice it to say that rûah is the principle of life that births creation, 
empowers individuals for specific tasks especially liberative ventures, and as breath, 
gives life to humans and all living creatures. Wind is neither static nor rigid. Rather it is 
always in motion, fluid, dynamic, unpredictable, uncontrollable, irrepressible, and all-
pervasive. We can then understand why Jesus in referring to the operation of the Spirit 
says to Nicodemus: “The wind blows wherever it pleases. You hear its sound, but you 
cannot tell where it comes from or where it is going” (Jn 3:8). Gregory Nazianzen 
expands this saying of Jesus by rightly acceding that the Spirit not only blows where He 
wills but also on whom He wills, and to what extent He wills.
13
 This is a very interesting 
metaphor. The Spirit that blows everywhere is pervasively present in the entire creation 
so that no one or group can monopolize, completely contain, or domesticate the Spirit. 
The wind that is ceaselessly surging symbolizes the insurgent Spirit who resists all forms 
of rigid formalization and routinization. Because the wind is constantly blowing and in 
motion, it makes stagnant or foul air become fresh and full of vitality. It refreshes and 
purifies, bringing about newness and new possibilities. Similarly, the ever blowing and 
new winds of the Spirit move over lives that are contested, degraded, or even moribund, 
groaning in them as in labor pain (see Rom 8:18-27). Since labor pains usually yield new 
birth and new life, the Spirit’s groan augurs radical novelty, new possibilities, new 
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creation, new beginnings, and a non-deceptive hope that shatters stagnation and 
moribundity. It yields and sustains life. For a world without air will degenerate into 
lifelessness. Wind is also a source of energy and power. No wonder rûah refers to the 
power of God to accomplish and actualize divine projects. When the powerful effusion of 
the great wind came upon the disciples on Pentecost, they were so possessed and filled 
with power and courage that they broke loose from their fears and lethargy and set “on 
the move towards unsuspected new things”14 that they would not otherwise do. The 
power and energy of the Spirit empowers and mobilizes the agency of the degraded and 
oppressed to resist and break the stranglehold of tyranny. Sometimes too, the irresistible 
power of a very strong wind is destructive of whatever stands in its way. This is about the 
Spirit as life-giver as well as the insurgent, transgressive, and resistant Spirit against all 
controls of empire and all anti-life forces.      
 Water or Rain: In a number of instances in the Bible water is used as an apt 
metaphor for the Spirit. As Jesus once put it, “If anyone is thirsty, let him come to me and 
drink. Whoever believes in me, as the Scripture has said, streams of living water will 
flow from within him. By this he meant the Spirit….” (Jn 7:37-39; cf 4:10). The symbol 
of water tells us a great deal about the Holy Spirit. Water is necessary for the preservation 
of life. A human being is said to compose of about sixty percent water. Hence, any acute 
dehydration can lead to instant death. Other animals and plants need water to stay alive. 
Without water or rain, the earth will neither be fruitful nor sustain any kind of life. In the 
days of Elijah, for instance, when it did not rain for three and half years, all vegetation 
died until Elijah prayed for it to rain again (see 1 Kgs 17:1; 18:41-45; cf Jas 5:17-18). 
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Analogously, it is to say that the Holy Spirit is indispensable to the preservation and 
sustenance of life. Water is equally necessary for cleansing our bodies and filthiness. 
According to Gustavo Gutiérrez, “water also continually purifies us and smoothes away 
any wrinkles in manner of being Christians, at the same time supplying the vital element 
needed for making new ground fruitful.”15 When the Spirit is poured out upon us, she 
births us anew, washes guilt away, refreshes and renews us (see Jn 3:5). And as Jesus 
said to the Samaritan woman about the life-giving water which he shall give, “Everyone 
who drinks this water will be thirsty again, but whoever drinks the water I give him will 
never thirst. Indeed, the water I give will become in him a spring of living water welling 
up to eternal life” (Jn 4:14). That is to say, when human beings receive the Spirit, she 
becomes in them a life-giving wellspring from which others are supposed to drink. 
Again, the immensity of water points to its power to drown or erode whatever tries to be 
an obstacle on its path. We see the destructive power of water at work in the Flood during 
Noah’s days (Gen 7) as well as the drowning of Pharaoh’s army in the Red Sea (Ex 
14:28). Water is one of the greatest solvents and it can, with time, erode even the 
strongest rock or stone on its path. It is also a source of power and energy. This is still 
about the life-giving and saving but also resistant Spirit.     
 Fire or Light: Another popular metaphor of the Holy Spirit is fire. In the OT, 
most theophanies of God occurred amidst fire. Fire in relation to God in the OT always 
signified the presence of God. But since it is in and through the Spirit that God is present, 
fire is another apt imagery for the Spirit. John the Baptist, when contrasting his own 
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baptism with that to be administered by Jesus, spoke about Jesus as the one who will 
baptize with the Holy Spirit and fire (Matt 3:11; Lk 3:16). The usage of the fire imagery 
here by John the Baptist appears to follow from the prophecy of Malachi 3:2-3, about the 
purificatory messianic fire that will refurbish and revamp everything, and foreshadowing 
the new creation. Again, during the Pentecost event, amidst a rushing mighty wind that 
filled the house where the disciples were hiding for fear of the Jews, “they saw what 
seemed to be tongues of fire that separated and came to rest on each of them” (Acts 2:2, 
3). Here, it is a source of power and enablement. Fire is indispensable for human life and 
survival. It provides warmth and heat without which humans cannot survive certain cold 
temperatures. Its combustive ability provides the energy needed for machine power of 
different sorts. Heat energy can be converted to light energy and to other several uses. 
Light dispels darkness. The heat and light from the sun are needed by plants for 
photosynthesis and by us for natural vitamin D. Without plants, animals and humans will 
lack food for sustenance. Moreover, fire consumes and burns. The burning capacity of 
fire can be purificatory or destructive depending on the circumstance. The Spirit who 
indwells us consumes sin in us. The fire of the Spirit is often called the fire or flame of 
love according to the language of St. John of the Cross. Just as the disciples were lighted 
up when the Spirit descended upon them at Pentecost and in place of fear, they became 
emboldened and fired up with enthusiasm to witness to Christ, so too when the Spirit gets 
hold of our hearts, she fills us with the fiery love for the Lord and with zeal for the 
proclamation of the Gospel in word and deed. The consuming fire of the Spirit also 
speaks to the resistance of the Spirit to whatever tries to impede her movement. 
 Oil or Anointing: The Spirit in both the Old and New Testaments is considerably 
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associated with or rather symbolized by oil. The metaphor of oil has a lot to tell us about 
the Spirit. As we shall see below, those who are assigned a specific task to carry out by 
God are always empowered implicitly or explicitly by the Spirit of God. Anointed places 
and persons become holy and by that very act, are set apart for God’s purposes. For 
instance, God commanded Moses to consecrate the tabernacle of the congregation, the 
ark of the testimony, the altar, and so on, by anointing them with oil (see Ex 30:25-29). 
Moses also consecrated Aaron and his sons by anointing them and thus setting them apart 
for the priestly office (see Ex 30:30). Others include David, anointed by Samuel for the 
kingly and prophetic office (see 1 Sam 16:13). Most of the prophets received their 
prophetic calling when Yahweh’s rûah came upon them and anointed them with power 
and utterance. At baptism when we are reborn by the Spirit, we are anointed and 
empowered to become priests, prophets, and kings (see 1 Pet 2:9). Again, it was oil that 
sustained the light of the seven-branched candlestick (the Minora) in the tabernacle of 
God. The tabernacle light that shined continually in the holy place symbolized the 
constant presence of God amidst the people. Irenaeus comments that it is the Spirit which 
gives light; he interprets the seven-branched candlestick which Moses received according 
to the heavenly pattern as the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit which rested on the Son of 
God in his coming as man.
16
 Indeed, identifying the Spirit with anointing, Irenaeus 
pointedly avers: “The oil of anointing is the Spirit, wherewith He (the Son of God) has 
been anointed.”17 When we are anointed by the Spirit, we also receive the sevenfold gifts 
of the Spirit and become light which requires the unceasing supply of the oil that is also 
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the Spirit if we must continue burning brightly in the world to radiate God’s presence and 
love. Furthermore, oil serves as a lubricant to prevent wear and tear resulting from 
friction between rubbing parts. In the same way, the relational Spirit, the Spirit of 
communion lubricates the frictions, conflicts, dangers, risks, ambiguities that tend to 
threaten human relationships emanating from the encounter of differences. The anointing 
which abides with us is even personified as the teacher of truth and wisdom (see 1 Jn 
2:20, 27). Oil is also necessary for the preservation of life not only as a necessary 
ingredient for our nutritional needs but also for healing and soothing the sick. All this 
symbolize the work of the Spirit as life-giver and preserver, as enabler and the principle 
of communion.           
 Dove: This avian symbol is used to describe the Holy Spirit more precisely 
during the baptism of Jesus in River Jordan. Accordingly, John the Baptist declaring that 
Jesus was the Christ gave this testimony: ‘I saw the Spirit come down from heaven as a 
dove and remain on him’” (Jn 1:32). St. Irenaeus speaks about the Spirit of God resting 
on Christ as a mingling with his flesh.
18
 The dove is associated with the symbol of peace 
and somewhat with the symbol of life. When the deluge receded during Noah’s days, he 
released a dove from the ark to ascertain if the waters had abated and if peace and life had 
returned to the earth. The dove came back to Noah in the evening carrying a fresh olive 
branch in her beak indicating that peace had returned and that the earth was once more 
habitable (see Gen 8:8-9, 10-11). This act of the dove is a ground of hope for a better and 
more peaceful as well as the possibility of an alternative world. Such a hope does not 
disappoint as God promises not to destroy the world again by flood. This hope for a 
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world that has been reconciled and now at peace with God through Christ, is a hope that 
does not disappoint “because the Holy Spirit has been given to us, pouring into our hearts 
the love of God” (Rom 5:1, 6). The dove is also known as a pure and harmless creature as 
well as a symbol of meekness and humility.
19
 This symbol interpellates our mentality in a 
world where living like cat and dog often due to human hubris and corporate greed is the 
vogue. In a fragmented world torn apart by endless violence, domination, and oppression, 
the Spirit symbolized by the dove is a reminder that an alternative world where justice, 
peace, love, and harmony reign is possible. The avian connection to hovering and 
birthing of creation will be explored in a subsequent section.     
It should now become obvious from the elaboration of these symbols/metaphors 
of the Holy Spirit that the Spirit does not shy away from matter or body, and therefore, 
from difference since matter is the principle of differentiation and individuation. Rather 
the Spirit seeks and rests on bodies always. The Spirit animates and endues bodies with 
life and power. In the circumstance where the life of the body is threatened, the Spirit 
recreates, revivifies, liberates, renews, and resists such anti-life forces.  
 At this juncture we shall take a closer look at what it might mean to affirm that 
the Spirit is the Lord and the Giver of Life. Of course, as already indicated, this 
affirmation was part of the expansion during the Council of Constantinople (381) of the 
third article of the Nicene Creed (325). The Council of Nicaea had articulated and 
defended the faith of the Church in the face of Arianism which had denied the full 
divinity of Christ. As opposed to the “pneumatomachoi” (opponents or fighters of the 
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Spirit who claimed that the Spirit was a creature), the Second Ecumenical Council of 
Constantinople affirmed the divinity of the Spirit as well as identified the Spirit with the 
role of God as Creator and Giver of life. In order to properly elucidate and reinterpret this 
affirmation of the Spirit as the Lord and Giver of life and its implications for Christian 
life and practice today, I will be particularly dependent on the work of Moltmann, 
especially The Spirit of Life.           
3.2.3 The Spirit as the Lord and the Giver of Life: Explication  
 The third article of the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed professes the Spirit as 
dominum et vivificantem – the Lord and Giver of Life. In the Hebrew Bible, these two 
metaphors implicate each other. The name “Lord” was never revealed to the patriarchs as 
God himself acknowledged: “God also said to Moses, ‘I am the LORD.’ I appeared to 
Abraham, to Isaac and to Jacob as God Almighty, but by my name the LORD I did not 
make myself known to them” (Ex 6:2-3). The name was revealed for the first time to 
Moses in the burning bush when God initiated the process of the liberation of Israel from 
Egyptian slavery. The divine name that God revealed to Moses which he (Moses) in turn 
was to convey to the people of Israel to whom God sent him is, “I am who am.” God, the 
‘I am’ further said to Moses to tell the Israelites that “Yahweh” the God-of their 
ancestors, the God-of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob had sent him to them and that this 
would be God’s name forever and for all generations (See Ex 3: 14-15). Yahweh is the 
glorious and awesome name of the God of Israel which the people were required to fear 
and revere (See Deut 28: 58). The Septuagint translates the revealed divine name as “ho 
On eimi ho On” and Yahweh as “Kurios.” Yahweh, therefore, refers to God who is Being 
in an absolute sense and who is the Unoriginate source or origin of all created existences. 
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God is and God causes to exist. The name Yahweh as Kurios – Lord, thus, takes on 
significance against the backdrop of the experience of liberation and the new life which 
God would work out on behalf of Israel. Hence for Israel, the unique experience of God 
was the experience of God’s lordship as her liberator (see Ex 14:30-31).20 What becomes 
obvious is that God reveals His presence in history always as a relational God; as the 
God-of, the God-for. He is the God-of-the-Patriarchs and in the Exodus event he becomes 
the God-of-a-people: “I will be your God and you shall be my people.” Thus particularly 
relational, God reveals himself as a God-of, who wants to be in relation to a people 
especially under the condition of oppression (both historical and spiritual). If this is the 
case, then it is at least plausible to argue that this is a “vision” of God; it is the way God 
wants to be seen or viewed. It is as a relational God, a God-of, that He listens and hears 
the cry of the people in order to liberate them (that is, as the God-for) and make them his 
people. Therefore, God’s very relational being and presence—as revealed and typified by 
the divine name ‘Yahweh’—signifies God’s solicitude for the people in their concrete 
experience of His liberating action on their behalf from oppression and suffering in an 
unjust socio-cultural and religious situation.      
 Israel experienced God as Lord primarily within the context of liberation. It is in 
this sense that Moltmann underscores the idea of freedom as that which lies behind the 
name Lord.
21
 The experience of God as Lord and the experience of true freedom thus 
belong together. So understood, the name Lord does not have any of the meanings that 
have usually been associated with it in the course of history to express master – subject 
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relationship. In that hierarchical understanding, the one lords it over the other; the one 
represses and subjugates the other; the one is free but the other is not. The metaphor, 
Lord, has too often been construed to entail imposition or domination requiring 
peremptory submission and loyalty. This may not be unconnected with the Latin 
connotation of the term Lord as “Dominus.” The word “domination” which could mean 
to lord it over, to imperiously tyrannize, or to be domineering and autocratic, derives 
from the Latin dominus. But God’s lordship is the power for compassion that liberates 
rather than enslaves or dominates, the power that gives new life and the hope of a 
brighter future rather than diminishes life and institutes the night. As Moltmann rightly 
puts it, “the name ‘Lord’ has nothing to do with enslavement. Its context is liberation. 
This can only be explained from the first commandment: it is the Exodus experience 
which is Israel’s revelation of God.”22Israel indeed first experienced God as a liberator 
before conceiving Him as a Creator. So the God who revealed himself as relational God 
in the context of liberation from oppression and bondage and gave them free life, must 
have created them in the first place in order to save them. Hence, the ‘I am,’ the God who 
is and who creates what is, is truly the ‘Lord’ because of His capacity, inter alia, to 
intervene and act in history, and to take as well an oppressed people’s side in order to 
save and liberate them.         
 What emerges from the foregoing is clearly a picture of God whose predilection is 
for the weak and oppressed. The entire setting for the revelation of the divine name to 
Moses speaks of compassion: “I have seen the affliction of my people in Egypt and have 
heard their cry of complaint against their slave drivers, so I know well what they are 
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suffering. I have come down to rescue them” (Ex 3:7-8). God’s lordship is mobilized 
when God ‘sees the affliction’ and ‘hears the groaning’ of the oppressed and dominated 
of human history, God ‘remembers’23 his covenant with humanity and takes the initiative 
to work out their liberation from the frigid clutches of death-dealing forces. Small wonder 
the prophetic tradition, as we shall see in a later section, presents God as the defender of 
the oppressed (for His reign is good news), unmasking sin, its oppressive evils, and 
injustice as well as denouncing the perpetrators (for His reign is not only critical of the 
bad and unjust religious and socio-historical present, but is also grace in order to 
transform society). God as Lord is the God of freedom and life in the midst of yoke and 
death (See Ex 6: 6-8).         
A pertinent point that needs to be stressed is that this compassionate act of God is 
completely gracious and gratuitous. The coming of God in history is always purely out of 
His gratuitous love. God’s gratuitous love and predilection for the downtrodden and 
exploited is a prophetic praxis. And it is within this theocentric matrix that every 
commitment to and solidarity of the weak and oppressed of the world is grounded since 
such divine gratuitousness is not opposed to human struggle and striving as a loving 
human response to it. Indeed, the gratuitous gift of liberation and justice which God 
accomplished on behalf of Israel became the condition of possibility for the task of 
liberating praxis and struggle on behalf of the vulnerable and the poor (the strangers, the 
anawin – widows, orphans, slaves, and all those who live under the crushing weight of a 
burden) with which Israel was charged. Precisely because they have all received justice 
from the Lord, justice is expected of every Israelite (See Ex 22:21; Deut 24:14; Lev 
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19:1ff). The relational God will keep being the God-of-Israel and Israel his people as long 
as, among other things, they keep defending the weak and the poor among them. 
Therefore, these two dimensions of liberation, the unmerited love of God as grace in 
history and the loving human response as a task, are, albeit,  distinct but must not be 
separated. Without circumlocution, John sums up this dynamic in his Epistle: “Since God 
loved us so much, we also ought to love one another” (1 Jn 4:11).      
What remains now to be articulated is the connection between the Spirit and Lord. 
According to Moltmann, “when the Spirit is given the name Lord, Christian experience 
of the Spirit is being set within Israel’s history with Yahweh.”24 That is to say, the 
lordship of the Spirit is understood in Christian experience against the backdrop of the 
idea of liberation and the giving of life. We find this idea clearly expressed in Pauline 
theology where St. Paul says: “The Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, 
there is freedom” (2 Cor 3: 17). Paul, of course, has in mind the Spirit of the risen Christ 
poured out to indwell believers, and who by so doing, frees “them from the compulsion 
of sin and the power of death because it now already mediates to them eternal and 
imperishable life,”25 writes Moltmann. Indeed, “the Spirit gives life” (2 Cor 3: 6), says 
Paul. And Jesus himself affirms this: “It is the Spirit that gives life” (Jn 6: 63). It is to be 
noted, however, that this very ascription of lordship is also true of Christ as was 
confessed of him by the early church which understood him as sharing in the lordship of 
God. Hence one of the earliest Christian creeds says: “If you confess with your lips that 
Jesus is Lord and believe in your heart that God raised him from the dead, you will be 
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saved” (Rom 10: 9-10).26 Indeed, Paul describes the risen Christ, the new Adam, as “a 
life-giving spirit” (I Cor 15: 45).27 For as the first-fruits from the dead, he becomes our 
savior to liberate us from the slavery of sin to freedom and from the hopelessness of 
death to eternal life.          
 The naming of the Spirit as the Lord and giver of life is thus set within the 
compass of a messianic Exodus experience. Just as Israel’s experience of God as Yahweh 
took form in the context of the Exodus experience of liberation from bondage and 
impoverished life to freedom and new life, so is the Christian calling of the Spirit as Lord 
set within the leitmotif of a new Exodus liberation experience. In accordance with 
Moltmann, “the end-time outpouring of the Spirit at ‘Pentecost’ is understood as a 
messianic Exodus experience.”28 In this Christian messianic understanding of the Exodus 
experience, what seems to have taken place is the assimilation of the role of Israel’s Lord 
into the Holy Spirit since as Moltmann notes, “‘the Old Testament’ is the testimony of 
the history of the Spirit for the future of the kingdom of God,”29 and which kingdom, for 
Christians, is already present hic et nunc.      
New life within the matrix of that kingdom, according to the Christian 
dispensation, requires new birth. Hence for John the evangelist, unless one is born again 
or born anew of water and the Holy Spirit, one cannot enter the kingdom of God (see Jn 
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3: 3-6). Moreover, for John, the Spirit is the Paraclete, the Comforter, who not only 
creates the new life in Christ but also nurtures it and defends it just as an attorney defends 
a client standing trial.
30
 It therefore becomes clear that the rebirth to life which the Spirit 
engenders is redolent with the Exodus leitmotif. It is about liberation from slavery to sin 
and from the evil manifestations of sin, and hence deliverance from death and freedom to 
new life.           
 After the departure of Israel from Egypt at God’s initiative, and while God dwelt 
in their midst all through the journey in the wilderness, the people were nevertheless, to 
work out their destiny in collaboration with God their liberator. Face to face with the 
difficulties that accompany the walk to freedom, Israel was frequently tempted to return 
to Egypt, that symbolic place of oppression, exploitation, and death. Similarly, even after 
the rebirth to new life by the Spirit, sin remains a temptation for us. It is in the light of 
this tendency that Paul reproaches the Galatian Christians: “Formerly, you did not know 
God, you were slaves to those who by nature are not gods. But now that you know 
God―or rather are known by God―how is it that you are turning back to those weak and 
miserable principles? Do you wish to be enslaved by them all over again?” (Gal 4:8-9). In 
his solicitude for the Galatians, Paul exhorts them to hold unto the freedom Christ won 
for them through the Spirit who gave them new birth and not to submit themselves again 
to the yoke of slavery. Hence, “It is for freedom that Christ has set us free” (Gal 5:1). 
Nothing could be further from the truth than to underline that the idea of freedom and the 
new life wrought by the Spirit in the believer was of great importance to Paul that he 
could not emphasize them enough. He goes further to say in his epistle to the Romans 
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that through Christ Jesus the law of the Spirit of life has set us free from the law of sin 
and death (see Rom 8:2). Paul, of course, uses the word ‘law’ in Romans in different 
ways to refer to: God’s law (2:17-20; 9:31; 10:3-5); the Pentateuch (3:21b); the OT as a 
whole (3:19); a principle (3:27); a controlling power (8:2). But Paul uses the law of the 
Spirit of life here to mean the controlling power of the Holy Spirit who is life giving as 
opposed to the controlling power of sin which ultimately produces death.
31
  
From what has been elaborated, it is obvious that in the experience of the Spirit as 
Lord, two key elements emerge: life and freedom. How these two elements correlate is 
beautifully given expression by Moltmann: “Freedom without new life is empty. Life 
without freedom is dead.”32 Those who are called to freedom and new life in Christ are 
enjoined to eagerly await by faith through the Spirit, the righteousness for which we 
hope. During this time of eschatological waiting, what matters according to Paul is, “faith 
working through love” (Gal 5:6). During this time, those called to be free and led by the 
Spirit of life are required to use their freedom to serve God and one another in love (see 
Gal 5:13). It is not a time for indulgence. Faith working through love is a “vision,” a way 
of being Christian, and a commitment to followership of Christ. To say that we have been 
reborn to new life and freedom by the Spirit supposes that we are “now living in depth 
our condition as disciples of him who said in so many words that he is the Way.”33 Love 
is the way of living out in action our faith in Christ in the eschatological in-between. But 
                                                 
      
31
 See commentary in The NIV Study Bible. 
      
32
 Moltmann, The Spirit of Life, 271. 
 
      
33
 Gustavo Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 15
th
 Anniv. ed., ed. and trans. Caridad Inda and John 
Eagleson (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2005), xxxii. See also Jn 14: 6. 
  
168 
 
this love, like the gratuitous love of God expressed in His liberative action is always a 
preferential and prophetic predilection for the weak and those stripped of their humanity 
by the forces of sin and death. Christian praxis of love is thus both a gift and a task to 
work toward God’s reign of shalom, establishing justice and peace. All those who have 
experienced the freedom and new life the Spirit offers have been swept into the economy 
of divine dance of love to propagate it; to participate in the Spirit’s movement of 
redemption. This is done, first of all, through overcoming sins in one’s own personal life 
and then via a struggle against all inhuman situations of injustice, misery, 
impoverishment, and exploitation wherever they are at work, thereby contributing to 
bringing about a just society and signaling God’s kingdom “which is certainly as yet only 
on the way to its fulfillment.”34 Indeed, in the words of Moltmann:  
living freedom and free can endure only in justice and righteousness. In just- 
 ice, human freedom ministers to life – the life shared by all living beings. In  
 justice, human life struggles for the freedom of everything that lives, and re- 
 sists oppression. So justice brings the two key factors freedom and life down  
 to a common denominator…. Only justice puts life to rights, and defines the 
 content of liberty through ‘the covenant of life.’ It is only in justice that life  
 can endure.
35
  
         
Moltmann here makes a salient move toward a more holistic pneumatological vision. The 
life and freedom engendered by the Spirit are not merely limited to an individual’s soul 
or to the life of the church alone. Rather Moltmann has in mind the universal activity of 
the Spirit in gracing the whole creation with life and space for freedom. Thus human 
freedom and life can only flourish in an atmosphere of justice. Genuine freedom finds its 
fullness in its orientation toward God, others, and nature—that is, in taking responsibility 
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for justice. This entails, among other things, openness to others, mutual respect and 
reciprocal acceptance of others for who they are, community in solidarity, restoration of 
rights and dignity to the deprived, conversion of the unjust, communion and 
communication of life, as well as openness to creativity and possibilities of newness. 
Unfortunately, in contemporary so-called secular rhetoric of liberty or freedom, this 
aspect of responsibility or obligation has been occluded, reducing freedom to merely 
issues of individualistic rights and entitlements.
36
 When the creative and prophetic Spirit 
of life and freedom possesses us, then justice and lasting peace will reign. We shall now 
look at the relationship between the Creator Spirit of life and the issue of embodiment.  
3.2.4 The Spirit the Giver of Life and the Question of Embodiment  
 In the preceding section, it is made clear that Israel experienced God as Yahweh 
or Lord in the context of the Exodus event of liberation. Thus God was first experienced 
as a Liberator and by extrapolation backward, was then conceived as a Creator. In 
liberating Israel from slavery and oppression, God graciously intends the good of Israel, 
giving it freedom and new life, and for it to flourish in the Promised Land. Similarly, in 
creating the whole world, God intends the good of all creatures, giving them life 
(particularly human beings), sustaining them, and providing for their flourishing. The 
point thus made is that the world with its goodness is neither the product of nor is it ruled 
by “a pantheon of viciously warring gods―as in many of the mythic tales of the ancient 
Near East―but by the One who is alone God, the LORD worshipped by Israel as 
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Redeemer and Creator.”37 God is thus ‘Lord’ over all, not in a tyrannical sense as was the 
case with the vicious gods, but as a gracious Creator God “who intends to bring all of 
creation to its proper end: the ‘rest’ of the Sabbath day.”38 As part of the essence of the 
Sabbath rest, God intends humans and creation to be free from servitude and exploitation. 
 Having offered this brief preliminary nexus between Israel’s experience of the 
Liberator God as the Creator God, we shall now look at the doctrine of creation and life-
giving from a pneumatological vantage point. It is worth noting that between the Greek 
pneuma, the Latin spiritus, the Germanic Geist, and the English spirit, if there is one 
thing that is common to them all, it is that they have always been construed in Western 
conceptual scheme as anti-corporeal, immaterial, and hence antithetical to matter and 
body. Moltmann calls for a recourse to the Hebrew rûah which does not permit the 
Western cleavage between nature, body, and spirit, if we must come to a more holistic 
appreciation of the Spirit’s activity in creation.39      
3.2.5 The Nature of the Spirit as Rûah      
 A return to the primordial understanding of the nature and richness of the Hebrew 
word rûah in talking about the Spirit is important and will meaningfully contribute to the 
way we understand the nature of the world. Whereas rûah appears about 380 times, the 
phrase rûah Yahweh occurs in about 27 passages in the Old Testament.
40
 The Hebrew 
                                                 
      
37
 D. Lyle Dabney, “The Nature of the Spirit: Creation as a Premonition of God,” in The Work of the 
Spirit: Pneumatology and Pentecostalism, ed. Michael Welker (Grand Rapids, Michigan and Cambridge, 
U.K.: Eerdmans, 2006), 77. 
      
38
 Ibid. 
 
      
39
 See Moltmann, The Spirit of Life, 41. 
      
40
 Ibid., 40. 
  
171 
 
rûah with a polysemic semantic range connotes something of the wind, storm, tempest, 
air, breath, energy, and power; it is what is moving or in motion, fluid, event-like, vital, 
living, active, rational, and conscious. Rûah is not static (as in the stasis of substance 
ontology), not rigid or calcified. Rather, it is dynamic. When applied to God as Yahweh’s 
rûah, the word refers to the creative, empowering, and life-giving power of God and even 
sometimes to God’s killing wrath.41 It refers to the overarching divine presence in 
creation, history, and in humans. Rûah at times also refers to its parallel, nephesh―the 
soul―to mean the principle of life or vitality, the individual human consciousness. From 
the outset, we have to remember that in the OT the Spirit had not yet acquired a distinct 
hypostasis. However, throughout the OT both impersonal and personal attributes are 
interchangeably predicated of rûah such as the Spirit speaking through the prophets. 
Even in the few instances where reference to ‘Holy Spirit’ occurs, and, of course, only at 
a relatively late period in the OT (see Ps 51: 13; Isa 63: 10, 11ff; Wis 1: 5; 9: 17),
42
 it 
does not refer to the Spirit as a distinct hypostasis.        
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3.2.6 The Work of Rûah as Creator Spirit     
 In the priestly account of the creation narrative in Genesis 1:2 the priestly redactor 
inserted the action of rûah Elohim over the waters of the sea in the Exodus context into 
the primeval chaos and waters in the deep at the beginning of creation. The same priestly 
redactor recollects in the Song of Moses: “At a breath (rûah) of your anger the waters 
piled up, the flowing waters stood like a mound, the flood waters congealed in the midst 
of the sea…. When your wind (rûah) blew, the sea covered them; like lead they sank in 
the mighty waters” (Ex 15: 8, 10).          
 Moreover, in the narrative of creation in Genesis 1: 2 the priestly author’s genius 
lies in his adeptness in transposing creation as a complex reality emerging from rûah 
Elohim’s action of moving upon or brooding over the primeval watery chaos (tohu 
vabohu). He writes: “Now the earth was formless and empty, darkness was over the 
surface of the deep, and the Spirit of God was hovering over the waters” (NIV). 
According to (KJV), “the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters;” (RSV), “the 
Spirit of God was moving over the face of the waters;” whereas (NAB) says, “A mighty 
wind swept over the surface of the waters;” and (NRSV), “a wind from God swept over 
the face of the waters (mayim).” Now, two facts emerge from the quotation above: the 
first is that rûah sometimes translates as wind and in some other cases as spirit. The 
second is that the Hebrew phrase měrahepeth‘al which literally means “flap,” “shake,” or 
“flutter”  translates in the expression rûah Elohim…měrahepeth‘al as “the spirit of God 
hovering over or brooding over….” Again, it also translates as “the wind of God…swept 
over….” Interestingly, this word měrahepeth is used only once elsewhere throughout the 
entire Bible, that is, in Deuteronomy 32: 11 where the NAB renders it thus: “As an eagle 
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incites its nestlings forth by hovering (yěrahēp) over its brood…” As used here the word 
retains some of the connotations of the Syriac rahep which literally means “to brood,” 
“incubate,” “shake,” or “protect.” It refers to the action of moving oneself gently, “to fly 
to and fro, to keep nest eggs warm, to brood.” The activity is thus similar to that of a bird 
brooding over its young.
43
  Whereas on the one hand, the use of the notion of “wind” to 
denote the Spirit in relation to creation retains something of the element of the 
unpredictability, the uncontrollability, the mysterious and dynamic nature of the Spirit, 
the avian imagery on the other hand, is a better fit with the idea of hovering and brooding 
over, and suggests more of a caring, life-giving activity of a living reality such as the 
Spirit of Elohim than that of wind.
44
 Thus, with the action of brooding over by rûah 
Elohim, the chaos becomes “promise,” culminating with the birthing or bringing forth of 
creation from chaos.
45
 The Spirit thus brings possibilities and hope into reality,
46
 leading 
                                                 
      
43
 See Amos Yong, “Ruach, the Primordial Chaos, and the Breath of Life: Emergence Theory and the 
Creation Narratives in Pneumatological Perspective,” in The Work of the Spirit, 191. Amos depended on L. 
Koehler and W. Baumgartner et al., The Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament, trans. and ed. 
M. E. J. Richardson, 2 vols. (Leiden, Boston, and Koln: Brill, 2001), 2: 1219-20; see also George T. 
Montague, “The Fire in the Word: Holy Spirit in Scripture,” in Advents of the Spirit, 38-9; he depended on 
F. Zorell, Lexicon Hebraicum et Aramaicum (Rome: PBI. 1968), 768; for a treatment of the association of 
the avian symbol with the Spirit which began way back in early Christian commentary, see Ephrem the 
Syrian, “Commentary on Genesis,” in Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture, Old Testament I: 
Genesis 1-11, ed. Andrew Louth (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 6.  
 
      
44
 Montague, “The Fire in the Word,” in Advents of the Spirit, 39. 
      
45
 George T. Montague, The Holy Spirit: Growth of a Biblical Tradition (New York: Paulist Press, 
1976), 67. 
      
46
 This pneumatological paradigm appears different from the Western epistemological claim which goes 
back to Aristotle. Aristotle had declared in his Metaphysics that the real was necessarily prior to the 
possible; that the real determines and defines the parameters of the possible. See Met, Θ, 1049b 5. But 
pneumatologically speaking, the Spirit of God is identified as the possibility of God that through the Word 
(dābār) brings the real into emergent being. The Spirit hovers over the watery chaos, and brings forth 
creation through the saying of dābār Elohim. God does not create out of necessity nor does creation 
  
174 
 
creatures to the realization of their destinies.     
 Towards the end of the priestly account precisely in Genesis 1:30, the author 
mentions the entrustment of “everything that has the breath (nephesh- breathing creature) 
of life” to humans to be cared for as well as for their sustenance. This breath of life is 
further specified in the Yahwist text as also given to humanity. Thus in Genesis 2:7: “the 
LORD God formed the man (ha-’adamah) from the dust of the ground and breathed 
(naphash) into his nostrils the breath of life (neshamah hayyim) and the man became a 
living being.” The word neshamah is used here instead of rûah to denote the breath of 
life given to Adam. However, in Job 27:3: “as long as I have life within me, and the 
breath of God (rûah eloah) in my nostrils,” the word rûah describes the breath or the 
spirit of God and is used as a parallel to neshamah (see also Isaiah 42:5).
47
 From these 
accounts, we notice a connection or an affinity between the breath of life given to all 
living creatures generally and humans in particular in that rûah Elohim is the giver of all 
life. Of particular interest is the fact that the rûah Yahweh who births and is the giver of 
life to creation is the same breath of life which made Adam become a living being and 
thus is here portrayed as a gift. The spirit as both the giver of life and the breath of life 
(gift) is, therefore, as Gary Badcock contends, not something that creatures “possess by 
permanent right”48 since according to the Psalmist, when God takes “away their breath, 
they die and return to their dust” (Ps 104: 29 ). The breath of life given by God returns to 
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God at the death of creatures (see Ps 31: 6). This fact makes clear the ontological 
transcendence of God who alone can give the Spirit to creation.      
 Basically, the creative and life-giving Spirit brings all of creation into being. St. 
Irenaeus of Lyons in his famous imagery depicts the Word and the Spirit as the two hands 
of God in the work of creation and salvation. Other church Fathers such as Athanasius 
and Gregory of Nyssa hold that whereas the Trinity acts as one and the divine action of 
creation is one, yet each Person’s role is performed in a distinctive pattern. Thus, the 
unity of action of the three divine Persons does not necessarily eliminate from view the 
proper role of each distinct Person. A pneumatological reading of Genesis 1-2, 
nonetheless, suggests that the creative dābār Elohim is uttered in the power and within 
the context of the primordial cosmic hovering over by the Spirit.  Rûah Elohim is here 
projected as already active in the work of creation. Thus according to the Psalmist, “By 
the word of the LORD the heavens were made, and all their host by the breath of his 
mouth” (Ps 33: 6; 147: 18).49 The Spirit not only births creation but sustains every living 
creature in being by continually supplying it with the breath of life. This truism is 
captured by Job 33: 4, “The Spirit of God has made me; the breath of the Almighty keeps 
me alive.” For as the Psalmist says: “When you hide your face (pānîm), they vanish; 
when you take away their breath, they die and return to dust. When you send forth your 
spirit (rûah), they are created; and you renew the face of the earth” (Ps 104: 29-30).50 
Montague draws attention to the fascinating relationship in this chiastically structured 
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text between God’s face (pānîm) and God’s spirit (rûah) to score the theological point 
that God is personally and actively engaged in creation
51
 as opposed to Deism.  
Therefore, the Spirit does not simply create and then remains aloof from creation. Rather, 
the Spirit creates, indwells all of creation, present to all of creation, indwells every living 
creature individually, vivifying, sustaining, and knowing each one in the very depth of its 
being. This wonderful dynamism of Yahweh’s rûah as ubiquitous divine presence finds 
expression in the words of the Psalmist: “O LORD, you have searched me and you know 
me. …you perceive my thoughts from afar…. Before a word is on my tongue you know it 
completely, O LORD…. Where can I go from your Spirit? Where can I flee from your 
presence?” (Ps 139: 1-2, 4, 7). Rûah as wind or breath not only pervades the entire 
creation but also permeates every living creature in a radical way. Like the air we inhale 
and exhale which permeates us in and out, and enfolds us, so it is that in the medium of 
rûah, we are so interpenetrated that we live and move and have our being in God (See 
Acts 17: 28). The Spirit who “searches everything, even the depths of God” (1 Cor 2:10) 
truly knows our individual unique identities more than we know ourselves.  
 Additionally, another aspect of the work of rûah Elohim is not only the giving of 
life and sustaining it but also the empowerment of every creature to live flourishingly. 
This, the Spirit does in the very act of creating each being uniquely through the 
“processes of division, distinction, differentiation, and particularization, beginning with 
the separation of light from darkness and continuing with the separating out of species of 
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plants and types of animals, each in its own or after its own kind.”52  In this very act of 
differentiating, the Spirit, as Colin Gunton argues, “far from abolishing, rather maintains 
and even strengthens particularity. It is not a spirit of merging or assimilation―of 
homogenization―but of relation in otherness, relation which does not subvert but 
establishes the other in its true reality.”53 By endowing all created reality with their 
distinctness and particularity, the Spirit gives each being the space of freedom to 
actualize its being and life. The creative and vivifying activity of the Spirit thus endorses 
the essential goodness and reality of each created being in its distinctness and 
particularity. God Himself rejoices in the goodness and beauty of creation that His rûah 
has polychromatically designed and wonderfully executed in the progressional 
affirmatory order from: “God saw that it was good” after each day of creating to the 
climactic “God saw all that he had made, and it was very good” on the sixth and last day 
of creating.          
 That all creatures are not morphed into sameness is the basis of relationality since 
otherness implies not merely difference between things or persons, but also how they are 
related. Following this logic, God is not creation’s ‘Other’ merely on the basis of 
substantive difference, but also because of their relatedness. “Only that which is both 
different and related is ‘other.’ That with which we are identical is not ‘other’; it is 
simply a repetition of ourselves. That to which we have no relation, on the other hand, is 
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likewise no ‘other’; it is, as far as we are concerned, simply ‘not.’”54 Otherness is that 
which primarily characterizes reality. For it is only in transcending ourselves in the 
encounter with the Other that we truly affirm ourselves, otherwise we remain trapped 
within the circle of our autonomous consciousness and interests while experiencing only 
narcissistic reflections, nay, mirage of ourselves. The indwelling rûah is that by which 
persons “as individuals are transcended, engaged, oriented beyond…[themselves], and 
related to God and neighbor from the very beginning.”55 Creation narrative viewed from 
a pneumatological perspective, expands the notion of “neighbor” to include all creation 
embraced by the cosmic breadth of rûah Elohim’s presence. It is in this light that Gunton 
contends that the Spirit is the power of relationality. He writes: “That which is or has 
spirit is able to be open to that which is other than itself, to move dynamically into 
relation with the other. Spirit enables a form of perichoresis to take place, between mind 
and world, world and God.”56 It is the presence of the divine Spirit in the world which 
maintains the transcendence of God as well as God’s embodied presence in creation. 
 The differentiation in all things, the diversity, the particularity, and their unity 
because they are differentiated, express the character of rûah Elohim as the creative, 
dynamic, life-giving, and relational presence of God in the world and history.
57
 The Spirit 
is God’s presence in the body of creation and in the particularity of differentiated bodies. 
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While reaching beyond all “dichotomizing distinctions,” the Spirit is “the relationality 
that holds things together even as it keeps them distinct,” writes Hodgson.58  This reality 
speaks to a pneumatological aesthetics in creation which proclaims the glory of God. It is 
such aesthetics that engenders the harmonious polyphony of all living creatures in 
response to the injunction of their divine Maker and Sustainer: “Let everything that 
breaths praise the LORD” (Ps 150: 6).       
 The Spirit as rûah is the power that engenders differentiation in all created things. 
Created things are differentiated or rather individuated because they have body. 
Corporeality is thus the symbol and vehicle of identity. As a symbol (that which gathers 
together), the body converges in itself the identity of the self without being identical with 
the self. In other words, there is something of the self that transcends the body. As a 
symbol, the self is not reducible to the body. Neither does the self possess any identity 
within space and time without reference to the body. All living bodies are as such 
because they have the Spirit of life indwelling them, vivifying, and sustaining them in 
being. At the same time, the Spirit is the principle of unity of all created things because 
they are differentiated. The Spirit that indwells differentiated bodies in creation also 
unites them with God without destroying their differences and otherness. This 
unity―unlike the Spinozean Deus sive natura which conceives God as identical with 
nature― does not tantamount to identicality. Put differently, divine presence in the world 
does not collapse the difference between God and the world thereby making them one 
and the same thing. Rather the unity constituted by the Spirit expresses God’s relatedness 
and immanence in the world. Thus, rûah is not in any sense hostile or antithetical to 
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‘body’ or ‘corporeality’ but is that which truly makes the corporeal a living being.59 It can 
then be argued that the presence of the divine Spirit constitutes the sacramentality of 
embodiment as the site of God’s self manifestation. If that is well taken, then in as much 
as God constitutes creation through the Creator Spirit, at the same time, God is 
constituted by relating to the world precisely as manifested.
60
 For the God who is not 
manifested in history remains unknown and cannot be believed in, and arguably, the God 
who is unknown, perhaps does not exist, or may at best remain a fictio mentis. The 
knowledge of the revelation of God presupposes and requires the existence of a historical 
human subject as its condition of possibility. It presupposes a human person, a subject as 
a pure potentiality and with an obediential but free capacity for hearing, understanding 
God’s word, and making a free decision in relation to that word. Therefore, God’s history 
lies in God’s coming to humans within the created order. As Eberhard Jüngel argues, 
God’s historicity entails God’s being as it comes; it is “being-in-coming.”61 It is an event-
like coming, it is God who comes in the trace. This God who comes in the trace is the 
God who is love. And because God is love, “this is then God’s being to be related 
to….”62     
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 Conceiving creation as the embodiment of God enlivened by the Spirit makes a 
demand on us with regard to our practices and outlook towards the created order. Henry 
Lederle clearly laments the long provincialization of the Spirit to devotional piety:  
 For too long the Spirit and his work has been conceived of in too limited a  
 sense. There was a capitulation at the beginning of the modern era in which  
 faith became restricted to the private devotional life and the latter was then  
 described as ‘spiritual.’ The Spirit should not be limited to spiritual experien- 
 ces and charisms…. The Spirit is at work in the world and should not be de- 
 graded to an ornament of piety.”63 
 
Lederle’s lament is a reminder that the ubiquity and pervasiveness of the Creator Spirit 
embodies God in every aspect of creation and human experience in history. Nothing is 
further from the truth than to contend that God’s embodiment in creation provides the 
basis for responsible social, economic, political and ecological engagement in a way that 
preserves our world and resources, as well as contributes through industry and work to 
building up and making the world a better and peaceable place for all.
64
 Interestingly, 
Ivan Satyavrata makes a fascinating suggestion: “Although the work of creation is 
complete in the sense that God has called it forth and it exists, it remains incomplete and 
unfinished in that its goal has not been reached.”65 Only at the eschaton would this goal 
be reached when creation would have become what it was meant to be. Meanwhile, the 
Spirit present and active everywhere continually directs creation and history toward its 
redemptive goal culminating in a renewed creation. Truly, the Creator Spirit not only 
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gave life to, but also empowered adamah to become a co-creator. We find this 
fascinatingly expressed in the charge given to Adam not only to name the other creatures 
but also to subdue the earth (see Gen 1:28; 2:19-20).The charge to subdue the earth does 
not in any sense connote domination or subjugation but rather the dignity of work 
because the Creator in whose image humanity has been created is the quintessential 
Worker Himself, “the universal Master Craftsman”66 as is evident in the beauty of the 
work of creation. Hence the Spirit’s role in the act of creation as well as embodying 
God’s presence in the created order “places significant obligations upon… [humanity] for 
stewardship and witness.”67 Humanity is thus obliged not to distance itself from any 
dimension of the Spirit’s activity since the Spirit is present and active everywhere in 
creation.
68
 It demands openness and docility to the action of the Spirit.  
 What is of crucial importance to highlight, however, is that the movement of rûah 
Elohim over the face of the watery chaos which birthed the body of creation into being 
marks “the first, original beginning of God’s salvific self-giving, which is identified with 
the mystery of creation itself.”69 Pope John Paul II rightly suggests, “This biblical 
concept of creation includes not only the call to existence of the very being of the 
cosmos, that is to say the giving of existence, but also the presence of the Spirit of God in 
creation, that is to say the beginning of God's salvific self-communication to the things he 
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creates.”70 Since God’s self-gift or self-donation in the mystery of creation is nothing but 
love, then it is at least not implausible to contend that it is the Spirit of God who 
introduces love into the world. God’s love in creation is expressed as self-gift. By nature 
(not so much about the whatness or the quidditas as about who God is for us), God is 
essentially a loving and hence a relational Being as biblical evidence bears witness. As 
both inwardly and outwardly self-communicating, neither self-enclosed nor narcissistic,
71
 
God freely and graciously loves creation into being as the fruit of that love. God’s self-
transcendence in the very act of God’s loving self-gift lets God’s other (the world) to be 
without collapsing the otherness of the world into God. In effect, this is so to speak, 
God’s hospitality towards the world. This also implies that God is love ontologically. 
God’s self-donation does not institute diminution in God since God freely gives of God’s 
self to otherness “and yet in so doing remains one with himself.”72 Arguably, God’s 
ekstasis is not incidental to who God is. Rather who God is―love―finds expression in 
his ecstasy, his grace. In creation the Spirit gives the breath of God to creatures and in a 
special way to humanity that it might share and participate in the nature and life of God.
73
 
Humanity created in the image and likeness of God is thus made for love, to love, and for 
community of love. Indeed, “God for us” (pro nobis) and “with us” (cum nobis), is ever 
seeking to freely share his life and love with the world, a love from which not even guilt 
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can separate us.
74
 Rather than a static, self-preoccupied thinking-thought, the God of the 
Bible is a loving, relational, and ecstatic God. The Spirit’s universal presence makes 
creation to be a sacrament of God’s ecstatic love and relationality.     
 At any rate, the Spirit truly gives life to bodies. But as the Spirit remains, 
according to Johnson, “the creative and freeing power of God let loose in the world,”75 
where the life and diversity of bodies become contested and diminished by anti-life 
forces and empire, the freeing power of the Spirit is at work to challenge, resist, liberate, 
recreate, renew, and empower. Put another way, the presence of the Spirit continues to 
make efficacious God’s original salvific self-gift in creation expressed in divine loving 
and compassionate engagement with the ruptured world. In what follows, we shall look at 
the prophetic work of the Spirit on behalf of justice and wholeness in a fragmented world. 
3.2.7 The Prophetic Work of the Liberating and Freeing Spirit  
 We have seen how Old Testament pneumatology linked the action of rûah Elohim 
with the giving and sustaining of the life of created living creatures in their differentiated 
bodily particularities. In articulating how the name “Lord” was assimilated to the Spirit 
against the backdrop of the Exodus liberative motif, we recall that two key elements were 
isolated: “life and freedom.” Having elaborated on how the Spirit gives life in the 
preceding section, what will guide our exploration as well as the choice and interpretation 
of texts here is the saving, freeing, resisting, renewing, and liberative gestalt of the 
narrative of the Spirit’s action in the face of life-negating situations of human history. It 
is about the compassionate engagement of the Spirit of God with creation and the human 
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world in its experience of sin, the effects of massive sin as well as brokenness. If the 
Spirit is, according to the affirmation of the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed, the Lord 
and the Giver of life, then one of the upshots of such an affirmation is that, that life given 
to creatures which makes them living beings and what happens to it, matter to the Spirit 
who creates and gives the life ab initio. Therefore, the Spirit who saves, liberates, and 
redeems is the same Spirit who first reveals God’s original salvific self-giving love in the 
mystery of creation. As John Paul II notes,“When…God opens himself to man in the 
Holy Spirit, this opening of God reveals and also gives to the human creature the fullness 
of freedom.”76 The universal immanent presence of the Creator Spirit “is always and in 
all circumstances the reality of God’s saving grace.”77     
 Now, after Adam and Eve were created and enlivened by the Spirit of life, they 
alienated themselves from God through disobedience and hence, sin ruptured creation. 
Creation became subjected to futility but not without hope, groaning for deliverance, and 
waiting with eager longing to share in the glorious liberty of God’s children in the 
language of St. Paul.
78
 This promise of liberation of God’s children which will embrace 
all of creation is already hinted at in the protoevangelium of Genesis 3:15. Yet, such 
cosmic liberation would be unintelligible apart from the original role of the Spirit in 
creating and giving life. The Spirit’s protological role in creation and in directing creation 
to its eschatological goal of completion or perfection thus becomes foundational for the 
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Spirit’s role in the redemptive work of recreation. In broad terms, redemption here refers 
to the renewing of creation. Redemption, as Clark Pinnock suggests, “does not leave the 
world behind but lifts creation to a higher level.”79 Rather than its negation, redemption is 
the restoration, nay, the renewal of creation. And the term perfection as used here should 
not be understood in Aristotelian metaphysical static categories. Instead, it refers to “a 
movement from imperfection to…the complete realization of the divine purpose”80 for a 
renewed creation. For as long as the in-between times last, “the Spirit keeps creation 
open”81 to the future until it attains its final and complete transformation into a new 
creation. As such, the Creator Spirit is equally the Re-Creator Spirit. There is, to be sure, 
an essential continuity between the creative and redemptive works of the Spirit.   
3.2.8 The Spirit and Divine Enablement/Empowerment   
 One aspect of the redemptive and liberative action of the relational Spirit that 
emerges from the OT is that of enablement and empowerment. The Spirit enables the 
creativity of select individuals and empowers others in order to equip them for specific 
tasks and services including various leadership roles, prophetic witnesses, and so on. The 
specific tasks, in other words, are not necessarily limited to the sacred but cut across 
every spectrum of life and human experience since all dimensions of the created order 
belong to the Lord and are redeemable. In all cases, the Spirit comes upon or possesses 
the select individual, instrumentalizing him/her for corporate purposes especially for the 
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preservation and deliverance of the community in the face of sinister and destructive 
forces.  Through the Spirit, God is “present in everything, in the ordinary and the 
extraordinary.”82Rûah’s enablement thus takes different forms and gestalt as the biblical 
understanding of the nature of rûah unfolds and develops in a crescendo fashion toward a 
clearer articulation of the Spirit’s role in messianic expectations. The Spirit comes upon 
bodies to empower them for liberative purposes. Let us now look at certain empowered 
biblical personages.           
 Joseph: In Genesis 41-43, the Spirit is at work in the tumultuous life of Joseph. 
The Spirit is recognized to have endowed Joseph with practical wisdom and 
extraordinary powers of interpreting dreams as well as the capacity to forgive his 
brothers. On account of the Spirit upon him, Joseph was judged a “discerning and wise 
man” and hence appointed by Pharaoh as chief administrator over all of Egypt to 
responsibly manage and administer food supplies in order to save lives in the situation of 
famine.          
 Moses: During his encounter with God at the burning bush, Moses was 
empowered and enabled to go to Pharaoh to work out the freedom of the Israelites from 
oppression and slavery in Egypt. Ordinarily, Moses would not have been able to 
accomplish such a feat if not under the enablement of the Spirit of God. Although, 
reference to the Spirit as the power behind all that Moses had to accomplish in Egypt is 
not explicit, it nevertheless, remains a fair assumption that such a role could not be 
played without the empowerment of the Spirit. That Moses actually had the endowment 
of the Spirit all along is made explicit in Numbers 11:17-26.  In the wilderness, burdened 
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with the complaints of his contentious people, God instructs Moses to appoint seventy 
elders and bring them to the tent of meeting to be equipped with the same Spirit that was 
on Moses to assist him in bearing the burden of the people. To empower the elders, God 
took of the Spirit that was on Moses with which He endued the seventy elders and 
immediately they began to prophesy. Even two of the elders who were among the 
appointed seventy but who could not make it to the tent of meeting with the others also 
experienced the Spirit’s enablement and prophesied in the Camp to the envy of Joshua. In 
this light Max Turner’s comment is apt that “the Spirit of the Lord was perceived as an 
endowment on Moses…through which he liberated Israel at God’s direction.”83 Again, it 
is worthwhile to note that, although, Moses had desired a spirit-filled community as he 
expressed when Joshua demanded that he (Moses) stop the two elders from prophesying 
(Num 11:29), “God’s spirit had been limited to the seventy elders” (Num 11:17, 25).84 
 Joshua: As the successor of Moses, Joshua was also endowed with the Spirit to 
enable him complete the Exodus by preserving the life of the people in the face of 
onslaughts from enemies on the way and eventually leading them into the Promised Land 
after its conquest. At the time of his appointment, Joshua was described by God as “a 
man in whom is the Spirit.”85 Interestingly, when he was commissioned to bring the 
people into the Promised Land, his name was changed from Hoshea (salvation) to 
Jehoshu‘a. The Hebrew Jehoshu‘a is a combination of Yahweh, Yah or Ya with hoshu‘a 
                                                 
      
83
 Max Turner, The Holy Spirit and Spiritual Gifts: Then and Now, rev. ed. (Carlisle, England: 
Paternoster, 1999), 5-6. 
      
84
 Mary Margaret Pazdan, “Joel,” in The Collegeville Bible Commentary: Old Testament, ed. Dianne 
Bergant (Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1992), 583. 
      
85
 Num 27: 18 (NIV). 
  
189 
 
and means “Yahweh saves.” And after the death of Moses, Joshua was during his 
succession perceived as a man “filled with the Spirit of wisdom.”86 It was under the 
enablement of the Spirit that he did exploits to save the Israelites.    
 Judges: Between the conquest of the Promised Land by Joshua and its occupation 
by the Israelites and the time the monarchy was instituted, about a century and half 
interval, the Israelite tribes constituted only a loose federation. During that period, the 
Spirit of the Lord rested upon certain charismatic leaders in the face of the critical 
situations that the people found themselves. The Spirit empowered them to be liberators 
and leaders of Israel’s tribes in those critical times. In these narratives of charismatic 
endowments, rûah Elohim remains always the active and determining subject. 
Charismatic endowments thanks to which these prophetic leaders and savior figures 
emerged are so called because they “are spontaneous and temporarily limited gifts 
conferred on individuals for (emphasis original) the whole people.”87 These Judges 
include: Othniel, the first Judge in the wake of Joshua’s demise ruled Israel for 40 years 
(Judg 3: 7-11). The Spirit of the Lord was upon him and enabled him to rout their 
Mesopotamian oppressors. Deborah was another Judge, characterized as a prophetess, 
and hence, under the enablement of the prophetic Spirit (although the Spirit is not 
explicitly identified with her leadership, but is a fair assumption to make, since as we 
have already seen in the case of Moses and the seventy elders, the nexus between the 
Spirit and prophecy is obvious). In league with Barak, she delivered Israel from the 20 
years of Canaanite oppression (Judg 4: 4). Gideon (Judg 6: 1-8: 35) under the 
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empowerment of the Spirit delivered Israel from the Midianite aggression and judged 
Israel for 40 years. Furthermore, when the Spirit of the Lord came upon Jephthah (Judg 
10: 6-12: 7), he led Israel to victory against the Ammonites and, thereafter, ruled for 6 
years. In the case of Samson (Judg 13: 1-16: 31) said to be the most notorious of Israel’s 
judges and a Nazirite, quite early on in his life, “the Spirit of the Lord began to stir him.” 
Then on three subsequent occasions, “the Spirit of the Lord came upon in power” and 
gave him such extraordinary physical strength that he tore a lion asunder with his bare 
hands, killed thirty men in a Philistine stronghold on the way to Ashkelon, and with a 
donkey’s jawbone, he went on to smother a thousand Philistines. Samson judged Israel 
for 20 years.          
 The activity of the Spirit in the form of charismatic endowments of liberators and 
leaders during the time of the judges was always in response to the supplication of Israel 
for deliverance. Recognizing that their collective crisis was often of their own making,
88
 
in repentance the Israelites cried to God for help. God responded by raising up 
charismatically inspired and empowered judges to save the people from their oppressors. 
 Monarchy: Saul was the last of the judges and with him the monarchy was 
established as the first king of Israel. As with the time of the judges, the continuity of the 
activity of the Spirit in relation to the era of human kingship is unmistakable.  However, 
there is a certain discontinuity.  Whereas charismatic endowments in the time of the 
judges were temporary, in the time of kingship, they became more permanent gifts given 
to Israel’s kings to enable them govern the people. Nonetheless, after Samuel anointed 
Saul king, Saul met with a band of prophets during which he was enmeshed in a religious 
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frenzy and prophetic ecstasy and began to make prophetic utterance as the Spirit came 
upon him. With the Spirit upon him, Saul was enabled to lead decisively and to zealously 
deliver Israel.
89
 In this way, the authority of the king which comes from the Spirit is 
linked with the prophetic office quite resonant with the experience of the seventy elders 
in Numbers 11 as we saw earlier. Hence, we see the obvious nexus between the Spirit, 
prophecy, and kingship. But Saul’s disobedience caused the Spirit to depart from him to 
David, thus marking the decline of Saul’s kingship.      
 David: In David’s case (1 Sam 16: 12-17: 1ff), the endowment with the Spirit 
came more directly through the ritual of anointing by Samuel. With David, God put a 
messianic stamp on Israel’s monarchy as expressed in the prophecy of Nathan: “I will 
establish the throne of his kingdom forever” (2 Sam 7: 13). David was a man after God’s 
own heart and God promises that He will remain with David even as God will be a Father 
to him and he will be a son to God (see 2 Sam 7: 14). At his anointing, the Spirit of the 
Lord was upon David, remained with or rested on him. He was empowered to lead and 
deliver Israel from her aggressors especially from the onslaught of the Philistine 
aggression led by the giant, Goliath. The kingship of David, therefore, mirrored a pattern 
of messianic leadership. Under the enablement of the Spirit, David ruled Israel for forty 
years. But David sinned against God when, not only did he commit adultery with 
Bathsheba but also plotted the murder of Uriah, her husband in battle. David was not 
unaware of the nexus between the Spirit, kingship, and prophecy. Having seen how the 
Spirit’s departure from Saul led to his fall, David would not want kingship devoid of the 
Spirit with a possibility of losing the throne. Hence, in the Psalm (called the Miserere) of 
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repentance and confession of sin attributed to David, he earnestly begs God: “Do not cast 
me from your presence or take your Holy Spirit from me” (Ps 51: 11). Although, the OT 
does not explicitly identify David with prophecy, the only allusion to the prophetic office 
is found in 2 Sam 23: 1-7, where David uttered an oracle described as his last words by 
the power of the Spirit. Curiously, if these last words of David were considered an oracle, 
there is an implication that he may have uttered previous words that equally constituted 
an oracle. Worthy of note, however, is that the New Testament explicitly links David to 
the prophetic office in Acts 2: 30 which sees the prophecy encapsulated in Psalm 16 as 
uttered by David. Be that as it may, as much as it was important, quite early on, for the 
king to prophesy as evidence that the Spirit was truly upon him, it was even much more 
important for the king to be subject to the demands of the prophetic word. This is 
especially the case because in the early days of Saul’s reign and the time of David, Israel 
had the ideal of kingship that was never to be duplicated either in the northern or southern 
kingdom until the advent of the eschatological ideal prophetic king.    
 There is no question that the empowerment of Israel’s leaders by the Spirit 
enabled them to deliver and preserve the people in times of crisis. It is well to note, 
however, especially beginning from Joshua in the conquest of the Promised Land through 
the judges to the kings, that the empowerment by the Spirit appears to be associated with 
violence as though the Spirit is the Spirit of war and vengeance. What do we make of 
such a difficult text as, for example, when the Spirit came upon Gideon, he sounded a 
trumpet, led his army in a victorious campaign against the Midianites, and returned home 
with their severed heads as trophies (see Judg 6:34-7:25). Another is the case of David in 
his campaign against the Philistines during which he decapitated the Philistine giant, 
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Goliath and took his head back to Jerusalem as a trophy (see 1 Sam 11:48-51, 54). Such 
texts as these and more tend to leave the suggestion that God’s rûah in the OT has 
something to do with violence. But according to the helpful suggestion of Michael 
Welker, it is about “the action of God’s Spirit [in] situations of danger in which no escape 
could be seen…. And they report wholly unexpected deliverance.”90 This sounds like the 
ethical principle involved in self-defense where the defense of oneself from unjust 
aggression may result in the collateral or incidental death of the aggressor. Even the 
argument that God is always on the side of the oppressed raises the question as to 
whether that transmutes God into a warrior as some OT texts seem to suggest. The fact, 
however, remains that the sheer gruesomeness of those battles makes the terrifying and 
violent aspects of the narratives keep raising more questions than answers.    
 The Prophets: Although all the prophets do not explicitly attribute their prophetic 
utterances to the activity of the Spirit, one of the major works of the Spirit in the OT was 
the inspiration of the prophetic word and visions.
91
 Indeed, the third article of the Creed 
affirms that it is the Spirit “who has spoken through the prophets.”92 St. Irenaeus, 
following Justin Martyr, grants that “the prophets were sent by God through the Holy 
Spirit” and that it was through the Holy Spirit that they prophesied.93 At different times 
throughout the history of Israel God sent prophets to speak to power the naked truth of 
God’s justice in the face of flagrant abuse and oppression of the weak and defenseless. 
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Not only to power, the prophets also addressed God’s truth to the entirety of the people 
when they disobeyed God, calling them to repentance and fidelity to God’s 
commandments. Equally in the face of national crises, the prophets rose to proclaim the 
message of deliverance and hope.        
 The prophets may easily be categorized into two classes: the non-writing and the 
writing prophets. Among the non-writing prophets were: Samuel who was sent to address 
God’s judgment to Saul (1 Sam 15: 24-26); Nathan sent to speak to David on his sin and 
power abuse (2 Sam 12: 1-15); others were Gad (2 Sam 24: 11-25), Ahijah (1 Kgs 11: 29-
39), Micaiah (1 Kgs 22: 8-28), Azariah (2 Chron 15: 1-7), and of interest to us is Elijah 
sent to Ahab and Jezebel (1 Kgs 21: 17-24) to condemn their idolatry, injustice, and 
oppression. Elijah was able to accomplish all did at his time when no other prophet was 
around in Israel because of the Spirit powerfully upon him. That he was strongly 
empowered by the Spirit is made obvious in the transmission of the Spirit to Elisha who 
asked to receive a double portion of the Spirit that was upon Elijah (2 Kgs 2).  
 Among the writing prophets, of particular interest to us are Micah, Ezekiel, Isaiah, 
and Joel, in that more than any other, they attributed their prophetic ministry to the overt 
work of the Spirit. In Micah 3: 5-8, the eight-century pre-exilic prophet, Micah, links his 
proclamation of the prophetic dābārYahweh (Word of the Lord) to his empowerment by 
the Spirit. Basically, his prophetic message impelled by the Spirit was God’s 
condemnation of the flagrant abuse, the pervasive moral corruption, and all sorts of social 
injustice prevalent at the time in Israel. Micah spoke out in no uncertain terms, decrying 
the exploitation of the peasants and the poor who were literally despoiled and stripped of 
their human dignity by the few―the civil and religious leaders―who thrived by 
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impoverishing the little people to enrich themselves. His was a clamant call addressed to 
the perpetrators to metanoia and to liberate the downtrodden. However, for their 
indifference to God’s love reflected in their oppression of the poor, exile to Babylon was 
to be their fate, even though God might still redeem them.
94
    
 Isaiah: Isaiah had a lot to talk about the work of the Spirit during his prophetic 
ministry. Because of its numerous allusions to the expected messianic king of Davidic 
lineage, the prophecy of Isaiah is often called the “Fifth Gospel” or the “the Gospel of the 
Old Testament.” Indeed, the term rûah occurs about 50 times throughout the entire 
corpus. Like Micah, Isaiah was also an eight-century prophet particularly during the reign 
of Ahaz and Hezekiah. Internally, Isaiah protested against all injustice prevalent in Israel 
at the time: crimes, idolatry, and their trampling on the poor. Isaiah consequently issued 
threats of God’s judgment against Israel because they added infidelity upon infidelity.95 
In the face of external oppression, however, Isaiah spoke words of liberation and hope. 
Indeed, in Proto-Isaiah, during the first plunder of Jerusalem by the Assyrians at the time 
of Ahaz who refused to listen to the prophet, Isaiah announced the basis of a future hope 
in the birth of Emmanuel in Isaiah 7: 10ff. At his birth, Emmanuel meaning “God-with-
us” will not simply bring God’s blessings and divine liberation. Rather, through him, 
God’s presence would dwell among humankind and in him the promises of old would 
come true. And to Hezekiah who listened to Isaiah, the prophet promised the survival of a 
remnant of the people of Judah during Sennacherib’s Assyrian invasion and Hezekiah 
resisted the enemy (see 36-37: 1-36).        
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 Again, in the midst of the Babylonian invasion still at the time of Hezekiah, Isaiah 
started to envision the beginning of a new future world. He understood that future to be 
beyond the present world characterized by violence and injustice. But the new world, 
more or less, a new creation will be one in which justice and righteousness will prevail. 
No longer can this new world be brought about by earthly kings. It would require the 
advent of an ideal king of the line of Davidic kingship, a Messiah upon whom the Spirit 
will rest and work with a mighty power in a unique and unprecedented way. Hence, out 
of the tradition of the Davidic kingship and lineage as well grew the Messianic hope.
96
 
Unlike the kings before him, the coming Messiah will be the true shepherd, will not rely 
on violence or oppression, but he will be the Prince of Peace. His zeal for the Lord 
Almighty will translate into his deployment of God’s power as power for compassion to 
the point of self-giving love climaxing in suffering and death. He will reign on David’s 
throne forever establishing justice and righteousness.
97
    
 Isaiah, thus, foresees the coming ideal king, the anointed one as the quintessential 
pneumatophoros (bearer of the Spirit). Hence Isaiah 11: 2 says: “The Spirit of the Lord 
will rest on him―the Spirit of Wisdom and of understanding, the Spirit of counsel and of 
power, the Spirit of knowledge and of the fear of the Lord.” The reference to “power” in 
relation to the regal figure who will be mightily endowed with the Spirit, as Max Turner 
notes, “pertains to the power to ensure freedom from enemies and enforce righteous rule 
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against opposition.”98 Thus Isaiah 11:3-4 goes further to describe the nature of the 
Messiah’s rule, about how he will be compassionate, with justice will he judge the poor, 
and with righteousness decide for the meek. This justice of compassion which the coming 
Messiah will bring the poor because of his empowerment by the anointing of the Spirit is 
taken up again in Trito-Isaiah (61: 1-2): “The Spirit of the Lord God is upon me, because 
the Lord has anointed me to preach good news to the poor….” The identity of the ideal 
king as Messiah, the anointed one, the liberator par excellence, will be constituted by the 
Spirit. Messiah, Christ, simply means the one anointed with the Spirit. Somewhere else, 
Isaiah also makes the point that the anointed one is sent by Yahweh and his Spirit: “and 
now the Lord, even the Lord and his Spirit, hath sent me” {emphasis original (48:16)}.99  
In the power of the Spirit, he will “initiate the rebirth of all the living for God’s new 
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creation.”100 In many instances, Isaiah announces that the Messiah king who will come, 
brings liberation, salvation, and will strengthen and restore his people (see 40: 10-13; 62: 
11). Isaiah equally envisages that the salvation and justice which the anointed one will 
bring will be seen by all the ends of the earth (see 52:10; 61:11). For the new heavens and 
the new earth which God will create will be open to all peoples and nations of every 
tongue (see 66: 18-19). Correlating the image of water and the Spirit, Isaiah illustrates 
how the coming God will engender new life, deliverance, and the hope of a peaceful 
time: “For I will pour water on the thirsty land and streams on the dry ground; I will pour 
out my Spirit on your offspring, and my blessing on your descendants” (44: 3). Again, 
when at last “the Spirit is poured upon us from on high and the desert becomes a fertile 
field…Justice will dwell in the desert and righteousness live in the fertile field. The fruit 
of righteousness will be peace” (32: 15-17). Just as water brings about life in the 
wilderness, so the outpouring of the Spirit will create new life in those who have been 
afflicted and desiccated by exploitation and oppression. What clearly emerges from the 
foregoing Isaiah’s texts is that the rebirth of the Messianic people of the new creation will 
be the work of the Spirit to be poured out.       
 Already in Isaiah, we begin to see that the future outpouring of the Spirit will no 
longer be the prerogative of merely certain select individuals. The Jewish tradition, even 
as we saw right from the time of Moses, had always limited the enduement of the Spirit 
of God on persons with official status like judges, kings, prophets, and so forth, who are 
given specific tasks to accomplish on behalf of the people. Rather, all the people will 
experience the rebirth from the Spirit to be poured out. God’s Spirit will empower every 
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member of the community of God’s people. It is this universal bestowal of the Spirit that 
is taken up by Ezekiel and Joel.      
 Ezekiel: Ezekiel, a priest, was one of those deported to Babylonin exile. He 
received his prophetic mission in the exilic period. More than any other, Ezekiel 
explicitly acknowledged his prophetic oracles to have been engendered by the 
enablement of the Spirit (Ezek 2-3: 1-27). The word rûah occurs about 46 times in 
Ezekiel. Moved by the Spirit, the exilic prophet prophesied against the sins of Judah, 
including those of the people, the leaders, and the false prophets (5-7; 11:1-12; 13:1-23; 
22:1-31) as well as the purported stability of cult and peace that presumed the guarantee 
of God’s protection of the Temple. Contrary to this view, Ezekiel, lifted up by the Spirit, 
beheld the kābōd (glory) of God departing from the Temple and announced the certainty 
of the exile (11: 23-24; 12:8-16). In all this, Ezekiel made thematic the explicit role of the 
Spirit in his articulation of God’s dābār. The kābōd of God which departed from the 
Temple was an indication that God’s presence was no longer to be seen to be confined to 
the Temple building orchestrated by cult celebration under the control of the priestly 
class.            
 With the vision of the departure of God’s glory from the Temple, Ezekiel became 
more aware of the ever more ubiquitous presence of God to the people. Since God was no 
longer limited to the Temple, then in the Spirit, God was present to the people even in 
their place of exile. Likening the exile to some kind of wilderness or even death-like 
situation, Ezekiel prophesied about the re-animation and re-vivification of their dead 
bones by the Spirit to make them become living beings once more (Ezekiel 37: 1-14). 
Ezekiel here projects the Spirit as the one who brings about a new creation and the giver 
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of new life. The Spirit does not only re-create and re-vivify but also renews the people by 
purifying and penetrating their hearts making them faithful to God’s covenant (36: 24-
28). Through the outpouring of the Spirit, “God will be the principle of faithful life and 
holy life for Israel.”101 Not only that, when the Spirit is poured out on Israel, then truly, 
never again will God hide his face (pānîm) from them (39:29) lest they return to their 
dust. By pouring out the Spirit and putting the Spirit into them, the people will become 
God’s dwelling place, God’s Temple, and God’s dwelling (Shekinah) will be among 
them.            
 Joel: As mentioned earlier, even beginning in the time of Isaiah, the expectation 
of the future Messianic age was already rife. The widespread outpouring and bestowal of 
the Spirit became more closely tied to it. Thus in Joel, this widespread outpouring of the 
Spirit became even more radically extended to embrace all peoples, indeed, all flesh.
102
 In 
his vision of eschatological events, Joel declares: “And afterward, I will pour out my 
Spirit on all people. Your sons and daughters will prophecy, your old men will dream 
dreams, your young men will see visions. Even on my servants, both men and women, I 
will pour out my Spirit in those days” (Joel 2: 28-29). What is radical and unusual in this 
text is the mention of “servants” (both men and women, that men-servants and 
handmaids). Except for their Sabbath rights protected by the sabbatical and Jubilee laws 
of Sabbath rest and release (Ex 20:10; Deut 12:12, 18; 16:11, 14), these category of 
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persons were excluded from the scheme of things in the community. Indeed, they were 
simply not considered members of the community. Hence the radicality of Joel’s 
prophecy means that “participation in God’s spirit implies equal (emphasis original) 
status for each person in the community.”103 The Messianic expectations and the hope for 
the universal outpouring of the Spirit are believed to have been fulfilled in the New 
Testament. The Spirit that will be poured out on all flesh, the heart of flesh, indicates 
once again that the Spirit is not antithetical to corporeality and history. Rather, the Spirit 
seeks body, animates, recreates, renews, liberates, and redeems body by resisting and 
subverting whatever life-negating forces that threaten the integrity and dignity of body. 
The Spirit empowers all flesh from their powerlessness and weakness and liberates and 
restores all who have been previously excluded and oppressed to the equal dignity of all 
humanity. In the light of the biblical testimony we have been examining, there is, 
accordingly, no room in the OT for what Welker describes as docetic pneumatology 
which removes the Spirit and the work of the Spirit from the domain of corporeality and 
history while relegating it to some form of ethereality.
104
  The Spirit is really active in 
time and space with creation and humanity in flesh and blood.    
 Before proceeding to treat the role of the Spirit in the life of the Messiah and 
subsequently in the church, it might well worth it to look briefly at the reading of the OT 
by and as Christians. Previously, I mentioned that in the OT the Spirit had not yet 
acquired a distinct personhood. Put another way, the Spirit in the OT was predominantly 
viewed as an impersonal force or the power of God at work in creation and history. But to 
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sustain the nexus between the OT and NT understanding of the Spirit, it is crucial to look 
at how Jesus himself and the early Christians understood their continuity by how they 
read the OT with regard to the Spirit.        
3.2.8.1 Christian Reading of the Old Testament in Relation to the Spirit  
 Considering the pluriform semantic range of the Hebrew word rûah, some authors 
have argued,on the one hand, that it is anachronistic and reductionist to equate rûah 
simply with the Spirit of God and talk less with the Holy Spirit. According to this 
position, to do so amounts to eisegeting (reading meaning) into the OT.
105
 Upholders of 
this view thus call for minimalism. On the other hand, others view all the works 
attributed to the OT rûah as evidence of the activity of the trinitarian third Person.
106
 
Advocates of this position are viewed as maximalist in orientation.    
 While it is a truism that the OT has its own canonical integrity, the question 
remains how the early Christians theologically interpreted the OT. No doubt, the veracity 
of the Trinity and hence, the distinct personhood of the Holy Spirit are NT revelations. 
Yet, Christian theological hermeneutics acknowledges the inspiration of both Testaments 
as the work of the same Holy Spirit. Indeed, as Gerald O’Collins maintains, all the OT 
personifications of the Spirit and Word paved the way for the eventual acknowledgment 
of the Trinity.
107
         
 That the Holy Spirit was already active in the OT is attested to by Jesus himself. 
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For instance, in Mark 12:35-36, “While Jesus was teaching in the temple courts, he 
asked, ‘How is it that the teachers of the law say that the Christ is the son of David? 
David himself, speaking by the Holy Spirit, declared’: ‘The Lord said to my Lord: Sit at 
my right hand until I put all your enemies under your feet.’” In this case, Jesus was 
alluding to the prophetic utterance attributed to David in Psalm 110:1. Jesus saw this 
Davidic oracle as inspired by the Holy Spirit. Again, in Acts 1:15-16, “In those days 
Peter stood up among the believers…and said, ‘Brothers, the Scripture had to be fulfilled 
which the Holy Spirit spoke long ago through the mouth of David concerning Judas, who 
served as guide for those who arrested Jesus…’” Here too, Peter read Psalms 69:25 and 
109:8 as inspired by the Holy Spirit. Furthermore, in Acts 4:25, when Peter and John 
rejoined the group of believers after their release by the Sanhedrin and reported all they 
underwent in the hands of the chief priests and elders, the believers, among other things, 
prayed thus: “Sovereign Lord…. You spoke by the Holy Spirit through the mouth of your 
servant, our father David…” The believers’ prayer in this instance refers to Psalm 2:1-2. 
Even Irenaeus follows this pattern and admits: “Wherefore the Holy Spirit says by David: 
Blessed is the man who hath not walked in the counsel of the ungodly” (emphasis 
original).
108
 On the basis of this pattern of theological hermeneutics by Jesus himself, the 
apostles, the early Christians, and the Fathers, it is arguable then that the OT references to 
the Spirit of God are evidence to the distinct personhood of the Holy Spirit albeit 
unnamed but already active in the OT.      
 Moreover, if Jesus could locate himself in the OT testimonies, for instance, when 
he appeared after his resurrection to the two disciples on the road to Emmaus and 
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eventually to the apostles in Jerusalem, he made them understand everything written 
about him in the Scriptures starting from Moses through the prophets to the Psalms (see 
Lk 24: 13-27, 44-47);  and if the NT writers could also decipher Christ in the OT 
witnesses, for example, Paul sees Christ as the Rock that provided Israel water in the 
desert (see 1 Cor 10: 1-4), then following the same trend, it becomes plausibly arguable 
that the Holy Spirit has also been actively at work in the OT. We shall now return to the 
question of the Spirit and the messiah.       
3.2.9 The Spirit and the Messiah       
 From both the Nicene creedal order and what appears to be the commonest 
trinitarian taxis―Father, Son, and Spirit―the impression has too often been that the 
Spirit comes only after Christ. To put it differently, the Spirit often tends to be viewed to 
have arrived for the first time at Pentecost after being sent by the risen and ascended 
Christ. But from our investigations so far, it is clear from the Hebrew Scriptures that the 
Spirit has not only been actively at work in creation but even before the coming of the 
Messiah, the Spirit as divine presence has always constituted part of the religious 
experience of the people of God. We equally saw the dynamic, reciprocal relationship 
between Spirit and Word in the OT as distinct but inseparable mediators of divine 
presence. In addition, during the intertestamental period, wisdom (hokmah in Hebrew or 
Sophia in Greek) was used in sapiential literature to designate the Spirit and became a 
key category for speaking about divine presence.
109
 Pentecost, thus, is not the first 
coming of the universal Spirit in history. Rather, it marks the apogee of the grandiose 
outpouring and, indeed, a more perfect manifestation of the same Spirit who has been 
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ever-present from the very beginning.       
 It is worth noting, however, that the Spirit does not simply come after Christ but 
has always accompanied the Word. Indeed, Mary conceived Jesus as the Son of God by 
the Holy Spirit (Lk 1:35). The Holy Spirit who overshadowed Mary
110
 and engendered 
the conception of Jesus of Nazareth reminisces the Spirit of God which in the very 
beginning hovered over the primeval waters and birthed creation. Indeed, the Creator 
Spirit created the humanity of Jesus in his incarnation. Before his conception, the angel 
from heaven had given his name to Mary. The name Jesus is the same name as Jehoshu‘a  
(the Lord saves). Thus, the name of Jesus reaches into the very mystery of God (as Savior 
or Liberator) revealed to Moses at the burning bush. At his baptism, Jesus was anointed 
and empowered by the Holy Spirit to carry out his prophetic ministry (Lk 3: 21-22) and 
claimed by God as His Son.
111
 Fully endowed with the Holy Spirit, he was led by the 
Spirit into the desert to be tempted and to overcome (Lk 4:1-2). And on his return to 
Nazareth after baptism and overcoming temptation, Jesus read from the text of Isaiah 
61:1-2; 58:6 (see Lk 4:18-19) in the synagogue on a Sabbath.  In the end, Jesus 
proclaimed the fulfillment of the text in him as the Messiah of OT expectation. Jesus 
appropriated this Isaianic material to declare the nature of his mission under the 
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empowerment of the relational Spirit. The identity of Jesus as the Son of God and as the 
Messiah, the Savior, cannot, therefore, be understood apart from the endowment of the 
Spirit in his life. As Gregory Nazianzen maintains, the Spirit both precedes Christ and 
follows Christ. There is to be no subordination of any to the other or supersession of any 
by the other.
112
         
 The prophetic Spirit anointed and empowered Jesus not only to overcome Satan, 
temptation, and sin through obedience to the Father and counterviolence, but also by his 
prophetic life-style and stance ―though non-partisan but definitely not apolitical―to 
mount resistance against massive evil. Early on, St. Irenaeus of Lyons in his theory of 
recapitulation, clearly recognized the redemptive significance of not only the passion and 
death but also the incarnation and life of Christ.
113
 In the dominant Western soteriology, 
however, much accent has been placed on the atoning and redemptive death of Christ (in 
isolation) which saves from personal sin to the neglect of the redemptive significance of 
the entire life of Christ expended in self-giving love (including his choice and defense of 
the neglected and excluded, the vulnerable, the exploited, and his stance against systemic 
evil such as injustice, and so on). We shall return to this issue in a later section. At any 
rate, it is as one who is birthed by the Spirit, one on whom the Spirit descends and rests, 
one who is first given the Spirit without measure (cf. Jn 3:34) that Jesus would be the 
bestower of the Spirit from the Father on believers. Indeed, the Spirit is not just the gift of 
Christ but also the giver of Christ as well.        
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3.2.9.1 Jesus as Messiah and the Reign of God     
 Asked by the Pharisees when the kingdom of God was to come, Jesus answered 
them by dismissing any construal that would comprehend the kingdom in terms of 
geographical locatedness or physicality. Nevertheless, he affirmed, “For behold, the 
kingdom of God is [already] among you” (Lk 17:20). Again, when it was insinuated by 
the Pharisees that the source of Jesus’ power for performing exorcisms was from 
Beelzebul, the prince of the devils, Jesus responded by pointing to the Spirit as the source 
of his empowerment. Reproaching their deliberate attempts to ignore at best or obfuscate 
at worst what was clearly the demonstration of God’s power, Jesus declared: “But if it is 
by the Spirit of God that I drive out demons, then the kingdom of God has come upon 
you” (Mtt 12:28). In the ministry of Jesus, the Spirit inaugurates the basileia tou theou. 
As Jesus proclaimed in his inaugural sermon in Nazareth noted previously, he was aware 
up till the moment he gave up his spirit on the cross (Lk 24:46) that the relational Spirit 
engendered liberation, forgiveness, deliverance, healing, restoration, and hope through 
his ministry. The endowment of Jesus with the Spirit without measure marked the explicit 
inauguration of God’s reign and the dawn of the new creation of all things. The Spirit,as 
Moltmann puts it, “makes Jesus ‘the kingdom of God in person,’ for in the power of the 
Spirit (emphasis original) he drives out demons and heals the sick; in the power of the 
Spirit he receives sinners, and brings the kingdom of God to the poor. This…power of 
God is given him not for himself but for others: for the sick, the poor, sinners, the 
dying.”114 Thus, the subversions encapsulated in the inaugural sermon which Jesus 
executed in his ministry and which the Pharisees tried to misrepresent, clearly show that 
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the reign of God with its characteristic radical reversals has been inaugurated.  
 In the Roman empire of the time of Jesus as in every empire, the core principle 
was domination. Imperial domination is often expressed in the deployment of the 
instrument of control to subject all into the category of sameness. In this setting, those 
who appear different are usually excluded. The reach of Empire is not merely 
geographical and political. It also wields control over every domain of life―religion, 
culture, economy, health, physiognomy and psychology, intellect and knowledge, wealth 
distribution, power, and so on―with the consequence that those who appear to fall 
outside the purported grid of the dominant normativity are perceived as deviant, as 
different (in a degenerate sense), as “other,” and hence, marked out for oppression and 
exclusion.
115
 Empire is thus characterized by the entrenchment of an imperialistic 
monoculture whose operative mechanism runs on core-periphery and top-down 
paradigm. Such totalitarian paradigm and unilateral run of power entails the subjugation 
of the minorities, those at the margins, the weaker peoples, and smaller cultures by 
empire.
116
 A crucial consequence of this monocultural imperialism is that its victims are 
often forced into invisibility as subjects and persons with their own group distinctive and 
specific expectations, experiences, perspectives, and desires. Jesus’ proclamation of the 
reign of God, among other things, as Bruce Malina suggests, unfolded within the context 
of the problem posed by imperialistic Roman political economy and culture as well as by 
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local Israelite aristocracy, the fanatic, hierarchized, bureaucratic, and pharisaic 
religiosity.
117
         
 Contrary to the operative mechanism of empire rooted in the politics of 
domination, violence, and control, Jesus demonstrated the power of God’s reign in terms 
of “struggle” (power in weakness) expressed in the politics of compassion and self-giving 
love as an alternative. The Gospels are replete with many instances of such display of 
compassion by Jesus. For example, Jesus reached out and touched a leper (at a time when 
lepers were regarded as among the worst sinners by the religious establishment and 
ostracized from the society of normal people) in order to heal him (Mtt 8:2-3). He 
welcomed the touch of the hopeless and frustrated woman with issue of blood considered 
as unclean and healed her (Mtt 9:20-22), forgave the paralytic (Mtt 9:1-2), criticized his 
own generation and the Pharisees and Sadducees (Mtt 12:38-45; 16:1-4), preached the 
Good News to and fed the drifting and hapless crowd (Mtt 14:13-21), renounced power 
as domination (Mtt 23:8-12; Mk 10:41-45), spoke truth fearlessly to power (Mtt 23:13-
39), welcomed children (Mk 10:14), mingled with the despised (Lk 7:36-50; 19:1-10), 
and so on. In these different circumstances Jesus enacted his politics of compassion as a 
demonstration of the reign of God that has come. Compassion and solidarity entail siding, 
identifying, and bearing the suffering of others with them to the extent of doing 
something practically to relieve their misery even at the risk of one’s own life (see Isa 
42:3; 50: 6; 53:4-5). Since there can be no such thing as true love or compassion without 
solidarity, solidarity thus entails some form of incarnation or identification with. In the 
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words of the Spanish-born Jesuit theologian, Jon Sobrino, “Solidarity that was not 
prepared to share the lot of those with whom it wanted to show solidarity would be 
paternalism, to put it mildly, or would lead to despotism. Solidarity in a world of victims 
[and the silenced] that was not prepared to become a victim would in the end not be 
solidarity.”118          
 Jesus’ Spirit empowered politics of compassion and prophetic stance would bring 
him into a seething and searing controversy with the establishment (the political and 
religious authorities). His politics of compassion subverted the politics of domination, 
greed, and exploitation at his time. No doubt, his life-style, his ministry of self-giving 
love, compassion, and his prophetic stance challenged the violence
119
 and life-negating 
structures of the religious, economic, and socio-political power relations in his universe. 
Consequently, those who benefitted from the status quo conspired and forged a 
pernicious alliance to eliminate him. In fact, Jesus posed a threat to the empire and its 
socio-political and religious status quo by offering a distinct and opposite alternative.
120
 
His unmasking of oppression which was sublimated and justified in the name of God and 
religion; his denunciations of the oppressors and forms of power that structure oppression 
in society at his time especially as represented and exercised by certain classes and 
groups (such as the Pharisees and scribes, the chief priests and the rich, the rulers and the 
aristocrats), as well as his defense of the oppressed formed part of Jesus’ prophetic 
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praxis. Jesus, of course, situated himself within Israel’s classic prophetic tradition and as 
such, knew that the fate of the prophets would be his lot as well (see Lk 13:32-33). 
Nevertheless, his prophetic praxis aimed, inter alia, at summoning whole groups and 
collectivities (and not merely individual sinners) whose power structure perpetrates 
systemic evil and oppression sublimated in God’s name, to conversion for the purpose of 
the transformation of society. This does not mean to reduce the ministry of Jesus to 
merely social activism and ideological exercise. It rather means to say that Jesus took the 
whole life of society seriously especially its structural dimensions that produced innocent 
victims in order to transform it through offering alternative values. As a divine figure but 
incarnated in history, his prophetic praxis and entire life could not but be meaningful in 
the light of the spatio-temporal conditions of his time including the religious, social, 
economic, political, ideological, cultural, and so forth. Thus, Jesus not only proclaimed 
the kingdom of life but also denounced the anti-kingdom, unmasking its different death-
dealing aspects: religious, social, economic, etc.     
 The Spirit empowered ministry of Jesus had to necessarily unmask and confront 
sin and evil in its different guises and manifestations―personal and social (which 
essentially has economic and political ramifications)―thereby making his ministry 
ineluctably assume a public character.  Non-partisan, albeit he was, that does not mean 
that Jesus’ Spirit-inspired ministry and history was apolitical or had no social and 
economic implications. He was definitely on the side of the oppressed, the hapless and 
downtrodden, the voiceless, the marginalized, the violated, the excluded, and, indeed, 
those on the underside in order to bring them the justice and compassion of God. His 
ministry and indeed his entire history was not simply all about preserving peace and 
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harmony as in pure pacifism (understood in the sense of absence of conflict).
121
 Rather, 
Jesus’ Spirit-enabled ministry was also subversive, however, not in the Zealots’ 
revolutionary sense.
122
 In proclaiming the kingdom of God for the poor, Jesus proffered 
an alternative way of establishing it different from the religious nationalisms and violent 
political theocratic model— friend-enemy—espoused by the Zealots. By contrast to 
Zealotism, the kingdom Jesus proclaims and expresses in his life, words, and deeds, was 
to be established through such humanizing values as truth, justice, compassion, love, and 
above all, by grace. He boldly and radically challenged the establishment to self-
criticism, denounced the alienation and inhumanity of their oppressive deeds, called them 
to metanoia, and to end the cycle of violence, while offering them liberation and hope. 
Because his Spirit-inspired insurgence against injustice and evil made the comfortable 
and powerful uncomfortable, when arraigned before Pilate the chief priests and the elders 
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of the people accused him of being a political subversive (Lk 23:2, 13-14; Jn 19:12-15). 
They murdered him out of colossal hatred, envy, and brutal injustice. But even at that, 
Jesus was not a passive victim in his suffering and death. It was not his victimizers, 
neither was it death itself that were the determining agents in his death. There is little 
doubt that Jesus was fully aware of what was going to be his fate in the conflict with the 
death-dealing forces and gods of the anti-kingdom. He knew that the fate of the prophets 
who went long before him awaited him (see Lk 13:31-33). Rather, in the power of the 
Spirit he freely and actively laid down his life for the sake of his friends. Nor was his 
death simply a pacification of God’s anger against humanity going by traditional 
atonement theory. It was fundamentally engineered as a result of State hatred and 
scapegoatism
123
 to which Jesus, however, actively surrendered as a sign of his credible 
solidarity and irrevocable love for his friends. As Sobrino succinctly puts it, “And where 
his own fate was concerned, Jesus—hard and verbally aggressive to the point of insult 
when defending the poor and oppressed—offered himself without resistance to his 
persecutors.”124 By so doing, Jesus proved that nothing, absolutely nothing, not even 
death could constitute an obstacle to God’s irrevocable saving love for his friends in the 
throes of life-negating anti-kingdom. Be that as it may, through his self-giving love even 
in death, the compassionate and “gracious God of Jesus enters into solidarity with all 
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those who suffer and are lost.”125 It is this God’s definitive love that saves. And because 
God’s love saves, we know him as truly God-with-us and God-for-us. What is most 
consoling, nonetheless, is that the power of the Creator Spirit who is also the Recreator 
Spirit transcends death. Thus in the power of the Spirit the giver of life, God raises Jesus 
“in new, unimaginable life as pledge of a future for all the violated and the dead…. and 
the whole cosmos itself.”126 This brings us back to the point that the relational, Creator 
Spirit remains unpredictable, uncontrollable, unrestrainable, and undomesticable. The 
ubiquity of the Spirit who gives life holds sway even beyond death. After his death and 
resurrection, Jesus sends the promised Spirit from the Father to the disciples.  
3.2.9.2 The Spirit and the Church       
 The Spirit, the giver of life in whose power Jesus is raised from the dead to new 
life is the same Spirit who has been poured out on the disciples on Pentecost. In the midst 
of the enveloping mighty wind and in hovering over and resting on each one of the 
disciples in the form of tongues of fire, the Spirit birthed the church (Acts 2:2-3). The 
early Christian community was clearly convinced that the outpouring of the Spirit on 
Pentecost after the ascension of Christ―in accordance with Luke’s chronology (Lk 
24:51; Acts 1:9)―was the fulfillment of the OT promise of a universal and inclusive 
bestowal of the Spirit in Joel as noted previously. The Spirit empowers the circle of 
disciples with a variety of gifts and different callings to witness to the saving power of 
Christ and to be a sign of the reign of God in the midst of the brokenness of this world. In 
this new community, the presence of the resurrected Christ will continue to be present to 
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the church and to the world in the Spirit. The Pentecost event of the outpouring of the 
Spirit on “all flesh” in fulfillment of Joel’s prophecy is important for our purpose in 
furthering our claim that the relational Spirit seeks and rests on body, gives life, 
engenders plurality and equality, and resists anti-life forces.     
3.2.9.3 The Spirit and Pluralism       
 The Spirit who is being bestowed on all flesh for their empowerment relativizes 
the imperial monoculture, monolingualism, and unilateral flow of power in empire. By 
broadening the reach of the Spirit’s inspiration and empowerment not only to a privileged 
few, the Spirit resists all that empire stands for―domination and control. The enablement 
of all flesh means, as Welker suggests, that “a specific group of people, a specific 
stratum, a specific tradition, or a specific culture can no longer claim for itself alone 
God’s presence, the reception of the Spirit, prophetic testimony, and true definitions of 
reality.”127 The Spirit is bestowed on all irrespective of differences: old and young, male 
and female, master and servant, privileged and disadvantaged. By empowering all, 
typical differences not withstanding, the Spirit fosters unity and equality in the midst of 
differences. This fostering of pluralism and heterogeneity which shatters the core of 
imperialistic monoculturalism―a particular perspective or culture of the dominant or 
privileged group paraded as universal―further finds expression in the bestowal of the 
gift of polyglossia by the Spirit during the Pentecost event. When the Spirit descended on 
the  Galilean disciples, as Paul writes, “they were all filled with the Holy Spirit and began 
to speak in different tongues, as the Spirit enabled them to proclaim” (Acts 2:4). The 
unpredictability and uncontrollability of the power of the Spirit which cannot be merely 
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contained within the familiar and the comfortable blossoms forth in the profusion of 
speech to the utter bewilderment and astonishment of all those gathered from every nook 
and cranny of the globe. What at first appears to be a confusion of languages as in Babel 
is quite dissimilar to Babel, in that in the Pentecost event, each of those gathered heard in 
his or her own native language and idiom. Those gathered included Parthians, Medes, 
Elamites, Mesopotamians, Judeans, Cappadocians, Asians, Phrygians, Pamphylians, 
Egyptians, Libyans, Cyreneans, Romans, Arabs, Cretans, and others (cf Acts 2:5-12).   
 The gift of polyglossia means that no one single language can express fully the 
mysterious immensity of the Spirit. The outpouring of the Spirit inherently requires a 
pluriversality of languages and narratives, and different peoples to give it expression. 
With the Pentecost experience which dismantles the stranglehold of monoculturalism, 
unilateralism, and uniformism, there is no more place for any one particular culture, 
tradition, group, or dominant voice to claim monopoly of the true definition of reality 
which becomes universalized or even absolutized. In this connection, it is difficult not to 
agree with Hodgson’s suggestion that: “There is neither a singular, monolithic truth nor a 
plurality of truths but rather a truth that is itself inherently pluralistic, reflecting the 
pluralism of universal reality.”128       
 The Spirit of Pentecost, indeed, sustains plurality, difference, and heterogeneity. 
In the church, the Spirit sustains the life of the body of Christ by indwelling human 
bodies and providing them with different gifts. Variously, Paul frequently describes the 
Spirit as indwelling human bodies: “You are in the Spirit, since the Spirit of God dwells 
in you” (Rom 8:9). Again, “If the Spirit of the one who raised Jesus from the dead dwells 
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in you, the one who raised Christ from the dead will give life to your mortal bodies also, 
through his Spirit that dwells in you” (Rom 8:11; cf. 1 Cor 3:16; 6:19). By being poured 
out on all flesh, the Spirit subverts the unsalutary differences created by empire which 
makes a certain class the dominators and others on the underside the subjugated. The 
Spirit resists these power differentials by creating an alternative pluralism in which all are 
empowered and not simply some or the merely privileged. In this way, the Spirit creates a 
certain egalitarianism among the empowered. While fostering pluralism and encouraging 
an affirmation of differences, it is not all differences that should be reinforced. As Welker 
writes, all “unrighteous differences”129 should be done away with. That is, differences 
that are life threatening, death-dealing, oppressive, or life-negating, are to be discouraged 
and resisted. While those that cultivate and flourish life should be sustained. It is positive 
difference that the Spirit promotes. The Spirit that is poured out on all people means, as 
Moltmann notes, “that the traditional privileges come to an end―the privileges of men 
compared with women, of lords compared with servants, of adults compared with 
children.”130          
 A crucial point to grasp is that the Spirit does not simply empower those who 
previously had no power and perhaps merely raise them to the same level with those who 
wielded power before. In other words, the insurgent Spirit does not simply accomplish a 
formal equality (which in this sense is equal to sameness). For such notion of formal 
equality would make it extremely difficult if not impossible to unmask and name how 
difference has often been maneuvered to continue to structure privilege and advantage 
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versus oppression and disadvantage. Equality is not the same as sameness or 
homogeneity. For there can be no genuine equality unless distinct groups, their specific 
culture, specific perspectives on reality, distinct experiences which form a crucial 
dimension of social existence in a particular contextual situation are recognized and 
affirmed. Blindness to difference when it is assimilated, under the guise of formal 
equality, into sameness often oppresses minority groups whose difference is delineated 
by the dominant groups as deviant  on the basis of their (the dominant’s) own purported 
neutral unsituated humanity. Therefore, whereas the Spirit strengthens those who are 
powerless, at the same time, the Spirit interpellates, resists, and restricts the powers and 
privileges that have been pernicious and death-dealing. It is in this sense that we can say 
that the life giving and liberating Spirit is on the side of the oppressed while restricting 
harmful powers and summoning their agents to metanoia and to the challenge of justice. 
God, undoubtedly, loves equally. At the same time, however, God’s love is not neutral. 
God’s love in the Spirit, as abundant biblical testimony affirms, is always a preferential 
option, a predilection for the powerless and defenseless, the voiceless, the weak, the 
vulnerable, the oppressed, the exploited, and the poor. He is the God of the poor and 
oppressed (see Ex 22:21-27; Ps 9:10; 68:6; 140:13; 146:7-9). In this way the relational 
Spirit creates relations that are life-giving rather than life-diminishing. And in this way, 
the relational Spirit engenders equality that at the same time affirms positive differences 
while fostering the inclusion and participation of all in the community of the empowered. 
 Another consequence of the Pentecost outpouring of the Spirit on all people is 
that those who are now empowered by the indwelling of the life-giving, resistant, and 
liberating Spirit, are to embody and propagate the same activities of the Spirit by 
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promoting justice and the flourishing of life for all in a fragmented and violent world. 
The community birthed by the resistant Spirit is a community of memory. It is a 
community of the dangerous memory of Jesus,
131
 as Johann B. Metz suggests, even as he 
placed himself in the prophetic tradition. It is a community of memory because it shapes 
and nourishes its identity by reliving the narratives of Jesus and the early Christian 
community, a community of resistance, reconciliation, possibilities, and hope. What we 
have been discussing in this section is that the Spirit poured out on all flesh does not 
obliterate difference. Rather, the Spirit promotes positive difference and plurality while at 
once relativizing and resisting harmful difference that structures privilege and oppression. 
We shall take a closer look at the construction of difference later on in order to figure out 
ways to engage the ambiguities inherent in the term.In the meantime, let us examine 
certain patristic positions on the significance of the relational Spirit and body in relation 
to identity and difference as well as to its relevance or otherwise for who we are with 
regard to God’s salvific act.         
3.3 Christian Tradition and Embodiment    
 From what we have discussed so far, the witness of the Bible depicts the Holy 
Spirit to not be opposed to corporeality. Nature, bodies (and hence plurality, diversity, 
and difference), and the interconnectedness of reality are no strangers to the Spirit. It is 
by now clear that the Spirit births and sustains the life of the world. Since our bodies are 
symbols, they bear the mark of our different traditions as well as cultural differences. In 
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our bodies too we are differentiated and individuated in the sense that no two persons are 
identical, even the identicality of so-called identical twins still does not render collapsible 
their identity, individuality, or particularity. As a bearer and not merely the constitution 
of difference, how we approach the question of body speaks much about our perspectives 
with regard to the issue of difference. If the Creator and relational Spirit instilled 
diversity and plurality in creation, promoted and elevated them at Pentecost without 
morphing all into sameness, are our differences relevant to God? Does the body matter to 
God and so with its embodiedness to be redeemed or is it merely a temporary expedient 
to be dispensed with and transcended at the long run in the resurrection? Ambiguity 
plagues the church’s account of the Spirit’s relation to body which has significantly 
impacted certain church practices with regard to certain bodies. This conflicted history 
notwithstanding, the Spirit continues to seek and rest on bodies, and continues to liberate 
and renew bodies. In this section we shall take a look at how the concept of embodiment 
was formulated in Christian tradition by the Church Fathers. Of particular interest to us 
here are the perspectives of St. Irenaeus of Lyons and St. Augustine of Hippo with regard 
to the place of body and hence, difference, in the divine economy.    
3.3.1 St. Irenaeus of Lyons       
 St. Irenaeus from Smyrna (ca. 135–ca. 200) studied at Rome and later became the 
bishop of Lyons. His theology is said to bridge the gap between Eastern and Western 
churches. His teaching on the Spirit is understandable, among other things, within the 
framework of his refutation of certain tenets of the Gnostic phantasmagoric complexity as 
he outlined in the greatest of his works whose significance and purpose is indicated by 
the title: The Refutation and Overthrow of the “Knowledge” Falsely So-Called 
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(popularly called Adversus haereses—Against Heresies). Embracing the exaggeration of 
oriental Platonism, the Gnostics taught that matter was intrinsically evil. Since for them 
the good God could not be closely associated or come into direct contact with matter 
which is evil, then material creation as presented in the OT could not have been the 
handiwork of the same good God of the NT. Rather, matter emanated from “spirit,” a 
displaced Eon – Demiurge, the Craftsman of the material world. Consequently, the idea 
that Christ, for instance, or even a human being who is thought to compose of spiritual or 
divine aspect, should possess a real, material body was repugnant to the Gnostics. Thus, 
they separated the Savior, Christ from the Jewish messiah Jesus and held that Christ only 
appeared to be human while his body was merely illusory.
132
 Again, consonant with their 
repugnance and contempt for matter, the Gnostics maintained that human body precisely 
as material cannot be saved anchoring their position on a misapprehended Pauline 
teaching that “Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God” (1 Cor 15:50). It is in 
the light of these basic Gnostic beliefs that Irenaeus’ theory of recapitulation133 and 
atonement, and the sharing of the human body in the fruits of the redemption through the 
communication of the Spirit become comprehensible.     
 Basically, Irenaeus teaches that Adam and Eve in the prelapsarian state were 
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created by God like children (in the sense of spiritual childhood and immaturity).
134
 
Although they were created immortal, God nevertheless, set them certain limitations, so 
that should they keep God’s commandments, they were to remain immortal and destined 
for perfection which they had to actualize through divine pedagogic and incremental 
stages within time and space.
135
 Irenaeus makes a subtle distinction between the image 
and likeness of God in humans. He holds that the body of Adam created from the ground 
and infused with a soul was fashioned in the image of God. It, however, requires the 
spirit from God in order to be in the likeness of God. Thus the communication of the 
Spirit of God to humans makes them complete. When Adam sinned, all humanity sinned 
underlining the solidarity of the human race with Adam as its head. In order to redeem 
human beings from the bondage and death caused by Adam’s disobedience, every 
dimension of Adam’s humanity has to be taken and summed up completely in the new 
Adam, Christ (recapitulation)
136
 in his incarnation to restore the solidarity of the human 
race with its new head.
137
 Adam’s disobedience estranged humanity from God. The Fall 
caused the loss of the Spirit for both Adam and his progeny. For restoration and renewal 
toward perfection, Irenaeus believes, Adam, and indeed, creation, needed the hospitality 
of God to open up such possibilities. Christ, thus, restored humanity to God by becoming 
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the same Adamic flesh. But unlike Adam who lost the Spirit, Christ the new Adam 
possesses the Spirit in full measure by which he permeates, vivifies, and sanctifies the 
whole human race, and communicating the same Spirit to humans through his obedience 
to the point of death.
138
 Irenaeus thus insists strongly on the true and full humanity of 
Christ the Redeemer as opposed to the docetic stance of the Gnostics.
139
 It is through the 
communication of the Spirit that humans become spiritual and thus empowered to share 
in the life of God and to achieve communion with God through the exercise of free will. 
The Spirit hence gives life to bodies that are destined for communion and relationship 
with God. Thus, the God of redemption is one and the same as the God of creation  
 Irenaeus emphasizes human freedom and insists that the mark of human equality 
is the gift of free will that makes humans responsible for their ultimate destiny. Indeed, 
he identifies the image of God in humans with the freedom of the will.
140
 This idea of 
freedom Irenaeus contrasts with the more fatalistic tenet of the Gnostics who divided 
humans into three categories or grades: the spiritual, the psychic, and the material. 
According to this deterministic approach, only the spiritual have hope of salvation; the 
psychic are salvageable but in a diminished form; the material are doomed to perdition. 
Hence, Irenaeus contends that St. Paul’s “spiritual” people in his letters refer to those 
who freely accept Christ, receive the Spirit, and thus become spiritual and have life 
because they allow themselves to be led by the Spirit. For “where the Spirit of the Father 
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is, there is a living man,”141 Irenaeus argues. While those who choose to live without 
Christ are carnal because, destitute of the Spirit of God, they are dead and not having life, 
cannot possess the kingdom of God.
142
 It is those given to carnal lusts,
143
 Irenaeus notes, 
which the Gnostics failed to understand as the flesh and blood that will not share in the 
kingdom of God, according to St. Paul. However, those who are spiritual do not dispose 
of their body; the communication of the Spirit does not vaporize their body.
144
 It is the 
entire person; body, soul, and spirit that is spiritual. Accordingly, it is those who are 
spiritual, those who have received the Spirit that are made for salvation, since “without 
the Spirit of God, we cannot be saved.”145 Therefore, salvation involves the whole 
person. For the perfect man is not merely a part of man but “the comingling and union of 
all the constituent parts, that is, body, soul, and spirit.
146
 According to the famous 
Irenaean Imagery, the Spirit is one of the two hands
147
 with which God fashioned us in 
creation and wrought our redemption. If the body would not be saved, then it would not 
have been created in the first place and the Word of God would not have become flesh.
148
 
God creates in order to save and that includes the body.      
 Again, Irenaeus argues, “If the flesh is not capable of salvation, man is not 
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redeemed, because flesh is an essential constituent of his nature.”149 While arguing for 
the immortality of the soul, Irenaeus, however, appears to hint at a subtle relative 
corporeity of the soul. This hint is captured in his description of the soul as having “the 
figure of a man” (hominis figuram). The soul possesses this figuram of the body fitted to 
it just as water to a vessel.
150
 Consequent upon this figuram and as opposed to the 
Gnostic theory of transmigration following Plato, the soul, Irenaeus teaches, utilizing the 
parable of Dives and Lazarus, continues to exist without passing from body to body; it 
retains the same bodily figuram in which it was originally fashioned, so that they (both 
soul and body) are able to know and recognize each other in the next world “and to 
remember the things which are here.”151 Importantly, nevertheless, Irenaeus distinguishes 
that the soul is immortal by nature while the body receives immortality only as an 
extrinsic and gratuitous gift after its dissolution or transformation from corruptibility to 
incorruptibility.
152
        
 Besides, Christ’s resurrection and the seal of the Spirit constitute the guarantee of 
the resurrection of our own bodies. Counteracting the separation by the Gnostics of the 
man Jesus who is capable of suffering from the Christ who cannot suffer, Irenaeus argues 
for the unity of the Savior who recapitulates in himself the whole humanity. Anchoring 
on Paul, Irenaeus contends that if the Spirit of him who raised Christ from the dead 
dwells in us, he who raised Christ will give life to our mortal bodies (cf. Rom 8:11). The 
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Gnostics appeared to be so preoccupied with the frailty and corruptibility of the flesh that 
they eliminated from view the power of God made manifest in weakness as Irenaeus 
suggests. For if God, Irenaeus contends, “does not vivify what is mortal, and does not 
bring back the corruptible to incorruption, He is not a God of power.”153 The flesh, like 
the grain of wheat which when sown in the earth decomposes before it increases, is sown 
in weakness in death but made alive in power. Rising through the instrumentality of the 
Spirit, the flesh becomes a spiritual body, so that by the Spirit it possesses perpetual 
life.
154
 With this imagery of the wheat, Irenaeus puts the idea of the resurrection and 
salvation of the body in close relation with the Eucharist.
155
 The wheat which is the fruit 
of the earth becomes, through the Word of God, the Eucharist, the body and blood of 
Christ. When we partake of the body and blood of Christ, it is preposterous that we would 
not, like Christ’s own body itself, be raised to immortal life.156 Furthermore, Irenaeus 
hinges on the Pauline imagery of temple to argue that our bodies as temples of the Holy 
Spirit and members of Christ, are destined for salvation and resurrection.
157
 As our bodies 
are the members of Christ, we will then naturally share in all that belongs to Christ 
including the resurrection of the body.        
 Moreover, another significant aspect of Irenaeus’ doctrine of recapitulation is the 
idea that he gleans from Paul’s epistle to the Ephesians 1:10 on the recapitulation and 
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reconciliation of all things in heaven and on earth in Christ. Irenaeus suggests that 
whereas the things which are in heaven are incorporeal, the things on earth are corporeal 
and find their synthesis in the human being. Christ therefore, recapitulates in himself all 
things “by uniting man to the Spirit, and causing the Spirit to dwell in man.”158 Christ 
who created all things and is inherent in all creation was in the last times made flesh and 
hung upon the tree that he might sum up all things in him-self.
159
 Clearly, Irenaeus’ 
theory of recapitulation which stresses the decisive importance of embodiment and the 
salvation of the flesh has a more robust cosmic ramification as this salvation includes the 
renewal of the whole creation. Thus, Irenaeus’ understanding of salvation as 
accomplished through the Spirit’s instrumentality holds great significance for ecology 
since all creation is interconnected and interrelated via corporeality. This affirmation of 
the goodness of the body and the material world as destined for salvation constitutes 
Irenaeus’ holism. All in all, the goal of Irenaeus has been to establish that the essence of 
the incarnation, life, passion, death, and resurrection of the Savior was the reconciliation 
and union of humans with God through the communication and restoration of the 
relational Spirit lost by Adam’s disobedience to human beings. This is because, without 
the Spirit, humans have no life since the Spirit is itself the life of those who receive it.
160
 
And humans who are perfectly alive because they possess the Spirit are the glory of God; 
hence the import of the timeless Irenaean mellifluous dictum: Gloria Dei, vivens homo 
which means “the glory of God is the human being fully alive.”  The relational Spirit is 
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truly the Giver and Sustainer of abundant life.      
 Irenaeus’ theory of recapitulation which entails the summing up of the whole 
human nature, the restoration of the Spirit of communion, and the reconciliation of all 
things in Christ with its cosmic ramifications is well taken. Nevertheless, I take an 
exception to Irenaeus’ stance that those who are not members of the body of Christ’s 
Church have no share in the Spirit. Irenaeus is, undoubtedly, pushed to this position 
because of his limiting the Spirit to the Church which for him appears to be the only 
means through which the Spirit as the pledge of immortality is communicated:   
 For where the Church is, there is the Spirit of God; and where the Spirit of  
 God is, there is the Church and every kind of grace…. Those, therefore, who  
 do not partake of Him, are neither nourished into life from the mother’s brea- 
 sts, nor do they enjoy that most limpid fountain which issues from the body  
 of Christ; but they dog for themselves broken cisterns out of earthly trenches,  
 and drink putrid water out of the mire….161      
  
The Irenaean axiom, ubi Spiritus Dei, illic ecclesia, et omnis gratia, seems troubling. If 
the Spirit of God blows wherever she wills as Irenaeus concurs, then it appears to be 
somewhat contradictory to at the same time limit the operations of the Spirit to the 
boundaries of the Church as Irenaeus seems to suggest. If the pervasive and 
uncontrollable Spirit makes possible the ever presence of God passing by, God always 
coming in a trace and drawing near especially in the most unexpected of places and 
persons, then the uncontrollable Spirit makes grace (understood simply as God’s free and 
gracious self-gift, self-donation, or self-communication) available to all human beings 
even outside the boundaries of the church. In the words of John Paul II, the “mysterious 
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working of the Spirit who, blowing where he wills…comes to and involves every person 
living in this world.”162As Johnson rightly suggests:       
 Every personal encounter of God with human beings occurs in the Spirit,  
 and it is in the Spirit that people make their response. This presence of the  
 Spirit is a power and a joy, an outpouring and a gift. It is not controllable by 
 any institution or community but is effective beyond the confines of the chur-
 ch, bringing forth fruits of holiness in people who do not partake of Christian 
 word and sacrament.
163
  
Irenaeus’ position is tenable but to the extent that the understanding of church is more 
expansive (beyond institution) and drastically revised along the lines of a robust 
pneumatological perspective. The Spirit is no property of the church and the living God is 
not simply the Christian God; He is also the God of all humankind and even of those 
whose way of life, cultures, customs, and perceptions of the good and true are unlike 
those of Christians’. There is no one community or person that enjoys a monopoly of the 
Spirit, and no institution can lay claim to an exhaustive possession and control of the 
pervasive and uncontrollable Spirit since she blows where she pleases. Indeed, the 
mystery of the living God cannot be limited to the Christian God. This overabundance of 
God made available by the pervasive and uncontrollable Spirit which is experienced in 
other distinct settings and religions should be allowed to create a leeway for a more 
expansive understanding of church and new catholicity.     
3.3.2 St. Augustine of Hippo       
 If Irenaeus’ theological endeavor with regard to the Spirit, body, and salvation, 
inter alia, significantly influenced and paved the way for later Eastern theological 
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currents especially those of the Cappadocians, Augustine’s did the same in the West. No 
doubt, the perspectives of St. Augustine (354–430), bishop of the North African city of 
Hippo, proved most influential in the formulation of Western theological trends with 
regard to the Spirit within the overarching framework of Trinitarianism. Since 
Augustine’s views on corporeality and the Spirit are interspersed within his vast literary 
lexicon, we shall here adopt, as a helpful criterion, to plumb his perspectives in what may 
be understood as the early and later Augustine.      
 Early on in his career, the reading of Cicero’s Hortentius inspired Augustine with 
the love of philosophy.
164
 By happenstance, he followed the Manichean dualistic beliefs 
which, among other things, conceived of a cosmic conflict between good and evil 
principles
165
 and that all material reality is evil and the handiwork of an evil god. For the 
Manichees, the true and good God has nothing to do with the material universe which is 
evil but rather presides over a spiritual realm. Manicheans equally held that the real self is 
the inner self which is spiritual waiting to be liberated from the entrapment of the body at 
death. Disappointed at some point, however, with the Manichees, Augustine reverted to 
Neo-Platonism
166
 which would influence his philosophical and theological perspectives 
after his conversion to Christianity in 386. After he became a Christian, the early 
Augustine rejected the Manichean belief that matter was evil and rather affirmed the 
goodness of the material world including human bodies brought into existence by the one 
and true God. Refuting the Manichean dualistic account of evil, Augustine conceives evil 
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as having no being, as a privation
167
 since whatever has being is good and originates from 
the true God who is not only good but is Goodness par excellence.
168
 Augustine argues, 
therefore, that evil issues from that empty and aberrant human desire (libido or lust)
169
 
and will in its sinful choice to turn away from God the immutable and ultimate Good and 
to turn toward temporal and lesser goods—intermediate goods—in Augustine’s pointed 
terminology.           
 Unlike Gregory of Nyssa, who held that our sexually differentiated human bodies 
were a temporary expedient which will become unnecessary in the resurrection, 
Augustine affirmed the goodness of bodily difference to be preserved even in the 
hereafter.
170
 According to Gregory, our sexual difference became expedient as a result of 
humanity being created in the image of God which entails freedom (as in Irenaeus) and 
hence, mutability as well as the possibility of the abuse of freedom through disobedience 
to God’s commandments.  Since the consequence of sin would be death, in order to 
preserve humanity from extinction, God in his foreknowledge created male and female as 
a biological reproductive mechanism to preserve the human race as long as the condition 
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of sin lasts. Gregory’s position, in other words, is that there would have been no need for 
sexual difference, were there to be no sin, and therefore, there will be no need for it after 
the resurrection.
171
 Augustine diametrically differed with Gregory.   
 Augustine’s encounter with Pelagianism, however, caused a shift of emphasis in 
his apprehension of human free will as the index of being created in the image of God. 
The British ascetic, Pelagius, had stressed moral optimism in the role of human effort 
through obedience to achieve salvation. Contra Pelagius, Augustine rather stressed the 
radical depravity and vicious corruption of the human free will (originally capable of 
avoiding sin—posse non pecare) emanating from the sin of Adam and Eve “after which 
neither they nor their posterity could avoid sinning (non posse non pecare).”172 In other 
words, the human will in the wake of the Fall no longer possesses any effective volitional 
power of its own to will the good via its own unaided natural capacity since the 
irresistibility of sin surpasses and wrecks the power of the will. For Augustine, therefore, 
Pelagianism undermines the fact that salvation cannot be achieved by human effort and 
autonomous free will under the condition of sin but can only be received as the free gift 
of God’s grace. To argue otherwise is, according to Augustine, to maintain “that human 
beings saved themselves.”173 But the good news, for Augustine, remains that “the 
graciousness of God’s redeeming grace depended on its being absolutely unconditional 
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on human work or merit.”174 In this way, the later Augustine modified his earlier 
understanding of the natural power of the free will to which he had attributed the capacity 
for both good and evil.         
 Having rejected one of the tenets of Manichean religion that God was a bodily 
substance and so somehow extended, and therefore, corruptible (a belief that he wrestled 
with for a long time), Augustine came to acknowledge that God is a spirit, thus 
immaterial and incorruptible.
175
 Since God is Spirit, communion with God must be a 
spiritual rather than a physical reality. Consequently, Augustine identifies the image of 
God in human beings with the soul,
176
 without discounting the goodness of the created 
order in general and the human body in particular.      
 After having identified the image of God in human beings with the soul or mind, 
Augustine in a further effort to articulate what communion with God entails, relates it to 
the rational faculties of the soul: memory, understanding, and will. The memory, as 
Augustine notes, in remembering its object, not only understands and knows itself, but by 
the same token also loves the object of its knowledge and becomes one with it. Augustine 
uses this psychological imagery to illustrate the presence of the Trinity in the soul. 
Memory stands for the Father; understanding for the Son, and will for the Spirit. The 
Father knows the Son He begets and the Son knows the Father who begets him and their 
reciprocal love (or gift) which they give to each other is the Spirit.
177
 Conceiving the 
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Spirit as both the Spirit of the Father and the Spirit of the Son, Augustine surmised that 
the Spirit is their unity or communion. Hence, the Spirit comes to be known as the 
vinculum amoris (bond of love) between the Father and the Son.
178
 The Spirit is thus the 
principle of communion and relationality. This Augustinian position was pressed to 
service in medieval Catholicism to emphasize the procession of the Spirit from both the 
Father and the Son which culminated in the addition of the Filioque clause (“and the 
Son”) unilaterally by the West to the Creed.179 At any rate, the life of the Spirit and 
communion with God for Augustine is not merely a life of the flesh but an interior life 
cultivated in a journey toward God.       
 In the light of this journey toward God, what has come to be known as the “ascent 
motif” in the later Augustine assumed prominence. Consequently, the “life of the mind 
rather than the life of bodies together [that is, the full human being as a complex unity] 
became the chief analogy for God’s life, and as a result the body often seemed distant 
from Spirit’s life.”180 Indeed, in accounting for human journey toward God within the 
confines of history, the pertinent metaphor Augustine employs is peregrinatio which 
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entails living out one’s time in the world like a stranger without attachment to it. While 
not necessarily shunning the goodness of the created order, bodiliness, and other worldly 
concerns such as order, power, civilization, and so on, the life of the Spirit, for 
Augustine, reorients them to God as the Good that truly satisfies. As Peter Brown puts it, 
those who belong to the city of God, for Augustine, “are set apart by a holy yearning for 
the heavenly Jerusalem.”181 The life of the Spirit in this yearning for the heavenly 
Jerusalem is to draw humanity into the eternal dance and fellowship of the Trinity. 
Augustine’s concern for the spiritual clearly overshadows every other consideration. 
 Augustine’s thought as elaborated above is well taken. Nevertheless, his apparent 
construal of history as merely a place of marking or living out one’s allotted time in 
peregrinatio runs the risk of promoting an attitude of stoical endurance of the evils and 
sufferings of this life including, perhaps, those emanating from injustice, be they 
ecological, economical, political, socio-cultural, religious, and so forth, rather than to 
resist and confront them. This objection is strengthened all the more when it is realized 
that Augustine’s androcentric projection of the normativity of male nature has proved 
very influential in promoting patriarchalism and the diminishment and exclusion of 
women in the Roman Catholic Church.
182
 Moreover, Augustine, to be sure, subtly grants 
that human freedom and responsibility are not annihilated by grace. However, his view 
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that salvation is received by sheer grace still risks rendering inconsequential and vacuous 
the role of human decision within the matrix of space and time in shaping ultimate human 
destiny.          
 Without pretending that the two Patristic figures we have considered in any way 
exhaust early Christian reflections on difference, it is sufficient that they represent 
significant influences in both the East and the West. It is clear that our bodies as symbols 
and bearers of our differences matter to God. As indwelt by the relational Spirit, what 
happens to these bodies of ours touches God since God has also taken body through the 
incarnation of Jesus Christ. In what follows then, a rethinking of the dignity of difference 
seems pertinent.            
3.4 Rethinking the Dignity of Difference    
 Certain people especially among oppressed groups have been wary of any attempt 
at reclaiming difference for fear that such will continue to re-inscribe the assimilationist 
description of “otherness” by the so-called privileged group. Such fearis, indeed, 
reasonable and well taken since the assimilationist construal of difference has continually 
been used as a ploy to legitimate cultural imperialism as well as the oppression and 
exclusion of those marked out as “different.” Nevertheless, it does not stop us from still 
probing the question of difference which remains a social and historical given that we 
cannot simply shy away from.  In this section, I attempt to sketch a certain understanding 
of difference that will help us reclaim the dignity of difference. But before we go further, 
let us revisit how difference has been overtly and somewhat continues to be covertly 
constructed.          
 As I suggested in Chapter 1, the kind of rationality espoused by the eighteenth-
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century European Enlightenment up to the nineteenth- through the early twentieth-
century modernity with its purported claim to universality and neutrality inevitably led to 
the exclusion and devaluation of some groups as savage and degenerate. Descartes had 
bequeathed to modernity a philosophy founded on the canon of mathematical style 
axiomata and scientificity.  The intrinsic rationality of this modern science and 
philosophy is that whatever cannot be clear and distinct under the gaze of the cogito as 
the rational knowing subject is said to lack epistemic status. This Cartesian cogito, this 
rational subject as knower, is projected “as a self-present origin standing outside of and 
opposed to objects of knowledge―autonomous, neutral, abstract, and purified of 
particularity,”183 as Iris Young writes. Thus, the Cartesian modern scientific and 
philosophical heritage constructs a discourse of “modern subjectivity by fleeing from 
material reality, from the body’s sensuous continuity with flowing, living things, to create 
a purified abstract idea of formal reason, disembodied and transcendent.”184 According to 
the Cartesian distinction between mind and body, it is only the mind that can be the 
matrix of clear and distinct knowledge since it lacks extension and hence fallibility which 
characterizes bodily senses and all material stuff. Distrustful of the fallibility of the 
senses, it is only with the eye of the rational mind, for Descartes, that one can see clearly. 
And “only what is seen clearly is real, and to see it clearly makes it real.”185 Hence, the 
subjectivity of the rational subject alone becomes the privileged authority that decides 
what is to be taken as truth and knowledge.      
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 Beginning with Descartes, therefore, reason assumed a new signification in 
Western epistemological and scientific discourse different from what it used to be in 
ancient philosophy. Reason no longer includes practical and praxic rationality; intuitive 
and emotive faculties pale into oblivion. Rather, in modernity, reason has come to mean 
exclusively calculative thinking, instrumental reason, or technical rationality. This 
appears like the coming true of what Martin Heidegger’s fear once was when he said that: 
“calculative thinking may someday come to be accepted and practiced as the only 
(emphasis original) way of thinking.”186 What I aim at here is not a rejection of the 
positive aspects, insights, and achievements of the Enlightenment and modernity. Neither 
is it an attempt to turn the clock back to pre-Enlightenment days. It is rather a critique 
that aims at eliciting the inherent reductionism of modern reason and its implications for 
the construction of difference.        
 Characteristic of the gaze of the cogito―the subject of modern calculative and 
scientific reason―is its normalizing propensity. The rational knowing subject who claims 
to be gazing from a transcendent, abstract, and neutral height, views every other reality 
including other humans merely as objects outside of itself. So viewed, they are to be 
measured, calibrated, and evaluated on the basis of the norm set by the subjectivity of the 
knowing subject. In this way, everything is subjected to the arbitration of subjectivity.
187
 
Thus the calculative thinker decides on the basis of his own norm―which becomes 
universalized―what is real and what is tenable.      
                                                 
      
186
 Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. John M Anderson and E. Hans Freund (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1969), 56. 
      
187
 See Benedict XVI, “Faith, Reason and the University Memories and Reflections,” in Regensburg 
Lecture of the Holy Father (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2006). 
  
239 
 
 Having articulated the lineaments and attributes of the Cartesian modern 
calculative rational subject, in what appears to be a crucial move, whiteness, masculinity, 
and class closely came to be associated with reason purified from the fallibility of matter 
and the senses as was espoused by later Western philosophers, anthropologists, 
sociologists, medical scientists, theologians, and so forth.  By the same token, blackness, 
brownness, redness, femininity, and others, were identified with body, lacking in 
rationality and intelligence. Rationality was conceived to issue forth from body type and 
physiognomy. White European bodies and facial features became the norm, “the 
perfection of human form, in relation to which other body types were either degenerate or 
less developed.”188 Because black bodies, according to the normalizing gaze, for instance, 
lacked rationality they were construed as ugly, deviant, degenerate, loathsome, violent, 
etc. Moreover, viewed as naturalized bodies bereft of rationality, black bodies were 
disproportionately eroticized, construed as having unbridled sexual licentiousness, 
immoral, childlike in mental simplicity, physically frail and diseased, lacking in self-
control, and, indeed, abnormal.
189
  It is in this way, as Young puts it, that “the dominant 
culture defines some groups as different, as the Other…. Dominant discourse defines 
them in terms of bodily characteristics, and constructs those bodies as ugly, dirty, defiled, 
impure, contaminated, or sick.”190 Clearly, we can see how nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century modern scientific and calculative rationality came to construct a 
discourse that lapsed into a medicalization and epidermalization of difference. Difference 
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came to be viewed simply from the standpoint of physiognomy, biology, as physical 
appearance became indicative as to whether a person was a superior or inferior human 
being. There is no doubt that group oppression based on groups marked out as different 
has been and continues in some ways to be perpetrated in accordance with the 
normalizing gaze we have been considering. It is also this consideration that largely 
explains cultural imperialism; that is, how “culturally imperialist groups project their own 
values, experience, and perspective as normative and universal.”191 When the dominant 
cultures and privileged groups ascribe normality and universality to their perspectives, 
they presume to lose and transcend their own particularity and situatedness.  Because 
members of the privileged group put themselves in the position of the modern scientific, 
detached, and neutral rational subject, they came to view their humanity and rationality as 
the authentic while others who are different were viewed as sub-human. There is no 
question that this modern philosophic and scientific way of constructing the discourse of 
difference “has come to have enormous influence and repercussions in modern Western 
culture”192 with regard to how it relates with those construed as Other contingent upon its 
normalizing gaze. The normalizing gaze of the purported detached rational subject which 
thematizes, objectifies, and totalizes the Other has profound and enduring consequences 
insofar as the infrastructure of its discourse continues to condition the ideology and 
psychology that support privilege, power, and domination.      
 What is crucial to note is that in contemporary culture, albeit the dominant 
discourse that structures privilege and oppression may have been outlawed in public 
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policy, it has, nonetheless,  assumed a subtler, more evasive, and delicate character. The 
construction of the ugly bodies of those considered as Other may no longer be a matter of 
conscious public discourse, it has, nevertheless, “gone underground, dwelling in everyday 
habits and cultural meanings of which people are for the most part unaware.”193  Even 
though people are now unaware in terms of discursive consciousness, yet such 
construction continues to find expression in the unconscious fears fueled by bias (in 
Lonergan’s sense of the term), the habits of avoidance, and aversions for the despised 
groups as well as an apparently unconcerned attitude rooted in a routinized habitus 
toward the unjust structures that cause their oppression.
194
 The sin of omission is a worse 
kind of sin.          
 As I mentioned at the beginning of this section, many people especially among 
the disadvantaged and oppressed groups fear to affirm that they are different from the 
dominant groups since such admission would simply be buying into the rhetoric and 
legitimation of exclusion of the Other. Put another way, they fear that any admission of 
difference would amount to a reinscription of subordination and oppression. While such 
fear and the danger are real, the fact of difference still remains a reality. It cannot simply 
be wished away. What is rather needed is a way of accounting for difference that does not 
lead to the exclusion and subjugation of the Other. Fundamentally, it is a truism that 
every human being irrespective of color, race, sex, class, religion, and ability, belong to 
the same taxonomy of common and full humanity with one human nature. Theologically, 
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this one human nature, according to Christian confession and, indeed, biblical witness, is 
anchored on the fact that all human beings are created in the imago Dei. No human being 
is more human or less human than another. All human beings are rational and equal. 
Equality here should not, however, be understood to mean sameness in the sense that 
everybody has to be Caucasian, for instance, in order to be human. But then, the one issue 
that is often glossed over is that as created beings, every human being exists within a 
spatio-temporal milieu, and thus, within history. In the words of Heidegger, a human 
being as a Dasein (being-there, situated or located being), who we are, and not 
necessarily what (quidditas) we are, our experiences and perspectives, are shaped by our 
distinct social milieu, memory, temporality, and historicity. Again, language is the home 
of being. There is no such thing as universal language. One thing we cannot do, as 
Jonathan Sacks rightly suggests, “is place ourselves outside the particularities of language 
to arrive at a truth, a way of understanding and responding to the world that applies to 
everyone at all times.”195  Language dwells in meaning. It is merely naïve and 
reductionist to equate a person’s physiognomical and biological features with the nature 
or essence of the person. Any such equation is tantamount to essentialism.   
 The trouble with warped discourse of difference is that on the basis of the 
essentialist or deterministic logic of identity, a dominant group arrogates to itself “the 
position of a norm, against which all others are measured.”196 By positioning itself as a 
norm, the so-called dominant group fails to recognize the particularity, situatedness, and 
contextualized status of its own perspectives which it tries to universalize. This has been 
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one of the key Western assumptions that progress achieved through the workings of 
technical rationality, would homogenize societies, neutralize differences (which would 
come to be called “tribalism”), and create one monoculture, the culture of the West. In 
this, what fails to be recognized is that there can be no such thing as the “unsituated self 
divorced from constitutive attachments to family, friends, community and history.”197 In 
other words, it is impossible to speak of any human being or social group who is context-
free. Young is right to suggest that, “contextualized understandings of difference 
undermine essentialist assumptions.”198       
 By trying to morph all into sameness, the dominant category renders those who 
are different invisible and hence easy objects of oppression and exclusion. But it is only 
because subjugated groups are able to stand up and positively affirm their group 
difference through, for example, protest and liberation movements, civil rights 
movements, and so on, that oppression and exclusionary policies together with the 
institutions that nurture them are counteracted. Essentializing the logic of identity also 
neglects the fluid character of identity. It forgets that even one person as a member of a 
particular group can inhabit multiple identities all at the same time. Indeed, both 
individual and group differences always cut across every social group. And so it is not 
about hard core dualistic and hierarchized opposition—white/ black, rationality/body, 
male/female, universal/particular, and so forth. There are always gray and overlapping 
domains when it comes to the question of identity and difference. Sacks captures this 
complexity very succinctly: “We are particular and universal, the same and different, 
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human beings as such, but also members of this family, that community, this history, that 
heritage. Our particularity is our window unto universality (emphases original)”199 To 
ignore the reality of difference from a positive perspective is to deny the reality of who 
we are as persons. In a very fascinating fashion, Sacks writes: “Our very dignity as 
persons is rooted in the fact that none of us—not even genetically identical twins—is 
exactly like any other. Therefore, none of us is replaceable, substitutable, a mere instance 
of a type. That is what makes us persons, not merely organisms or machines.”200 “If our 
commonalities,” Sacks continues, “are all that ultimately matter, then our differences are 
distractions to be overcome.”201        
 To be sure, however, our differences are neither distractions nor exclusive 
oppositions to be overcome. An alternative to understanding difference simply in an 
essentializing and stereotypical way is to construe it in terms of relationality. Reality is 
not merely constituted by dualism in terms of dialectic of opposition. Rather, the really 
real is constituted by relationality; it is a complex of interconnected relationships. As I 
have made clear in the previous chapters, it has been part of the burden of this work to 
demonstrate that relationality is the overarching characteristic of reality. When 
understood from a relational perspective, the fecundity of difference enriches parties 
engaged in an encounter in the spirit of openness and unbiasness.  This idea of openness 
in the encounter with the Other is crucial since there is something of a mystery in every 
human being and every social group. No one social group enjoys a monopoly of truth and 
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knowledge. There is rather plurality in reality. To disregard this fact amounts to human 
hubris. Besides, it is also an attempt to keep nourishing the fear that renders impermeable 
the frontier between sameness and Otherness in order to sustain and continually defend 
privilege and domination. Perhaps this underlines Heidegger’s summons to all to 
releasement and openness to the mystery.
202
 The term releasement derives from the 
German word, “Gelassenheit” which connotes a certain sense of composure, calmness, or 
unconcern. The word also has to do with the idea of letting the Other be, letting the world 
go and giving oneself to God. Thus releasement, when understood within the context of 
relationality, entails recognizing and respecting the otherness of the Other, letting the 
Other be, and the opening of oneself to the Other in self-transcendence and reciprocity. 
Indeed, releasement and the need for openness of oneself to the mystery that the Other is, 
belong together.  This is not to be delusional about the fear, risk, danger, and ambiguity 
that come with the interpersonal encounter between the self and the Other. But in order to 
be fully human with the Other, openness, embrace, and solidarity require the self to have 
the courage to deal with those ambiguities that difference yields. A relational 
understanding of difference is thus an other way of relativizing previously held universal 
and purported neutral objective positions of dominant global designs which are but 
particular, situated epistemologies and, therefore, for overcoming the exclusion and 
exclusiveness. In this way, domination and alienation would be jettisoned in favor of 
releasement.         
 Pneumatologically, as we argued in the foregoing section, the relational Spirit 
poured out on all flesh at Pentecost empowers all the inspirited to embrace a 
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transformation of imagination. Taking the challenge of relationality—embracing 
equality-in-difference in openness and solidarity—seriously would require a rethinking of 
attitudes toward those often excluded by us as Other. It would require revisiting and 
retrieving memory that keeps informing, most times surreptitiously, our histories, 
legacies, actions, aversions, and engaging it in truth telling in order to ascertain if and 
how such memory and imaginary may have been freeing some people while hurting those 
viewed as Other. Such memory and imagination need to be transformed in order to 
become more life-affirming. The liberating Spirit who resists and overcomes all life-
negating structures ushers us into the pluriversality of the body of Christ for mutual 
enrichment and for witnessing to the reign of God. In the community of the inspirited, 
everyone, irrespective of social status, place of origin, language, sex, ability, culture, and 
so on, is recognized, respected, and has a place in the community. In that community, the 
Spirit empowers the powerless, makes the silenced native tongues of the margins to be 
heard, and sets them free from their suffocating situations to develop their own capacities 
and actualize their own destinies. It is this kind of Spirit enabled community that should 
be a sign of the reign of God to the world. When we say that we have been indwelt and 
inspirited by the outpouring of the Spirit, such a statement is fecundated with a profound 
theological import that has significant implications for ecclesial and social praxes. 
Through the outpouring of the Spirit, we become the body of Christ “and individually 
members of it” (1 Cor 12:27). Through the agency of the indwelling Spirit, Christ raises a 
body “for himself within humanity…through which the domain of Jesus’ body is 
extended.”203  If in the double epiclesis at the Eucharist we invoke the Spirit to transform 
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not only the bread from the earth but also us into the body of Christ, then the calibration 
and evaluation of bodies that lead to “the domination and reduction of human bodies”204 
become theologically problematic. As Shawn Copeland aptly puts it, such constitutes “an 
insult to Eucharist.”205 Theologically, the inspirited human body becomes a site of divine 
revelation. The human being fully alive because enlivened and vivified by the life-giving 
Spirit becomes, in the language of St. Irenaeus, the glory of God. Again, in the words of 
Jesus in Matthew 25:40, whatsoever you do to these little ones who are my brothers and 
sisters, you do it to me. I am sure that it is because of words of Jesus like this one from 
Matthew’s text that Marianne Sawicki wryly and pointedly comments: “Jesus turns up in 
bodies other than his own.”206 Any refusal or exclusion of the Others because they are 
regarded as different by any group renders the Eucharistic koinonia an empty ritual. 
Emphasizing the importance of difference, Vladimir Lossky suggests that “the face of the 
Spirit is the assembly (koinonia) of redeemed human faces in their infinite diversity. 
Human persons grown to the fullness of their particular identities, but sharing in the 
common divine gift of reconciled life…are the Spirit’s manifestation.”207 Christianity is 
not innocent when it comes to the question of the denigration and desecration of bodies 
since it once supported and clearly crafted theological justifications to legitimate the 
enslavement of black and other bodies. This complicity of Christianity truly subverted the 
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koinonia, the communion, and relationality through which the Spirit binds the members 
of the ekklesia to the Trinity and to the body of believers, and indeed, to all of creation. 
This instance and similar others illustrate a denial of the Eucharist. The liberating, 
reconciling, renewing power, and grace of the Spirit challenge and also help all who are 
used to oppressive proclivities to unlearn such, convert, transform their memory and 
imagination, and begin to embrace praxes that are life-giving and life-affirming.   
 This challenge is no more clamant than in contemporary times when what used to 
find expression in oppressive and exclusionary public conscious discourse has 
metamorphosed into hidden but practical unconscious habits, feelings, behaviors, cultural 
vocabularies, generalized media culture, and aversions for the degraded Other that simply 
appear to be normal because taken for granted. In other words, such practices are not a 
matter of the choices or actions of a few isolated individuals who are out to denigrate the 
Other; they have simply become, for that matter, unconsciously institutionalized. More so 
because such new guises subtlely evade the reach of law and public policy, it requires a 
socio-historical and critical analysis and description like the kind we have been pursuing 
in this section in order to get to the root of the matter. That such transmuted practical 
discourse exercises significant influence with far-reaching effects on the denigrated Other 
today cannot be overstressed. On the other hand, it is often the case that those who have 
been oppressed and so devalued for such a long time tend to come to internalize and 
introject their devaluation and unconsciously understand themselves through such 
prism.
208
 Such imagination also needs transformation that will engender the revaluation 
and revalorization of the dignity and agency of the denigrated bodies. It is such 
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imaginations and collective negative social memories that need to be interpellated, 
unmasked, named, and transformed so that difference will no longer be construed for 
exclusionary but for mutual enriching purposes. Considering the need for proper 
transformation and senatio in radice of the said imaginations, we shall, in the next 
section, take a look at a broader understanding of the concept of sin and evil.  
3.4.1 Broadening the Concept of Sin     
 Through the centuries, the dominant trend with regard to the understanding of sin 
in Christian thought has focused on the individual as the sinner. This particular 
understanding of sin is not unconnected with the idea of the traditional elements that 
come into play in order for sin to occur. They include, among others, intention, 
knowledge, and free choice. There is also little doubt that the Adamic account of sin (see 
Gen 3:1ff) would have contributed immensely to the development of a juridical and 
privatized notion of sin. Sin becomes a transgression or disobedience against God’s law 
in relation to its concomitant punishment. Moreover, it is easier to ascertain at the 
individual level the constituent elements that go into the making of sin in order to impute 
culpability. Hence, sin has most frequently been conceived solely as a matter of evil and 
morally questionable choices located within the will of an individual who, consequently, 
stands guilty before the judgment of God. Going by this construal, the experience of evil 
has most often been viewed as the punishment for sin. It is in this light that the whole 
idea of the practice of penitence and penance—to heal the wounds and undo the 
punishment due sin—which overly concentrates on the individual in much of Roman 
Catholic tradition becomes understandable.  It is not my intention here to undervalue, still 
less deny the reality of the individual sinner as the locus of responsibility for sin and evil 
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since fundamentally it is the individual who, by and large, makes morally sinful choices. 
For without such recognition, it becomes even more difficult to apprehend the possibility 
of receiving grace, conversion, and acceptance of God’s mercy. Rather, it is my judgment 
that the overemphasis and preoccupation with individualized understanding of sin 
(though it preserves personal responsibility) eliminates from view other significant 
aspects of sin especially the tragic dimensions of the horrendous injustice that the selfish 
and unregulated greed and choices of certain groups cause to others on our planet. In 
individualized view of sin, those sinned-against as victims and the massive evil caused to 
them do not often enter the picture. More often than not, the very fact of victimhood is 
not actually and truly acknowledged. It is not hard to understand the reason. Since the 
perpetrators of massive evil do not suffer what their victims, the sinned-against, suffer, 
they cannot imagine the anguish involved. Thus, only the victimized is qualified to speak 
about what it feels like to be sinned-against. Truth here is rooted in practical reason and 
in the verifiability of the historical praxic experience of suffering bodies in unjust 
situations. It is this truth that reductionistic instrumental reason always tends to jettison as 
irrational. Part of the call to conversion on the side of perpetrators, is thus to be open to 
listen to the victims in order to learn the concrete truth of what it means to suffer.
 Individualized or privatized notion of sin and evil is, therefore, to my mind, 
narrow and perhaps has, for that matter, caused a neglect of the question of the impact of 
massive evil, the undeserved suffering, anguish, and massive destitution brought upon the 
sinned-against. It is true that everybody is a sinner, that is, no one is sinless. But that does 
not negate the fact that everybody has not sinned equally and that some groups of people 
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are simply innocent victims of evil “forces largely beyond their control.”209 The 
distinction between perpetrators and victims is crystal clear. Sin basically as an offence 
against God is an offence that at the same time is inseparable from an offence against 
neighbor. However, certain sins are primarily against neighbor. The sin and evil of 
insatiable and unregulated greed which drives the engine of market capitalism which of 
necessity creates inequalities, for instance, results in sin against love of neighbor and not 
primarily an issue “of personal or professional morality in direct relation to God.”210 
 Sin may be personal but it is never individualistic. It is also social and structural 
or systemic. The social dimension of sin, according to Bernard Häring, entails some “sort 
of solidarity in corruption.”211 In his 1984 Post-Synodal Exhortation Reconciliatio et 
Paenitentia, Reconciliation and Penance (hereafter, RP), Pope John Paul II painstakingly 
labors to explain the distinction between personal sin and social sin. While admitting the 
reality of social sin, John Paul II suggests that ultimately, such cases of social sin are 
nothing but simply “the result of accumulation and concentration of many personal 
sins.”212 Put another way, social sin is merely an aggregate of many personal sins. For 
him, then, social sin is nothing but:    
a case of the very personal sins of those who cause or support evil or who  
 exploit it; of those who are in a position to avoid, eliminate or at least limit 
 certain social evils but who fail to do so out of laziness, fear or the conspira-
 cy of silence, throughsecret complicity or indifference; of those who take re-
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 fuge in the supposed impossibility of changing the world and also of those 
 who sidestep the effort and sacrifice required producing specious reasons of 
 higher order. The real responsibility, then, lies with individuals.
213
 
 
Understandably, part of his reason for this position is to avoid the possibility of 
attributing responsibility to an anonymous or generalized system or structure. Another 
factor is because of his conviction that sin “is always a personal act, since it is an act of 
freedom on the part of an individual person and not properly of a group or 
community.”214 Even though John Paul II concurs that both external and internal 
conditioning factors and influences “may attenuate, to a greater or lesser degree, the 
person’s freedom and therefore, responsibility and guilt,”215 he, nonetheless, insists that 
the individual remains free. He fears that any disregard of this fact in order to blame 
external factors like structures, systems, communities, for individuals’ sins, detracts from 
the freedom and hence the dignity of the person. To crown it all, he argues that an 
institution, a structure, or a society cannot be the subject of moral acts. Consequently, an 
institution, a structure, or a situation cannot in itself be good or bad. That is to say they 
are morally neutral. While John Paul II’s fears are genuine and his position well taken, 
there still remains something troubling about such position. To ascribe neutrality to 
certain institutions for fear of diminishing personal freedom and responsibility is to gloss 
over the evil inherent in such institutions by their very nature. Let us take, for an 
example, the institution of slavery with its structures which caused unprecedented 
suffering including the uprooting and dislocation of African slaves in Europe and the 
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Americas. Such an institution and other social structures like colonialism (and neo-
colonialism by their very nature cannot be said to be neutral, neither morally good nor 
evil. Without any circumlocution, I dare to say that such institutions by their very nature 
were and remain a crime against humanity wherever and whenever they existed or still 
exist. Dehumanizing by their very nature, they are essentially evil. Such institutions 
qualify as structural evil as they were even legitimated by law and given theological, 
religious, and ecclesiastical sanction as well as philosophical justification.
216
 They were 
not merely the result of the accumulation or aggregate of many personal sins but an 
institutionalized violence that incarnated as normalization at the time. Any disregard of 
the massive evil caused by such horrendous institutions to their innocent victims 
jeopardizes the prophetic task of unambiguously calling evil by its real name and for 
what it is and more so, of naming who is creating it. In this case, it is about denouncing, 
for example, the institution of black enslavement as evil and unmasking the perpetrators 
as Europeans and Americans because all Europeans and Americans whether personally 
guilty or not benefitted from the said evil institution. The same logic applies to global 
neoliberal imperialistic capitalism. All in the global North who benefit from it whether 
knowingly or unknowingly, directly or remotely, including the churches, are implicated 
in the massive poverty that is unleashed on the two-thirds world, especially, Africa.  The 
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relational, liberative, and resistant Spirit challenges both society and church of the North 
to listen to and learn from beyond its borders.      
 John Paul II seems to understand this fact. For, somehow, he veers toward this 
direction without actually going there. I said this because in underscoring the unfailing 
holiness of the church, John Paul II recognizes that for the church to be an authentic 
witness and agent of reconciliation, it has to be mindful of its own failings and the 
constant need of purification, penance, and renewal.
217
 As he clearly puts it: “for, by 
reason of her sins, sometimes "the radiance of the church's face shines less brightly" in 
the eyes of those who behold her.”218What is meant by this statement: “by reason of her 
(the church’s) sins?” Does this refer to the personal sins of the church’s individual 
members? Or is it about the corporate sins of the church as a corporate entity? Or is it 
about both? While this statement might be riddled with confusion and unclarity, it is not 
difficult,at any rate, to know where John Paul II stands on this. With regard to social sin 
in relation to the church, his position would definitely be that the sins of the church are 
nothing but the aggregate of the personal sins of its individual members. For he strongly 
avers: “Whenever the church speaks … or… condemns as social sins certain situations or 
the collective behavior of certain social groups, big or small…she knows and she 
proclaims that such cases of social sin are the result of the… concentration of many 
personal sins.”219 John Paul II also grants that “social sin can be committed either by the 
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individual against the community or by the community against the individual.”220What is 
unclear in all this is how a social group as an entity may engage or participate in massive 
evil and sin. The sins of the church may, therefore, not simply be limited to the personal 
sins of its individual members or, for that matter, to the concentration or accumulation of 
the personal sins of members but also to the work and whole life of the church as an 
institution including the decisions and actions endorsed by the official church and carried 
out in its name.        
 By the way, it had to take over half a millennium, precisely in 1992, during his 
papal visit to Senegal (to one of the ports from where slaves were shipped out of Africa) 
for John Paul II to confess on behalf of the church and to ask Africans, to forgive the 
church for its collusion and participation in the enslavement of Africans. The church is 
not merely a collection of individuals who compose it. It is also an organization, a body 
with a life of its own which is not merely an agglomeration of atomized disparate 
individuals. It is an organism, a body in which members exist through a spiritual and 
mystical relatedness and bonding such that it is described as a koinonia or communion. 
Because it exists as a body through relatedness, whatever happens to one part has an 
impact on the rest. Thus, it is as an organic entity that the church can participate in sin 
through its practices, policies, and even translations (which might be ideological and so 
sometimes create situations of injustice, exclusion, oppression, and suppression through 
the wielding of the coloniality of power).
221
 In December 1999, the International 
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Theological Commission issued the document, Memory and Reconciliation: The Church 
and the Faults of the Past (hereafter, MR).  MR aimed at providing a theological 
foundation for the “purification of memory” as one of the signs that may help people to 
live the exceptional grace of the celebration of the Jubilee Year 2000 with regard to 
resentments stemming from the legacy of past faults of the church.
222
 What is worth 
noting, however, is how the central focus and tenor of this document lean heavily toward 
reconciliation with God and hence the glorification of God. No doubt, the document 
makes reference to reconciliation with other humans (referring to Matt 5:23-24 where 
Jesus asked the offender to go first and be reconciled with his brother before bringing his 
offering to the altar), particularly those victimized by past injustices.
223
 Yet the treatment 
of such reconciliation in MR is consistently underemphasized and subordinated as a by-
product of reconciliation with God. To be sure, only God can absolutely forgive. 
However, numerous biblical passages press home the point that reconciliation with God 
is achieved by seeking reconciliation with one’s fellow humans first. The prophet Isaiah, 
for instance, clearly insists that the worship pleasing to God is predicated upon the 
outreach to victims of socio-political, cultural and religious injustices (see Isa 58:1-12). 
Similarly, according to John, whoever claims to love God but hates his brother or sister is 
a liar, “since no one can love God whom he cannot see if he does not love his neighbor 
whom he can see” (1 Jn 4:20). Therefore, reconciliation with fellow human beings whom 
we have hurt and victimized is a necessary condition for reconciliation with God.    
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 A common link between MR and RP is its emphasis on social sin as always “the 
result of the accumulation and concentration of many personal sins.”224 MR goes on to 
say that “Sin is therefore always personal, even though it wounds the entire Church, 
which, represented by the priest as minister of Penance, is the sacramental mediatrix of 
the grace which reconciles with God.”225 Again, while maintaining that one can only 
speak of social sin by way of analogy, MR deduces that “It emerges from this that the 
imputability of a fault cannot properly be extended beyond the group of persons who had 
consented to it voluntarily, by means of acts or omissions, or through negligence.”226 The 
fundamentum of this position is still the idea of personal sin which entails knowing and 
willing consent. But this position remains really disturbing. What if those group of 
persons who had consented voluntarily did so not in their own names but in the name of 
an institution (sociologically understood, like the church), is it not the church that bears 
the blame? Moreover, the argument that the imputability of a fault cannot be extended 
beyond the group of persons who consented to it does not really seem to hold water since 
the church as an institution outlives individuals and groups of persons who act on its 
behalf. Individuals and groups come and go but the church remains and whatever wrongs 
committed in its name remains associated with the church. The church is to be held 
accountable for those wrongs committed in its name whether or not the group of persons 
who consented to them are still around or not. By this, I do not mean personal sins of 
individual members of the church of which they go to con-fess to the priest. I am talking 
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about wrongs or evils officially sanctioned and legitimated by the church and backed up 
with official theology. Is this just the accumulation of the sins of individuals? For such 
wrongs against whoever may be the victims, the church as an institution takes 
responsibility and imputability regardless of whether or not the specific actors in the 
name of the church are still there. As if this is not yet enough, the document intriguingly 
states that, “only when there is moral certainty that what was done in contradiction to the 
Gospel in the name of the Church by certain of her sons and daughters could have been 
understood by them as such and avoided, can it have significance for the church of today 
to make amends for faults of the past (emphasis mine).”227 But it is arguable that the 
church of today does not emerge from the vacuum. Its contours are shaped and informed 
by the traditions and legacies of the church of past generations which it has inherited 
including the good and the ugly, and of whose story it has be-come a part (by way of 
common memory). The church of the present continues the legacy of the coloniality of 
power of the church of the past. There may be no purification of memory without 
acceptance of responsibility. If memory is the faculty that brings the past into the present, 
then we accept that that past is a part and parcel of our story whether the actors in the past 
are still around or not. In a certain sense, the church of the past is still the same church of 
the present. There is continuity. If the church of the present does not accept that memory, 
then what are we purifying? We can be held responsible without necessarily being 
culpable. As a matter of fact, the real problem we have to deal with in our world today is, 
perhaps, not so much about what has been done by people who knew they were doing 
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wrong as about what has been done by people who were convinced they were right.
228
 
The worst crimes, massive evils, and egregious injustices committed against humanity 
have all probably been executed by people who were convinced they were doing the right 
thing. Nazism, colonialism, slavery, the Spanish Inquisition, and the burning of heretics 
at the stakes are a few examples. Sadly enough, in all this talk about personal sin and 
imputability, the innocent victims of the effects of other’s sins are left out of the equation 
that seems to be more interested in ascertaining moral certainty. Sin is not just sin; it 
attacks and ruptures relationships. It undermines the relationality that characterizes 
reality. It is of utmost importance to acknowledge the experience of the victims, affirm 
the harm done to them irrespective of whether the specific actors in the name of the 
church are still extant or not, and then look into the structures and attitudes that supported 
and perhaps continue to perpetuate the harm and change them, and make amends to 
restore the sense of dignity and equality of the victims.
229
 Real healing is inseparable 
from justice. The call for the healing or purification of memory and reconciliation cannot 
be a calling of victimized peoples, groups, persons, religions, nations, and so on, simply 
“to conform to the pattern of the…dominant group doing the calling [and defining what 
that purification means]. There is no way to heal from violence…brokenness, 
[exploitation] if the injustice that caused the…[harm] is not also addressed.”230 There is 
need to go to the root of the matter without cosmetizing and rationalizing over moral 
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certainty when in the meantime, those mistreated are still carrying the burden and wound 
of the wrongs done to them.          
 Another point that is often eliminated from view when sin is limited to 
individualized sins is what I have already hinted at above. It is about the normalization 
and powerful sedimentation of ways, attitudes, behaviors, cultural vocabularies and 
idioms which not too infrequently prove influential in the formulation of policies which 
ultimately end up denigrating and insidiously making victims of some social groups 
regarded as “Other.” Such practices, as noted in the preceding section, are not simply a 
matter of the choices or actions of disparate individuals. Neither are they about the 
concentration or accumulation of disparate personal choices or actions. These have 
simply become institutionalized and normalized ways of causing violence and oppression 
to others. Such social structures, even as they grant the enjoyment of unprecedented 
privilege and power to those who live within them, they have become “so subtle and 
complex, so intertwined with commonly held assumptions about human nature and the 
good life, as to be nearly invisible”231 to those who participate in them. That explains 
why, among other things, it is crucial that structural evil requires cultural healing; a 
healing of the collective imagination and social memory bank, and calls for corporate acts 
of metanoia, not only of individuals but also of social groups whose ways of living 
(inordinate consumerism, for instance), policies, ideologies (be they economic, political, 
or religious) make victims of others through oppression, suppression, domination, 
deprivation, financial slavery, or even death. All, albeit, are sinners, but all do not sin 
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equally. Those who have privilege and advantage thrust upon them by the unjust socio-
economic systems and the coloniality of power in which they are embedded; and who 
enjoy the fruits of global neoliberal market capitalism, for instance, which at the same 
time brings untold suffering and destitution to the vast majority of the globe; are on all 
counts greater sinners than those who only suffer the experience of its horrendous 
injustice. This kind of sin is not directly against God but the neighbor. What needs to be 
stressed is that God’s solicitude is not merely directed toward the one who sinned directly 
against God but more so to innocent victims, the poor, the oppressed, because they suffer 
the evil of the sins of perpetrators and oppressors. Genuine conversion, metanoia, and 
purification of memory, therefore, requires that we pay an intense and profound attention 
to the effects of our sins on those sinned-against in order to change our ways. The 
irrepressible and resistant Spirit confronts all unrighteous power relations and challenges 
all in power—civil or ecclesiastical—to self-criticism and to learn from the victims. As 
the Johannine Epistle makes clear, anyone who claims to know and love God but is 
lacking in neighborly love is a liar (see 1 Jn 2:4; 3:15; 4:20; cf. Jn 8:54; Jas 1:27); for 
such people suppress the truth and only cling to the image of God of their own 
fabrication, which is idolatrous. Indeed, the witness of Scriptural evidence abundantly 
attests to the fact that it is neighborly love that proves our love for God.     
 What strikingly emerges from the foregoing is that it is pertinent to unmask, 
assess, and name evil in its personal, social, and structural dimensions in order to engage 
it. It is an effort to put into relief the difference between oppressors and the oppressed. 
This task involves what Gayatri Spivak calls “strategic essentialization.”232 As an 
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approach, strategic essentialization allows one to name evil in a definitive way especially 
within specific social and political contexts in order to strategically mobilize the agency 
of the oppressed and those cut of from power equation to engage and resist such specific 
tyranny. One of the goals of strategic essentialization is to stress the need of recognizing 
that some people are actually and truly oppressed and hence are innocent victims. This 
recognition should lead to a move to end the cycle of violence and victimhood which 
have more often than not been eliminated from perspective in individualized or privatized 
view of sin and evil. Such recognition will, no doubt, help victims—who most often 
introject and place the blame for their victimization on themselves—in their healing 
process. Be-sides, such acknowledgment would cushion victims and enable them to 
overcome the dangerous temptation to revenge and/or replicating the sin and evil that has 
been visited upon them.        
 This task also calls for the healing and transformation of memories and 
imagination (I shall deal with this issue later). Since social structures are always mediated 
through private lives, social change will always go hand in hand with personal metanoia. 
As a matter of fact, structural transformation is an index and verification of authentic, 
profound, and abiding personal conversion. The fact that institutions and ideologies that 
perpetrate massive evil are human creations, the argument of inevitability is neither 
sustainable nor defensible. They can always be transformed. Things can change and an 
alternative world is always possible. Genuine and deep conversion, therefore, calls for 
human solidarity, solicitude, and responsibility for the neighbor. The neighbor is not 
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necessarily the one who is like us as the parable of the Good Samaritan reveals. No 
doubt, through the Creator, life-giving, and relational Spirit, God has made every person 
in His image. The life of every human being indwelt by the living Spirit of God is equally 
important to God especially the plight of the defenseless poor and oppressed. Yet, in that 
same image, each of us is different. The challenge to our social and religious imagination 
then is how “to see God’s image in one who is not in our image”233 and still love him or 
her. It certainly calls for openness to the Spirit who effects a change of heart (see Jer 
31:31). Nowhere is this challenge more evident in human intersubjectivity than in the 
question of hospitality to the stranger, the one who is different, not quite like us. In the 
next chapter, I shall deal with the framework of hospitality as a model for negotiating the 
boundaries of difference and of living out in concrete terms the communion and 
relationality inspired and made possible by the life-giving, liberative, andrelational Spirit. 
3.5 Conclusion         
 We have demonstrated in this chapter that the Lord and the Giver of life is truly 
the relational Spirit. This fact has been illustrated with evidence from biblical, Patristic, 
conciliar, magisterial, and other contemporary theological resources. The lordship of the 
life-giving relational Spirit is comprehensible within the matrix of creation and liberation 
leitmotif. Thus, the Spirit not only gives life and provides for its flourishing, but also 
interpellates all life-negating forces by being on the side and in solidarity of the 
marginalized, oppressed, and exploited. In a world of differences, the relational Spirit 
challenges all perpetrators of massive evil who make victims of others to self-criticism 
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and conversion to the love of neighbor which is inseparable from the love of God. It is 
the life-giving and liberative Spirit who makes communion and relationality necessary 
for building an alternative world possible.  
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Chapter 4  
 
The Relational Spirit and Hospitality/Friendship: 
Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference 
 
4.1 Introduction         
 In the preceding chapter we articulated the need for acknowledging the dignity of 
difference (which itself is a gift of the relational and Creator Spirit). What remains to be 
worked out is a framework that would allow us to negotiate differences in a way that is at 
the same time transformative and enriching. This chapter investigates the model of 
hospitality/friendship as a suitable framework for negotiating the boundaries of difference 
in a mutually enriching way; and as a way of living out the imperative of the Spirit who 
enables the overflow of God’s abundant hospitality to the world.    
 I will first and foremost clarify the meaning of the term hospitality, the reason for 
its choice as a preferable model, and the key elements that constitute it. The next section 
will focus on the deformations of hospitality and friendship. Here, I shall expose certain 
notions that appear as hospitality but in actual fact, are not. We shall do this particularly 
in conversation with Aristotle. In what follows, the question of hospitality will be 
investigated in conversation with two key postmodern philosophers, Emmanuel Levinas 
and particularly Jacque Derrida’s take on the impossibility of hospitality. We shall then 
use the insights of decolonial thinking especially, of Walter Mignolo, to problematize the 
Eurocentric bent of deconstructionism. This leads us to an examination of the ritual of 
welcome among the Etche as one instance of the enactment of hospitality in a historically 
concrete situation that allows for the emergence of the voice of the excluded outsider. 
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Furthermore, this takes us to the treatment of hospitality as a liberative imperative of the 
Spirit. As the one anointed by the Spirit, Jesus embodies and enacts the liberative 
hospitality of God by bringing release to the oppressed and suppressed. The climax of his 
hospitality is in the complete gift of himself in the Eucharist which, in turn, becomes a 
gift and a task for the church. Finally, our awareness of the eschatological tension in 
which we abide helps us to understand that unlimited hospitality especially as 
accomplished in the Eucharist, remains an eschatological ideal and a lure toward which 
Christians strive proleptically in hope of its fulfillment while working now for justice and 
peace in the power of the Spirit. The model of hospitality, we will conclude, remains a 
preferable framework for articulating an African theology that will usher in the social 
transformation of Africa in an age of globalization.   
 4.2 Hospitality/Friendship: Preliminary Clarifications   
 Taken in a broad sense, the word hospitality expresses a set of relationships and 
encounters between hosts and guests. The guest could be known, invited, and 
expected/unexpected or a totally uninvited and unexpected stranger who simply arrives. 
My interest here lies in understanding hospitality as a religious concern for the stranger. 
From the outset, hospitality to the stranger should be understood as a model for 
negotiating the complexities, ambiguities, and the sometimes difficult eddies surrounding 
difference and identity as well as one way (not the only way) to respond to the challenges 
posed by difference. As amply demonstrated in the preceding chapters contemporary 
understandings of relationality underscore that identity is discovered in difference. In 
keeping with such understandings, it becomes clear that as human beings, we are able to 
delineate our identity by our ability “to distinguish what is other to ourselves, what is 
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irreducible to our own needs and wishes.”1 On this note, Edward Farley is right when he 
writes, “If we cannot get outside the circle of our [own] autonomous [narcissistic] 
interests and desires, we will experience only reflections of ourselves.”2 This is very 
important considering that our local context (Nigeria) is a space that is inhabited by 
multiple religious and ethnic identities, as well as other configurations that call for what 
decolonial thought describes as border thinking and pluriversal existing (I will explain 
this later).          
 Let me now talk a little bit about who a stranger is in order to focus our discussion 
of hospitality and friendship. A stranger is someone considered not an insider but an 
outsider defined by his/her difference which, in any case, does not make the person less 
equal. A stranger is that person who is not like us and so viewed as not one of us. S/he is 
regarded as a foreigner, an alien. Precisely as an alien, a stranger is that person who does 
not share the cultural patterns, traditions, narratives, religion, and history of an unfamiliar 
world that is being approached or encountered. The unfamiliar space approached is one 
where the stranger is without a home. Found in the uncanny and the unhomely with no 
supporting networks,
3
 the stranger is one who approaches an unfamiliar turf where s/he 
may or may not be welcomed.        
 Ordinarily, the world of home can be said to be the space where the host inhabits 
a settled existence. The import of hospitality to the stranger may not be clearly 
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understood without an appreciation of the significance of home. Lucien Richard 
fascinatingly employs a cluster of qualifications or markers to elucidate this significance. 
According to him, “Home is a safe place; it is an affective place. It is a community in 
which communion should exist; it is habitable.”4 The home, Richard goes on, 
“describes…the place where I belong, where I have rights and obligations. …Less simply 
a space than a place of intensity, of emotional energy, ‘home is where the heart is.’”5 
Furthermore, “to be ‘at home’ implies familiarity, mutuality, respect, security. It means 
that communication with one another and understanding of the other can follow 
established patterns. In the home reality is predictable; the ‘other’ is not an abstraction.”6 
Just as the notion of the stranger implies the idea of an outsider/insider, so also the notion 
of home is laden with the idea of an inside and an outside. This understanding of home 
brings to the fore the category of boundary which makes possible the distinction between 
inside and outside. As Richard suggests, “Within our boundaries there can be domestic 
peace; outside, life can be dangerous and hostile. At the same time that the inside offers 
comfort, it also offers a chance to communicate with ‘neighbors’ and their living spaces. 
Boundaries of human living need not be exclusive.”7 An ideal home which necessarily 
incorporates the idea of a house is one which not only has windows through which its 
inhabitants can only look outside but also a door (or doors) through which they can go 
out and let others come in as well.      
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Richard’s description of the notion of home as more or less a stable entity, a safe 
and affective place within whose boundaries domestic peace is guaranteed but beyond 
which there can be insecurity, precariousness, conflict, and hostility, is well taken. 
Understandably, Richard seeks to affirm and accentuate the positive and humane aspects 
of the notion of home inside of which is “the space of a pure domesticity, if there is such 
a thing.”8 Albeit, he grants that boundaries need not be exclusive, his description, 
however, eliminates from view the sometimes internal dynamics of ambivalence, 
ambiguity, and conflict which take place even within the interior borders of the home 
itself. It is here that postcolonial theoretical approach becomes germane. To state the 
matter differently, the home space is not merely a stable and ordered space of pure 
domesticity and solidity, a space where reality is always predictable, and a place where 
interface with others always follows established patterns and orderliness with emotional 
and communal securities guaranteed. That the home space is characterized by such 
ambivalence finds expression in Michael Nausner’s recognition of the fact that “it was in 
the familiar surroundings of his home town Nazareth that Jesus met his first real death 
threat (Luke 4:21-30).”9 For the purity of the home traditions and assumptions, even 
insiders who dare to be different may sometimes be oppressed and treated like outsiders.  
With regard to friendship, while it is part of human nature to engage in friendship, 
it is not always the case that people are friendly. To forge the bond of friendship takes 
time and testing through various circumstances. Friendship entails a “willingness to place 
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our life and needs in the hands of another.”10 This means that the process of getting to 
know someone in prospect of opening authentic friendship requires vigilant efforts 
(translating, interpreting and reinterpreting each other’s actions and attitudes over a 
period of time) in order for mutual trust to come about. Friends never enter into a 
relationship from a presuppositionless position. Friendship does not dissolve the 
individual differences of those in a relationship. Rather, when authentic friendship has 
been established, friends learn to transcend their individual selves to seek what 
transcends them in the relationship: the truth that none possesses in its fullness. Hence, 
authentic friends are not afraid to engage their distinct histories and experiences through 
conversation in order to enrich themselves with the truth which is personal and without 
one party imposing on the other, his or her own epistemic stance as some neutral, 
abstract, universal, and unlocalized phenomenon. This also implies the possibility of 
disagreement on issues without stopping them from being friends. Where authentic 
friendship with openness to mutual trust exists, the parties involved would realize that 
there is something deeper in relationship (which is not self-serving) that goes beyond 
their individual desires; something that calls for self-dissipation for one’s friend. Such a 
realization would be helpful to friends in devising a paradigm or mechanism for 
sustaining a relationship even when they disagree. By extrapolation, this means that we 
can also be friends to those who do not agree with us and who may not necessarily be our 
friends. We can live together, coexist and inhabit the same space even if we do not agree.
 Friendship, undoubtedly, has its own temptations. Friends, for instance, might 
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become too familiar with each other that it becomes “increasingly difficult to speak the 
truth, as and when we see it, to someone with whom our life is intertwined…. Yet the 
demand to do so…never ceases. We can never claim to ‘have the truth,’ to fully know 
another, since our articulations of what we think to be the case are always up for revision 
(emphasis mine).”11 Truth is not merely an assertion with a claim to universal rational 
validity imposed by one party on another. Alasdair MacIntyre has rightly reminded us 
that no one thinks and operates outside a certain given tradition or perspective. Therefore, 
“those who pretend to operate outside any tradition by claiming the ground of rational 
discourse are themselves guided by the tradition called ‘liberalism.’”12 Indeed, it is 
legitimate to say that every thinking and every inquiry is always grounded and proceeds 
from some implicit and underground perspective held by the one doing the thinking or 
quest. Authentic friendship requires that each party be honest and be him/herself. Where 
honesty exists, even when out of human frailty a friction occurs in the relationship, 
friends with understanding would be able to seek avenues for reconciliation.   
In friendship, genuine friends do not enter into a relationship from a position of 
self-sufficiency. Seneca, for instance, espoused the position that self-sufficiency is the 
condition of possibility for friendship.
13
 His view was formulated as a critique against the 
perspective that sees friendship as rooted in the need to compliment a lack in one’s life. 
Thus, for him, friendship is only possible between two people who have already attained 
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the abundance of virtues and are self-sufficient. In this way, they do not have any lack to 
fill out by each other; they are invulnerable and unaffected in the relationship since 
friendship simply becomes a leisure affair. Friendship so conceived does not allow for 
any mutual enrichment; there is no expectancy since each of the parties does not stand to 
learn anything from one another because each is already self-sufficient. That this type of 
mindscape (self-sufficiency) continues to guide the Catholic church’s relation to other 
religions today even with all the hullabaloo about interreligious dialogue is obvious, as 
we shall see in the next chapter.       
The fact that we can still be friends even to those who disagree with us or are 
unlike us links friendship to hospitality which is extended to those outside the inside of 
the borders of the home turf. This brings us to a subtle and tenuous distinction between a 
frontier and a border. Hispanic theologian, Roberto Goizueta, has beautifully silhouetted 
the contours of “the Frontier myth” which is rooted in the desire to “construct” an 
“other.” Tracing the myth back to its British colonial antecedence, Goizueta locates its 
most explicit articulation in American history as synthesized by the American historian, 
Frederick Jackson Turner in what today is known as the frontier thesis:     
American social development has been continually beginning over again on  
 the frontier. This perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this expan-
 sion…with its new opportunities, its continuous touch with the simplicity of 
 primitive society, furnish the forces dominating American character. In this 
 advance, the frontier is the outer edge of the wave – the meeting point betw- 
 een savagery and civilization….14 
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Clearly, a crucial characteristic of the frontier is to extend, to expand, to dominate, to 
seek new opportunities, to conquer, especially the purported region of savagery that lies 
outside the frontier. The frontier today intrumentalizes neoliberal capitalist economic and 
market forces (globalization), as well as political and not infrequently, military might to 
achieve its goal. The frontier characteristically constantly moves outward and strongly 
resists every movement from without into it viewed as tantamount to uncivilization. 
Construed as the meeting point between savagery and civilization, Goizueta rightly 
interprets the frontier as “an idol, and that, like all idols, it generates victims”15 always to 
justify its own innocence much in tune with René Girard’s mimetic and scapegoat 
theory.
16
 By generating victims and passing the bulk as a way to maintain its own willful 
innocence, the frontier then does not have to bother to deal with the egregious evils and 
injustices that are embedded at the core of its own social order and power. The interior 
frontier of modernity with its myth of progress and expansion of civilizing mission 
couched in hubristic logocentric global designs; its claims to offer to the so-called 
savages on its exterior boundaries the ideal of history, rationality, and of being human, 
amounted to the dislocation of the subalterns. Colonialism is often justified as something 
nobler rather than pure exploitation, oppression, repression, subjugation, and the 
silencing of the epistemological potential of the “outside.” What emerges from this is that 
colonial discourse and modernity’s instrumental rationality (which, by the way, is only a 
local rationality/epistemology) became universalized as the norm from which to gauge 
                                                 
      
15
 Ibid.,192. 
      
16
 For more detail, see René Girard, The Scapegoat (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); 
Violence and the Sacred (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1977); Deceit, Desire, and the Novel: 
Self and Other in Literary Structure (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1965). 
  
274 
 
other rationalities or irrationalities. But to be sure, what truly lies hidden beneath the 
surface of this so-called myth of progress of modernity is the irrational myth of violence 
and barbarism of the hegemony of Western episteme. This type of discourse serves power 
as it is used to support the hegemonic reach of modern rationality, knowledge, and 
epistemology which at the same time suppresses or silences every other epistemic 
perspective at the margins. But if God who is transcendent also in his freedom 
gratuitously and radically reveals himself in the most unexpected of places, in Jesus from 
Nazareth, that place where nothing good comes from, then frontier by its very nature is 
preclusive of the possibility of a divine irruption, a revelation that impinges upon it from 
the “other side.” As Jesus declares in Matt 25: 34-40, the hungry, the stranger, the poor, 
the weak and vulnerable, indeed, the one from the “other side” constitutes the privileged 
locus of revelation. In this sense, it is clear that hospitality and friendship to the stranger, 
the vulnerable, and indeed to the subaltern, thus take on a cardinal theological 
significance.           
 In keeping with the above understanding, a frontier differs from a border. 
Accordingly, “A border is the place at which two realities, two worldviews, two 
cultures…[or plurality of cultures/worldviews], meet and interact…. At the border 
growth takes place by encounter, by mutual enrichment. A true border, a true place of 
encounter, is by nature permeable.”17The border, like the threshold of a home, is not 
inside, it is the “in-between,” the limit space between inside and outside. Precisely as the 
“in-between,” it is the space of transition, the space where hospitality is extended to the 
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stranger who arrives. It is always from the border as from the threshold that doors are 
opened and arms are opened or extended to embrace and welcome. As the “in-between” 
and the place of transition, the border becomes, in the language of Walter Mignolo, the 
space of the “colonial difference” from where emerges “border thinking” which aims to 
unsubjugate and foreground silenced subaltern perspectives through intellectual 
decolonization.
18
 I will elaborate more on this and its significance for border inhabitation 
in a later section. A border becomes a frontier when it becomes impregnable or 
exclusionary and implacably harsh with only a totalizing agenda. What is needed is not a 
frontier that moves outward only in order to dominate, conquer, totalize, and subjugate 
the potential epistemic status of the “outside” because it lacks openness of being toward 
mutual relationship with others. Rather than a frontier that grows only by mere expansion 
outward, what is needed is a border, a meeting point where growth and/or enrichment is 
predicated upon genuine cross-epistemological interaction respectful of equality-in-
difference. The boundaries of the home turf should be characterized as a border, a 
threshold where authentic hospitality is at the service of difference rather than a frontier 
which excludes and silences. 
  Before we proceed, there is need to attend to a further clarification on the reason 
for our choice of the model of hospitality/friendship rather than covenant in our effort at 
developing an African theology that is contemporarily relevant for the social 
transformation of Africa. Such clarification has become necessary in view of certain 
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objections raised especially by Nigerian philosopher-theologian, Francis Njoku, against 
the use of hospitality model for grounding a relevant African Theology.   
4.2.1 Hospitality Versus Covenant      
 In his essay, “Missiology Today: The African Situation,” Elochukwu Uzukwu had 
argued for the endurance of African hospitality in defiance of all cultural fragmentation 
emanating from colonial infiltration, technology, and modernity. Building on this 
observation, Uzukwu submits that hospitality, to the extent that it has abided, “it could be 
described as a way of being an African”19 and as the minimum a person expects from 
family and community.  For Uzukwu, the hospitable attitude of Africans toward the 
stranger proves a fertile ground for preaching and receiving the Gospel. It is against this 
backdrop that he proposes hospitality as a model of inculturation. What must be carefully 
noted in this observation is that Uzukwu avoids essentialism by stating in no uncertain 
terms that hospitality is “a” way (not simply the way) of being African. This assertion 
should be understood to mean that hospitality constitutes an important aspect of African 
inhabitation; albeit, a unique characteristic of Africans, it is not exclusive to Africans as it 
is also uniquely shared by the rest of the world in their own unique ways. The reality of 
African hospitality should not, however, be dismissed or even trivialized on the grounds 
that it is after all a commonplace among peoples of all cultures as Njoku seems to 
suggest.
20
 This commonality of hospitality should not eliminate from view the distinct 
                                                 
      
19
 Elochukwu E. Uzukwu, “Missiology Today: The African Situation,” in Religion and African Culture: 
Inculturation – A Nigerian Perspective, ed. E. E. Uzukwu (Enugu, Nigeria: SNAAP Press, 1988), 158. 
      
20
 Francis O. C. Njoku, “Some Indigenous Models in African Theology and an Ethic of Inculturation,” 
in Essays in African Philosophy, Thought and Theology, ed. Francis O. C. Njoku (Enugu, Nigeria: SNAAP 
Press, 2002), 246. 
  
277 
 
symbolic universes that ground, shape, and inform its practice in different regions and 
traditions. To be sure, as Njoku further notes, “there are records of brutality or hostility 
emitted to people outside of one’s clan…. The present state of affairs in the [African] 
continent could be all but hospitable to its citizens or strangers!”21 Yet it is arguable at the 
same time that hostility is not peculiar to Africans and to the African continent. Just like 
hospitality, inhospitality is also widespread across different regions of the world. You 
only need to read the newspapers or listen to daily news to confirm this fact. Njoku 
further opines that viewed through a critical lens, the so-called African hospitality may 
well be merely “a personal feeling of some good hearted individuals who are found in the 
various degrees in every culture amid the general attitude of suspicion shown towards 
strangers. So it (hospitality) may not be presented as a specifically or solely African 
cultural attitude or value.”22        
 Njoku tends to ignore the fact that hospitality could be well practiced both on the 
individual and communal levels. In the case of the latter especially, certain distinct 
cultural and symbolic rituals guide its practice. Such distinct cultural symbols associated 
with the practice of hospitality must not be treated with levity. This is because every 
region is a historico-cultural and linguistic entity; and when a symbol is taken outside its 
original contextual universe and social location, its signification is either obscured and 
hence rendered unintelligible or completely obliterated. The seriousness of this matter in 
our time of increased linguistic, historico-cultural, and pluriversal consciousness can 
scarcely be overemphasized. This recognition must be taken seriously in order to avoid a 
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naïve simplification and/or conflation of the practices of hospitality in different regions 
by collapsing them under one common denominator. A people’s contextual approach to 
hospitality with its undergirding symbols must be respected insofar as such symbols 
function not to dominate or prejudicially exclude but to welcome the stranger who 
arrives. Reality is never unmediated; nor unsituated. Indeed, nothing is unmediated. By 
the same token, hospitality as an aspect of reality, its commonplacenessnotwithstanding, 
is never unmediated since it needs a particular historical place/space in order to be carried 
out. It is, therefore, needful to humbly and sincerely recognize the fact that all actual 
expressions of the enactment of hospitality are historically and culturally contingent and 
variable. Thus, the presence of hostility does not necessarily present a sufficient reason 
for reducing hospitality to the merely personal feeling at best or for peremptorily 
dismissing its reality at worst. After all, even individuals can also be hostile rather than 
hospitable to others. And quite unlike hospitality which has conventional rituals to shape 
its practice of welcoming the other, hostility does not have such recognized rituals. Thus 
while hospitality can be seen as a way of “being,” hostility is not, even though it might 
irrupt intermittently due, partly, to the “structural situation of the created order—its 
materiality and temporality—“23which implies that sometimes, there could be weaknesses 
and pitfalls in our relation to the other and in our ability to extend hospitality. Whereas as 
beings created in the image of God, as I have earlier on established in the previous 
chapters, we not only have the capacity for love, compassion, and empathy 
(misericordia) in our relationships with others but do actually practice and live these 
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virtues as well. Yet as creatures inhabiting the postlapserian dispensation, albeit, 
redeemed, we are still prone to finitude and fallibility.     
 Another area where Njoku takes issue with Uzukwu is in the latter’s observation 
that although, the presence of a guest ordinarily portends a good omen but he/she could, 
depending on the circumstance, equally constitute “both threat and luck.”24 By this 
Uzukwu could be understood to mean that in the encounter between the stranger and the 
host mutual respect is expected. Should the stranger try to impose his/her message on the 
host with no due regard for the traditions and, may be, protocols of the host, then there is 
every likelihood that the stranger may face opposition, criticism, and possible rejection of 
his/her message. The idea of threat or opposition or rejection does not seem to augur well 
with Njoku. For him, hospitality is either an intrinsically “positive value”25 or it is not. It 
cannot incorporate simultaneously both terms of “threat and luck” as expressed by 
Uzukwu. Njoku seems to understand the idea of opposition or threat as suggested by 
Uzukwu as an element of aggressiveness introduced into the metaphor of hospitality. For 
Njoku then, this amounts to a diminution of the notion of hospitality. At any rate, Njoku’s 
fears and apprehensions are frankly understandable especially in view of his purely 
rationalistic and logical modality which sees hospitality to the guest as portending both 
threat and luck to be not only dualistic but also contradictory. But clearly, it is also true 
that life is larger than logic. It must be affirmed that Uzukwu’s observation is realistic 
rather than merely idealistic. On this side of the eschaton, when the stranger abuses the 
hospitality of the host by disrespecting his (the host’s) traditions or by regardlessly 
                                                 
      
24
 Uzukwu, “Missiology Today,” 159. 
      
25
 Njoku, “Some Indigenous Models in African Theology,” 245. 
  
280 
 
imposing his perspective on the host, the likelihood of encountering opposition, criticism, 
or even rejection is a real one. This does not, however, take away or detract from 
hospitality which must not be abused. It must be kept in mind that the practice of 
authentic hospitality is not an effort in passivity. There is no question that authentic 
hospitality eschews totalization be it either on the part of the host or the guest. As Hans 
Boersma rightly affirms, “Hospitality rejects the violence of a totalizing imposition of 
oneself on the other, the violence that forces the other to be shaped into one’s own 
image.”26 Therefore, in a number of ways, hospitality as an active attribute can also be an 
activity of interpellation of the proclivity of the host to thematize, homogenize, dominate, 
and totalize the stranger; it could as well be an imperative summons to the host to be 
open to responsibility and justice as “the essential precondition for gaining the truth.”27 
Yet authentic hospitality ordinarily demands that the guest respects and not dominate or 
impose his will on the host.         
The fluidity inherent in the metaphor of hospitality warrants that one could be 
hospitable yet at the same time critical of the status quo. As Gerald Boodoo in a 
fascinating rhetorical move puts it: “Isn’t this one of the messages of the parable of the 
good Samaritan? The very act of kindness and hospitality by the Samaritan was a 
scathing condemnation of the religious and social context of the time. Hospitality then 
allows for welcome and participation as well as meaningful resistance and opportunities 
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for change.”28 Hospitality must not be bastardized to take advantage of either the host by 
the stranger or vice versa. And because reality is never unmediated, therefore, neither the 
host nor the stranger has complete possession of the truth to be imposed on the one by the 
other or vice versa. This should not be seen as a form of endorsement of relativism. It 
should be noted that “Enlightenment presuppositions about truth and reason gave…[the 
very specter of relativism] its stature as a threat. For they presume a normative set of 
rational criteria available to all, against which any claim to other sets of criteria is utterly 
unsettling. That is what we mean by ‘relativism.’”29 Rather, hospitality entails a way of 
saying that truth can only benefit from an atmosphere of respectful encounter with 
another
30
 (which is not merely an intellectual debate in which there is a winner and a 
loser but rather an honest and humble “cross-epistemological conversation” à la 
Mignolo). This also means that when it comes to the question of hospitality, there may be 
no claims to any hard and fast boundaries characterized by solidity. Rather, where 
genuine hospitality is given, it renders boundaries pliant, permeable, and penetrable. 
Hospitality thus includes an element of uncertainty which has to be carefully navigated 
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via dialogue and deference. Hospitality helps us to understand that all human inquiry and 
thinking happen within a tradition. Hence, any claim to faith grounded in “pure reason” 
or abstract universal, is, at best, an illusion, and at worst, violence. What is required is for 
us to develop, through hospitality, the skills needed to navigate among the distinct 
traditions without totalizing any. The element of uncertainty in hospitality is, therefore, 
profitable to theology, and for that matter, African theology which remains faith 
constantly questing to understand as it seeks to penetrate the depth of Africans’ particular 
experience and confrontation with divinity in their own historical and social space. This 
questing of faith by its nature, progresses asymptotically.      
In hospitality, the boundary is neither shunned nor simply transcended but rather 
transformed into a border, a space of negotiation, translation, and interpretation in the 
light of the stranger who approaches as an other center of epistemic enunciation. In 
hospitality, border is not erased.  Rather it assumes a certain malleability, permeability, 
plasticity, and instability.
31
 The permeability of the border allows for its opening to 
enable subaltern perspectives to emerge. This kind of understanding is redolent with 
Homi Bhabha’s point that the place called boundary or borderline “puts us in the position 
of translating differences into a kind of solidarity.”32 The border is not a place for 
destroying but rather for affirming differences while at the same time allowing for a 
movement across differences through mutual encounter and interaction leading to 
growth, enrichment, and transformation in solidarity of others. Thus to be a boundary 
dweller entails an interstitial inhabitation of the “in-between” where identity is actually 
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shaped by a multiplicity of factors and not necessarily in an essentialist fashion that gives 
the impression of a more solidity of identity than what is actually the case. On account of 
the numerous external influences that have always infiltrated and ultimately invented 
Africa as a forced reality particularly the experience of colonialism, it is plausible to 
submit that Africans are characterized by a border or an “in-between” inhabitation or 
dwelling. In this way, Africans, like other subalterns in the modern/colonial world 
system, inhabit multiple identities. However, it is only in keeping with such an 
atmosphere that the Gospel which is both transcultural and countercultural can effectively 
impact culture by interpellating and transforming those elements that are counter-Gospel. 
At the same time, the Gospel in turn is itself enriched and its dimensions expanded 
through rereading, translation, and reinterpreting in the light of such encounter with local 
cultures/epistemologies and situations of lived experiences.    
 By and large, in view of the objections raised, Njoku proposes the model of 
covenant in place of hospitality. He sees the idea of covenant as not the only feasible 
model but for now remains, nevertheless, the best for constructing an African theology of 
inculturation. To make his point, Njoku adopts G. E. Mendehall’s definition of covenant 
as a “solemn promise made binding by oath, which may be either verbal formula or a 
symbolic action. Such an action or formula is recognized by the parties as the formal act 
which binds the actor to fulfill his promise.”33 Njoku briefly rehearses some of the 
biblical accounts of covenants ranging from simple ones between men to those between 
God and men, the people of Israel, and climaxing in the Eucharist. In all this, Njoku’s 
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interest seems to focus on the idea of “oath” or “promise” which is binding on the parties 
involved in the pact to avoid occurrence of a breach. The oath makes the parties to be 
respectful and faithful to each other. Indeed, he sees the idea of the Hebrew berith which 
has the English equivalent of oath as analogous to the Igbo (African) idea of Igba-ndu 
which means mating or communion of life.
34
 Through Igba-ndu which may involve the 
ritual process of blood drinking taking from and by both parties, “communion in the same 
life and meaning”35 comes to be effectuated. In this way, Njoku underscores that the idea 
of humans as covenanted or existing in communal union is no stranger to the African 
experience. Indeed, Njoku minces no words in affirming that covenant making 
characterizes African mode of being. He goes on to aver that through such covenants, 
“even strangers come to see themselves as ‘blood relatives,’ thereby assuring the 
sacredness of all in a common paternity/maternity and brotherhood.”36 For Njoku, this 
covenant model overcomes the prejudices and fears, and perhaps, the uncertainties 
surrounding the ethic of encounter which, accordingly, can only be nourished by life of 
communion and friendship.
37
 Quite frankly, Njoku grants that even the covenant situation 
is not perfect or absolute since there abounds an infinite possibility for breaching it. But 
his conviction is that in the event of a breach, parties involved can “avail themselves of 
the infinite possibility of renewals, re-enactments and re-commitment to their initial 
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cause….”38 To my mind, this observation of Njoku with regard to human limitations that 
frequently endanager relationships is key to understanding the import of igba-ndu. Igba-
ndu (meaning binding life together) seems to be more meaningful when understood as the 
ritual renewal of already existing relationships but which have been broken or 
endangered by betrayal, neglect, or failure.       
Njoku’s position is undoubtedly fascinating. There are many appealing features in 
his analysis of covenant. Yet it contains some troubling subtle nuances which need 
further critical exposition. But before proceeding, it is, however, pertinent to point out 
that every model always encapsulates reality from a particular perspective. Since no 
model or imagery pretends to be exhaustive, all models limp. At any rate, some models 
would be more significant than others in the sense that they are more illuminative of the 
issue at stake and more unifying of its multifaceted aspects into a holistic vision. 
Moreover, a model may be more relevant in a particular time and context than in another 
particularly in view of the signs of the times.
39
 In an age of pluriversality and 
globalization, with the shrinking of the world into a smaller village and coupled with the 
ambivalence of interconnectedness and fragmentation which has heightened awareness of 
differences, I contend that the metaphor of hospitality remains a preference. This is so 
because, among others, hospitality is capable of transforming boundaries into an “in-
between” space for negotiating difference and fostering solidarity with the stranger 
regarded as other in our contemporary time and context.       
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While there is little doubt as Njoku establishes that covenant is not only a biblical 
but also African motif (such as Igba-ndu), it is equally pertinent to argue that hospitality, 
in the first place, is the condition and possibility for covenant. Hospitality always 
precedes covenant. Before any talk of covenant, before alliance or agreement, a welcome, 
a recognition of the other, a hand is held out or spread out to embrace
40
 the other, the 
stranger. Even in the case of the Sinaitic covenant, before making a covenant with Israel, 
God had to first of all show the people of Israel hospitality while they were strangers in 
Egypt. As strangers in Egypt, the people of Israel were the “other,” the subaltern, those at 
the margins and hence, the voiceless, and the silenced, and worst still, the oppressed and 
enslaved. Israel, of course, fared well initially in Egypt until a new Pharaoh breached the 
bond of friendship and subjected it to subaltern position. It was from such situation that 
the hospitable God liberated Israel before ever entering into a covenant with the people 
(cf Ex 2:23-25; 3:7-10). Before covenant, God first welcomed Israel as strangers. Indeed, 
God’s hospitality to the people of Israel which was a condemnation of the unjust social 
structures that pushed them to the exteriority of Egyptian frontier, preceded and paved the 
way for the Sinaitic covenant. It was there on the margins, in that subaltern location that 
God revealed his power to lift up the silenced and oppressed. Subalternity is also a place 
of speaking; it is also a place with epistemic potential, and indeed, a site of revelation. 
God’s hospitality and concomitant election is thus the foundation of his covenant with 
Israel.
41
 Actually, in accordance with the common ancient Near Eastern practice of 
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making treaties or alliances (especially suzerainty pacts), a brief chronicle or rehearsal of 
historical antecedents which serves as a prologue usually precedes the making of 
covenant commitments.
42
 It includes especially the deeds of benevolence and hospitality 
performed by the suzerain on behalf of the vassal. This is to inspire faithfulness on the 
part of both parties. Besides, whereas in covenant, everything seems to be more 
controlled and predictable, in hospitality what appear to be more prominent are the 
elements of surprise, expectancy, and fluidity which are more congenial to the revelatory 
nature of hospitality. God who comes in the stranger, the subaltern is one who arrives and 
presences in the most unexpected and unpredictable places.  It is little wonder that 
Pharaoh fails to notice God speaking through Moses and Aaron, the representatives of the 
stranger (Israel) before him. God actually restored the silenced voice and demands that it 
be given a hearing. This is the work of hospitality; and authentic hospitality requires that 
the stranger, the subaltern, the outsider, not be silenced.     
 Indeed, the Greek noun for hospitality, xenos not only embodies a potential for 
fluidity but equally denotes simultaneously a guest, a host, or a stranger.” The verb, 
xenizo or xenizein means not only “to receive or entertain as a guest” but also “to 
surprise.” The fluidity characteristic of hospitality makes the exchange or reversal of 
roles between hosts and guestspossible. Put another way, the stranger is the bearer of the 
culture, tradition, the world of meaning and values, and indeed the context s/he brings 
with him/her to an unfamiliar world where s/he depends on the hospitality of the host 
who is at home. In a certain sense then, the host as the homeowner becomes the guest of 
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the stranger who assumes the status of a host since the homeowner could always learn 
something from the stranger for their mutual transformation. Again, it is arguable that 
quite unlike some covenants, whenever and wherever genuine hospitality takes place, it 
always tends to a greater inclusiveness
43
 by making boundary as border malleable, 
perforated, and unstable while recognizing and welcoming differences.   
 Clearly, covenants have a greater tendency to ossify or rigidify boundaries and to 
exclude those who do not identify with the initiated as covenant members. In capturing 
how the Hebrew people despised and excluded the Gentiles as uncircumcised pagans 
before Christ, for instance, Paul has this to say: “At that time you were without Christ, 
you did not belong to the community of Israel; the covenants of God and his promises 
were not for you” (Eph 2:12). In the same vein, the ritual of Igba-ndu which establishes a 
covenantal relationship can also be exclusive. Whereas those who have taken part in 
Igba-ndu now see themselves as sharing in one communion of life, as more or less “blood 
relatives,” those who have not taken part in the ritual may be viewed as “non-blood-
relatives,” and hence, excluded. In order words, whereas covenants tend to exclude non-
covenant members by hardening the distinction between outsiders and insiders, 
hospitality rather tends to expand and transform the frontier by welcoming the stranger 
who is not considered a “blood relative” but rather a foreigner who is a non-covenant 
member in the “conviction that God’s redeeming work always discloses itself…[in the 
subaltern] as well.”44 In a covenant, the parties involved no longer see themselves as 
strangers to each other; they are like blood relatives with no more prejudices and fears 
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surrounding their relationship. Arguably, however, even before such rapprochement is 
achieved, it is fundamentally through hospitality that the tension between those who 
perceive themselves as insiders and as outsiders precipitated by the element of 
strangeness can be doused and defused. The interpellatory nature of hospitality functions 
to overcome the tension and transform the foreigner into a guest, and when welcomed, 
into a friend. On the basis of these clarifications, it is still my heartfelt contention that the 
model of hospitality remains a preferable metaphor for dealing with and for negotiating 
the boundaries of difference. It is a helpful model for a creative epistemology of an 
African theology that would be relevant in an era of World Christianity, of pluriversality, 
and globalization. At this juncture, before we move on to further tease out the notion of 
hospitality, I think it might be useful to review certain articulations of hospitality that in 
our estimation might rather be deemed deformations of hospitality.    
4.3 Deformations of Hospitality/Friendship    
 In some ways, a number of philosophers (Western) have construed hospitality not 
only as a political practice but also as an exercise in virtue. Among such philosophers, we 
would focus on Aristotle, the disciple and student of Plato, since his sway continually 
underwrites much of the later traditions of Western ontological and epistemological 
constellations. To be treated here is Aristotle’s take on magnanimity and charity as 
pathways to self-actualization as well as his understanding of friendship.    
4.3.1 Aristotle’s Notion of Self-Actualization and Hospitality/Friendship
 In silhouetting the contours of interpersonal moral virtues necessary for political 
life, Aristotle derives their status basically from the vantage point of the self’s (agent’s) 
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own flourishing, eudaimonia, which, for him, is the telos of moral virtue and agency. 
There is no doubt that Aristotle is well aware that human beings are social by nature, for 
he states, “…no one would choose the whole world on condition of being alone, since 
man is a political creature and one whose nature is to live with others.”45Consequently, 
humans as embedded within the complex web of relationships acquire virtues and live 
them out in relationality. But for Aristotle, the agent is not only the point of departure of 
all love, magnanimity, and hospitality but also the terminus ad quem of all such 
relationships since they are necessarily geared toward the perfecting of the self (agent) in 
virtue. It comes as no surprise that in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle introduces his 
thought thus: “relations with one’s neighbors, and the marks by which friendships are 
defined, seem to have proceeded from a man’s relations to himself.”46 For Aristotle, the 
good man is a lover of self who “wishes for himself what is good…and does so for his 
own sake.”47 This is the core characteristic of Aristotle’s magnanimous man. It is only 
from this standpoint of agent-centeredness that any ethical relationship with the other is 
possible within the Aristotelian framework. In loving another, the self actually loves itself 
with the other merely playing an instrumental function. It is against this backdrop that 
Aristotle opines that “loving is better than being loved”48 not because such act of loving 
is disinterested but because it is freighted with the investment of conducing to the 
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actualization of the potentialities of the self that would not otherwise be possible. To 
demonstrate this point, Aristotle employs the metaphor of the “producer – product” 
relationship to capture the operative dynamics between the hospitable, so-called 
magnanimous man and the beneficiary of his magnanimity or hospitality. Thus in loving 
the beneficiary, the hospitable benefactor stands to his beneficiary as to another self (that 
is, himself since the other simply becomes an extension of the self) because “the 
handiwork [who is here taken to be the beneficiary] is in a sense, the producer [who is the 
benefactor] in activity; he loves his handiwork …for what he is in potentiality, his 
handiwork manifests in activity.”49 Aristotle goes on to press home the point: “For a 
person regards what come from him as his own, as the owner regards his tooth or hair or 
anything….”50 From the foregoing exposition, it becomes clear that in the ethical 
encounter or relationship between the self and the other, what is of cardinal importance 
for Aristotle is the self-actualization of the self, the good of the self while the other is 
merely the instrument for such a project.       
 This same matrix of self-actualization also shapes the contours of friendship in 
Aristotle. Friendship is possible only between two adults who are good in themselves (in 
the sense of lacking imperfection): “a good friend is by nature desirable for a good 
man.”51 Because the motivating factor in friendship is for whatever contributes to self-
actualization, it is only a good friend who is perfect in virtue that can be desirable for the 
good man. This implies, therefore, that a friend in pain, for instance, cannot be desirable 
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for the good (magnanimous) man since he cannot understand how we could possibly “ask 
friends to share in our bad fortune, for that would bring them pain.”52 For Aristotle then, 
friendship between the good, shuns any kind of vulnerability or imperfection since that 
would not conduce to enhancing self-actualization but rather diminish or deter such 
prospect. Accordingly, a benevolent or magnanimous action for the sake of a friend is, 
after all said and done, a refined self-love in Aristotle.     
 This Aristotelian framework whose ghost has, no doubt, continually haunted 
Western epistemological systems is problematic and disturbing for a number of reasons 
some of which we would like to bring to limelight. First of all, for Aristotle, the essence 
of hospitality or beneficence is for the self to acquire virtue and become a 
hospitable/beneficent person. In this way, the self actualizes itself. On the contrary, when 
the self fails to be hospitable, that is, fails to attain virtue but rather relapses into vice by 
becoming, for instance, cruel, hostile, and tyrannical, then the only thing regrettable, 
going by the Aristotelian parameters, is the failure of the self to actualize itself and thus, 
stunting both its growth in virtue and its capacity to attain eudaimonia. Going by this 
frame of thought, cruelty is evil primarily because it is preclusive of the self’s flourishing. 
This position eliminates from view the fact that cruelty is first and foremost wrong 
because it is intrinsically evil and because of the violence it inflicts on the other who is 
made a victim and not necessarily because it does not contribute to the flourishing of the 
agent. As a matter of fact, way back in his Politica (treatise on Politics),Aristotle 
condemns tyranny only for its effects on the happiness (eudaimonia), virtue, and 
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longevity of the tyrant.
53In other words, Aristotle’s particular interest is not on the 
violence of the tyranny visited on the subjects of the tyrant but rather on the fact that 
tyranny precludes the eudaimonia and self-realization of the tyrant. Secondly, in this 
Aristotelian design, the beneficiary appears condemned to the receiving end as long as his 
existence makes it possible, in the first place, for the benefactor to realize his potential for 
beneficence. Since the benefactor needs a long time to cultivate this virtue, because 
virtues are acquired over a long span of time through practice, then the beneficiary 
necessarily needs to remain in his status as long as whatever time it takes the benefactor 
to become self-actualized. From this purview, it does not seem there is room for making 
the beneficiary to become independent. The recipient is condemned to a dependent status. 
And one insidious implication of this is that once the benefactor believes he has 
sufficiently acquired the virtue of beneficence (which is self-actualization/self-
sufficiency), a tendency is for him to flaunt himself as being moral enough as though one 
can actually become moral enough leaving no more room for further striving and 
improvement. Thirdly, the Aristotelian magnanimous man confers gifts on the 
beneficiary without any expectation of material reciprocity from the latter. The gifts 
conferred only enable the giver to mature in virtue and thus serve to reinforce his sense of 
superiority and self-sufficiency as the benefactor. Gift giving and hospitality for the 
magnanimous man only serve to underline his superior status which accrues to him 
respect, honor, and prestige as a virtuous man. Lastly, this idea of gift giving and 
hospitality as a way of reinforcing the superiority of the giver necessarily creates a 
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polarity at whose opposite end is located the inferior recipient so-called precisely as 
unable to actualize him/herself since, according to Aristotle, it is better to love/give than 
to be loved/given. This approach leads to deformation when hospitality, as Letty Russell 
writes, “is practiced as a way of caring for so called ‘inferior people’ by those who are 
more advantaged and able to prove their superiority by being ‘generous,’ rather 
than…[being] a model of partnership.”54      
 We must not simply use others as objects of our charity in order to make us feel 
satisfied as generous people. Worst still, when we dictate for the recipients of our so-
called charity on how they may or may not use such charity. Russell suggests that:  
We must strive to meet others as they are [that is, to see them the way they  
  see themselves, not as we want to see them through the prism of our own  
 eyes], not as objects of our charity, but as persons in their own right, capable 
  of making choices about their destiny. If we insist they dress as we do and 
 follow the same manners, we are not exercising hospitality but ‘reforming’ 
  others to match our expectations.
55
 
 
Therefore, hospitality goes beyond mere charity. We cannot give others what they are 
undeserving (charity) unless and until we first of all give them what they are truly 
deserving (their just right to be respected for who they are, to equality, to human dignity, 
to life, to cultural and religious freedom, to actualize their own epistemic potential and 
destiny, and indeed to justice). We cannot give a person charity without at the same time 
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removing imposed universal structures and institutions that continue to silence and 
inferiorize them and make them victims of massive evil. There can be no true charity 
without justice. Thus, beyond mere charity, hospitality requires deeds of genuine 
solidarity with those who are pushed into the border of subalternity rather than totalizing 
and letting them be trapped in the web of dependency and indebtedness.
56
 But in this 
whole Aristotelian framework, it is glaringly obvious that the status of the recipient as a 
subject in his own right is left out of the picture. With too much of attention focused on 
the self (agent), that is, the benefactor and his self-actualization and prideful display of 
generosity, one wonders if this type of approach is not in any way contributive to the 
unjust structures that encourage dependency syndrome, control, manipulation, and as a 
ploy to support the structures of power discourse that remains operative through the 
process of globalization today.      
 Granted, Aristotle considers relationships anchored on utility or pleasure as 
inferior and egoistic. Yet the principal evil of such egoism expressed as greed, avarice, 
selfishness—which make victims—is not so much that it harms others as it harms the 
egoist, because by so doing, the egoist has dwarfed his own capacity for self-
actualization. In the face of the scandalous poverty, flagrant destitution, and death from 
starvation, for instance, that have engulfed the Two-Thirds World largely due to 
neoliberal capitalism that feeds the greed, avarice, individualism, and inordinate 
consumerism of the One-Third World, Aristotle’s approach in this case condemns not the 
injustice involved but only the failure of the consumerists to attain self-actualization in 
virtue. Additionally, this Aristotelian perspective comes to a head in his metaphysical 
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theory of “act and potency” where he contends that existence, precisely as actuality, is the 
chief good. Transposing this idea to the notion of his ethical subject, Aristotle maintains 
that the chief good of the self is to actualize and maintain itself in being. And because 
existence or being is good, the self has to persevere in being by doing that which 
contributes to its flourishing. Therefore, besides delighting in the activity of being itself, 
the self also delights in the activity of being with itself.
57
 The significance of this 
Aristotelian standpoint is found in the enormous influence it has wielded throughout the 
entire trajectory of Western philosophical and theological thoughts from Parmanides 
through Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Sartre, Husserl, even Heidegger, and 
several others.  It is about the notion of “persevering or persisting-in-being,” “being-for-
itself” and “with-itself” which is finely captured by the Spinozean succinct terminology: 
conatus essendi. All in all, we maintain that, albeit, Aristotle articulated his idea of 
magnanimous and hospitable ethical relationship between the self and the other in the 
context of relationality, such relationship is deformed precisely because it centrally 
focuses on the self persevering in its own being, being-for-itself rather than being-for-the-
other. Despite talk of beneficence to the other, it remains unclear whether at all the other 
has any “moral significance for the self except insofar as he or she is a function of that 
self’s own thrust toward self-actualization.”58 Authentic hospitality is rather about 
allowing space for the stranger, the subaltern, the silenced and dependent to emerge and 
assume his or her own place as well actualize his or her own destiny. As Thomas 
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Ogletree writes, “It involves a recognition in the other of a center of meaning and value 
which cannot legitimately be reduced in significance to our own drives for self-
actualization.”59 But before we can bring this argument full circle, it would be useful to 
attend to yet another philosophical issue which borders on the possibility and/or 
impossibility of hospitality.          
4.4 The Thesis of the Impossibility of Hospitality    
 A fascinating phenomenon in so-called postmodernity is the increasingly renewed 
interest among postmodern philosophers in the question of human hospitality. This is 
particularly pertinent in the light of massive movements of people today through 
immigration and migration especially from the South to the North as well as the tensions 
stemming from the encounter with people, religions, cultures, and traditions which are 
different and so challenge one’s identity and primordial assumptions. In this section, I 
will be drawing on two postmodern philosophers, Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques 
Derrida with particular reference to their reflections on hospitality.     
4.4.1 Emmanuel Levinas and Hospitality     
 Levinas, a Lithuanian Jew, “moved to France in 1923, studied under Husserl and 
Heidegger in Germany between 1928 and 1929 with robust enthusiasm for German 
phenomenology. In 1930 he published his first book on Husserl, The Theory of Intuition 
in the Phenomenology of Husserl which was actually his dissertation. However, 
beginning from the mid-thirties, his suspicion and dissatisfaction with the preponderance 
of ontology in Western thought reached a climax when later he shockingly learned that 
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his former teacher, Heidegger was involved with Nazism which for him was a political 
embarrassment. Coupled with his own (Levinas’) five-year imprisonment and the murder 
of his parents and brothers by the Nazi regime, Levinas eventually came to reevaluate 
and interpret Heidegger’s ontology as a splendid renewal of the Western tradition – the 
ontology of the Same. Levinas’ philosophical enterprise can be said to be undergirded by 
one overarching concern: that Western thought is embedded in structures that do violence 
to the integrity of the “other.” Consequent upon its violent tendencies and consistent 
suppression of the “other,” Western philosophical thought suffers an inability to respect 
the “other.”60 On the way to exposing this proclivity, Levinas traces the penchant of 
Western tradition for an imperialistic “ontology of the Same” all the way back to 
Parmenides.
61
 His goal, as already noted in Chapter 1, is partly to liberate the “other” 
from the tyranny and totalizing objectification by the same or the self. He makes it a 
point of duty to question and to break with the consistent preoccupation of Western 
thought with “perseverance-in-being” as we saw figured above in Aristotle and others. 
This preoccupation with essendi upon which, by the way, Western culture is founded 
according to Levinas, expresses itself by imposing rational categories (claimed to be 
universal) on reality, on the world including the human other. In this way, reality, and 
particularly the human person is conceived merely as an epistemic other—an object of 
intentionality—whose epistemic status is real only in the consciousness of the self. The 
other is scrutinized, measured, evaluated, judged, and known from the standpoint of the 
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self. The other is not regarded in his/her own terms. Indeed, the other is constructed and 
ontologized either as an object or area of study by what Mignolo calls the “coloniality of 
power.” This particular trend which runs across the entire gamut of Western thought 
constitutes an ontological violence as it undermines the alterity of the other who is 
another center of consciousness, value, and meaning. This ontological violence which 
involves an attempt to construct the other in the image and likeness of the self has the 
implication of refusal to accept the other as other. Thus Western cultures including their 
politics and economics which are undergirded by a totalizing, assimilating, and 
imperializing metaphysics as well as purported universal epistemological categories 
naturally lead to violence, domination, oppression, and suppression because they scarcely 
leave room for difference, for the irruption of the other. At any rate, the other for Levinas 
remains irreducible to the “same.” In his alterity, the other, unlike other phenomena, 
remains an enigma that defies a definition in phenomenological terms, because the other 
is never given or comprehended in consciousness.
62
    
 Levinas’ starting point on the way to upend and break with this Western 
metaphysical tradition is not the self’s unyielding quest for self-actualization, 
centeredness, or self-integration through persisting in being. Rather he starts with the 
notion of the “face” of the other. To be sure, the face, one of the key terms in Levinas, is, 
according to Colin Davis, “problematic because it both does and does not refer to real 
human faces. The face is that part of the body of other people which is most readily (or 
most often) visible; it is also the most expressive part of the body, and the notion of the 
                                                 
      
62
 Ibid., 21. 
  
300 
 
face as expression (emphasis mine) plays an important part in Levinas’ think-ing.”63 The 
face in Levinas is primarily not a thing seen or intended. Hence writes Levinas, “The face 
is present in its refusal to be contained. In this sense it cannot be comprehended, that is, 
encompassed. It is neither seen nor touched – for in visual or tactile sensation the identity 
of the I envelops the alterity of the object, which becomes precisely a content.”64 It is as 
expression, speech, discourse that the face reveals itself. The face does not reveal itself to 
be seen, but rather to be heard. The face of the Other speaks to me.   
 The speech of the face is simultaneously an imperative and an appeal. As an 
imperative, it questions and repudiates the self for its egoistic and murderous tendencies 
to suppress and assimilate the other. At the same time it is an appeal to the self to accept, 
respect, recognize, and welcome the discourse of the face even in its destitution in 
manifestation. The speech of the face is thus an invitation to welcome and openness to 
plurality and difference. Levinas uses such adjectives as higher and lower to describe the 
mode of the approach of the other who addresses the self in the other’s face.65 The other 
comes as higher not in the sense of dominating the self since his resistance, precisely as 
ethical, is preeminently nonviolent and nonethnocidal.
66
 Rather higher is understood in 
the sense that the imperative nature of his speech and call challenges, interpellates, judges 
the arbitrariness of the self’s proclivity to homogenization and absorption of whatever 
lies outside it into the hegemony of its empire. The face of the Other in its speech thus 
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traumatizes, shocks, and shakes the self’s powers of totalizing, dominating, and 
appropriating the other, questioning the self’s propensity to persist in being and satisfying 
only itself. The face thus shocks the thematizing self with the truth about itself and thus 
marks the self’s limits. At the same time, the other is lower because he approaches the 
self not with coercive power but in destitution and defenselessness, with an appeal to be 
welcomed while calling the self to ethical responsibility.      
 Levinas presses home the idea of the irreducibility of the other whose alterity is 
non-adequate to any perception in intentionality by contending that the other speaking in 
the face approaches the self in a “dimension of height.”67 The other speaking to me in the 
face is my master and my teacher. More to the point, Levinas means to say by this that:  
the…encounter with the other opens up a new world of meaning to which I 
 otherwise have no access. I do not possess that world within my own orient- 
 ation to meaning, not even latently. Thus, I cannot presume that the other is  
 like me or that I can understand the other on the analogy of my own experi- 
 ence—perhaps through a process of identification and projection. If I am to 
 approach the other’s world of meaning, I must let him teach me about it, open 
 its contours and nuances to me.
68
       
  
This is a very important caveat from Levinas. We cannot gain access to the system of 
meaning and value constituted by the world of inhabitation of the other by imposing our 
own particular categories, projecting our own perceptions and understandings upon him 
under the assumption or pretext that they have universal validity for all. That kind of 
universal rationality silences the voice of the other who should be heard as an epistemic 
center of its own. To comprehend the other solely according to our own system of 
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meaning and value amounts to an ontological and epistemological violence. We cannot 
master or know the other in advance since his alterity resists such mastery and 
determination. It is only in the context of discourse, the speech of the face that the infinity 
or mystery of the being of the other and his world is revealed to the self. Ethical 
responsibility in Levinasian perspective, therefore, entails the readiness and openness to 
allow the other to come to audibility and not to silence him. This responsibility to 
welcome and not to thematize the other who approaches, to hear the speech in the other’s 
face, to learn from the other, is what hospitality is about in Levinas.    
 According to Levinas, this ethical responsibility is infinite. On this side of the 
eschaton, we can never become moral enough; enough can never be enough. We are 
never done with the neighbor who always concerns us,
69
 with being responsible toward 
others, especially toward the weak, the widow, the poor, and the stranger. Again, 
according to Levinas, this responsibility toward the other is not only infinite, but also 
non-symmetrical. Unlike Buber who sees the I-Thou relationship as one of symmetrical 
reciprocity, for Levinas, it is decisively asymmetrical because it does not wait for 
reciprocity which tends to subject hospitality to calculations of deficits and 
compensations in cost accounting.
70
 My responsibility and obligation toward the other is 
not conditioned on what I stand to get out of it or on the other’s reciprocal obligatory 
indebtedness to me. In this way, Levinas rejects the traditional vocation of being as 
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being-for-itself, the interestedness and perseverance of being-in-itself and for-itself, 
which he considers, to be at the root of all the crises of civilizations, the wars, and the 
massive atrocities of the twentieth century. Although the word, hospitality, features rarely 
in Levinas’ works, Jacques Derrida, however, affirms that “Totality and Infinity 
bequeaths to us an immense treatise of hospitality (emphasis original).”71    
All in all, Levinas has posited that the practice of hospitality is necessary 
particularly in the light of pluralism and difference. His perspective proffers a fascinating 
corrective to the structures of the universal epistemology of the coloniality of power that 
continues to hold sway in our globalized world. Hospitality and friendship should serve 
as central elements of our relational activity as members of the comity of one common 
humanity. Such perspective recognizes our equality-in-difference in a way that is 
enriching rather than destructive of each other. Albeit, his account of the encounter 
between the I and the other is not an event that is located within synchronic and historical 
real time because the other rather approaches from a diachronic, pre-originary, and 
immemorial past, it, nevertheless, has real time analogue and relevance.  The Levinasian 
“face” which speaks must be seen and heard in the faces of all those who are oppressed, 
subjugated, and silenced by the coloniality of power of the modern/colonial world 
system’s imaginary. Indeed, along these lines, his account provides “a structural 
possibility that precedes and makes possible all subsequent [real time historical] 
experience.”72 Let us now turn to Derrida.       
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4.4.2 Jacques Derrida and the Impossibility of Hospitality   
 The ethical concern expressed by Levinas particularly with respect to the 
obligation to respond with hospitality toward the epiphany of the other who approaches 
the self has been appropriated and expanded by Derrida (1930-2004), the philosopher of 
deconstruction. During the last few years of his life, Derrida wrote two books on the 
theme of hospitality. The first is entitled Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas in which he not 
only analyzes the idea of hospitality in the oeuvre of Levinas but also builds on it. The 
second is entitled simply Of Hospitality. Besides Levinas, Derrida’s reflection on the 
theme of hospitality equally developed in conversation with the philosophical strands in 
Søren Kierkegaard, Husserl, and especially Kant.
73
    
 Immanuel Kant, the philosopher from Königsberg reflected on the theme of 
hospitality in the context of his discussion on the conditions for peace between states. In 
his essay on Perpetual Peace (1795) Kant describes what seems to be a universal 
hospitality as the right of a stranger not to be treated as an enemy when he arrives in the 
land of another. The stranger may arrive in another’s country with a claim to a universal 
right to hospitality, to be welcomed, on the grounds that “all men are entitled to present 
themselves in the society of others by virtue of their right to communal possession of the 
earth’s surface.”74 This stems from Kant’s universal conception inspired by his Judeo-
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Christian heritage that “originally, no one had more right than another to a particular part 
of the earth.”75 However, this universal hospitality is one that is conditioned. The stranger 
must behave peaceably in another’s country. And he only has the right of resort and not 
the right of guest. With the right of resort, the stranger has only a right of temporary visit 
and not the right of permanent stay which would be the right of guest.
76
 
 Derrida rejects this conditioned hospitality as articulated by Kant because, for 
him, it is plagued by determinacy and involves a horizon of expectation. Because it is in 
the nature of this conditional hospitality of reciprocity to spawn a vicious circle of 
indebtedness which is characteristic of the logic of the economy of exchange, Derrida is 
led to enunciate the impossibility of hospitality. Insofar as we remain entangled in the 
web of the economy of exchange, pure and true hospitality not already tainted by the 
reciprocal logic of debts and obligations remains an impossibility. Derrida thus 
distinguishes between this conditional hospitality continually threatened by the logic of 
indebtedness and absolute hospitality that is freely given. Such unconditional and 
absolute hospitality requires that before welcoming the stranger who approaches, we 
forego all profiling, all judging, all analyzing, and evaluating of the other. The whole 
point of identification is to engender knowledge, vision, and prejudice which eventually 
lead to thematization and control. Pure hospitality then requires that we desist from 
continuing the violence that tries to construct the other by shaping him into our own 
image. Derrida rather suggests that pure hospitality requires a radical and absolute 
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openness to the advent of the wholly other without any prefiguration.
77
 This wholly other 
refers not only to God but also to every human person. The other as the wholly other 
transcends all determinacy, possibility, presence, and possibility. For Derrida, violence is 
intricately interwoven within the structures of conditional hospitality as understood along 
Kantian lines of totalization. In the light of this violence, Derrida rejects it in favor of 
unconditional and absolute hospitality.       
 In making the case for radical and absolute openness to the advent of the 
newcomer, Derrida rejects all manner of messianism. Put another way, he is wary of any 
claim to any definitive arrival of the kingdom in any particular messianic figure. For such 
a claim would be preclusive of the radical openness to the future of the ceaseless advent 
of the other, a future removed from the violence and regime of presence, the presentable, 
and the programmable. Hence Derrida argues for a messianicity without messianism, a 
revelation without vision, a religion without religion, without truth, without knowledge 
since the wholly other cannot be identified with any determinable faith or a determinable 
messiah.
78
 Derrida wants to overcome the determinacy of religion and messianism which 
generate determinable faiths that brew pernicious absolutism, universalism, and 
triumphalism engendering exclusion and exclusiveness. For Derrida, the freedom of the 
wholly other prohibits its containment within the determinate dogmatic content of any 
particular historical religion, institution, or program. To do so amounts to reducing the 
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wholly other to the regime of sameness. For that reason, Derrida emphatically insists on 
“the infinite respect of the singularity and infinite alterity of the other.”79 The notion of 
messianicity has the character of an absolute openness to an indeterminate future that can 
never be fully realized. It is a messianicity whose future hope and promise ceaselessly 
remain to come (à venir) and absolutely undetermined. Accordingly then, pure hospitality 
implies messianicity. Derrida’s search for an indeterminate messianicity is undoubtedly 
informed by his fear of the violence often associated with particular messianisms, 
whether it is of Judaism (Zionism), Christianity, or of Islam. For the moment that 
messianic future is claimed to be realized, then hospitality becomes thrust into the 
horizon of determinacy, and hence, leads to the impossibility of the avoidance of 
violence.         
 However, despite this quest for unconditional hospitality with indeterminate 
messianicity, Derrida realizes that within the limits of time and space, hospitality is 
always caught up within the aporia of indeterminacy and determinacy, unconditionality 
and conditionality. This aporia is the dilemma—which Derrida describes as the double 
bind—of hospitality. While, on the one hand, pure hospitality entails unconditional 
welcome extended to the stranger, on the other, Derrida realizes that the stranger must be 
welcomed in a particular way, by means of particular protocols and conventions, and 
within a particular symbolic universe and language.
80
 In other words, the conditionality 
of hospitality entails that it have a specific context. Therefore, for the welcome to be real 
and effective, the stranger must somehow be identified, called out or be greeted by name. 
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Yet, Derrida is not unmindful of the slippery slope which stealthily lurks at the 
background. For in the context of the particularities and conditionalities of hospitality, 
there is often the tendency that the process of “identification always risks negating the 
hospitality that is extended; for in inviting, recognizing, or identifying the stranger, in 
subjecting him or her to our suppositions or our knowledge if not our prejudices, the 
stranger always risks becoming a relative nonstranger …who look[s], sound[s], and 
smell[s] like us…who share[s] our tastes.”81 The real danger is how within the fabric of 
conditionality, the posing of a question which quite frankly should be a welcoming 
gesture to the stranger who approaches could easily be transcoded into a tool for 
thematization, control, and the shaping of the stranger into our own image, to become one 
who is like us in order to be welcomed.      
 As a way to get around this aporetic double bind, Derrida first of all comes to the 
concession that both ends of the hospitality spectrum—the unconditional or unlimited 
and the conditional—are necessary. Real hospitality consists in unconditionally 
welcoming the unexpected guest into a particular symbolically and linguistically 
conditioned context. Derrida’s concession is not based on the fact that we are incapable 
of pure and unconditional hospitality perhaps due “to our finitude…our limited capacities 
and resources, or…simply…[due] to political expediency.”82 It is rather the recognition 
that real hospitality is always about welcoming particular guests and not indiscriminate or 
indeterminate “wholly other.” Because the welcoming question is threatened always by 
the danger of turning into an inquisition and thematization, Derrida suggests that 
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deconstruction is necessary. Deconstruction thus becomes a thoroughgoing critique of the 
consistent propensity to insist on the solidity and purity of being and of trying to shape 
the other into our image. At any rate, because for Derrida, real hospitality has to consist 
in the welcoming of a particular guest in a particular context, then pure hospitality is 
always impure, it is always compromised insofar as it is enacted, realized, and made 
effective in real time. Therefore, for Derrida, unconditional hospitality is and should 
remain an impossibility.       
 Moreover, Derrida addresses himself to the question of “gift.” Utilizing the same 
trend of thought, he maintains that a pure gift is unpresentable and absolutely 
undetermined. He opines that there is never pure altruism in gift-giving.
83
 Gift giving is 
always betrayed or even cancelled by at least the hidden desire for affirmation. Even if 
this affirmation does not come from the recipient of the gift, the giver of the gift 
somehow repeats it to himself by way of confirming the gift he has given. This is what 
Derrida calls iterability. It is this idea of repetition inherent in the word, gift, or promise 
that betrays it by changing the context and meaning of the original to the horizon of 
economy, knowledge, determination, and so on, because the repetition brings it into 
presence. Derrida thus insists on the impossibility of the gift. For the gift cannot be 
brought into presence while still remaining a gift either on the side of the donor or the 
recipient; it is impossible for pure gift to be present. The gift as such is entirely foreign to 
the horizon of theoretical determination and analytic knowledge, economy, ontology, and 
conceptual definition. The gift as such, like hospitality, cannot be legitimately presented 
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in reality, for the moment it is achieved, it ceases to be a gift. Ultimate messianic justice 
and the dreams of realizing absolute hospitality as conceived by Derrida remain an 
eschatological reality that awaits us, that is to come (à venir).     
4.4.2.1 A Critical Evaluation of Derrida’s Deconstructionism  
 Derrida’s brilliant insights are well taken. There is no doubt that he and other 
postmodern deconstructionists are trying to subvert the specter of Western 
epistemological traditions with their entrenched totalities which thematize and oppress. 
This has always been a central problem more especially since the time of the history of 
the modern/colonial world system which classified alterity on the basis of the normativity 
of Western global designs that created the regions of subalternity. However, it must be 
said that Derrida’s conceptualities are still troubling. Although, Derrida has a project of 
dismantling totalities, he appears to end up merely in deconstruction for the sake of it. 
The radicality of his deconstruction which negates everything determinate as the horizon 
of totality and economic exchange leads him to take flight into the realm of absolutes that 
defy mediation in history. Because such absolutes are never mediated, Derrida ends up 
critiquing the imperfections of determinate historical practices rather than providing 
solutions on how to improve on them. He criticizes religions and other determinate 
entities merely for what they cannot achieve in terms of pure and perfect realization of, 
say, hospitality or the gift, within history, than in encouraging them to bear a better and 
more effective witness in showing hospitality in the best possible way they can.
84
 By 
emphasizing the absolutes, he is unknowingly reconstituting the old dualisms (much like 
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“same” versus “other” that he is trying to overcome) that have always plagued Western 
thought. For to speak of unconditional, indeterminate, pure, is to at the same time imply 
their opposites, conditional, determinate, and impure. Because his absolute 
conceptualities allow no place for mediation for fear of the regime of sameness, he has 
difficulty finding a middle ground as a way to get around the opposite ends of his 
conceptual spectrum. But the truth remains that reality is never unmediated.  
 Moreover, Derrida tends to be blind to the reality that one can never simply think, 
inquire, and know in a vacuum or from a delocalized “zero point”85 that constitutes an 
indubitably neutral objective foundation outside a tradition. Although his goal, as for 
other postmodernists, is to subvert that tradition, nevertheless, the presuppositions of that 
same tradition are still implicit in his thought. Basically, Derrida simply re-inscribes 
Enlightenment rationalism (pure reason that is merely logocentric and ahistorical 
abstraction). Indeed, it is legitimate to say that Derrida thinks in supraessentialist terms 
and “otherization.” Hence, Derrida’s religion without religion, his messianicity without 
messianism can only continue to remain pure and absolute as long as they lack 
incarnation and mediation in history. From the Christian tradition, the absolute, 
transcendent, and incomprehensible God is the same God incarnated in Jesus from 
Nazareth (that subaltern region). And because Derrida gets lost in ahistorical abstraction 
and logocentrism, his perspective fails to be fully attentive to the reality of the situated 
and particular historical living experiences of the subalterns. The reality of such subaltern 
historical experiences and knowledges is completely foreign to Derrida even though he 
may have a notional idea of it; but it is not the same as being a subaltern. Hence, it is only 
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the subalterns who can give expression to their own historical experiences which equally 
enjoys an epistemic status. As a matter of fact, Derrida is thinking from a position of 
power (coloniality of power) and has no knowledge of the reality of colonial difference 
from the subaltern perspective. He can only learn it from the subalterns themselves. If 
hospitality cannot be incarnated or mediated, how can the margins emerge from that 
constructed subalternity of inaudibility where nothing good comes from according to the 
coloniality of power, but where, nonetheless, divine revelation irrupts?  Precisely as 
caught up in ahistorical abstraction, Derrida’s deconstruction is, at the long run, still 
totalizing. No doubt, Derrida indulges in negative theology in order to save transcendence 
from being encapsulated in a determinable way. But by claiming that the best that can be 
said about transcendence is the radicality of the unconditioned, then Derrida presupposes 
or implies that he already knows in advance all about transcendence. This, in itself, is 
thematization. Thus, Derrida plunges back head on into what he is trying to escape from. 
The issue is that Derrida’s thinking is still rooted in Western metaphysical tradition 
which only thinks in terms of “First Cause” or “Absolute Foundation.” In line with this 
understanding, that which “never arrives,” “always without limit,” that which “continues 
to become,” is for metaphysics beyond thought and defies its logic, since the only logic 
possible for it is that of absolute foundation, the logic of sameness, or finished-product 
(object). But God’s gift is a non-object, it is grace.      
 Besides, Derrida’s emphasis on the infinite and absolute singularity of the 
individual out of fear of reducing or “fusing” the individual into the horizon of the “We” 
or perhaps to avoid subscribing to schizophrenic personality, rather isolates the individual 
absolutely with an absolute responsibility. Any claim to absolute obligation or absolute 
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responsibility, realistically speaking, amounts to an assumption that is false. We always 
exist as integrated relational beings and we need relationality and the solidarity of others 
to achieve what, as individuals, we cannot achieve alone all by ourselves. Add to that, 
Derrida’s emphasis on absolute singularity loses sight of the reality of multiple identities, 
that an individual can inhabit multiple identities at the same time largely because of 
dichotomous experiences which are never had in isolation. Such dichotomous 
experiences find expression, for instance, in Homi Bhabha’s “in-between” or “border 
dwelling,” W. E. B. Du Bois’ “double consciousness,” Abdelkebir Khatibi’s “double 
critique,” Luke Mbefo’s “two-fold heritage,” and so on. That is why we need an other 
perspective, an other paradigm or logic of thinking which is relational because it is not 
ethnocidal but rather accommodating of a diversity and pluriversality of local narratives 
simultaneously since even the tradition or memory which Derrida’s thinking presupposes 
is also itself a local history or local epistemic center. In any case, Derrida’s take on 
absolute hospitality and pure gift as impossibilities helps us to appreciate all the more a 
pneumatological foundation of hospitality and the gift. The very impossibility that 
Derrida highlights is precisely what is made present in the superabundance or rather the 
excess of God’s gift of divine hospitality made available through Jesus Christ in the 
Spirit. But before we treat this, let us in the following section explore Mignolo’s notion 
of “border thinking” as an other paradigm that is accommodating of differences not in an 
oppressive way but à la equality-in-difference.       
4.5 Walter Mignolo and Border Thinking     
 In order to put a finger on his notion of “border thinking,” Argentinian 
semiotician and decolonial thinker, Walter Mignolo, tries in his book, Local 
  
314 
 
Histories/Global Designs, to, first of all, theorize what he describes as the “colonial 
difference” in the formation and transformation of the “modern/colonial world system.”86  
Drawing on and expanding the insights of Immanuel Wallerstein and others, Mignolo 
underscores that colonial experiences in their variety of shapes and forms started all the 
way back from the 1500s with the emergence of the Americas to the second half of the 
twentieth century in the emergence of global colonialism. By coupling 
“modern/colonial,” Mignolo and other decolonial thinkers want to insist that coloniality 
and the “coloniality of power” do not simply end with early forms of active colonization 
of peoples and lands forcefully appropriated and occupied. Rather, the colonial project 
still perdures and is inextricably linked with “the modern world since it is part and parcel 
of modernity…not a later addition to the modern project. The modern project and the 
colonial project go hand in hand. As long as we exist in the modern world (as we are 
especially in a modern world system such as neo-liberal capitalism) we are existing in 
contexts that exhibit structures of coloniality and the coloniality of power.”87 Again, the 
coupling of modernity/coloniality allows Mignolo to highlight “the spatial dimension 
imbedded in the modern world system that is lacking in the linear conception [(such as 
early modern, modern, and late modern)] of modern Western history.”88 With the 
emergence of global colonialism and the enduring coloniality of power, the spatial 
dimension of the system shows that the colonial difference is no longer restricted to the 
external borders or peripheries (where it is still present) away from the metropolitan 
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centers but is today, perhaps thanks to migration and communication, all over, in the 
peripheries and in the centers as well. Let me now throw more light on some of the key 
terminologies used here.       
 Coloniality: Decolonial thinkers make a distinction between colonialism and 
coloniality. As already noted above, whereas colonialism entails the formal subjugation 
of peoples, the occupation of their lands, and exploitation of their resources, coloniality 
has to do with a complex, pervasive, and expansive reach of hegemonic power 
throughout the planet. Indeed, coloniality is the matrix out of which colonialism emerges, 
such that even in the wake of colonialism, coloniality—which maintains structures of 
power discourse that classify and subjugate people on the basis of race, class, gender, 
production of knowledge, and so on—far from being history, is still alive and well today 
especially “in its new guise of global coloniality.”89     
 Coloniality of Power: A term which Mignolo adopted from Anibal Quijano 
identifies it with capitalism and its consolidation in Europe from the 15
th
 to the 18
th
 
centuries. Accordingly, it refers to the way by which the entire planet with its continents 
was classificatorily articulated and legitimated on the basis of an epistemological 
perspective that utilizes certain institutional structures as channels of production of 
knowledge. Those channels which function to articulate, control, and manage such 
classifications (in which task the concept of culture becomes crucial) include (state, 
university, church, and so on).
90
 Mignolo contends that “Eurocentrism becomes, 
therefore, a metaphor to describe the coloniality of power from the perspective of 
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subalternity. From the epistemological perspective, European local knowledge and 
histories have been projected to global designs….”91 Global designs are, therefore, 
always local histories created in the metropolitan centers and then exported, 
implemented, and enacted as universal for all in various particular places. Coloniality of 
power is thus a “conflict of knowledges and structures of power.”92  
 Within the modern project, coloniality of power, through its classificatory agenda, 
creates the “inside” and the “outside” of modernity. The regions, cultures, and those on 
the outside are considered of interest only as areas and objects of study and knowable 
only through the prism of Western epistemology. In this way, the outside of modernity 
became a place of inferiorization and subalternization, a place of subjugated and silenced 
epistemic potential. Worst still, those on the outside of modernity were repeatedly and 
forcefully taught to reject and despise all knowledges, histories, and traditional forms of 
thought native to the subalterns. By so doing, such subjugated knowledges (viewed as 
inadequate, naïve, unscientific, and thus, disqualified) became buried under the guise of 
functionalist systematized knowledge and all “in the name of disciplinarity and 
scientificity in the production of knowledge.”93 The coloniality of power thus subjected 
the subalterns to Eurocentric epistemological hegemony as the only nomothetic and 
scientific way of knowing and thereby creating a spiral of dependency and imitative 
tradition. Hence, diversity and plurality were sacrificed on the murky stable of 
Eurocentrism. This is what has been described by decolonial thinkers as the dark side of 
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modernity.
94
 Those who wield the coloniality of power from inside modernity and who, 
therefore, benefit from it, are easily blinded to the devastating negative impact of 
modernity on the vast majority who are outside. An Etche aphorism says: “shi onye nyuru 
anaghi eshi ya ishi” which literally means “one’s own excrement does not smell foul to 
the person; it is rather more off-putting and repugnant to others.”  This is a way of saying 
how easily a person can be blind, unperceiving, and insensitive to the negative and 
repulsive effects of his or her action on others. It is this space of negative impact created 
by the coloniality of power outside modernity that is described as the “colonial 
difference” in decolonial thought (that is, the difference between the inside and outside of 
modernity). It is the space where local histories (emanating from inside modernity) 
inventing and implementing global designs intersect or conflict with subaltern local 
histories (outside modernity). Fascinatingly, Mignolo not only sees the “colonial 
difference” as the space where the coloniality of power through global designs is enacted 
but also where the restitution of subaltern knowledges and histories is taking place.
95
 This 
point of intersection between subaltern local histories and global designs is where “border 
thinking” takes place. 
 Border Thinking: Border thinking is still within the imaginary of the 
modern/colonial world system but truly takes place in the space of colonial difference 
and subalternity (the space of repressed and silenced local knowledges and histories by 
the coloniality of power through global designs). Mignolo contends that border thinking, 
properly speaking, can only work and “be such from a subaltern perspective and never 
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from a territorial (e.g. inside modernity) one. Border thinking from a territorial 
perspective becomes a machine of appropriation of the colonial differe/a/nces; the 
colonial difference as an object of study rather than as an epistemological potential. 
Border thinking from the perspective of subalternity is a machine for intellectual 
decolonization.”96 Border thinking as a form of decolonial construction which emerges as 
a response to the wound of the colonial difference is less a discourse of resistance than a 
discourse of unsubjugating and legitimizing local histories and epistemic loci that were 
subalternized and repressed during the long process of the colonization of the planet.
97
 It is, therefore, not so much a new idea as a new way of thinking, an other 
paradigm or logic of thinking not anchored on universal reason and global designs. 
Border thinking which emerges in the moments of cracks in the imaginary of the 
modern/colonial world system implies “a new opportunity of breaking open closed 
gates”98 for subalternized and silenced perspectives to become foregrounded. In 
restituting subalternized and silenced local histories to the foreground, border thinking, 
by the same token, reveals the particularity and “the local histories from which global 
designs emerge in their universal drive.”99 In this sense, border thinking aims at 
intellectual “decolonization, and transformations of the rigidity of epistemic and 
territorial frontiers established and controlled by the coloniality of power…(emphasis 
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original).”100 This also means that subaltern knowledges and histories can no longer be 
viewed only as objects of study; subalterns must be viewed as subjects and no longer as 
objects of study according to the canon of Western social sciences. Subalternity produces 
not simply cultures and objects to be studied but also intellectuals who are producing a 
body of knowledge and generating theories as they reflect on their own cultures and local 
histories. This body of knowledge is also scientific in its own rights and must not be 
silenced any longer by the coloniality of power but recognized and respected especially 
in academia. This calls to mind Valentin Mudimbe’s observation: “Since the 1960s 
African theorists…ideologues [philosophers, theologians, and so on], rather than 
confiding in and depending on…[Western episteme], have tended to use critical analysis 
as a means for establishing themselves as ‘subjects’ of their own destiny, taking 
responsibility for the ‘invention’ of their past as well as of the conditions for modernizing 
their societies.”101 As a matter of fact, Mudimbe underscores that since the end of World 
War II, it has meant the possibility of new open gates for “new theories in the African 
field”102 in the light of contextual determination. To Mignolo’s point then, border 
thinking as “an other paradigm”—and as an alternative to global designs, abstract 
universal, and neutrally objective knowledge—is not a return to another essentialist 
“otherization” (à la Boodoo), but a recognition that every knowledge, every history is 
situated. As an other paradigm, the logic of border thinking is, therefore, “a logic of the 
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plural”103 and requires that no tradition projects itself as an abstract neutral universal to 
be imposed on all.          
 Border thinking as “an other thinking” is not murderous because it does not 
thematize or totalize. Its aim is not conquest but intellectual decolonization, the 
unsubjugation, and foregrounding of forced, dislocated, and silenced subaltern local 
histories/knowledges. It is, according to Mignolo, “a way of thinking that is not inspired 
in its own limitations and is not intended to dominate and to humiliate; a way of thinking 
that is universally marginal, fragmentary, and unachieved; and as such, a way of thinking 
that, because universally marginal and fragmentary, is not ethnocidal.”104 And because 
border thinking can only be such from a subaltern perspective and never from the inside 
of modernity, it is border thinking that can actually not only interpellate modernity’s 
global designs but also dismantle them through intellectual decolonization. 
Decolonization is a form of deconstruction but from a subaltern perspective on the 
exteriority of modernity. Decolonial thinking, thus problematizes intra-modern discourses 
and Eurocentric critiques of modernity (e.g., postmodernism and Eurocentric 
deconstruction). That is why Derrida, as we have seen above, can only do Eurocentric 
deconstruction but not decolonizing deconstruction because he criticizes modernity’s 
totalizing and thematizing propensity from the inside, from the perspective of modernity 
itself. He cannot do decolonization because of his blindness to the colonial difference. 
Perhaps that is why, at the long run, Derrida relapses into the same absolutizing and 
totalizing categories that he is trying to displace in the first place. This is because he is 
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seeking alternatives inside the same modernity that grounds his thinking and utilizing 
categories that have the same origin in the logocentric hubris of Western episteme. 
Clearly, Derrida seems to not be able to think outside “absolutes.” He is not able to think 
the colonial difference but limits himself only to the colonial structure of every culture 
which he absolutizes: “All culture is originally colonial (emphasis mine).”105 Derrida’s 
phobia for determinacy and particularity makes him think that any talk about the 
particularity of a socio-historical culture, religion, or knowledge automatically leads to a 
kind of sovereignty, a kind of law coming from elsewhere, and so to domination. Hence, 
all culture is colonial. Consequently, the only way he thinks for him to get around this 
aporia of domination of any determinate entity, is to dwell in the “absolutes” leading to 
“religion without religion,” “politics without politics,” “culture without culture;” with no 
mediation or incarnation in determinate particularities. Thus, Derrida is still caught up in 
the abstract and remains in custody of the universal proclivity of modernity’s concept of 
“pure reason.”          
 But border thinking which emerges out of the colonial difference understands 
what it means “to be or feel in between,” to have “a double consciousness,” and to have 
multiple identities. Border dwelling or the “in-between” where border thinking takes 
place is a space for negotiating differences, and especially a locus for letting the silenced 
voice of the stranger, the subaltern, be enunciated. Border thinking, in this way, aims at 
the “multiplication of epistemic energies in diverse local histories”106 and at remapping 
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colonial differences toward a future world characterized by an ethics and a politics of 
pluriversality (a combination of plural and universality).      
 Pluriversality stands to dethrone the monolingual, totalizing neutral reason or 
global designs invented, exported, implemented, and enacted in the name of universality. 
To be sure, “pluriversality is an attempt to make visible and viable a multiplicity of 
knowledges, forms of being, and visions of the world. Pluriversality is equality-in-
difference, the possibility that many worlds can fit in one world. It is the future 
alternative to modernity/coloniality.”107 This notion of pluriversality resonates with the 
Igbo African aphorism: “egbe bere ugo bere; nke si ibe ya ebele, nku kwa ya” which 
means “let the eagle perch and let the kite perch; may the one that denies the other the 
right to perch have its wings dislocated.” It is a call to us that in spite of our differences, 
we can all coexist in one world without the one oppressing the other. Pluriversality is, 
therefore, open to what Mignolo calls macronarratives.      
 The notion of macronarratives is not a reinscription of metanarratives. Rather, it is 
aimed at dethroning the hegemony of abstract universalism of modernity’s global 
designs. Mignolo conceives macronarratives “as a network of [multiple diversity of] local 
histories and multiple local…[epistemologies]”108 engendering the possibility of 
“dialogical thinking”109—which is a thinking with (as subjects) rather than a thinking for 
or a thinking about other people and their history (as objects of study)—and “‘double 
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translation’ allowing for an intersection between incommensurable (from the perspective 
of modernity) forms of knowledge.”110 Within the matrix of pluriversality, every local 
history/narrative will have to survive in diversity; it will have to recover itself, structure 
itself, and preserve itself, while changing and absorbing.
111
 Pluriversality, conceived from 
the standpoint of border thinking, thus, calls for hospitality and friendship in relating to 
others beyond the frontiers established by a totality, a monolingualism, and a 
universalism that is falsely universal. This is all the more reason in the context of 
globalization that has brought differences to inhabit the same space in a more 
interconnected way.          
  It should be clear by now that identity is found always in relationality and 
difference. And since we always exist as relational and integrated beings inhabiting 
multiple identities, Mignolo envisions that local identities/histories would be modified by 
one another through cross-epistemological conversation requiring a pluritopic rather than 
a monotopic hermeneutics. A monotopic hermeneutics—that is, a perspective of a 
homogeneous knowing subject located in a purportedly universal, delocalized, and 
unsituated no-man’s-land—enshrines the distinction/dichotomy between the knower and 
the known, the subject and the object studied, the borderland (as the known) and a pure 
disciplinary subject (the knower) uncontaminated by the border matters s/he describes.
112
 
Pluriversality rather underlines that the space of our existing understood in terms of 
epistemic locations, is characterized by “their disruption of dichotomies through being 
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themselves a dichotomy. This, in other words, is [for Mignolo], the key configuration of 
border thinking: thinking from dichotomous concepts rather than ordering the world in 
dichotomies (emphasis original). Border thinking, in other words, is logically, a 
dichotomous locus of enunciation….”113 Border thinking as thinking from dichotomous 
concepts which yields macronarratives requires a reconfiguration and transformation of 
disciplinary scientificity to become trans-disciplinary/cultural, inter-disciplinary/cultural, 
and multi-disciplinary/cultural. No doubt, intellectuals generating and producing 
knowledge from subaltern perspectives, have embraced this approach. By and large, 
border thinking can be said to be a way out of the labyrinth of the clash of civilizations.
 The significance of Mignolo’s insight for negotiating the boundaries of difference 
in our interconnected and globalized world cannot be overemphasized. It has relevance 
for intercultural, ecumenical, interreligious, feminist, and liberation hermeneutics, as well 
as for communion ecclesiology, among others. It also resonates to a very large extent 
with my own thesis of relationality from an African perspective. My Nigerian context as 
an epistemic space, for instance, is a forced invention of the coloniality of power as a 
conglomerate of diverse peoples, cultures, languages, histories, epistemologies, and 
religions, constructed without the consultation or participation of the people. If being 
Etche-Nigerian is understood, for instance, in terms of epistemic locations, this suggests 
that the hyphenated Nigerian is more than simply being an Etche or where the Etches are. 
Rather, it entails the relationships and engagements Etches have with the diversity in the 
Nigerian space—a conglomerate of diverse cultures, religious faiths, histories, and so 
forth, which we could also call epistemic centers—at the intersections of encounters with 
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them. In keeping with this understanding, then Etche-Nigerian space is at the same time 
Yoruba-, Hausa-, Tiv-, Ogoni-; Catholic-, Muslim-, Protestant-,ATR-space. So to be an 
Etche-Catholic, for instance, is, by this configuration, to be in such relations as Catholic-
Muslim, Catholic-Anglican, Catholic-ATR, and so on. This is what decolonial thought 
refers to as the dichotomous nature of pluriversal epistemic locations which disrupts 
dichotomies through being themselves a dichotomy.      
 The dichotomous nature of border thinking and pluriversality creates a condition 
of possibility for border thinking in terms of cultural and religious diversity. In terms of 
interreligious encounter, it creates a possibility for mutual enrichment of faiths rather 
than trying to conflate or resolve these dichotomous categories into monolingual and 
homogenous narratives, which, of course, merely renders invisible the coloniality of 
power still alive and well today. After all, this is not strange to the nature of Christianity. 
As an organized religion, Christianity is modified by its deep roots in Judaic cosmology, 
epistemology, history, ethics, and so on. It is also shaped in the formulation of its 
doctrines by Greco-Roman traditions and philosophies while in turn, the Christian gospel 
also modified and transformed the aforementioned traditions. It is all these traditions 
interwoven and cross-fertilized with Christianity that have equally become our own 
Christian heritage. But this is a process that remains ongoing if Christianity must be 
relevant for every epistemic location which may not simply be a passive but active 
recipient of the faith. Hence, these dichotomous forms are constitutive of who we are as 
Christians. Undoubtedly, it is in relation to such continual and dynamic engagement of 
Christianity with diverse religious traditions, local histories/ epistemologies, and the 
situated dichotomous lived experiences of peoples, which invites constant double 
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translations, pluriversal readings and reinterpretations, that strengthens and clarifies the 
uniqueness of our faith. Border thinking and pluriversality require that silenced voices 
and subjugated epistemologies/histories be heard and foregrounded as they contribute to 
the continual shaping of the Christian tradition (which is supposed to be living and 
dynamic, not fossilized) through their reasoned reflection on their faith experiences of the 
divine. Boodoo is on the mark when he says: “If what we call faith cannot/will not 
generate nor be informed by a production of knowledge that breaks the coloniality of 
totalizing systems, of idolatry, then that faith is no faith at all, that is ideology.”114 It is 
difficult not to agree with Boodoo as he further submits: “Our faith must serve and be 
served by the epistemological perspectives that are generated out of the colonial 
difference, the dichotomous experiences of our situations, the border thinking that comes 
from our forced and dislocated spaces.”115 This is the only way to overcome the tyranny 
of the coloniality of power that, unfortunately, is still alive and well today. In what 
follows, I will explore an aspect of Etche (African) hospitality which highlights the 
revelatory nature of hospitality as a locus of epistemic enunciation and, thus, as a site for 
theological reflection.          
4.6 The Etche-African Ritual of Hospitality    
 Among the Etche, one significant symbolic ritual is the benediction invoked on a 
family member who is about to embark on a long journey especially to a far away place. I 
have personally had this experience. Those who preside over this ritual are usually the 
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parents and grandparents. The ritual, among other things, involves the taking of a pinch 
of sand from the ground and imposing them on the right and left big toes of the person 
about to travel. In the process, there is invocation of God’s blessings, peace, safety, and 
security; the protection of the ancestors as well as a passionate supplication to the 
person’s chi to help him/her actualize his/her destiny by bringing the journey to a 
successful end and at last to bring the person back home safely. During the process of this 
ritual, God is often invoked by such names as the following: Chinedu-ije (God who 
directs a person’s journey), Chizoba (God who saves and protects), Chisom (God who 
accompanies a person), Chinonso (God who is near), Chinonyere (God with a person), 
Chidube (God who leads), Chikwado (God who fructifies and brings plans to their 
fulfillment), Chibuzo (God is the way), and so forth. The significance of this ritual is to 
underscore that God is with the prospective traveler and will be with him/her even in the 
strange place. In other words, the traveler becomes an embodiment of the divine, and 
indeed, an icon or sacrament of the divine. Besides, as I pointed out in a previous chapter, 
in Etche anthropological assumption, the human person is not just ordinary but has a 
unique relation to God because of the presence of chi (spirit) in every human being.
116
 
 This particular anthropological assumption also underwrites how the Etche view 
people from other cultures and places who they encounter. They tend to view such 
persons as equally accompanied by God and by their chi or rather as bearers of the 
divine. Hence, hospitality among the Etche assumes the nature of a religious concern for 
the other, especially the stranger who is considered sacred and who, as such, is deemed 
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revelatory of the divine.
117
 Hospitality for the Etche is thus not only an ethical practice 
but also a religious enactment because it is believed to involve a triadic dynamics of 
host←stranger←God. God passes by in the stranger encountered by the host. God comes 
to us in the stranger. Therefore, hospitality so understood is not primarily geared either 
toward the self-actualization of the host or toward what the host stands to gain out of the 
encounter with the other via reciprocity. Rather a divine and transcendent orientation is 
the warrant for our human ethical and hospitable responsibility toward the other. For the 
Etche, the encounter between the host and the guest is considered to always take place in 
the presence and mediation of the Spirit. God and the Spirit meet us in the guise of 
strangers who interpellate and challenge our thematizing presuppositions.   
 This practice of impartation of divine benediction on the prospective traveler as 
well as the belief in and recognition of the trace or presence of the divine which passes 
through the stranger or visitor is one that is widespread in most of West Africa. Among 
the Wum of Cameroon, for example, when a family member is about to travel to a far 
country, the parents and grand-parents sit down while the person stands before them. The 
parents and the grandparents then bring the two hands of the person together, forming a 
cup-like shape and exhaling into the person’s palms while pronouncing blessings and 
good wishes upon him/her. Interestingly, the exhalation resonates with the biblical 
impartation of the Spirit, the breath of life. God is beseeched to accompany, guide, guard, 
and to see the traveler to his/her journey’s end. In a similar way, the Chribo of Liberia 
practice exactly the same thing that the Wum people do. With regard to recognizing the 
divine in the stranger, the Fang of Gabon believe that an ancestral spirit passes by a 
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stranger who consequently should be given hospitality.
118
 The same is also true of the 
Bulsa who believe that ancestral spirits visit them in the form of strangers, orphans, 
beggars, the sick, and so on, and therefore, they should be treated with kindness.
119
 
 In Etche cosmo-religious tradition, hospitality may be said to be given to different 
categories of persons who are distinguished by different designations. Some of this is 
based on personal experience. Among different categories of guests, our interest here 
focuses on the welcome usually given to two kinds: “obhia,” and “oghaghaa.” An 
“obhia” generally could be an invited, known, and expected guest. Such an obhia could 
be said to be an invested guest. An obhia could also be unknown but expected. Upon 
arrival, an obhia is usually given a good treat by the host. To begin with, obhia is offered 
oji (kola nut) which is often accompanied with ose-oji (alligator pepper), garden egg, and 
ngwo (palm wine) or another kind of drink in the absence of palm wine as a symbol of 
welcome and acceptance by the host.
120
 An Etche adage says: “eme obhia oji y’ekwuo 
hhe okwhoro bia” which means when the guest is first offered kola nut, that is, welcomed 
and accepted, then and only then will s/he be able to unpack his message to the host by 
unveiling the purpose of his mission. What is important to note here is that the enactment 
of hospitality creates an atmosphere of openness that allows the voice of the stranger or 
guest to heard rather than silenced. Of course, apart from the initial offer of kola nuts, the 
host family cooks delicacies with their best cuisine to entertain an obhia and usually in 
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the company and gathering of family and community members.
121
    
 The second category of guests is the “oghaghaa.” In Etche conceptual scheme, 
the concept of oghaghaa designates a guest who is a total stranger, unknown, uninvited, 
and unexpected. The oghaghaa is the wayfaring stranger who simply arrives but whom 
society owes justice and kindness. The concept of oghaghaa points to a helpless stranger 
who has been pushed to a situation of marginality by forces beyond his or her control, but 
who, nevertheless, deserves to be given a hearing and shown solidarity. To be sure, it is 
to an oghaghaa that true hospitality is given. Etches see in the oghaghaa something 
sacred and will do their best possible to accommodate him/her.
122
 An oghaghaa could be 
someone seeking refuge from oppression, repression, or persecution in his own town or 
village; a victim of stigmatism and ostracism, famine, or loss of land; a dislocated and 
displaced person, and so on. Etches are blessed with an abundance of arable land. There 
have been several cases of those considered oghaghaa who have come into the 
community and have been warmly welcomed by host families and the entire 
community.
123
 Such strangers, after telling their stories, have been known to be 
incorporated into the community where they usually stay for the long haul in terms of 
undetermined period of time.  They have been known to be given a piece of land to 
cultivate and a house to live in. Again, the men especially have also been known to have 
married (if they were unmarried before they came) and raised their own children while 
living in the host community. All of these, especially gifts of land and a house to live in 
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are given free of charge to an oghaghaa (the stranger). He does not have to pay for the 
land or give any kind of compensation to either the host family or the community.  
 As time progresses, the oghaghaa gradually comes to some understanding of the 
ways, the culture, language, traditions, and other aspects of the host community without 
necessarily losing his alterity even though as an “in-between” dweller, his identity 
becomes reconfigured.  As pointed out above, hospitality entails a certain dynamic 
fluidity which makes possible the reversibility of roles between host and guest. It is from 
this standpoint that the presence of the oghaghaa who represents a distinct epistemic 
center contributes in the modification of the host community’s culture/traditions since his 
perspective is often given a hearing on issues in the community. The stranger can help to 
point out to us areas in the culture that are less humanizing which are not infrequently 
taken for granted but nonetheless, need to be addressed.
124
 At any rate, the stranger who 
has come to live in the community comes to be taken more or less as a member of the 
community. Eventually, after several years some of them (the oghaghaaswho choose to) 
do leave and return to their own home land. What is really our point of interest here is 
how the oghaghaa (who is already the suppressed and silenced) is not doubly silenced 
again in his host community of refuge. As pointed out above, one of the reasons for this 
hospitality shown to the oghaghaa is the belief that the stranger embodies the divine and, 
therefore, carries a promise. Hence, the stress it is only through the active role of the host 
families and community in receiving, accepting, and welcoming the stranger without 
subjugating or silencing him or her, that the promise embodied by the oghaghaa would 
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come to pass. To be sure, Etche hospitality is about how we relate to the stranger who is 
understood to be revelatory of the divine; it is about openness to welcome difference 
without the violence of trying to shape him or her into our own image or subjugating and 
silencing his voice. 
 In the light of the Etche anthropological assumption with regard to the presence of 
chi (spirit) in every person including the stranger, we can better appreciate the 
significance of their hospitable concern for the oghaghaa. The recognition of the 
presence of the spirit in the oghaghaa who approaches serves to awaken in the Etche a 
sense of responsibility for accepting and sharing the gift of themselves, their land, and 
home with the stranger. For the Etche, hospitality to the oghaghaa is, therefore, not done 
on the basis of the pedigree, profile, surname, or where s/he comes from, but rather in 
view of what the stranger represents for them—God or the spirit who comes in the 
stranger. Hospitality is thus one other way of how the Etche experience the Spirit. Where 
authentic hospitality is enacted, there the Spirit, nay, the Triune God, is found. For the 
Etche, hospitality to the stranger becomes a pathway to God and God’s pathway to them. 
Etch hospitality to the oghaghaa is thus one excellent way of negotiating the boundaries 
of difference. Significantly, the model of hospitality pushes relationality beyond the 
limits of kinship, tribal, and ethnic settings to build solidarity of others who are not of the 
same ethnic group with us, those who do not share the same blood with us or in the same 
blood covenant with us. The cardinal imperative for a new, virile, dynamic, and viable 
model of building relationships beyond the boundaries of ethnicity in Africa today, may 
be met through the metaphor of hospitality. What has been said here so far does not 
assume that this manner of hospitality simply comes easy or is achieved instinctively 
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without taking cognizance of a usual disorientation that encounters with strangers tend to 
foment in us. The Etche, like all humans, do also have their own fair share of human 
weaknesses including the tendency to dislike what is the unlike and exclude others who 
are not like us from the radius of our religious and ethical concern. The truth of the 
matter, however, remains that their understanding of the divine transcendent orientation 
of hospitality as the impetus helps invaluably in majority of cases to direct its practice 
along the right course; to recognize the stranger (oghaghaa) as the one whose presence 
awakens in us a sense of ethical responsibility to accept and share ourselves, our land, our 
gifts, and community with him or her without, at the same time subjugating or repressing 
him or her.  
Contrary to Derrida, who, for fear of determinacy with its tendency to thematize 
or degenerate into economic exchange, is more interested in taking flight into vague 
abstractions and the “absolute,” the Etche hospitality is historically and concretely 
mediated in the situation of the stranger in need of welcome and recognition. Etche 
hospitality may not be a perfect one, but it is still better than simply indulging in the near 
obsessive stress on absolute unconditioned and the radical discontinuity of determinable 
hospitality à la Derrida. We are always historical and situated beings. And historicity is 
not the same as or simply reducible to totality. Nor does it necessarily amount to an 
automatic totalitarian reduction of the other to the regime of sameness. Hospitality, to be 
realistic, necessarily has to be incarnated and mediated as typified in the Etche brand. 
Derrida’s position is likened to the skeptic, who driven by an obsessive fear of falling 
into error, refuses to believe anything including error itself, and thus, risks finding the 
truth. Therefore, Derrida’s negative theology conflates everything into the absolute while 
  
334 
 
seemingly turning a blind eye on the need for a concrete constructive hermeneutics of 
engagement with ambiguity and pluralism that characterize our historically conditioned 
and situated living and experiences. What is worth noting, however, is that in the two 
categories of Etche hospitality as we have seen above, the stranger is welcomed as a 
bearer of the divine. On account of the stranger’s revelatory character, s/he is welcomed, 
recognized, and not silenced in spite of her or his subalternity. Against the backdrop of 
the whole idea of the divine passing through the stranger—who embodies a promise and 
thus, an epistemic potential—as the foundation of hospitality, we now take a look at 
hospitality as an imperative of relational pneumatology.  
4.7 Liberative Hospitality as an Imperative of the Relational Spirit 
 
Hospitality from a Scriptural perspective could be said to be always empowered 
by the Spirit of the hospitable God. In the person of Jesus from Nazareth, the unlimited 
hospitality of God is incarnated and mediated. It is the Spirit who not only makes 
possible but also renders present the hospitality of God mediated through the life, works, 
and paschal mysteries of Jesus Christ, the Son of God. As Brendan Byrne suggests, “The 
whole mission of Jesus…can be summed up in the phrase ‘the hospitality of God.’”125 
Jesus as the one anointed by the relational Spirit concretizes the hospitality and good 
news of God in the life of those dislocated and subalternized by the social structures that 
oppress, subjugate, and silence them. Because the hospitality of God does not remain an 
absolute unconditioned but is always mediated historically reaching its climax in Jesus, 
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John Koenig is right in insisting that a deep link always “exists between the verbal 
content of God’s good news and its historical embodiment in boundary situations.”126
 As we noted previously, the Spirit who descended on Jesus at his baptism and 
rested on him marked his anointing and hence, his empowerment for his messianic role as 
the one who inaugurates and ushers into the present the eschatological liberative 
hospitality of God. As one empowered by the Spirit, wherever Jesus exercised his 
messianic ministry, the hospitality of God was made manifest. This is in conjunction with 
his inaugural announcement in the synagogue at Nazareth: “The Spirit of the Lord is on 
me, because he has anointed me to preach good news to the poor. He has sent me to 
proclaim freedom for the prisoners and recovery of sight for the blind, to release the 
oppressed, to proclaim the year of the Lord’s favor” (Lk 4:18-19). Without succumbing 
to the traditional tendency of over-spiritualizing this text and depriving it of its critical 
bite and subversive potential, it is clear that this announcement encapsulates a wider 
program of social justice and God’s tender hospitality toward the poor, the oppressed, the 
subalternized, and the silenced. This understanding comes to a sharper focus when we 
come to appreciate the import of the concept of aphesis meaning “release” in Luke’s 
Gospel. The significance of this concept, in the words of Byrne, “implies that the 
ministry of Jesus will fulfill the program of social justice that, according to Isa 58:5-7, 
God required of Israel.”127 The release meant here is not merely spiritualized but actually 
embraces a practical historical liberative dimension to it as is already powerfully reflected 
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in Mary’s Magnificat: “He has put down the mighty from their thrones and lifted up the 
downtrodden” (see Lk 1:46-55); and as enshrined in the Beatitudes (Lk 6:17-26; see Matt 
5:1-12). It was a practical interpretive device employed by Jesus not only as a religious 
instrument but also as a social one deployed to disturb and challenge the powerful and to 
restore hope to the powerless and voiceless. In her own case, Mary recognized that she 
has actually been lifted up and released from her situation of invisibility and inaudibility 
(which was her lot as a woman under the penumbra shadow of the patriarchal Israelite 
society of her time) when she asked the heavenly angel Gabriel in the event of the 
Annunciation: “How can this be?” By posing this all important question, the voice of a 
woman, a subaltern, for the first time, was given vocality and hearing in the synoptic 
Gospels.
128
 This is more significant when we realize that Mary’s question was posed to a 
sovereign, a heavenly authority figure, to whom a woman of her lowly status could not 
ordinarily ask such a question (except through the man, her husband) at the time. Besides, 
Mary’s question is less a suggestion of doubt than it is of her wanting to be clarified on 
her role and contribution toward the concrete embodiment of Jesus in the flesh. This is a 
typical example of the cracking of coloniality and the unsubjugation and foregrounding 
of a silenced epistemic potential of a subaltern. The irruption of the angel became a 
moment of crack in the system of repression which allowed for the enunciation of Mary’s 
epistemic potential and destiny. Therefore, the good news which Jesus preaches to the 
most isolated and ignored does not remain mere words but actually effects a change by 
lifting the oppressed and repressed from a situation of marginality and marginalization to 
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reclaim their dignity and equality-in-difference. Thus, as the bearer of God’s liberative 
hospitality, Jesus dismantles and dethrones all the mighty structures that dominate and 
repress the underdogs, and in turn lifts up the downtrodden, the subaltern, and the 
silenced, from the frontiers of the shadows of invisibility and inaudibility to foreground 
and legitimize their epistemic potential. The subaltern, like Mary, also has a contribution 
to make in bringing to the world and in the shaping of our dynamic faith tradition.   
 As a background to our understanding of the import of Jesus’ hospitality toward 
the margins, it may be helpful to briefly investigate the import of hospitality in the First 
Testament (OT). The OT repeatedly returns to the motif: “You shall not oppress the 
stranger, for you know the heart of the stranger—you yourselves were strangers in the 
land of Egypt” (Ex 23:9). Again, “When a stranger lives with you in your land, do not ill-
treat him” (Lev 19:33). Hospitality was also understood to be revelatory of the divine. 
Abraham and Sarah upon welcoming the three strangers did not know they were showing 
hospitality to God (Gen 18:1-15; cf. Heb 13:2). This valorizes the theological 
significance of the stranger as an epistemic center and a site of revelation. Indeed, this 
Abrahamic role as an ideal host who welcomed the irruption of the divine in the strangers 
became archetypal in ancient Judaism.
129
 
However, as time progressed, “a number of forces—socioeconomic, political, and 
religious—worked to…[diminish or preclude the practice of hospitality]. In diverse ways 
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Palestinian Judaism prior to 70 C. E. suffered from tendencies toward exclusivism.”130For 
example, many of the purity ritual laws (cf. Lev12-19 ) came to be translated and 
interpreted in such ways as to regulate and set limits to the encounter and interaction with 
those considered unclean. Those who were considered ritually unclean, the likes of 
lepers, hemorrhaging women, and Gentiles or pagans, were to have nothing to do with 
the community of the people in the name of purity of tradition.
131
 At some point, these 
purity ritual laws became ideological, and were instrumentalized by the powerful 
religious authorities to oppress and repress, to exclude and denigrate certain categories of 
people in the Israelite community. Among other things, it is this anomaly that the 
hospitality of Jesus serves as a scathing condemnation and aims to dismantle. 
 Equipped for his messianic mission with the power of the Spirit, Jesus would 
engage the powerful entrenched forces that seek to oppress, silence, and deprive all those 
excluded and marginalized, of their God-given human dignity.
132
 On various occasions, 
therefore, through his actions and words, Jesus challenged and condemned the oppressive 
religious, political, and socio-economic structures of his day. In keeping with such a 
stance, Jesus went out of his way to challenge “exclusivism wherever it was officially 
sanctioned or accepted as normal. Above all, the challenge is dramatized in stories about 
Jesus’ association at table with the marginal people known as tax collectors and 
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sinners.”133          
 In many cases, Jesus would be both a guest of, and a host to those regarded by the 
religious tradition as “sinners”—tax collectors, publicans, and prostitutes (cf. Matt 9:9-
13; Mk 2:13-17; Lk 5:27-32; 7:36-50). Jesus touched and healed lepers who were 
declared untouchable and quarantined outside the community, silenced and not allowed 
to communicate with any body for the sake of not contaminating ritual purity (cf. Mk 
1:40-45). What is interesting to note here, especially in the case of Zaccheus, the tax 
collector (Lk 19;1-10), and the leper, after Jesus had released them from their repressed 
situations, for the first time in the Bible,their voices are heard. For the first time, we hear 
the silenced voice of Zaccheus: “But Zaccheus stood up and said to the Lord, ‘Look 
Lord! Here and now I give half of my possessions to the poor.” In the case of the leper, 
although Jesus had asked him not to tell anyone about his healing except the priest; 
“However, as soon as the man went out, he began spreading the news everywhere.” From 
their individual experiences of the Lord in their own unique situations, they have a story 
to narrate which must not be silenced. This is what the relational and liberative 
hospitality of God is about. Joachim Jeremias writes, “The inclusion of sinners in the 
community of salvation, achieved in table-fellowship, is the most meaningful expression 
of the message of the redeeming love of God.”134 This redeeming or liberative love of 
God expressed through the hospitality of Jesus aims at the restitution of such excluded, 
silenced groups and persons who deserved to be recognized and heard. In this way, the 
inclusive hospitality of Jesus is subversive and condemnatory of the structures of 
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oppression and repression.         
 Furthermore, it is the same point that is underscored in the parable of the great 
banquet organized by a king for his son. In this parable, Jesus aims to dismantle the social 
structures that perpetuate the ignoring of those who are already marginalized and 
subalternized by society. Hence, the poor, the crippled, the lame, the blind who were 
among the oppressed and marginalized in the world of ancient Judaism were all brought 
in to partake of the meal (cf. Lk 14:15-24; Matt 22:1-14). In this parable, Jesus relativizes 
all classificatory structures that denigrate, ignore, and stifle the epistemic potentials of the 
repressed and excluded. The margins are at last given the chance to become visible to 
reclaim their equality-in-difference in the kingdom fellowship. Jesus’ hospitality here 
entails a dethroning of the system of domination. In all these instances, Jesus 
demonstrates by his actions and words that the hospitality of God does not exclude 
anyone; that the margins constitute a privileged place of divine irruption that should be 
recognized and heard.  
This point is further orchestrated in Jesus’ encounter with the Samaritan woman at 
the well. The Hebrew people treated the Samaritans as despised aliens who do not 
possess the God of Israel. Plus, she was also a woman (who had no place in the scheme 
of things in the society). But Jesus as the one empowered by the relational Spirit 
dismantled the barriers of both ethnic and male chauvinism and reached out to the 
Samaritan and extended God’s hospitality to her (Jn 4:1-42). After her experience of 
Jesus in her situation, for the first time, her voice was given vocality and hearing as she 
told the whole town the gospel about Jesus. Jesus unsubjugated and lifted her from 
marginality to the foreground. Again, in the parable of the Good Samaritan, Jesus 
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projected the Samaritan as the one who acted as a true neighbor to the stranger robbed, 
beaten, and left half dead. The story of the kindness and hospitality of the Good 
Samaritan by Jesus is aimed at condemning the social and religious structures and 
institutions that perpetuated exclusion and repression. For the sake of purity of tradition 
and ritual cleanness, the priest and Levite ignored an act of kindness to a half-dead man 
when he most needed assistance and support. For the sake of purity of tradition, those 
viewed as outsiders are often ignored and excluded. At worst, they are thematized and 
totalized by being reduced into the regime of sameness. Indeed, purity of tradition, if 
there is such a thing, is an illusion of ideological and totalitarian systems. Is it any 
surprise that in the name of pure Christian tradition, authentic canon, translation, and 
interpretation, the epistemic potentials and voices of the already silenced subalterns have 
continued to be silenced today? Goodness, kindness, excellent cultural values and 
treasures, can also be learned from the subaltern, the outsider as typified by the Good 
Samaritan. No one person, group, or tradition has a monopoly of goodness and truth. 
God’s grace and gift of holiness is not limited to any one particular group of people or 
tradition. This invites pluriversality and a plurality of traditions that allows for the voices 
of the silenced, the values of subjugated and subalternized epistemic locations, to be 
foregrounded, legitimized, and heard. Therefore, God’s hospitality as embodied by 
Jesus—the one anointed and empowered by the Spirit—is inclusive, subversive, and 
prophetic. Its inclusion of those denigrated, marginalized, and oppressed by the 
entrenched forces that seek to impoverish their dignity means that true hospitality is life-
giving and life-affirming. Its prophetic stance seeks to subvert, to challenge, to 
overthrow, and to transform whatever structures that generate oppression, exclusion, and 
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thwart human dignity. In this sense, hospitality is also liberative and redemptive.  
 It is in the light of scenes as the ones just pointed out that Jesus would begin to get 
into conflicts with the domination system. The increasing conflict between Jesus—on 
account of his  inclusive, interpellatory, and prophetic hospitality—and the entrenched 
powerful forces that ruled his world climaxed in the crucifixion. He was murdered for 
daring to be in solidarity of subalterns and for speaking from the wound of colonial 
difference and subalternity, when he should be silent. He was killed for not preserving the 
oppressive and suppressive religious practices of the system of purity and holiness.
135
 
Indeed, the cross is the height of Jesus’ hospitality to and solidarity of the margins where 
he gave the superabundant and supreme gift of himself for their sake. On the cross, Jesus 
ends the circle of economy of exchange and indebtedness. On the cross he ultimately 
dissipated himself completely for others to the point of giving his own life in their place. 
But before he suffered, Jesus dramatized and sacramentalized this immeasurable self-gift 
as a testimony of his credible love and friendship in the Eucharist. Let me now talk a little 
bit on the Eucharist in relation to hospitality.        
4.7.1 The Eucharist and Hospitality      
 In the Eucharist and on the cross, Jesus proved, contra Derrida, that unconditional 
and unlimited gift giving and hospitality is an impossible possibility since God makes the 
impossible possible. In a sense, the Eucharist as the sacrament of Jesus’ gratuitous total 
self-gift for the salvation of the community is the highest form of hospitality and 
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friendship. Greater love has no one than to give his life for his friends (cf. Jn 15:13). The 
Derridean standpoint with regard to the impossibility of the gift and hospitality because 
they are unpresentable and unrealizable within the parameters of historico-temporal 
determinacy is precisely what is made present in the Eucharist. The Eucharist is the 
sacrament of Jesus’ love, hospitality, and friendship. Both as sacramentalized in the 
Eucharist and as enacted on the cross, the hospitality and friendship of Jesus are not left 
as abstract absolutes but are actually mediated and made concrete in history without 
diminution or reduction to the regime of economy. The notion of gift with regard to the 
divine is one with a profound theological import. Theologically, divine gift is another 
name for grace. And by nature, grace is that which is a “non-value,” a “non-worth,” a 
“non-object,” or that which is unquantifiable, incalculable, immeasurable, ungraspable, 
and always excess. That is why grace is said to be constituted by gratuitousness and 
graciousness. It is gratuitous because given free of charge and gracious because 
unlimited. God’s self-gift as grace (non-object) means that the transcendent-immanent, 
the absent-present God, is nothing of what is. It is precisely because God is nothing of 
what is, that God must “become.” God continues to become but never arrives, never 
reducible to a finished-product which would amount to objectification. Because God 
continues to become, he becomes through a symbolic or iconic body in which to presence 
himself without being identical with the icon. The icon becomes only a translucent mirror 
through which God presences by gradually saturating it without being consigned to the 
measure of our gaze on the icon as in the case of an idol.
136
 The historical Jesus from 
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Nazareth is thus the Ursakrament (original or primordial sacrament) who iconizes God 
and through whom God becomes body. In the Eucharist God continues to become but 
never finishes coming. Through the Eucharistic double epiclesis, the bread (gift of the 
earth and work of human hands) and the assembled community, become the body of 
Christ. In the Eucharist, God continues to become both cosmic and human body. The 
God who is distant and absent is the one who is near and presences in the Eucharist. 
Since it is the Spirit who edifies the church, the sacraments of the church including the 
Eucharist, are both gift and grace of the Holy Spirit.
137
    
 Again, as the Messiah, Jesus’ relationship to others is not about conquest and 
domination as it is about liberation, subversion, and transformation of unjust social and 
religious structures that diminish life. During the Last Supper, when Jesus instituted the 
Eucharist in the power of the Spirit, after washing the feet of the disciples, in a long 
discourse, Jesus spoke his final words to them concerning his impending death, the 
coming of the Spirit, and how they are to live and relate to one another. In a very moving 
way, Jesus calls his followers, “friends” especially because of the openness in his 
relationship with them. He did not hide from them anything he has learned from the 
Father. Relationality, hospitality, and friendship, require that openness and honesty exist 
between parties engaged in a relationship in the recognition of their equality-in-
difference. In genuine friendship, self-sacrifice for the sake of one’s friend rather than 
totalization is key to lasting relationships. Because he regards his followers as his friends, 
Jesus could say “Greater love has no one than this, that he lay down his life for his 
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friends” (Jn 15:13). Jesus chose the disciples and also elevated them to the level of 
friends. What friends do for each other is self-emptying for the sake of the other. This is 
what Jesus commands his friends to do: “‘You are my friends if you do what I 
command.’ ‘My command is this: Love each other as I have loved you’” (Jn 15:14,12). 
He loved by his willingness to lay down his life for their sake. Thus, the friendship that 
Jesus recommends for his followers is one that is self-sacrificial and non-totalizing. 
Jesus’ example is, therefore, meant to teach the disciples the radicality of God’s relational 
engagement with humanity as one of friendship. This is the pattern and vision the 
followers of Jesus are to imitate in their relations to others. They are to relate and engage 
others who also are God’s friends especially those at the margins, including non-
Christians on the model of friendship and hospitality. Jesus’ hospitality and friendship 
constitute the model and the condition of possibility for Christian hospitality and 
friendship.           
 The reality of the Eucharist thus grounds our hope and is a spur for our striving 
toward the achieving of unconditional gift and hospitality. Jesus’ self-gift in the Eucharist 
symbolized by material bread and wine is a sign that God’s hospitality cares about and 
takes seriously what happens to the human person (who is a composite of body, soul, and 
spirit with intellectual, intuitional, emotive, psychological, and other dimensions). Jesus 
gave his life that the community may be saved. But then, God’s gracious self-gift in 
Christ, is both a gratuity and a task. It challenges and calls us to express God’s hospitality 
not only toward others (by flourishing the life of all and eliminating all unjust and death-
dealing institutions) but also toward all of God’s creation and our environment.138 In the 
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gift of the Eucharist, we also become the “flesh of Christ” in order to share intimately in 
the situations and struggles of those who are being oppressed, silenced, and subalternized 
by social structures and to bring them release (aphesis) as Jesus did.   
 To carry out this task of hospitality, the church is totally dependent on the Spirit. 
As Thomas Hughson writes, “Invoking the Spirit expresses and enacts a constitutive and 
constant dependence of the eucharistic community and presider on the Spirit for the 
transformation of the gifts, no less than the institution narrative expresses and manifests 
continuity with Christ’s words and acts at the Last Supper.”139 The Eucharistic epiclesis 
thus displays the nature of the church as one which is constitutively and constantly 
dependent on the Spirit in ever-new fidelity to Christ. Hence, the Spirit empowers the 
members of the Eucharistic community as the body of Christ with gifts to bear witness to 
the hospitality of God embodied in the Eucharist. The gifts of the Spirit are for creativity, 
for service to others, and for building up the community. Since all have been gifted, 
hospitality requires that these gifts (whether of individuals, groups, or local traditions, 
etc.) be recognized and not subjugated and silenced. This means that the Spirit is not a 
possession of the church as a piece of property. Nor is the Spirit merely at the disposal of 
the church as its divine assistant, albeit, the church “can and may ask for the coming of 
the Holy Spirit and can be certain that this plea will be heard.”140 But always, the church 
“exists and acts in all aspects and dimensions in radical dependence on the somewhat 
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unpredictable action of the Spirit…”141       
 The Eucharist is reconciliatory by nature. It reconciles us to one another as 
members of the one body and to God. As Paul puts it, “But now in Christ Jesus, you who 
once were far away have been brought near through the blood of Christ. For he himself is 
our peace, who…has destroyed the barrier, the dividing wall of hostility [which separated 
us]” (Eph 2:13-15). Furthermore, “He destroyed hatred and reconciled us…to God 
through the cross, making…[us] one body” (Eph 2:16). With all this in mind, Paul then 
underscores an all important point: “consequently, you are no longer foreigners and 
aliens, but fellow citizens with God’s people and members of God’s household” (Eph 
2:19). In the power of the Spirit, Eucharistic hospitality builds relationships across 
differences making it possible for all to feel welcomed in God’s household. The Spirit 
who accomplishes the Eucharist is thus the power “of fluidity that permeates or 
circumnavigates the barricades of impossibility we erect.”142 In the Eucharist we are built 
into a community, a fruitful communion that honors equality-in-difference. As a 
community built out of equality-in-difference, it requires that no person’s charisms or 
group cultural values and local epistemologies be subjugated and subalternized by a 
regime of the coloniality of power. The relational Universal Spirit who blows where she 
wills and bestows gifts freely is also present and actively at work in the region of colonial 
difference where border thinking takes place.     
 It is the relational Spirit who makes it possible for us to crisscross the boundaries 
of our differences and engenders understanding across differences. This is exactly the gift 
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that the Spirit bestowed on the church on the day of Pentecost. The Spirit’s gift of 
polyglossia at Pentecost shattered the imperialistic and totalizing monolingualism of 
Babel and restored the beauty of pluriversality to its rightful place (Acts 2:1-18). With the 
gift of polyglossiaat Pentecost, the Spirit empowers the church to welcome pluriversality 
by creating space for macronarratives and fostering equality-in-difference. Indeed, it was 
this marvel of plurilanguagism by the Spirit at Pentecost that jolted the church into 
mission ad gentes. The challenges and opportunities which difference presents become 
for the church through the power of the Spirit always an occasion for coming to a new 
understanding through constant rereading of the Bible, translation, and reinterpretation. 
Any claim to a static authentic interpretation with a universal application irrespective of 
distinct local histories and situated lived experiences becomes not only ideological but 
reinscribes and supports the totalizing discourse of the coloniality of power. The tongues 
of fire of the Pentecostal Holy Spirit are many and pluriversal. When the tongues of fire 
rested on each of the disciples, filled with the Holy Spirit, they began to speak other 
languages as the Spirit enabled them to speak. Everyone in the crowd consisting of 
diverse groups from the different parts of the world who heard them were excited because 
each heard them speaking and proclaiming in their own native language, what God, the 
Savior does. A hermeneutic of hospitality as an imperative of the relational Spirit’s 
economy of abundance (a plurality of gifts for many and different Christian practices and 
services for the good of others and the world) thus upends the spiral of the economy of 
exchange and indebtedness. As members of the body of Christ and as those who become 
the Eucharistic body of Christ through the epiclesis of the Spirit, we, and the church, 
continue to be gifted by the relational Spirit for hospitality and friendship.   
  
349 
 
4.8 Hospitality and Eschatology     
 Already we have established that Christian hospitality which entails a 
transformative encounter with the stranger is an imperative of the relational Spirit. The 
same Spirit who anointed and empowered Jesus to be the embodiment of God’s abundant 
and inclusive hospitality also empowered the church at Pentecost to participate in and 
embody divine hospitality in its relations to others. Through the life, death, resurrection, 
and ascension of Jesus, the reign of God has already been inaugurated while awaiting its 
eschatological fulfillment. The relational Spirit poured out on Pentecost makes 
participation in God’s hospitality possible. The church bears witness to this possibility 
through its hospitable practices toward those usually considered outsiders by working out 
their release from what oppresses and silences them.
143
    
 The imperative of the Spirit to bear witness to God’s hospitality reminds the 
church of the need to be open to pluriversality of macronarratives and to the dignity of 
equality-in-difference in a World Christianity today. The church can still carry out its 
mission without necessarily reducing everyone to the regime of the same through the 
coloniality of power (which would involve doing violence to subaltern local histories and 
epistemologies through totalization). As we noted earlier, the impossibility of absolute 
and pure hospitality is what has been made possible in Jesus and in his gift of the 
Eucharist. For the church, however, hospitality as embodied in the Eucharist remains an 
eschatological ideal and a lure as the church continually and anticipatorily strives toward 
the eschaton in its historical situatedness and particularity. While presently inhabiting the 
“in-between” of the eschatological tension, the church and the members of the body of 
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Christ are challenged to ceaselessly and unflinchingly witness to the eschatological but 
liberative hospitality of God concretized in the work of peace, justice, and righteousness 
in a globalized but fragmented world of violence and conflicts. As those who have been 
loved and made friends of God, we are called to join in the divine mutual ecstatic dance 
of love (perichoresis) and propagate divine hospitality in the world. It is in the nature of 
dance to alluring and contagious. An Igbo aphorism puts it succintly: “onye amaghi agba, 
y’ekwewe n’isi” meaning “even if one does not know the dance step, the lure of the dance 
makes one join by nodding one’s head. The relational Spirit ushers us into a divine milieu 
of mutual dance of love in order that we might embody the dance and transform the 
world into the kingdom. By joining in the divine dance, we embody it and continue to 
open it out to the world. Socio-cosmic disharmony results when human beings who are 
not only destined for the Triune dance but who have actually been swept into the dance 
refuse to gyrate according to the rhythm, and instead introduce a counter-rhythm through 
unjust relationships, exploitation, oppression, and repression. Hospitality as a model 
holds enormous promise that is relevant for constructing an African theology that takes 
Africans’ situated lived experiences and histories seriously.     
4.9 Conclusion         
 In this chapter we have examined the importance of the model of hospitality as a 
practical framework for negotiating the boundaries of difference. We investigated the 
nuances which distinguish true and genuine hospitality/friendship from covenant and a 
relationship driven by the desire and quest for self-actualization. From the vantage point 
of its revelatory, interpellatory, and fluid character, hospitality is best enacted in the “in-
between,” in the border or the space of colonial difference where border thinking takes 
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place to unsubjugate subalternized voices and local histories/epistemologies through the 
coloniality of power. It is this understanding that we find behind the practice of 
hospitality by Jesus which climaxed in the complete gift of himself for the salvation of 
others and sacramentalized in the Eucharist. For the church, hospitality is thus both a gift 
and a task. The model of hospitality still holds enormous potential for the transformation 
of imagination that would usher in social transformation especially as it concerns Africa. 
At any rate, hospitality remains an eschatological ideal to which the church strives while 
presently coursing through the tensive eschatological ‘in-between.” 
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Chapter 5 
 
Toward an African Christian Relational Pneumatology: 
Significance for Being Church Today 
 
5.1 Introduction 
  
In the preceding chapters, I have tried to establish from both biblical and Christian 
traditions how the Holy Spirit is the Lord and the Giver of life. It has also been our task 
to seek a reinterpretation and a rearticulation of this confession in a way that allows for 
new understandings of the Holy Spirit in order to elicit its relevance for being church in 
present day Africa in the context of the ambiguities of globalization. In this chapter, we 
will look at the Universal Holy Spirit in the light of the multiplicity of spirits in West 
African world-views in order to gain new understandings about the Spirit. We shall 
examine the mission of the Spirit as distinct from that of Christ in order to focus our 
discussion. Toward constructing an African relational pneumatology, we shall be drawing 
and building on the insights of African Initiated Churches (AICs). The implications of 
this pneumatology for being church in postcolonial Nigeria and Africa today would be 
explored. And finally, we shall investigate a way forward for African theology.  
5.2 The Holy Spirit and Other spirits in the World   
 As the Giver of life, the Spirit of God is the Creator and sustainer of all life forms 
including human life in the world. Not only this, the work of the Spirit in the world also 
entails resisting all life-negating forces that try to diminish and impoverish life. Thus, as 
Lord, the Spirit is the resistant and prophetic power of God for liberation and salvation 
not only from sin but also from all manifestations of the destructive effects of sin 
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particularly as they affect the poor, the marginalized, the oppressed, and the exploited. 
All this is a way of showing how the Spirit of God is involved in and with the world. 
Notwithstanding the fact of her own hypostatic entitative reality, the Holy Spirit is, 
clearly, a way of referring to God’s universal presence and active working in the world. 
As pointed out previously, God is immanent in all things through the Spirit. The Spirit 
who anointed and empowered Jesus for his redemptive work is one and the same as the 
life-giving rûah Elohim who birthed creation into being. Indeed, Jacques Dupuis is right 
when he writes: “The immanent presence of the Holy Spirit is always and in all 
circumstances the reality of God’s saving grace.”1As I had already made clear, we shall 
be using both the personal and impersonal properties in talking about the Personhood of 
the Holy Spirit since the Bible allows for both ways of expression.     
 If the Universal Holy Spirit has been pervasively present in the whole world 
before the incarnation of the divine Logos, how do we make a sense of the awareness of 
the existence of “other spirits” predominant in the spirit-world of other cosmo-religious 
world-views and traditions in the world? Do these “other spirits” have anything to do 
with the Universal Holy Spirit and if so, could they shed a different light on biblical data 
and perhaps challenge the traditional paradigm with regard to our understanding of the 
Spirit’s activity in religions, cultures, and history in general? Or are they mutually 
exclusive and opposed to each other? How can talk about the Holy Spirit become 
meaningful within the context of other “distinctive cultural understandings of ‘spirit’”2 or 
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“spirits” as the case may be?  In what follows, I shall re-examine some materials from the 
Bible and Patristic tradition as well as certain scholarly endeavors that would help us to 
broach an other understanding of the relationship between the Holy Spirit and “other 
spirits.” The goal here is to establish that there exists a precedence in the Bible and early 
tradition with regard to how to construe the relationship between the Holy Spirit and 
other spirits. This approach will be helpful toward an understanding of how it is that the 
Universal Holy Spirit has been actively present and at work in cultures, religions, and 
world-views outside the boundaries of Christianity. It should also be kept in mind that the 
“other spirits” in question here are not to be understood according to the Christian 
conception of “demons” in the sense of spirits opposed to God. Rather, we have in mind 
spirits that are conceived as compatible with (and in some cases as the modalities of) the 
dynamic hierarchy of the Supreme God.        
 In the first place, there is no doubt, according to the Christian confession, that 
Jesus is the definitive revelation of God. However, it is legitimately arguable that Jesus is 
not the exclusive revelation of God. As Gavin D’Costa suggests, “Jesus is called totus 
Deus, never totum Dei; wholly God, but never the whole of God.”3 While Jesus is wholly 
God, he is neither the Father nor the Spirit. Nor is he the entire Trinity personified. God is 
more than the person of Jesus because the Triune God also includes the Persons of the 
Father and the Spirit. Jesus as the definitive revealer of the Father—whom no one has 
ever seen—is the Way and the one who leads us to the Father in the Spirit: “Whoever 
sees me sees the Father” (Jn 14:9).  But such revelation “is never completely exhausted in 
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history.”4 As Jesus says to his disciples, “I still have many things to tell you, but you 
cannot bear them now. When he, the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into the 
whole truth” (Jn 16:12). Again, as I indicated in Chapter 2, albeit Jesus is the definitive 
revelation of God insofar as the incarnation is concerned (in that there would not be a 
second incarnation), but precisely as the eikon of God, this revelation cannot be 
exhausted in history by the church at any time. Therefore, in spite of the definitive self-
disclosure of God in Jesus, the complexity of such revelation invites the awareness that 
God still maintains his mysterious and hidden quality as well as his distance and 
otherness from humans even in the person of Jesus Christ. Besides, it is also legitimate to 
say that the particularity and historicity of the humanity of Jesus from Nazareth in all its 
Jewishness could not have exhausted all about the divine pre-Incarnate Logos. 
Consequently, no single or particular group of traditions, neither Jewish, Greco-Roman, 
nor African can completely appropriate the holy mystery that God is. It is through the 
universality and pervasive presence of the Spirit, blowing where she wills (Jn 3:8), that 
she “constantly and in surprising ways calls us into deeper understanding of God in 
Christ.”5 The Spirit plays this role, albeit, without focusing attention on herself. The 
Spirit is rather the light in which we see light. It is in the Spirit that we see, know, and 
have access to Christ and through him (Christ) to the Father. The Spirit is indeed our true 
access to the Triune God. Thus, as the Lord and Giver of Life, it is the relational Spirit 
who creates, empowers, and relates to each creature, “bringing each [and all creation] 
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into communion with the Trinity.”6 In order to gain some helpful understanding about the 
relationship between the Holy Spirit and “other spirits” particularly in Etche -West 
African cosmo-religious universe, let us first examine the church’s emergent 
understanding with regard to the presence and operation of the Universal Holy Spirit in 
the world and in non-Christian religions.     
5.2.1 Vatican II and Beyond: The Church’s Emergent Understanding                              
        of the Universal Spirit  
     
When, in his December 25, 1961 apostolic constitution, Humanae salutis (Of 
Human Salvation), pope John XXIII set out to convoke Vatican II, he set the tone and 
tenor of the council within the horizon of “a new Pentecost.” In the prayer dedicated to 
the opening of the council, the pope made a plea to the Holy Spirit: “Renew your 
wonders in our time, as though for a new Pentecost.”7 With this plea, the entire 
proceedings and outcomes of the council were placed under the horizon and influence of 
the Spirit with an abiding trust that the Holy Spirit would not fail to direct the 
deliberations and orientations of the general councils. This plea appears to be grounded in 
the enduring belief that the Spirit unceasingly brings about newness. Hence, the prayer 
for a new Pentecost was not merely a plea for a repetition of the original event but 
stemmed from a conviction that Pentecost is ongoing. Therefore, John XXIII had in 
mind, unlike previous councils, a council whose preoccupation would not simply be 
definition of dogmas and clarification of disciplines. This approach, to be sure, did not 
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emanate from any disdain for dogma, doctrine, or church discipline. Rather, taking their 
validity for granted, the pope envisioned a pastoral council for the renewal/reform 
(aggiornamento) in the self-understanding of the church and its relations to its otherness 
in the light of new conditions and “signs of the times” in the modern world that is both 
historical and natural. Through the invocation for a new Pentecost, the pope placed this 
vision of aggiornamento under the domain of the Spirit’s sway and leadership with the 
realization that the Spirit is the protagonist and agent of newness and renewal.  
 But in spite of the preponderant attention given to the Spirit in the beginning and 
all through the council, precisely as not a dogmatic council, there was not a dogmatic and 
systematic treatment of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Although, references to the Holy 
Spirit appear at least 258 times in the entire gamut of the council documents, such sheer 
enumeration does not, in and of itself, according Yves Congar, yield a conciliar 
Pneumatology.
8
 Out of the 16 conciliar documents, Congar, however, goes on to identify 
six of what he calls “elements of true pneumatology that were present at the Second 
Vatican Council.”9 They include: (1) the Christological reference to the Spirit as the 
Spirit of Christ; (2) the communal structure of the church serves Christ’s Spirit; (3) a 
trinitarian view of the economy of creation and grace; (4) the Spirit as source of charisms, 
renewal, and coinstitutive of the church; (5) the Spirit as the principle of the communion 
of local churches; and (6) a certain recognition of the Spirit already active in history 
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before the recapitulation in Christ.
10
       
 Of particular interest to us is the last element mentioned by Congar. In several 
places in different documents, the council speaks, for instance, of the Spirit of the Lord 
“who fills the whole earth;”11 “who directs the unfolding of time and renews the face of 
the earth, and who is not absent from this development;”12 who “was at work in the world 
before Christ was glorified;”13 and “who works on man and turns him toward God.”14 
Additionally, the council developed some positive view of other religions and cultures as 
containing “elements of truth and grace,” and hence can be salvific.15 In keeping with this 
positive attitude, the church vouches to reject “nothing of what is true and holy in these 
religions;”16 and exhorts Christians that, “while witnessing to their own faith and way of 
life, [they should] acknowledge, preserve and encourage the spiritual and moral truths 
found among non-Christians, also their social life and culture.”17But one thing, however, 
remains important to be noted.  In spite of this positive outlook and recognition of the 
presence of grace and truth in the beliefs, rituals, religious sense, human values, virtuous 
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practices, treasures of wisdom, hospitable and moral living of other religions which guide 
their adherents to God, the council still views them as merely partial, temporary, and, 
therefore, defective. For the council, regardless of all of these fruits and values which can 
only be attributed to the active presence of the Universal Spirit, the other religions, as 
preparations for the Gospel, are only straining and reaching toward their true completion 
and fulfillment in Christianity and more precisely, in the one church (Roman Catholic) of 
Christ. In other words, according to this fulfillment model which provided the gestalt for 
the council’s thinking, unknown to these religions and their adherents, is the assumption 
that the presence of elements of truth and grace in them ultimately comes from Christ and 
orient them toward the one church of Christ. This reservation on the part of the church 
comes to expression in one of the conciliar documents on the Pastoral Constitution on the 
Church in the Modern World: “For since Christ died for all people, and since the ultimate 
vocation of the human race is in fact one, and divine, we ought to believe that the Holy 
Spirit in a manner known only to God offers to every person [including non-Christians] 
the possibility of being associated with this paschal mystery.”18 This positive 
acknowledgement on the part of the church that “the Holy Spirit [who] in a manner 
known only to God,” invisibly but actively offers grace in all peoples and religions, 
points, at least implicitly to the possibility of salvation for people outside the boundaries 
of the church’s word, sacrament, and apostolic ministry. This is also in connection with 
the universal salvific will of God. But after all is said and done, the council’s thinking 
shaped by the fulfillment model still maintains that the presence of saving mystery and 
grace to all peoples (and far less explicit, to all religions) remains the saving mystery of 
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Christ requiring the necessity of the church (Catholic) as the ordinary means of salvation. 
What this comes down to, according to this theory, is that the elements of truth and grace 
present in the “others” and their religio-cultural traditions are already found in 
Christianity and superabundantly in the Catholic Church. Put another way, there is 
nothing fundamentally different or new in these “others” that is not already found in 
superabundance in the church. This appears to be the much that the council could 
cautiously say with regard to the Universal Spirit of God who fills the whole world and is 
thus, present and active in non-Christian religions. Postconciliar theology, nonetheless, 
developed a greater sensitivity toward the “others” and their religio-cultural traditions. 
Along this line, Karl Rahner’s influence which contains a seminal insight, among others, 
remains pivotal though not without its own pitfalls. The shape of Rahner’s argument 
looks like this:      
Given that human beings are not pure individual spirits but embodied spirits 
 -in-the-world with a social nature, all their relationships are mediated throu- 
 gh the structures present in their society at any historical moment. The same  
 holds true for relationship with God. It is quite unthinkable that salvation   
 could be achieved as a private, interior reality outside of the religious bodies 
 in the environment in which people live. Since experience of the divine is  
 embodied in the creeds, rituals, and moral codes of religious traditions, these 
 concrete religions necessarily become the mediation of salvation in various 
 cultures.
19
          
  
This Rahnerian approach, on all counts, expresses a deeper sensitivity toward the 
“others” and their traditions. It amounts to a seminal but significant and real 
acknowledgement of the reality of religious pluralism. However, it is not as innocent as it 
seems. For what forms the infrastructure with regard to Rahner’s edifice is the “inclusive 
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presence of Christ” model. Thus, in spite of his remarkable insight and apparent openness 
to the otherness of other religions, Rahner could not disentangle himself from what has 
come down as the requirement of the invested central affirmation of the Christian faith. 
This key affirmation is conceived as the mystery of the uniqueness of Jesus Christ as the 
universal Savior of all humankind. For Rahner, this mystery is already operative in all 
religions such that members of other religions are saved in Christ, albeit, not despite but 
through their own religious practice and belief. Precisely as the epitome of embodied 
spirit par excellence via the incarnation, the movement of God toward humanity and of 
human transcendentality toward God finds its climatic expression in Jesus Christ who is 
mysteriously present in every religion. Because this human transcendentality toward God, 
according to Rahner’s transcendental theological anthropology, is an existential condition 
in which it is created, all human persons are caught up in a “supernatural existential” 
transcendence toward union with God. This movement toward union with God is not the 
result of a natural desire or search, or for that matter, a yearning for God. Rather, it is 
created by God freely and graciously in the human person and destined for God. 
Consequently, Rahner opines that all human beings—who may not become Christians 
through the gospel, sacrament, and apostolic ministry—are saved by Christ the universal 
Savior, even if it is unknown to them. They are already “anonymous Christians” since all 
other religions are “anonymous Christianity” because of the grace of the inclusive 
presence of Christ that is universally operative in them.
20
 Consequently, Rahner’s 
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position becomes susceptible to the charge of inclusivism.   
 However, along this line of profounder sensitivity as found in Postconciliar 
theology, the singular contribution of Pope John Paul II remains outstanding. More than 
any other pope before him, John Paul II—in what appears as an unprecedented 
endorsement as well as a real and important advance—emphatically “affirms the 
operative presence of the [Universal] Spirit of God in the religious life of non-Christians 
and the religious traditions to which they belong.”21 Following the path of the 
achievements and insights of his two predecessors (John XXIII mediately and Paul VI 
immediately), John Paul II, in his first encyclical, Redemptoris Hominis,set for his 
pontificate, inter alia, the goal of unity and dialogue among Christians and with non-
Christians. With regard to the latter (non-Christians), the pope acknowledges in no 
uncertain terms the operative presence of the Spirit of truth in the “firm belief” of the 
other religions when he asks:         
Does it not sometimes happen that the firm belief of the followers of the   
 non—Christian religions—a belief that is also an effect of the Spirit of   
 truth operating outside the visible confines of the Mystical Body—can  
 make Christians ashamed at being often themselves so disposed to doubt  
 concerning the truths revealed by God and proclaimed by the Church and  
 so prone to relax moral principles and open the way to ethical permissive-  
                                                                                                                                                 
temporary, and so defective blind human yearning and search for God which only finds fulfillment in 
Christianity through Christ in whom God is revealed in person requiring the obedience of faith. Whereas 
the latter, on the contrary, views the human yearning for God as not merely natural and the result of human 
effort but already as a graced and supernatural existential condition. In other words, there can never be any 
human search for God that is not always already initiated by God and constitutes God’s self-
communication or self-gift to all human persons regardless of whether they know it or not, and whether or 
not they respond to it or welcome it. It is already by and in giving himself that God initiates the process of 
his being sought by the human being. For more detail, seeDupuis, Christianity and the Religions, 52-55. 
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 ness?
22
           
   
This affirmation of the operative presence of the Spirit of truth in the “firm belief” of the 
other religions became recurrent in John Paul’s numerous speeches, writings, and even 
prayers. Appropriating the texts of John 3:8 which speaks about the Spirit who “blows 
where he wills;” and Romans 8:26 where Paul speaks about the Holy Spirit who prays in 
us, respectively, the Pope underlines that every authentic prayer both of Christians and 
non-Christians is inspired by the same Spirit of the same living God even when, for 
some, this God is the great Unknown.  According to him, “We trust that wherever the 
human spirit opens itself in prayer [even] to this Unknown God, an echo will be heard of 
the same Spirit who, knowing the limits and weakness of the human person, himself 
prays in us and on our behalf, ‘expressing our plea in a way that could never be put into 
words’ (Rom 8:26).”23 Again, in his address to the members of the Roman curia on 
December 22, 1986, in the wake of the October 17, 1986 World Day of Prayer for Peace 
held at Assisi, the pope alluded to the mystery of unity of all of humankind grounded in 
creation and redemption. Accordingly, that unity which cuts across differences and 
divisions was palpably manifested during the Day and in the atmosphere of authentic 
Prayer. For the pope then, every authentic prayer always takes place under the influence 
and within the horizon of the Spirit. He thus submits: “We can indeed maintain that every 
authentic prayer is called forth by the Holy Spirit, who is mysteriously present in the 
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heart of every person.”24 But the pope did not simply stop at this. Perhaps working under 
the assumption that what appears to be new doctrinal statements or teachings do not 
necessarily revoke their antecedents, John Paul II’s deeper sensitivity to the presence and 
operation of the Universal Holy Spirit of God is still seen to be undergirded by the 
fulfillment matrix, nevertheless. Hence he maintains, “The intercession of the Spirit of 
God who prays in us and for us is the fruit of the mystery of the redemption of Christ, in 
which the all-embracing love of the Father has been shown to the world.”25 There is, 
however, a certain pay off in all this. From the new growing positive attitude, a clearer 
teaching is beginning to emerge in which the church understands and recognizes, at least 
to a certain extent, that the Holy Spirit is not only universally present in the world and 
actively at work in every human being, and, therefore, in members of other religions, but 
also “in the other religious traditions themselves.”26     
 This emerging understanding is given its clearest and most explicit articulation in 
the encyclical of John Paul II on the Holy Spirit, Dominum et Vivificantem (given May 
18, 1986). Here, the pope most explicitly refers to the universal dispensation of the Holy 
Spirit which is not limited to the two thousand plus years since the birth of Christ. Rather, 
it embraces “the whole action of the Holy Spirit even before Christ—from the beginning, 
throughout the world….”27Accordingly, this prevenient action of the Holy Spirit “has 
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been exercised, in every place and at every time, indeed in every individual.”28 The wind 
which blows where it wills, “reminds us of the Holy Spirit’s activity also ‘outside the 
visible body of the church.’”29 And once more, the leitmotif of the presence and activity 
of the Universal Spirit is referred to in the encyclical, Redemptoris Missio {henceforth 
RM (given December 7, 1990)}. Here again, with crystal clarity, the pope speaks of the 
special manifestation of the Spirit in the church and its members but whose presence and 
operation is not limited to the visible boundaries of the church. Rather, the Spirit’s 
“presence and activity are universal, limited neither by space nor time…. The Spirit…is 
at the very source of the human person’s existential and religious questioning which is 
occasioned not only by contingent situations but by the very structure of its being. The 
Spirit’s presence and activity affect not only individuals but also society and history, 
peoples, cultures and religions.”30 And even more explicitly, through the Universal Spirit, 
the pope says God “does not fail to make himself present in many ways, not only to 
individuals, but also to entire peoples through their spiritual riches, of which their 
religions are the main and essential expression.”31      
 It remains to be said that despite this emerging, and indeed what appears as a 
blossoming understanding concerning the affirmation of the universal presence and 
activity of the Holy Spirit not simply in the members of non-Christian religions but also 
in the religious traditions themselves, the guiding frame of thought remains the 
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fulfillment model. In fact, this framework is even made most explicit in John Paul II’s 
apostolic letter, Tertio Millennio Adveniente (henceforth TMA), in which he 
unmistakably states: “Christ is thus the fulfillment of the yearning of all the world’s 
religions and, as such, he is their sole and definitive completion.”32 This same framework 
is also the organizing principle in the document jointly issued by the Pontifical Council 
for Interreligious Dialogue and the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples, 
captioned “Dialogue and Proclamation: Reflections and Orientations on Interreligious 
Dialogue and the Proclamation of the Gospel of Jesus Christ” (May 19, 1991). More still, 
the paradigm is even acutely discernible in the Congregation for the Doctrine of the 
Faith’s declaration, Dominus Iesus (2000), which among other things, maintains the 
unicity of Christ as the only universal Savior; that the Holy Spirit does not work 
salvifically in the other religions apart from Christ; and emphasizes all the more the 
gravely deficient situation of non-Christian religions objectively speaking.  
 After all is said and done, the question remains: “why the other religions in the 
first place?” The answer may not simply be a facile recourse to the Barthian musing that 
they are merely “beliefs” because of the incommensurable human search for God as 
opposed to “faith” which is the obedient response to God’s free self-revelation in Christ. 
Is it possible to also recognize in the other religious traditions something of divine 
initiative toward human beings without necessarily subsuming it under the central 
affirmation of the Christian “way” as the only way of salvation and union with God? Can 
God not freely draw all kinds of different people to himself by all sorts of different routes 
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apart from the Christian way? We may be overconfident that we already have the secured 
roadmap to the divine, but what if, and rightly so, the subalternized and the space of 
subalternity (the religions and religious others) also constitute a site of divine revelation? 
And if so, how do we measure how much of divine presence is there and from whose 
norm? Whose perspective? By the way, if the Spirit is at the very source of all human 
persons’ existential and religious questioning (search), as John Paul II accedes in RM, 
how could it be said at the same time that such search and questioning is a blind human 
search for God (that is, merely human effort and initiative) as the pope seems to underline 
in TMA?
33
 This is not only illogical and inconsistent, but a contradictio in terminus: 
something cannot be and not be at the same time. Again, if there are elements of truth and 
grace, as well as spiritual riches understood as fruits of the Universal Spirit through 
which God, in many ways, makes himself present in other religions, does not the verdict 
that they are gravely deficient amount to contempt for God who freely chooses to make 
himself present in those manifold ways? There is no gainsaying that there are not two 
economies, one of Christ, and another, of the Spirit, but one single economy of 
redemption. Yet in that one economy of redemption initiated by the Father, there is 
manifest and operative real difference and not only unity between the mission of Christ 
and the mission of the Spirit. An exploration of this pneumatological real difference 
perhaps may be useful to theologically account for God’s activity in other religious 
traditions without necessarily subsuming it under the horizon of Christianity as the 
paradigms of both “anonymous Christianity” and “fulfillment” are wont to suggest. 
Perhaps it is pertinent to stress that the view represented by the above two theories savor 
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“too much of religiocultural imperialism in claiming for Christianity all that is good in 
other religions.”34 In any case, a significant development that is right on the mark, at 
least, is the emergent recognition by the church of the universal presence and activity of 
the Spirit of God outside the boundaries of the church and not only in individuals but also 
in non-Christian religious traditions, in their firm beliefs, and cultures. Let me now, in the 
following section, talk a little bit moreabout the explicit proprium and mission of the 
Spirit as distinct from that of Christ.        
5.3 The Pneumatological Difference in the Mission of the Spirit 
 There is no question that in the aftermath of such historical experiences with 
Montanism, Joachim of Fiore, and Reformation, the Catholic Church has always been 
apprehensive of any attempts to emphasize the distinctness between the missions of 
Christ and Spirit. As the church views such emphasis as a potential source of division and 
proliferation in the one body of Christ, consequently, the economic and ecclesial unity of 
the two missions rather than how they are distinct has been the rule in ecclesial 
statements more so than an exception. In any case, it remains important to stress that 
there are no two economies but a single economy of the salvific will of God. Yet within 
this one economy initiated by the Father, there operates two missions with real and 
internal difference between that of Christ and of the Spirit. Whereas there is inseparable 
communion and complementarity in the Trinity, there is also real distinction and 
otherness which is not a mere mental convention. Thus, the Father is neither the Son nor 
the Spirit; neither is the Spirit the Son. The mission of the Spirit with its temporal effect 
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is different from the mission of the Son with its temporal effect,
35
 albeit the Spirit 
proceeds from the Father through the Son. To minimize the difference between these two 
missions is to do violence to the Trinitarian mystery as the customary insistence on 
economic unity and complementarity of missions not infrequently tend to be easily 
conflated and misunderstood as one divine mission with two aspects.
36
   
 Not only is the Spirit a distinct person from the Son by virtue of origin but there is 
also a difference between the temporal effect of the mission of the Spirit from the 
temporal effect of the mission of the Son. The mission of the Son is in content and shape 
inextricably linked not only to his manner of origin (generation or being begotten of the 
Father) but also to the temporal effect as expressed in the assumed human nature 
(incarnation), and in the whole of Christ’s life, words, deeds, ministry, passion, death, 
resurrection, and ascension into glory at the Father’s right hand. As the definitive and 
explicit climax of revelation in “the salvific economy willed by the One and Triune 
God,”37 the Son’s mission and entry into human life and history in the particularity of 
Jesus of Nazareth is once-and-for-all, unrepeatable, and in that sense, permanent and 
finished. So understood, there can be neither new incarnation nor new paschal mystery. 
But not so with the mission of the Spirit. Whereas the mission of the Spirit in content and 
shape is strongly connected to procession from the Father through the Son, its temporal 
effect is other than incarnation (in the sense of assuming any created reality in the form of 
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a hypostatic union) but expressed in “self-giving presence and personal influence of the 
Spirit in creation and history (emphasis mine).”38 In this sense, the mission of the Spirit 
and its temporal effect remains unfinished, still occurring anew, and not confined or 
physically located in a definitive place since the Spirit keeps blowing wherever she wills. 
This “pneumatological difference underlies and makes possible continual newness 
precisely in and through the temporal effect in the mission of the Spirit—new gifts, 
inspiration of the Scriptures [or its new interpretations], surprising personal inspirations, 
unforeseen communal movements, organized local initiatives in service of neighbors.”39 
Thus, this temporal effect in the mission of the Spirit is so diffused that it is spread out 
and directed to all human persons and not merely to Christians alone (even though it is 
directed most fully to Christians in their communion with Christ and the Father), but to 
the whole creation since the Spirit is universally active at work. Not resting any where, 
not limited or restricted to any definitive place, yet the Spirit acts everywhere through all 
times in all nations, peoples, religions, and cultures. Until the eschaton, the temporal 
effect in the mission of the Spirit is still underway, unfinished, remaining always new and 
renewing.
40
 As part of her role, the Spirit opens up the church to its eschatological future 
bringing about always, the possibility of newness, renewal, and reformation. It is because 
of the ever renewing work of the relational Spirit who leads the church to self-
transcendence and self-criticism that the church can be said to be “ecclesia semper 
reformanda.” It can be argued, therefore, that Jesus and the Spirit do work in diverse and 
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manifold ways within the framework of the unity of the single salvific economy initiated 
by the Father. The Spirit operates salvifically beyond the incarnate Christ before, during, 
and after the hypostatic union. The work of the Spirit in both Christianity and non-
Christian religions may thus be different from, albeit not contradictory, to what Christ did 
or said. There is, therefore, a nonidentity in the missions of Christ and the Spirit, though 
they are complementary.          
 Besides, granted that the Word incarnate is the definitive and most explicit 
revelation of God, yet it is conceivable to hold that the divine Word (Logos) cannot be 
exhaustively identified with what has been revealed through the particularity of the 
historical humanity of Jesus from Nazareth. Through the hypostatic union, the humanity 
of Christ serves the divine Word as an instrument. It is possible then to conceive that the 
Universal Spirit who is not only the Spirit of Christ but also the Spirit of the Father may 
be actualizing different aspects of the one salvific economy initiated by the Father in non-
Christian religions.
41
 Such salvific operation of the Spirit in other religions does not 
contradict what Christ had accomplished. Rather, Christ remains the once-and-for-all 
climax of revelation and the unique and universal Savior of humankind in accordance 
with the Christian faith claim, which, nonetheless, is a valid claim. But it must be pointed 
out that the Universal Spirit has been bestowing gifts, empowerment, and impulses, for 
example, on the likes of Moses, Joshua, David, the prophets; inspiration of Scripture, 
grace and truth in other religions, and so forth, before the incarnation and the paschal 
mystery of Christ. The Spirit did not start bestowing these gifts only after she was sent by 
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Christ post-Ascension to impart the fruits of Christ’s paschal mystery. Indeed, it can be 
said that all God’s salvific activity in the world which is climaxed in the paschal mystery 
of Christ is made possible only in the power of the Holy Spirit. A robust pneumatological 
horizon, therefore, invites respectful and discerning dialogue and solidarity of others as a 
better way for Christianity and the church to bear witness to the gospel of Jesus Christ 
and to the reign of God for the liberating redemption of the world.  Let me now elaborate 
more on the unique mission of the Spirit.       
5.3.1 The Spirit as Communion and as the Agent of Communion  
 As already established in previous chapters, the Spirit is not only the communion, 
the vinculum amoris in the Trinity but also binds the Triune God to creation and to the 
church, as well as the principle of communion and unity among the members (in spite of 
their differences) of Christ’s Body. Also as seen above, the relational Spirit is the 
principle of “beyondness.” As the creator and constructor of personality, the Spirit draws 
human persons beyond themselves in order to give of themselves to others. Jeffrey Vogel 
is right when he writes: “As the agent of communion, the Spirit’s role is…to draw those 
whom he indwells out of their self-enclosure towards others and, ultimately, towards 
God. The Spirit is the source of outgoing motion in them, or the movement itself, 
directing them to God and neighbor.”42 In the past, a lot of emphasis has been placed on 
the hiddenness, the holding back, and the self-effacement of the Spirit to the point of 
forgetfulness of the Spirit as the coequal third hypostasis of the Blessed Trinity. A 
construal of particularly the text in John’s Gospel that the Spirit does not draw attention 
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to herself (cf. Jn 16:12-14) has not too infrequently led to a diminution or limitation of 
the personhood and proprium of the Spirit. In the New Testament, a verb that is often 
used to speak about the movement of the Spirit is ’εκχέω which may mean “out-going,” 
“gushing forth” or “pouring out” onto others (cf. Acts 2:17, 33; 10:45; Tit 3:6). This verb 
depicts the very opposite of self-effacement or holding back. Rather, the Spirit pours 
herself out onto those she indwells, empowering and jolting them into motion oriented 
outward toward others. The gushing-forthness of the Spirit is always other-directed. 
Relationality and movement in an other-directedness is what is enabled by the outpouring 
of the Spirit. According to an interesting and illuminating insight of Kallistos Ware, the 
Spirit is “not so much hidden as transparent.”43 No one can say Jesus is Lord except in 
the Spirit. In the illumination and transparency of the Spirit, Christians experience Christ 
as Lord and recognize others in their full humanity alongside their distinct treasures and 
epistemic potentials. In the transparent light of the Spirit, persons become sensitive and 
attentive to their vision or seeing of others in whom the Spirit brings God into presence. 
In the transparency of the Spirit human beings are oriented toward their fellow humans 
and become attentive to the neighbor in whom God is iconically revealed.    
 Attentiveness or sensitiveness to God which of necessity becomes sensitiveness 
and attentiveness to one’s fellows is what is enabled by the outpouring of the relational 
Spirit. Such sensitiveness engendered by the Spirit enables those she indwells to see God 
in others and others in God. It is the outpouring of the relational Spirit who anointed and 
rested on Christ that enabled him to give himself away completely and to dissipate 
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himself for others even to the point of death. This is what it means to “walk according to 
the Spirit” or to be “in the Spirit” rather than be “in the flesh” in accordance with the 
language of the Apostle Paul (cf. Rom 8:4).       
 Paul often correlates flesh and Spirit as two principles of activity and 
manifestations that interlap in the life of a believer. To walk according to the flesh (kata 
sarka) or to be in the flesh (en sarki) does not simply mean to live a corporeal or bodily 
existence (for even Christ himself did this and took care of people’s bodily needs). 
Rather, it means to focus or limit one’s gaze only on all that flesh means which is a 
domain that is resistant to or rejects God, and by the same token, hostile to all that God 
loves especially fellow human beings. Such fleshly gaze continually and voraciously 
annexes the other to itself by appropriating and objectifying the other. Flesh captures the 
very materiality and historicity of the human condition which inevitably entails 
vulnerability, sinfulness, fallenness, suffering, division, conflict, and mortality. 
Consequently, the flesh leads to death and its works are death-dealing. Among the works 
of the flesh are: idolatry (which is incidentally associated with death and the spilling of 
the blood of innocent victims unjustly), enmity, jealousy, dissension, selfishness, envy, 
and so on (cf. Rom 8: 6, 12-13; Gal 5:19-21). To the mammon and idol of neoliberal 
capitalism is sacrificed the blood of many human victims in the Two-Thirds World 
spilled through unjust and avaricious economic structures, and through other forms 
oppression and subjugation of the poor. By contrast, to walk according to the Spirit or to 
be in the Spirit is to be in filiation or to be united with the Lord. And this filiation, of 
necessity, finds expression in human solidarity and koinonia. Thus, the outpouring and 
indwelling of the Spirit leads to love of and friendship with God as well as with 
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neighbor.To walk according to the Spirit ultimately means life insofar as the Spirit is life 
and as the source of life, gives life (cf. Rom 8:9). As Gustavo Gutiérrez lucidly puts it: 
“To walk according to the Spirit is to reject death (selfishness, contempt for others, 
covetousness, idolatry) and choose life (love, peace, justice). To renounce the flesh and 
live according to the Spirit is to be at the service of God and others.”44 It is to be in an 
abiding state of “vigilant insomnia,”45 to use the language of Emmanuel Levinas, for the 
speech of the face of the neighbor. Therefore, it is in the power of the relational and 
transparent indwelling Spirit that we are able to go beyond ourselves and the proclivities 
of the flesh to not dominate and suppress the subalterns. The Spirit is thus truly the 
principle of communion and reconciliation.       
 Going by the Pauline construal of “the flesh,” we cannot but let our curiosity be 
aroused momentarily with regard to what it means to affirm: “the Word became flesh.” If 
flesh captures that which is fragile, fallen and prone to sin, subject to mortality, and 
resistant to God and to the reconciling activity of the Holy Spirit, how then can we 
continue to affirm that the Word, of all things, became flesh? It must be insisted that this 
affirmation is necessary if the redemptive work of Christ must preserve its significance. 
Such an affirmation points to the self-emptying of the Son of God in becoming flesh and 
thereby identifying completely with and sharing most deeply in the frailties and foibles of 
the human condition.
46
 It is from within rather than from without that he redeemed that 
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fallen condition. The church as the sacrament of Christ is reminded and challenged to be 
the “Flesh of Christ.” That is, the “Word became flesh” invites the church to empty itself 
and prophetically and intimately share in the human condition in the world in all its pain, 
misery, brokenness, sinfulness, conflicts, alienation, and in its subjection to mortality. 
This is even more urgent now because the Spirit has been poured out on all flesh, 
identifying with all humanity in all its differences, defects, poverty, and so forth, in order 
to recreate, liberate, renew, and reconcile it and all of creation with the Triune God. 
Though the Word became flesh without sinning, but the church as the “Flesh of Christ” is 
reminded of its non-hypostatic union with Christ and hence, of its susceptibility to lust, 
weakness, and sin;
47
 and therefore, the need for its continual dependence on the renewing 
power of the Holy Spirit without basking in the euphoria of triumphalism and elitism. 
The church as the “Flesh of Christ Crucified” is a reminder that the church must not be 
aloof but be in sympathetic solidarity with, deeply involved and sharing intimately in the 
agonies of the weak and the beaten in their struggles for justice and liberation from sin 
and all its manifestations. This is the mission and witness to which the relational and 
resistant Spirit has empowered the church to embrace.    
 It is as the relational principle of communion that on the day of Pentecost, the 
Spirit mobilized the church for mission. Quite frequently, the Mystical Body theology 
tends to view the church as a fully-fledged structured reality, though having nascent 
operations, which Jesus simply turned over to the autonomous leadership of the apostles 
under the guidance of his memory. The account of Pentecost in Acts 2, however, presents 
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us with the opposite of such a stance. The church, according to Thomas Hughson, 
“became church only on Pentecost and in this became assistant to, instrument for, and 
acting in dependence on the Spirit.”48 Although certain essential elements were 
potentially present, but before Pentecost the church as such did not yet exist. From 
Pentecost henceforward, however, the church existed and only acted under the power and 
as an instrument for the Spirit. Perhaps I must also not fail to stress that the church and, 
for that matter, Christianity, functions as an instrument for the Spirit only when it serves 
the Holy Spirit rather than silencing the Spirit. This is because it is a historical fact that 
the church, nay, Christianity has sometimes sided with power or through the coloniality 
of power imposed purportedly authentic interpretations on all with total disregard for 
local histories/epistemologies and situated lived experiences. It has also been lamentably 
complicit in intolerance, slavery, colonialism, inquisition, racism, sexism, and other 
sinful acts. On the African turf, the Rwandan genocide is a case in point. Christianity was 
also used to legitimate and defend the heinous, dehumanizing, and segregationist regime 
of apartheid in South Africa. On such sinful occasions, the Christian church (Catholic, 
Protestant, and so forth) cannot be said to be the instrument for the Spirit. When the 
church indulges in these kinds of iniquitous practices, then it defies the paradigm which 
the Holy Spirit reveals in Christ. Beginning with the Incarnation, Christ’s prophetic and 
liberative ministry, the Cross, the Eucharist, and so on, the paradigm is consistent: that 
divine power is expressed in solidarity of the oppressed and suppressed rather than for 
conquest and totalization. It is power for compassion, for love, for healing the wounded 
and broken, for releasing (in the sense of aphesis) the oppressed and lifting up the 
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suppressed, for overcoming sin and its varied manifestations, for prophetically siding 
with and liberating the poor, and not for domination. Obedience to the Spirit in order to 
be instrument for the Spirit requires openness and vulnerability on the part of the church. 
This, among others, is what Christian witness to the divine, hidden in the vulnerable 
humanity of Christ, requires.        
 As already mentioned above, with regard to the institutional structures put in 
place by Christ, he did so in the Spirit in whose power he was conceived and who 
anointed him and empowered his ministry from the beginning to the end. Hence, Christ 
coinstituted those institutional structures with the Spirit. But then, it was only from 
Pentecost onward that:   
the institutional structures Christ and the Spirit coinstituted existed and func- 
 tioned in dependence on and in service of the Holy Spirit. That dependence 
  resulted, of course, in a strengthened christological focus since now they (the
 disciples) adhered to Christ-as-sent-and-sending.
49
 
      
In one final crucial statement, Hughson submits:        
Pentecost and the ensuing mission revealed the whole church in its social,  
 communal reality, including the successors to the apostles and visible mini- 
 stry, as deriving not only from the once-and-for-all life, ministry, teaching,  
 death, and resurrection of Jesus but also in complete, constant dependence in 
 unexpected ways on the mission of the Spirit who acts to provide ever new 
 guidance in service of Christ’s mission.50 
       
This means that the church as a community, in all its activities, both institutional and 
charismatic, is totally dependent on the Holy Spirit. What is required of a church that is 
totally dependent on the Spirit is to always, through careful discernment, recognize where 
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the Spirit is moving or working and join in rather than stifle the stirrings of the Spirit 
through the coloniality of power. Once more, this brings to the fore the significance of 
the epicletic nature of the church as one that confidently invokes the Spirit in order to be 
always faithful in all things.        
 Clearly, Acts 2 portrays a church that from Pentecost onwards, is dependent on 
the mobility of the Spirit for witness and mission. The Spirit opens the church up for 
mission through solidarity and dialogue. On the day of Pentecost, the outpouring of the 
Spirit, without destroying the gift of difference and pluriversality caused everyone to 
rather hear in his or her own native language. This common experience of everybody 
understanding the preaching of the apostles in his or her own native language fostered, 
more than anything else, solidarity among those gathered.  Such solidarity made it 
possible for everyone assembled—strangers, natives, and others—to coexist and 
communicate within such a pluralistic and multicultural context as the Pentecost. Thus, 
we can see from Acts 2 that the Spirit engenders mission and witness in ways that are not 
destructive but respectful of genuine equality-in-difference and pluriversality which in 
turn enrich the Gospel of Christ quite in contrast with the monolingualism of the tower of 
Babel. This is more so because the Universal Spirit is also actively at work in those 
different and diverse cultural and linguistic contexts. As a matter of fact, mission and 
witness entail “finding out where the Holy Spirit is at work and joining in.”51 The 
relational Spirit continues to invite solidarity today as essential in the struggle for justice, 
liberation from dehumanizing oppressions, peaceful and hospitable coexistence, and for 
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witness and mission that is respectful of equality-in-difference in an increasingly 
pluralistic and multicultural but interdependent globalizing world. A fortiori, this need for 
solidarity calls for transformation of imagination in which the other has been constructed, 
objectified, and inferiorized. This call for transformation of imagination is a call to 
conversion, to metanoia by the relational Spirit who calls us to self-transcendence and 
drawing us beyond ourselves to solidarity of others. It is a call to break our 
connivances—whether by commission and especially by omission—with the social and 
religious structures that continue to dehumanize others and sustain unjust situations, and 
to become committed to a resistant and liberating common action that overcomes the 
oppressive status quo, while ensuring that all human persons actualize their destinies and 
all subalternized local histories with their epistemic potentials foregrounded and 
legitimized. Now that we have established the unique mission of the Spirit and her 
Universal Spirit presence and operation in other religious traditions including their firm 
belief and spiritual riches, I shall, at this point, elaborate more on the question of the 
relationship between the Universal Holy Spirit and “other spirits” with particular 
reference to West African spirit-universe and mystical experience.     
5.4 The Universal Holy Spirit and the “other spirits” in       
     West African Mystical Experience 
     
The question of the relationship between God/Holy Spirit and the multiplicity of 
spirits in Etche and other West African weltanschauungen must be refocused. While the 
definitive revelation of God in Jesus must not be compromised, nevertheless, the God of 
the Bible whose name is translated by the vernacular names of God (with all their cultural 
baggage) in West African Christianity suggests that God can manifest himself through 
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several modalities in different religions. As a matter of fact, what must be kept in mind at 
all times in approaching people of other religions is the fact that God, through the 
Universal Spirit, has never left himself without being present in all nations at any time. 
As M. A. C. Warren notes: “Our first task in approaching another people, another culture, 
another religion, is to take off our shoes, for the place we are standing is holy. Else we 
may find ourselves treading on men’s dreams. More serious still, we may forget that God 
was here before our arrival.”52 Warren further writes that “When we approach the man of 
another faith than our own it will be in the spirit of expectancy to find how God has been 
speaking to him and what new understandings of the grace and love of God we may 
discover in this encounter.”53 Indeed, God, in ATR, is the relational dynamic center 
around whom all the other elements of African religions revolve.     
 Not surprisingly, Lamin Sanneh maintains that the adoption of African names for 
God in Christianity carries implications for social and cultural transformation since such 
names not only regulate indigenous naming rules, ethics, but also historical 
consciousness. Accordingly, “the name of God contained ideas of personhood, economic 
life, and social/cultural identity; the name of God represented the indigenous theological 
advantage vis-à-vis missionary initiative.”54 Consequently, Sanneh argues that the fact 
that Christian expansion or its resurgence was limited to those societies that preserved the 
indigenous name for God “suggests that theologically God had preceded the missionary 
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in Africa, a fact that Bible translation clinched with decisive authority.”55 This means that 
the relational and flexible qualities of God in ATR makes him open to universality as 
attested to by the adoption of his vernacular names in translating the God of the Bible. 
This also means that the vernacular names used to designate the God of the Bible must 
not be uprooted from their cultural contexts with all their accompanying cultural baggage 
since this is what it means for God to be truly universal in a way relevant to every 
context. Therefore, the diverse vernacular names used to designate God in different 
religions as a supreme, creator, ultimate, and personal deity may not facilely be reduced 
to a common signification without considering their meanings and significance in their 
originating contexts.          
 To elucidate this point, Sanneh beams light on the signification of the term 
“Olugbala” which, for the Yoruba of Nigeria, means “savior.” It is this name Olugbala, 
together with all its natural signification in the Yoruba idiom, that is used to translate 
savior in the Bible thereby generating new understandings of Jesus Christ. In this 
endeavor of translating Olugbala into savior, the name could not have been completely 
excised from its connection with the rich heritage of Ifa divination from which it draws 
its import. Therefore, “The name for savior, Olugbala, for instance, is preloaded with 
older Yoruba theological notions of divine power, solicitude, and redemptive suffering. 
Olugbala accedes to the Jesus of Scripture without dumping the old cargo.”56 This is the 
kind of reworking and rearticulation that is going on in African Christianity today. 
Accordingly, since God’s dynamic hierarchy in ATR is not incompatible with the 
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existence of a multiplicity of spirits who participate in divine devolved power, they (the 
spirits) do not preclude but rather become instrumentalized in the realization of divine 
economy for the well-being of human beings and the achievement of their destiny in the 
world. Therefore, the multiplicity of spirits and divinities with regard to West African 
religions in relation to God-talk and the Holy Spirit speaks to the multiplicity of religions 
as the manifold ways and modalities through which the intended benevolent purpose of 
God’s economy may be fulfilled and experienced. This is a way of affirming that insofar 
as other religions (non-Christian, including ATR) contain elements of truth and grace as 
already affirmed by the church, it is legitimate to say that they function as ways of 
salvation for their adherents since the Universal Spirit of the Mysterious God also 
operates salvifically in them. This means that ATR (with its values) and for that matter, 
other non-Christian religions, may not be seen merely as a kind of praeparatio 
evangelica
57
 or merely as destined to find their fulfillment in Christianity. Rather, since 
the Universal Spirit has been and is salvifically operative in them, they enjoy some form 
of autonomy of their own and function as ways of salvation, at least, for their adherents.
58
 
In other words, “non-Christian religions may be seen as part of the plan of divine 
providence and endowed with a particular role in the history of salvation.”59 In this 
connection, the final statement of the Dar-es-Salaam conference of Third World 
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theologians submits: “We recognize also as part of the reality of the Third World the 
influence of religions and cultures and the need for Christianity to enter in humility into a 
dialogue with them. We believe that these religions and cultures have a place in God’s 
universal plan and the Holy Spirit is actively at work in them.”60   
 Let there be no doubt that the said autonomy and role of non-Christian religions 
subtracts nothing from the Christian claim that Jesus is the unique and universal savior or 
that the Church is a sacrament of Christ’s salvation. Rather, granted that the Christian 
faith affirms Jesus as the mediator of “God’s gift of salvation to humanity in an overt, 
explicit, and fully visible way, which is now continued in Christianity,”61 it does not 
cancel or revoke God’s past covenants (Adamic, Noahic, Sinaitic, and so forth) and 
neither does it nullify the salvific operation (both past and present) of the Universal Spirit 
at work in other religions. But because Christ is the culminating point, the explicit and 
definitive revelation of God’s gift of salvation—which has been operative in other 
religions before this climax—he (Christ) and “the non-Christian religions are related to 
one another.”62 For the same reason, the non-Christian religions are also related to 
Christianity but cannot simply be reduced to or said to be fulfilled in Christianity, albeit, 
they can be open to Christianity. This faith stance calls for a dialogic encounter between 
non-Christian religions and Christianity in order for each to benefit from one another in 
constructing their identities and attaining their full potential. It is by respecting and 
recognizing the wholesome values of other religions that Christianity can modify them 
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and they in turn modify and enrich Christianity. It is not merely about inserting the 
Gospel into the non-Christian religious and cultural other; for such a strategy appears 
imperialistic and reconstitutes the coloniality of power.     
  Thus, in West African religious frameworks, religion is fundamentally about the 
divinization of human beings on earth through contact and closeness with the 
Transcendent and the realization of both individual and communal divine destinies. The 
fundamental issue and concern in West African cosmo-religious framework is less about 
preoccupation with exclusive belief-systems, creedal formulations, and bedrock of 
certitudes (however important they may be) than it is about the viewing of religion “as 
the matrix in which men and women experience and respond to the sacred in their human 
existence….”63 It is, therefore, not so much about how much truth of the pre-Incarnate 
Logos (asarkos) is contained and operative in extra-biblical traditions, according to Justin 
Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, and others, as about the truth of the religious and 
spiritual dimension of people’s situated lived experiences and their responses to the 
action of the divine within their traditions and human existence. Properly speaking, then, 
it is the Universal Spirit blowing where she wills who engenders such experiences and 
responses to divine action and grace.        
 In Etche and West African ancestral religions, the multiplicity of spirits 
corresponds to the maximization of the agentive competency of the divinities, spirits, 
ancestors, other human mediators. Such agency is enacted through their participation in 
God’s dynamic hierarchy and devolved power toward the realization of the goal of 
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religion in West African conceptual schemes. This goal is nothing more than the 
realization of humanity’s divine destined course under the human condition in this life 
which ultimately culminates in the divinization of human beings for their wellbeing. It 
has been affirmed that West African primal religious world-views are acutely this-
worldly. The idea of this-worldliness should not be understood as a relegation of 
transcendence or lack of eschatological orientation, or for that matter, purely in a 
materialistic sense. Rather, the notion of “this-worldliness encompasses God and man in 
an abiding relationship with God, in other words, the divine destiny of humankind, and 
the purpose and goal of the universe (emphasis original).”64 In these world-views, heaven 
is already wedded to earth, the supernatural forms a continuum with the natural, and 
grace—God’s presence mediated by the spirits, divinities, who are instrumentalized by 
the Holy Spirit—already provides the adherents with the salvific means they need to 
achieve the destiny intended for them by their divine author within the same historical 
process.           
 In these Weltanschauungen, the universe is understood as a holistic universe with 
no sharp separation, dualism, or conflict between the physical and the spiritual, the 
mundane and the sacred, the profane and the religious. We have amply illustrated this 
point previously in chapter 2 above.
65
 Accordingly, the physical and the mundane act as a 
vehicle for, as a reflection, and indeed, as a sacrament of the divine. The unceasing 
commerce between the celestial and the terrestrial weld them into a complementary and 
unified organic system. In this conception, the divine or the transcendent, albeit distinct, 
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is neither separate from nor disengaged with the realm of human affairs, since humans 
themselves are constantly involved in the continual traffic and encounter with the divine 
especially through different ritual processes and in self-transcendence toward others 
(such as the Oghaghaa). Within this sacramental imagination, God is seen in all things, 
according to St. Ignatius of Loyola: that is to say, God is sacramentalized in “other 
people, communities, movements, events, places, objects, the environment, the world at 
large, the whole cosmos. The visible, the tangible, the finite, the historical—all these are 
actual or potential carriers of the divine presence.”66 Moreover, I must also say that the 
fact that these world-views do not conceive of any sharp separation between the sacred 
and the mundane does not mean to say that the Etche/West African religions are sacralist. 
Being sacralist means to be “so preoccupied with the sacred as to prejudice the material 
well-being of the community and to impede man’s control over his environment.”67 
Rather, the sacred and the mundane are not seen as alternatives or irreconcilable 
polarities but as complementary dimensions of reality. Over and against the constant 
tendency in Western traditions (especially neo-Scholastic ontotheology) to 
transcendentalize the divine absolutely, sacramentality and sacramental operationism 
radically connect the mundane material aspect of a sacrament to the divine signified 
reality, and subversively resists any unwholesome theological construct that renders the 
divine as merely abstract. Consequently, the affirmation is right on target that “at the 
heart of the universe and of religion [of West African world-views] is a divine-human 
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relationship for the fulfillment of humanity’s divine destiny.”68   
 Put another way, this conception discloses the truism that God seen through the 
prism of West African ancestral religions is keenly involved in a dynamic and relational 
engagement with human beings in this world in a way that is intended for their good and 
wellbeing. Indeed, Dominique Zahan has also aptly drawn attention to the this-
worldliness of African mysticism and spirituality when he wrote: “man [African] aspires 
to become God; certain rites even lead him there. However, he never leaves his human 
condition; he does not rise to the sky in order to peacefully bask in the beatific vision. 
Rather, he obliges God to come to earth, to renew his closeness to man, to descend to him 
in order to divinize him. Thus, the favored place for the African beatific vision remains 
the earth.”69 Thus the world, the universe remains a sacramental site for divine-human 
encounter for the good and salvation of humanity and creation. The material world in this 
African perspective, therefore, “is not only not evil, but shares in the same destiny of 
goodness as the human race itself. The salvation of humanity also entails the re-creation 
of the material world—a new heaven and a new earth…”70 which is the work of the life-
giving and Creator Spirit. It is a frequent tendency in Christianity for Christians to be so 
preoccupied with the life of the world to come and beatific vision that they sometimes 
seem not to know how to live this life in this world by cultivating positive human 
solidarity, friendship, compassion, and concern for the alterity of others. It makes 
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absolutely no sense to fret so much about the life to come in the next world when a 
majority of the people (of the Two-Thirds World ravaged by poverty, for instance) have 
not even started living this present life with dignity. Consequently, in connection with 
human well-being and the realization of their divine destined life, the numerous spirits 
and ancestors as mediums and intermediaries, are instrumentalized to mediate the 
manifold aspects of the divine economy. According to Caleb Oladipo, they guarantee the 
solidarity, stability, and progress of the human community in the world insofar as this 
role will engender the achieving of the expected destined course of the life of the 
members of the community.
71
 In his attempt to construct a relevant African 
pneumatology, Oladipo limited himself to utilizing the functionality of the ancestors only 
in accounting for the operation of the Holy Spirit in Yoruba African indigenous 
Christianity.
72
 He purposefully or otherwise failed to integrate the place of the divinities 
(Orisas) in his analysis and articulation. The divinities are not merely deified beings but 
fundamentally spiritual or divine entities and may not be neglected in any talk about 
African pneumatology.       
 Furthermore, the spirits who mount certain human beings like the diviner-doctors, 
prophets, healers, dibias, and so on, empower them to dislodge evil forces, to bring 
therapeutic healing to the ill, and succor to victims of witchcraft. They mount people in 
order to dispose such persons to not just affirm themselves through realization of their 
own destined course in life but also to give themselves away for others. This is very 
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redolent with the Spirit mounting/resting on/anointing Jesus for his ministry during which 
he would give himself completely away for others to the point of death. It is about 
relationality, hospitality, and friendship. It is these excellent relational qualities of the 
spirits as well as the plurality and flexibility assumed in God’s dynamic sovereignty that 
have been reworked and appropriated into West African Christianity particularly in 
relation to the Holy Spirit. West African Christianity necessarily presupposes the 
assumptions of ATR and what Kwame Bediako calls “primal imagination.”73 The 
relational, pluralist, and dynamic assumptions inherent in ATR makes it open to the 
universality of the Gospel. This allows for the possibility of the modification of 
indigenous knowledges and traditions by the Gospel as well as the modification and 
expansion of dimensions of the Gospel by the indigenous traditions through translation, 
rereading of the Bible, and reinterpretation giving rise to new understandings of Jesus 
Christ in the light of situated lived experiences and local histories.   
 This explains why, in the process of the Gospel proclamation, there can never 
be—contrary to the colonial missionary ideological style of transplanting Western culture 
as the purported civilizing aspect of evangelization—any active senders and passive 
receivers. This has been the Catholic way from the very beginning even though this 
approach was abandoned at some point in its history when it became the dominant 
religion. It cannot be gainsaid that any one or group in the over one millennium history of 
the Christian church has completely abandoned their “cultural and religious heritage in 
order to become Christians.”74 There is not, and there has never existed anything such as 
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some pure form of universal acultural Christianity. The universality of the Gospel means 
that there is no such thing as a universal Christianity that is not at the same time a 
Christianity with a Jewish background, a Greco-Roman background, and rightly so, 
cannot equally be without an African background. Faith is always “the faith of a 
historical community. Christianity…was born in the matrix of Judaism and in Semitic 
context.”75 It is only within the particularity of its cross-fertilization with diverse and 
different religious and cultural contexts that the Christian faith derives its universal 
appeal. While conversion to Christianity necessarily brings about radical change in the 
lives of converts, Christianity, however, cannot exist at the expense of the authentic 
values of indigenous religions. Whereas Christianity may transform or correct some 
aspects of those traditions when necessary, they also in turn actually enrich Christian 
faith as they become the modes through which it finds concrete expression and self-
realization. Hence, on the need for Christianity to don an African face, for instance, 
James Johnson has this to say:   
Christianity is a religion…suitable for every race on the face of the globe.  
 Acceptance of it was never intended by its founder to denationalize any  
 people, and it is indeed the glory that every race and people may profess  
 and practice it and imprint upon it its own natural characteristics, giving it  
 a peculiar type among themselves without losing any of its virtue. And why 
  should there not be an African Christianity as there has been a European  
 and Asiatic Christianity?
76
 
 
A people, therefore, need not and must not desert their cultural and religious heritage and 
traditional values in order to become or upon becoming Christian. Subaltern local 
histories and epistemic potentials must not be silenced by the coloniality of power.  
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 There is no gainsaying that God’s salvific love and faithfulness is for all 
humankind. In the light of this, Sanneh affirms that plurality “is a prerequisite for 
authentic Christian living, since translation assumes cross-cultural encounter where the 
notion of multiple living cultures makes it necessary to exchange one form of 
communication for another. In both its Protestant and Catholic forms, Christianity has 
affirmed with the Gentile breakthrough the shibboleth of God’s faithfulness toward all 
peoples.”77 West African ancestral religion with its pluralist propensity has, no doubt, 
helped its traditions to be broadened and deepened by the impact of its contact with the 
two religions of Islam and Christianity, irrespective of their enormous negative 
dimensions with regard to the fragmentation of Africa. By the same token, African 
religious values have also modified and expanded the dimensions the gospel. The 
pluralist and flexible proclivity of ATR makes it possible for it to be open to cross-
fertilization with other faiths. In point of fact, as Ghanaian evangelical theologian, 
Kwame Bediako rightly underscores: “Long before pluralism, religious as well as 
cultural, became a subject of serious discussion in the Western world, many Christian 
communities in Africa had been living, witnessing and learning to survive and grow in 
the context of religious pluralism.”78 Elsewhere, Bediako indicates that ATR, 
Christianity, and Islam, have often lived side by side and contributed to the various 
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African societies.
79
 Openness and welcome to other religions have thus been a hallmark 
of ATR. It is this dynamism, this flexibility, and this opennessand ability for creative 
interdependency that has enabled the primal imagination of ATR to survive, albeit not 
unaffected, but not completely wiped out in its contacts with the other faiths. In African 
Christianity, there is, therefore, both continuity in relation to the authentic values of 
ancestral religions and discontinuity as well.       
 In the realm of continuity between Christianity and the West African ancestral 
religions, there is a question that needs to be answered. It is about the issue of how the 
‘primal imagination’ brought its own peculiar gifts of relationality, plurality, multiplicity, 
dynamism, and so on, to bear on “the shaping of Christian affirmation [and tradition].”80 
In order to answer this question, we must turn to the insights of African Initiated 
Churches (AICs)—also called Spiritual Churches because of their emphasis on the Holy 
Spirit and her works—in order to see what they have done with the primal imagination 
and African religious heritage. More than the mainstream missionary churches, the AICs 
remain the best site so far for ascertaining how African indigenous values (particularly 
“spirit qualities”) have been reworked and appropriated into the Holy Spirit in 
Christianity. They also remain the best place to find Christianity “brewed in an African 
pot.”81 But before investigating this, let us first establish that such reformulation and 
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reworking taking place in African Christianity today is not unprecedented. It has been 
native to Christianity.          
5.5 Biblical and Patristic Antecedents     
 Certain biblical data provide us with evidentiary materials for understanding the 
usage of the term “spirits” or group of spirits and their creative assimilation into the Holy 
Spirit. Already in the Old Testament, there is a precedent in the prophetic and priestly 
traditions which creatively reworked, reinterpreted, and assimilated Canaanite and other 
Semitic divinities into angelic host in the service of Yahweh in divine council. Equally, 
the names of Semitic divinities were assimilated into the name of Yahweh of Israel.
82
 
Having said that, I shall focus here on the book of Revelation with its several references 
to a group of “seven spirits” and how this has been reworked by certain church Fathers 
and contemporary biblical commentators in relation to the Holy Spirit. The book of 
Revelation severally refers to a group of “seven spirits” (Rev 1:4; 3:1; 4:5; 5:6).  Of 
crucial importance to note is the fact that the first mention of the “seven spirits” is set 
within the context of the initial greeting and doxology. Thus in Rev 1:4-5, “grace and 
peace” are presented by John as coming “from him (God) who is, who was and who is to 
come, and from the seven spirits of God which are before the throne, and from Jesus 
Christ, the faithful witness, the firstborn of the dead, the ruler of the kings of the earth” 
(emphasis mine). A close reading of the use of the preposition χαί (from) in the above 
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passage seems to suggest that the “seven spirits” are included in the divine power to 
bestow grace and peace so much like God the Father and Jesus Christ. Since such a 
capacity to bless with grace and peace indicates something of a divine origin, it is 
possible to infer that the “seven spirits” participate in the same divinity as the Father and 
the Son. In other words, the seven spirits here appear to be on the same level as God the 
Father and Jesus the Son. Indeed, Paul makes this explicit when he writes, “The grace of 
the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Spirit, be 
with you all” (2 Cor 13:14). From this occurrence of the “seven spirits” in Rev 1:4 as 
sharing in the same divinity as the Father and the Son, it is not hard to see how the early 
church would rework and re-dimension it into what would generally designate “Holy 
Spirit.” This is further coupled with the fact that in accordance with biblical numerology, 
the number “seven” symbolizes fullness or completeness. Seen in this perspective then, 
the “seven spirits” would “represent the Spirit of God in its fullness and 
completeness.”83Considering the metaphorical and apocalyptic density of Revelation, 
Edmondo Lupieri is cautiously inclined to think that “John is developing some kind of 
(pre-) Trinitarian thinking.”84         
 It is clear from the other passages in Revelation that the “seven spirits”—albeit, 
often expressing angelic traits—are not the same as the seven angels. For instance, the 
seven stars held by the Son of Man are said to represent the angels of the seven churches 
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and the seven lampstands are the seven churches (1:16, 20; 2:1). Certain passages, 
however, seem to give the impression of a subordination of the seven spirits. For 
example, Revelation mentions “he who holds the seven spirits of God and the seven 
stars” (3:1); “Seven flaming torches burn before the throne; these are the seven spirits of 
God” (4:5); “I saw him with seven horns and seven eyes, which are the seven spirits of 
God sent out to all the earth” (5:6). From all this, there emerges not only an apparent 
subordination of the seven spirits but also a conflation of their personal and impersonal 
characters. How is it that the seven spirits participate in divinity as evidenced by their 
capacity to bless with “grace and peace,” and yet, are presented as flaming torches before 
the throne, held by Christ, the seven horns, and the seven eyes of the Lamb? To my mind, 
there does not seem to be any contradiction here. It is not unusual for impersonal 
metaphors to be employed to describe the divine in the Bible. As has already been 
pointed out in Chapter 3, the Bible is full of impersonal metaphors or images used to 
describe the Spirit and her activities, such as, wind, fire, light, oil, water, power, energy, 
and so on. The impersonal images thus describe the activities of a personal being who is a 
divine person. Both aspects of the Spirit’s character are complementary rather than 
contradictory. What sometimes may appear as a seeming subordination of the Spirit may 
rather well be an aspect of the self-effacement of the Spirit in bringing into presence the 
other Persons. It is in the Spirit that the other Persons are made present. For the Spirit is 
the communion of the Father and the Son as well as the principle of communion between 
the Trinity and humanity, and all of creation. In keeping with this line of understanding, 
then, the seven eyes projected as the seven spirits of God sent out to all the earth, for 
instance, would designate an all pervasive presence and immanence of God in the whole 
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world through the Universal Spirit. The Spirit is both “the Spirit of the Father and the 
Spirit of Christ the Lamb”85 not because she is lesser than them but rather because they 
are always manifested or revealed in the Spirit.     
 In a very illuminating article, Romanian biblical scholar, Bogdan Bucur explores 
the Wirkungsgeschichte (reception history) of the Book of Revelation. He unveils how 
both patristic and contemporary commentators have been wrestling with the construal of 
the passages under consideration. Bucur’s agenda, undoubtedly, is to overcome a certain 
exegetical impasse between the alternatives of either viewing the occurrence of “spirits” 
in the texts as actually referring to spirits or to angels. Utilizing available evidence 
constructively, Bucur sketches the contours of an angelomorphic pneumatology as a way 
to hybridize the two alternatives. Nevertheless, he points out, among others, how, in 
referring to the seven spirits, the seven eyes, and the seven lamps, which, of course, may 
be found in Zechariah 3:9 and 4:2,6-7,10, the Book of Revelation connects them with the 
rest/tabernacling of the seven spiritual gifts on the messianic stump of Jesse (Isa 11:2; cf. 
Prov 8:12-16).
86
 Drawing on the fragments from patristic commentaries provided by 
Albin Škrinjar and others, Bucur highlights a particular patristic reworking and 
reformulating, especially, of Revelation 5:6. Here Bucur reaches back to Oecumenius and 
Andrew of Caesarea who seem to construe 5:6 as referring to the seven gifts of the 
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Spirit.
87
 Bucur corroborates this standpoint by citing Karl Schlütz who “has shown that a 
connection between Isa 11:2 (the seven gifts of the Spirit) and Zech 4:10 (the seven 
lamps) was an established topos in patristic exegesis.”88 Furthermore, Bucur grants that 
both “Ancient and modern exegetes agree that Rev 1:4 is intended as a reference to the 
seven spirits/eyes/lamps of the Lord in Zech 3:9; 4:10”89 which is also connected to Isa 
11:2. The question of identifying the Spirit as impersonal spiritual gifts shares resonances 
with the biblical tradition of identifying the Spirit with impersonal metaphors such as 
wind, energy, water, and so forth, as a way of describing the manifold activity of the 
dynamic Spirit of God who resists any arbitrary or rigid formalization and routinization. 
It is in keeping with such tradition, it seems, that Jesus could say, “If anyone is thirsty, let 
him come to me and drink. Whoever believes in me, as the Scripture has said, streams of 
living water will flow from within him. By this [water] he meant the Spirit….” (Jn 7:37-
39; cf 4:10).          
 In a very excellent and fascinating move, Irenaeus of Lyons, in his The 
Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching, conceptualizes, with a remarkable clarity, the 
seven spirits as the manifold ways the Spirit indwells us to equip us for numerous 
services and destinies. Thus he asserts:    
Wherefore also the Spirit of God is manifold in (His) indwelling, and in   
 seven forms of service is he reckoned by the prophet Isaiah, as resting on   
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 the Son of God, that is the Word, in His coming as man. The Spirit of God, 
 he says, shall rest upon him, the Spirit of wisdom and of understanding,   
 theSpirit of counsel and of might, (the Spirit of knowledge) and of godli-  
 ness; the Spirit of the fearof God shall fill him (emphasis original).
90
  
    
For Irenaeus, therefore, the “seven spirits” correspond to the names of the seven spirits 
(the gifts) that rested upon Christ as prophesied by the prophet Isaiah. This Irenaean 
construal also clearly echoes the Pauline theology of charismata where he holds that 
there is a diversity of spiritual gifts for a diversity of ministrations/services (diakonia) but 
all are the workings of the same Spirit (cf. 1 Cor 12:1-11). The same Spirit is present and 
manifests herself in diverse and manifold ways in different individuals through the 
presence of diverse spiritual gifts. The different gifts (or spirits) bestowed on different 
individuals are to be actualized and to be used for service in the community of the 
faithful. Of interest to us is how Irenaeus understands the gifts of the Spirit as the 
manifold ways and operations (energeia) through which the outpouring of the Spirit is 
active in distinct persons for service. After all said and done, the indication of the 
capacity of the “seven spirits” to impart the blessing of “grace and peace” much in the 
same way as the Father and the Son, coupled with the Pauline greeting formula in 2 
Cor13:14, and together with the trinitarian baptismal formula in Matt 28:19, is highly 
suggestive “that a reference to the Holy Spirit would have been the likely intention of 
Rev 1:4.”91 Thus, the seven spirits or the seven gifts would designate the active manifold 
ways of the operations of what the early church would not too infrequently reformulate 
and understand as a generalized “Holy Spirit.” The seven spirits leitmotif was, therefore, 
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reworked by early Christianity “in the service of pneumatology.”92 If what we have been 
trying to articulate in the light of biblical, patristic, and contemporary exegetical materials 
makes sense, then it is legitimate to say that a similar line of thinking is also possible and 
even fitting for understanding the relationship between the pervasive presence of the 
Universal Spirit of God in the whole world and “other spirits” in the spirit-worlds of non-
Christian traditions and cultures. Following from this precedence and relevant analogue, 
we will be most helped to situate our understanding of developments within African 
Christian theology along the continuum of a historical movement that has always given 
birth to Christian theology. With this in mind, let me now look into AICs’ rearticulation 
and reworking of the Holy Spirit in the light of the multiplicity of spirits of ATR. I will 
then build on this insight and expand it in ways that allow for new understandings of the 
Spirit from an African Christian perspective.     
5.6 Expanding AICs’ Insight: Toward an African Christian                      
     Relational Pneumatology       
  
A number of factors undoubtedly led to the emergence of AICs. Among others, 
they include: European disdain for African culture and values as primitive, the 
inferiorization of African personality, colonial political and socio-economic oppression 
and exploitation, fragmentation of African sense of wholeness of life via banishment of 
numberless Africans from their communal roots and solidarities through the slave trade, 
as well as the disruption of the cosmic unity through forced land-grabbing thereby 
disinheriting Africans, and so on. At a time when African beliefs in the supernatural 
world and spirits were demonized and dismissed as superstition by post-Enlightenment 
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Europeans and colonial missionary Christianity, AICs inevitably arose, inter alia, to 
rediscover the Bible and a Christianity that rather than alienate Africans, speak and deal 
more explicitly with real African concerns while utilizing the traditional African religious 
heritage. Because of the genius of the AICs to tap into the core of African cosmo-
religious world-views in their rediscovery of the Bible and new reception of Christianity, 
they can be said to be behind not only the survival of, but also the boost to an African 
Christianity that is growing in leaps and bounds today. In Nigeria particularly, the 
popularity and achievements of AICs and later neo-Pentecostal churches, have had 
profound impacts on the majority of the mainline missionary churches that can never be 
underestimated.
93
 Such Spiritual churches, for example, in Nigeria today include: “the 
Cherubim and Seraphim Church, the Christ Apostolic Church, the Church of the Lord 
Aladuras,  the Zionist, the Celestial Church of Christ, and the Apostolic Faith, to mention 
a few.”94 It is in these churches that we see an expression of Christianity that is in 
profound and explicit continuity with ATR. Accordingly, “These churches take cross-
fertilization seriously.”95 It must be pointed out that these churches did not simply 
integrate or add ancestral religious heritage and practices to Christianity. Rather they 
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have been able to repackage and transform what have been previously believed in ATR 
alongside its concomitant attitudes, actions, and practices and given them Christian 
expression. Of particular interest is their understanding of ATR as oriented toward 
integral human health and wholeness as well as the dominance of spirit-dimension that 
sustains an orbit where spirits and humans are constantly intermingling. It is in this sense 
that we can understand how these churches have reworked the belief in multiplicity of 
spirits in the traditional ancestral religious space into the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. 
 In a most remarkable way, the AICs have creatively appropriated the assumptions 
and genius of African ancestral mysticism and spirituality in what has emerged as a 
radical African reinterpretation and rearticulation of Christianity (closer to Jesus and the 
Apostles than to its Western expression). As Mercy Amba Oduyoye suggests, 
“salvation/liberation in Africa is primarily…for health and wholeness.”96 Health here 
should not be understood as limited to healing from biological or physical illness. In this 
African conception, it means more than that. Health in this framework entails a more 
encompassing and comprehensive state of well-being of not just the individual but also of 
the society, and, of course, of the cosmic order as a whole. Health and wholeness in the 
African purview are more integral or multidimensional. They embrace different levels of 
well-being: the physical, mental, psychic, emotional, socio-economic, political, moral, 
spiritual, ecological, and so forth. Importantly, health and wholeness include being 
reconciled and in harmony with oneself, being at rights with each other, at rights with the 
world (material environment), and, of course, through sacramental operation, at rights 
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with the spirits, and ultimately with God. It is about wholeness and restoring the balance 
of nature in an organic universe of which the human person constitutes an integral part if 
not the center but of which s/he is not the only inhabitant. Maintaining or restoring health 
and wholeness is one of the reasons for spirit-possessions as illustrated in Chapter 2, 
geared toward the constant great struggle against violence and all anti-life forces.
97
 That 
the material universe, objects, events, persons, and so on, can be and are carriers of divine 
presence does not say all about ATR’s sacramental approach to life. There is more to this 
sacramental operation than a flat-out reflection of divine presence. As pointed out above, 
the spirits, divinities, and ancestors are understood to guarantee the solidarity, stability, 
and progress of the human community in this world. By virtue of their participation in the 
dynamic relational hierarchy and devolved power of God, they play a key role in the 
realization of divine economy insofar as this results in the actualization of human destiny. 
An actualized destiny enables a person to give away him/herself for others. To the extent 
that the spirits and divinities keep guaranteeing the realization of human destinies, they 
always engender new possibilities which make the sacramental presence of the divine 
remain always in a continual process of realization. In this sense, it can be said that 
ATR’s sacramental approach to life is eschatological. But all this is the work of the spirits 
and the divinities.         
 Understandably, AICs have appropriated these qualities of the spirits, divinities, 
and ancestors in ATR. In a very strategic and creative theological move, AICs, according 
to James Fernandez, have refocused these experienced qualities of the multiplicity of 
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ATR spirits and divinities (in West African religious universe) by subjecting them to a 
“higher order of integration in a Generalized Holy Spirit (emphasis original).”98 They 
have, therefore, successfully reconstituted and synthesized the multiplicity of the 
benevolent spirits of ATR into the One Holy Spirit. Consequently, all the benevolent 
influences, the empowering, healing, and liberative life-giving qualities as well as other 
workings of the spirits in ATR have been creatively engaged, reformulated, repackaged, 
transformed, and reinterpreted as the gifts of the Holy Spirit for a variety of ministries in 
AICs. These gifts are deployed for service to the community in taking care of human 
needs and resolving existential life-problems. Fernandez is, however, not unaware of the 
problem that may be posed by the spirits manisfesting at times their parallel or even the 
uncertainty as to the subordinance of these spirits causing a situation of spiritual 
schizophrenia.
99
 What has been accomplished here is about a local reception and 
appropriation of the Christian message in a way that expands its dimensions and allows 
for new understandings.         
 African spirituality as we have seen above is anthropocentric (a human-centered 
spirituality, human wholeness and health). An authentic African doctrine of the Holy 
Spirit assures the legitimate aspiration of the multiplicity of spirits which is the eminent 
fulfillment of the destiny of human beings in the world. Hence, the aspiration of the 
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multiplicity of spirits becomes efficacious through the Holy Spirit of Jesus Christ. West 
African Christian spirituality is viewed precisely as this-wordly. In this sense, the Holy 
Spirit understood as another Paraclete is meaningful and relevant to West African 
Christians because it emphasizes the third person of the Trinity as the one who continues 
the earthly work of Christ in healing, protecting from evil spirits and witches, giving 
abundant life, etc. Thus, an authentic African pneumatology is this-worldly, 
incarnational,
100
 or kenotic. Just as the multiplicity of spirits in ATR are assigned by God 
to fulfill different aspects of God’s purpose for human well-being, so in West African 
Christianity is “the Holy Spirit believed to be sent from God into the world to accomplish 
the purpose of God”101 for human beings. This kenotic understanding finds expression in 
spirit possessions, visions, dreams, ecstatic and prophetic utterances believed to be the 
manifestation of the Holy Spirit. Through such possessions and utterances, those 
mounted by the Spirit suppress their rational faculties in order to allow the Spirit use 
them for the good of the community. The Holy Spirit comes down from the supernatural 
order and is palpably present in a mighty and mysterious manner in the community in the 
midst of singing, clapping, and dancing. In this way, the Holy Spirit in West African 
Christianity does not merely indwell persons for contemplating transcendence but is 
actually involved in a more holistic way in the quotidian life of not just individuals but 
the community as a corporate reality. Like the functionality of the deities and ancestral 
spirits, the Holy Spirit is now viewed as the giver of life, and imparts wisdom and 
knowledge. Hence, the Spirit is regarded as a person and not merely as the energy/power 
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or the essence of God. And just as the multiplicity of spirits enjoy independence within 
the matrix of relational and dynamic transcendence, the Holy Spirit, it is believed, also 
enjoys independence in bestowing a variety of gifts to different persons and to distinct 
communities for a nonthreatening pattern of ministry. The multiplicity of spirits now find 
fulfillment in West African Christianity in the many ways in which the gifts of the Spirit 
are manifest for the building up of the community.
102
 This successful reappropriation of 
ATR’s spirit-qualities into the overall project of reinterpreting and rearticulating the gifts 
and role of the Holy Spirit in Christianity is, to all intents and purposes, nothing short of 
an authentic African Christian pneumatology. And as far as this is concerned, AICs have 
played a leading role. This project of rereading, reinterpreting, and rearticulating which 
allows for new understandings of the Holy Spirit, means for Sanneh, the same process 
“whereby the Christian message is appropriated into existing local frameworks but still 
remains recognizably Christian, much like what the Greeks in places like Alexandria, 
Antioch, Athens, and Ephesus did with the Jewish heritage of Jesus.
103
  
 Perhaps it may be important to caution that this reinterpretation or repackaging by 
AICs should not be trivialized as syncretism. As Sanneh eloquently explains, the term 
“Syncretism represents the unresolved, unassimilated, and tension-filled mixing of 
Christian ideas with local custom and ritual, and that scarcely results in the kind of 
fulfilling change signaled by conversion and church membership.”104 In keeping with this 
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understanding, an example of syncretism may be, offering sacrifice to the God of Jesus 
Christ after converting to Christianity and at the same time also offering sacrifice to 
Orisa. On a further interesting note, however, Sanneh unpacks the undergirding 
motivation behind the facile use and indiscriminate application of the term syncretism: 
“Besides, syncretism is the term we use for the religion of those we don’t like. No one 
calls himself or herself a syncretist! It’s a name we use of others, and not in a 
complimentary way. Unless we use the term as a judgment against our own forms of 
religious practice, I suggest we drop it altogether.”105 What the AICs have done is rather 
a rearticulation or cross-fertilization resulting from a new reception of the Bible and 
Christianity in a manner that deals more profoundly and explicitly with African concerns 
and reality. But this should not also come as a surprise to anyone. It may only be a 
surprise to someone who thinks that there can only be one expression of the so-called 
universal Christianity which is uniform in every respect and in every place. That could 
have been possible during the era of Christendom. Today, Christianity is no more 
Christendom but World Christianity which speaks the language of people and people 
understand it in their own native language and idioms just as it was on Pentecost when 
the church was born.          
 Additionally, this creative interpretation in AICs is by no means unprecedented. A 
relevant analogue exists, as indicated above, in the historical continuum of the 
development of Christian thought. As I have mentioned previously, evidentiary data 
indicate how old Testament priests and prophets did a similar reworking and assimilation 
of the Semitic spirits and El into the retinue of Yahweh’s divine council and into God’s 
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own name (for example, Elohim) respectively.
106
 Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, 
and other Fathers of the Early Church did a similar reworking and reinterpreting of the 
biblical pre-Incarnate Logos within the framework of extra-biblical traditions; and more 
precisely within contexts of paganism and Hellenistic culture.
107
 These Fathers renounced 
the tendency to view Christianity and non-Christian traditions as mutually exclusive.
108
 
Besides, we have also seen above how the “seven spirits” of the Book of Revelation and 
the “seven gifts” of Isaiah were theologically reworked by the EarlyChurch and the 
Fathers into what came to be generally designated “Holy Spirit.” Indeed, even from a 
Catholic perspective, the self understanding of the church has never been constructed in a 
vacuum without taking into cognizance and critically reflecting on the multiple religious, 
socio-political, and cultural contexts that it inhabits in different epochs.
109
 This was the 
case until the church lost sight of the theology of the local which was only rediscovered 
in Vatican II. The converts to African Christianity especially among AICs are able to 
creatively navigate their multiple religious heritage in a way that makes their Christian 
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faith authentically Christian and truly African. In place of the spirits and divinities, it is 
now the Holy Spirit who possesses persons in AICs. The visionaries, prophets, and the 
Lord Aladuras or healers are mounted by the Holy Spirit and empowered to bring 
healing, liberation from evil forces, and to restore to wholeness. What is interesting here 
is that the modality of spirit-possession is patterned on the assumptions of primal 
imagination of ATR except that now it is the Holy Spirit who descends through 
invocations, songs, drumming, and dancing, on the mediums. And in all this, the 
undergirding core principle remains relationality. In this authentic African Christianity, 
God remains the Unoriginate Origin and source of all cosmic powers for health and 
wholeness. This power of God for health and wholeness is effectuated and mediated 
through the life-giving work of the liberative and resistant Creator Spirit. The life-giving, 
liberative, and resistant Spirit actualizes Christ’s solidarity with the poor, the weak and 
the powerless, the excluded, the oppressed, and the exploited of the world today. It is for 
this life which the Spirit brings, this health and wholeness, this truth and grace which 
God has bestowed on all peoples, that the church has been empowered by the Spirit for a 
life-giving rather than alienating and life-diminishing mission and witness. The church 
needs to work in solidarity with the religious others in a common action of liberating the 
world. It is difficult to disagree with Anselm Min when he writes: “The church does not 
exist for its own sake; it exists for the other, for the liberating redemption of the world in 
solidarity.”110 As has been acknowledged, the Universal life-giving Spirit has been 
operative not only in different peoples but also in different religious traditions and in their 
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affirmed beliefs. Part of the mission of the church thus becomes to approach these 
traditions in the spirit of expectancy with the hope of finding new understandings of 
God’s love and grace in an atmosphere of friendship, solidarity, and hospitable encounter 
with the other since the truth of God always transcends any given conceptuality. This 
should be the proper attitude rather than one of assumed self-sufficiency and superior 
vantage point which preclude any possibility of openness, honesty, and humility (devoid 
of hubris) in the encounter with the religious others. It is grossly illusional and perhaps 
imperialistic to work under the assumption that whatever so-called gravely deficient 
elements of truth and grace present in these other religions are already superabundantly 
and uniquely present in Christianity and more precisely in the church (Catholic). 
 Fruitful and genuine interreligious dialogue,as Jürgen Moltmann insists, invites 
not only a clear understanding and defending of one’s own faith conviction and 
perspective but also an awareness of incompleteness that is the condition of possibility 
for religious cross-fertilization.
111
 The understanding that the Universal Holy Spirit is 
present and operative in other religions allows us to rethink and reconceptualize the claim 
of Christian uniqueness.         
5.6.1 Rethinking the Claim of Christian Uniqueness   
 Perhaps at this juncture, it might be helpful to take a look at an illuminating 
proposal by Peter Phan in his book, Being Religious Interreligiously, concerning 
contemporary understandings of religious claims to uniqueness/universality in relation to 
the encounter with religious others as well as the issue of multiple religious belonging. 
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As a way to get around the exclusivist, inclusivist, and pluralist impasse in interreligious 
dialogue, Phan proposes four basic points.  The first is that if the claim to uniqueness and 
universality constitutes “a fundamental article of faith of one’s religious tradition [it] 
must be maintained in interreligious dialogue.”112 In this way, the pluralist thesis which 
holds otherwise is rejected. This pluralist thesis which Phan rejects, states (for Christians, 
for example) that Jesus is merely one of the many savior figures in the history of the 
world. Contrary to this, Phan’s proposal emphasizes the importance of authenticity in 
owning up and holding on to one’s own deepest faith convictions, since one cannot 
bracket one’s own perspective and still be able to fully appreciate that of another’s. The 
second point which provides the core of the third, is that “A distinction must be made 
between the claim of uniqueness and universality of one’s religious founder and that of 
uniqueness and universality of one’s religion as a social organization.”113 Phan is of the 
view that whereas the former which is an affirmation of faith “must be clearly maintained 
and defended” the latter precisely as an empirical statement prone to differing 
epistemologies and criteria of verification should be abandoned or significantly qualified. 
Phan substantiates this stance by utilizing the Thomistic distinction between knowledge 
based clearly on conclusions drawn from self-evident and verifiable principles, and faith 
which lacks the perfection of clear sight because only grounded in the will moved by 
divine grace. Finally, Phan stresses that maintaining and defending the faith claim of 
uniqueness and universality of one’s religious founder need not lead to exclusivism (nor, 
for that matter, to inclusivism) rather than an inclusive theology of religions. The fact that 
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the uniqueness and universality of particular faith claims lack empirical verifiability does 
not imply that faith statements lack veracity or meaning. Rather, their truth is assured 
only in terms of the assent of the will and not necessarily because they are so self-evident 
as to be exhaustively captured and conceptualized in exclusive secure institutional 
proclamations. In point of fact, because of the nature of Christian faith affirmations as not 
so self-evident, they are sometimes misconstrued even by Christians and oftentimes do 
not necessarily amount to convincing proofs for non-Christians.
114
    
 All in all, Phan suggests and rightly so, that our religious faith can have identity 
only in relationship with other faiths’ perspective. With the distinction between the 
uniqueness and universality of the founder of one’s religious faith and the religion itself, 
between Christ and Christianity (which must not be reduced to each other ) clarified, 
Phan writes:     
There is then a reciprocal relationship between Christianity and the other rel- 
 igions. Not only are the other non-Christian religions complemented by Chri-
 stianity, but Christianity is complemented by the other religions. In other words, 
  the process of complementation, enrichment, and even correction is two-way 
 or reciprocal. This reciprocity in no way endangers the faith confession that the 
  church has received from Christ the fullness of revelation, since it is one thing  
 to receive a perfect and unsurpassable gift and quite another to understand it fully 
 and to live it completely. It is therefore, only in dialogue with other religions that 
 Christianity can come to a fuller realization of its own identity and mission and a  
 better understanding of the unique revelation that it has received from Christ, and 
 vice versa…(emphasis original).115  
 
This very interesting position of Phan is quite in keeping with the understanding of the 
thesis of relationality we have been exploring herein; that identity can only be found and 
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constructed in difference, in the encounter and relationship with an other. As Christianity 
comes to a fuller realization of its identity through encounter with other religions, by the 
same token,“other religions can achieve their full potential only in dialogue with one 
another and with Christianity.”116      
 Acknowledging that faith is fundamentally grounded in the assent of the will 
(which means that that which reveals or addresses itself to humans may be 
received/recognized or could be rejected through the exercise of the faculty of the 
will)—and not merely in the hard and fast institutional assertions/claims to secure 
certitudes and absolutes—entails that faith possesses an inherent openness that permits or 
allows for dialogue (interfaith). This is because as lacking the perfection of clear sight 
and verifiable self-evident principles, faith possesses an element of uncertainty (not 
untruth) and indeterminacy, and consequently, must continually struggle to take a leap to 
search for a clearer picture of the truth that confronts it. Because faith is grounded in the 
assent of the will, it can never be premised on imposition but rather on persuasion. No 
one can be forced to have faith or be saved against his or her will; for to do so is to deny 
and contradict human freedom which even God does not do. Perhaps this explains why it 
can be said that religion in a certain sense is the highest guarantor of liberty. This 
resonates with an Etche adage which says: “arushi kpagbha ngangha, egoshi ya oshishi 
ejiri tuo ya” which literally means “when a deity becomes arrogant by neglecting its part 
toward human well-being, then it would be shown the wood used to iconize it.” This 
means that for the Etche, not even a deity can compel their allegiance against their will if 
they decide not to honor it. This stance throws enormous weight around human liberty. If 
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faith is the assurance of things hoped for ([Heb 11:1]; that is, not yet fully possessed 
though anticipated), then it must continually adopt the attitude of incompleteness
117
 and, 
therefore, of constant expectancy
118
 for the surprising arrival of the unexpected God who 
comes only as a trace. For faith to be faith and not reduced to mere rational knowledge, 
then it invites maintaining an indefinite measure of groping/hope for the unexpected God 
in an open-ended fashion. This open-ended nature of faith allows for a questing that 
presses onward in hope of a fuller attainment of the plenitude of truth that has always 
already grasped the believer but which can only be filled out not merely by self-
referentially looking inwards but more precisely by dialogic engagement with the inward 
meanings of the experiences of other faith perspectives. The questing of faith is in view 
of understanding. But since some understanding of God’s self-communication to humans 
does not render the Mystery which is God less mysterious, then this questing of faith 
progresses somewhat asymptotically toward the God who addresses. David Burrell is 
right when he writes: “God’s word presents a challenge to understanding rather than a 
certitude made easily available.”119 Christian faith affirmations are, therefore, not merely 
a matter of hard and fast assertions but rather invitations to experience, to recognize, and 
to participate in the truth that is a person (Christ himself who is the way, the truth, and 
the life) who confronts humanity and calls for such recognition and assent. Crucially, for 
Christians, it is essential to be reminded that Christ is not only the truth but also the way. 
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To follow him as the way is to follow a person, to experience, to participate in, and to 
respond to the truth of a person. But the uniqueness and identity of such recognition and 
assent can only be sharpened and clarified in the light of dialogic engagement with the 
religious other. This does not mean that Christian faith affirmations are to be derived 
from or determined by the content of other religious traditions. Rather, it means that 
Christian faith affirmation can only find its identity and the meaning of its own 
uniqueness in relationship to the claims and presuppositions of other faith perspectives. 
As Burrell lucidly puts it: “Our location in a world where diverse traditions become 
aware of their mutual presence to one another invites us precisely ‘on a voyage of 
discovery stripped of colonizing pretensions: an invitation to explore the other on the 
way to discovering ourselves.’”120 Out of this encounter emerge greater clarity and a 
consequent readiness to make adjustments needed in order to adhere to the truth of God’s 
universal salvific will. One is, however, under no illusion that this clarity may, at times, 
not occur. Yet, we can still live together as friends in spite of disagreements and 
seemingly contradictory viewpoints.       
 Such an encounter enables faith to continually undertake autocriticism and be 
open to new translations and reinterpretations. This is important because the 
incomprehensible God through the Spirit of novum and possibilities never ceases to 
come or work in strange new ways and can be found in unexpected places beyond all 
human calculations, circumscription in dogmatism, and programming. In point of fact, 
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Jesus Christ is divine Word translated into humanity via the Incarnation.
121
 In order to 
engage humanity definitively, divine self-disclosure climaxed not in hard and fast 
theological formulae and propositions, but rather in a human being, in the person of the 
Word incarnate. Jesus is the dialogue of God with humanity. The climatic divine – 
human dialogue required that Divinity be translated into humanity, that God become 
human. In a similar vein, faith affirmations in dialogue with the others require that they 
be constantly translated in order to bear authentic witness to Christ and to provide the 
opportunity for others to recognize the significance of Christ for Christian believers. 
Through such witness to Christ and as the condition for others to perceive his 
significance for Christians, the Spirit might dispose the others to also recognize Christ 
and ultimately confess him as Lord. By the same token, it will equally allow Christians 
to respect, recognize, and proclaim other religions as revealing the truth of God. Such 
encounter must inevitably allow for mutual conversion.     
 Perhaps I need to also stress that the dynamism of the Spirit which is often 
experienced in the emergence of the uncontrollable, the unpredictable, the new, and the 
unexpected, does not mean that the Spirit is anti-institution, anti-structure, or anti-dogma. 
Rather, it is a way of underscoring that the Spirit cannot be routinized or domesticated 
because she blows where she wills. However, it is equally true that when the Spirit 
brings about newness, she guarantees its enduring and abiding impact by fructifying it 
and ensuring its stability and dependability in a way that is continually and dynamically 
transformative of human existence. Hence, newness and uncontrollability do not imply 
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disorder, chaos, or unrelated pure succession since the Spirit is equally the Spirit of order 
who transforms chaos into promise and into being. As pointed out above, even the 
institutional structures of the church—which are vital elements for the fulfilling of the 
church’s mission—are coinstituted by Christ and the Spirit. But neither these ecclesial 
structures nor the church itself are objects of faith precisely because they are created 
realities. They have meaning only in relation to and in dependence on the Holy Spirit. It 
is for this reason that structures, institutions, order, traditions, dogmatic proclamations, 
and so on, can only be life-giving and not become sterile, anachronistic, oppressive, 
alienating, or exclusionary, if and only if they are continually dependent on the Spirit. 
For it is the Spirit who makes them come alive and become living traditions and 
institutions by being responsive to the signs of the times and attentive to the new ways 
and places where the Spirit is at work. Sensitiveness to and dependence on the Spirit who 
blows where, when, and how she wills invite traditions to constant self-criticism, 
translation, revision, reinterpretation, and creativity. For this is what makes a tradition a 
living tradition (a dynamic traditio and not a static tradita) because, in this way, it is able 
to proffer relevant answers to questions arising from new contexts and new situations or 
otherwise risk paling into insignificance and irrelevancy. Attentiveness to the workings 
of the Spirit warrant that traditions be changed or be adapted to fit new situations and 
current needs. This does not also mean that traditions or beliefs only matter in the face of 
novel circumstances.
122
 In fact, they impact on our everyday life and quotidian 
experiences; they “are constantly exerting pressure on all that we know and do;” and in 
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most if not all instances, they profoundly shape “not only how we perceive our world but 
also how we engage and respond to it.”123 By and large, it is about faith seeking to 
understand itself better in the light of emergent contexts and situations.     
 Therefore, identity and the truth of any religion are best discovered only in going 
beyond itself (the religion) in the encounter and engagement with other faith claims. The 
other remains a mystery since that other cannot be exhausted in advance and so opens the 
possibility of new awareness and understanding in the encounter. Indeed, it is the other 
that brings about the finding of the identity of the self; that is to say, identity is neither 
static nor possessed in an essentialist fashion, it is rather constructed in and gifted by the 
encounter.
124
 For without the other, the self ends up in an aching melancholic loneliness 
and narcissistic vision of the self. Authentic personhood is “being” understood as 
communion,
125
 being-in-relationship in accordance with the African axiom, “I am 
because we are and we are because I am.” Precisely as the subject of freedom and 
awareness, one’s personality develops as one becomes aware and relates to others as 
equally other centers of freedom, value, significance, and awareness. As we have amply 
demonstrated in Chapter 3, it is the relational and life-giving Spirit who creates and 
constitutes the interrelatedness and interconnectedness of the created order in a cosmic 
harmony.
126
 The relational Spirit is thus the creator and constructor of personality, 
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drawing human persons ever further beyond themselves, to give of themselves to others. 
She is indeed, the principle of “beyondness,”127 ever drawing us beyond ourselves into 
deeper relationships with others and with the world. This work of drawing out into 
deeper relationships and interconnectedness is a unique role of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit 
draws us out beyond ourselves in order to creatively engage the other; to use our 
actualized destinies for the well-being of others; and possibly, to dislodge or overcome 
whatever oppresses or prevents them from actualizing their own destinies.   
 AICs know very well this work of the Spirit and have tapped into these helpful 
elements of African ancestral heritage to make themselves real familial communities of 
brotherhood/ sisterhood where everyone is cared for and recognized for who they are 
with regard to their charisms in the spirit of relationality and solidarity. Whereas, in most 
mainline missionary churches (ensuing from their colonial legacies), there hangs a pall of 
anonymity and an apparent loss of African communalistic and familistic root 
paradigm.
128
 In AICs, the previously marginalized and subalternized have been given 
both visibility and audibility. In this way, AICs have shown that ATR can creatively and 
fruitfully engage Christianity in a way that benefits and enriches both. Unlike 
Christendom and mainline missionary churches which have always subordinated women 
and have continued to wield the coloniality of power in oppressive and repressive ways, 
for instance, AICs rather harness the dynamism, the plurality, and relational tenets of 
ATR (in which women could be priestesses) in a way that empowers everybody (women, 
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men, young, and old). This remains a challenge to the mainline churches in Africa in 
general and especially to the Nigerian Catholic Church in particular where a conservative 
hierarchy and clergy still exercise authority in a Tridentine fashion. It is also a reminder 
that because the Christian faith of a majority of African Christians (whether they are 
conscious or unconscious of it) is formed against the backdrop of ATR, therefore, its 
(ATR’s) religious and spiritual presuppositions must be taken seriously by any African 
Christian theology. Accordingly, all that is being accomplished in AICs is attributed to 
the work of the Spirit who determines who should be what (whether man or woman) in 
these churches. Keeping in mind this emphasis on the Spirit, we now explore certain 
ecclesiological implications of an African relational pneumatology.   
5.7 African Relational Pneumatology: Ecclesiological Implications 
 From all that has been said so far in this work, it should be evident that any 
treatment of pneumatology from an African perspective has to include a relational 
pneumatology of wholeness and abundant life. As explicated above, on the basis of 
relationality as a core tenet and organizing framework of the Etche, and for that matter, 
West African cosmo-religious space, wholeness embraces the integral wellbeing of not 
only the individual but also the community, the society, and indeed, the whole cosmic 
order. Since all of these are interconnected and complementary, true religion, according 
to John Pobee, “requires a person to show deep and genuine concern for the well-being 
of…[all].129 Wholeness and health touch on the physical, psychological, socio-economic, 
political, spiritual, and ecological dimensions of human existence in the world.    
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 Clearly, on the path toward integral wellbeing is the realization of destiny. But 
even the realization of destiny is comprehensible only within the matrix of relationality. 
Indeed, Eboussi Boulaga seemingly conceives destiny in terms of death; to die to 
oneself, to one’s individuality, to one’s private consciousness, and thus, to become a 
presence henceforward to and for others and the community.
130
 Relationality not only 
guides the relationship between God as the Unoriginate Origin and the entire creation but 
is also the determining criterion of interaction among the different beings that populate 
West African cosmo-religious universe. Reality is construed in a holistic sense as a 
complex interplay of multidimensions irreducible simply to a monistic, universalistic, or 
dualistic perspective. The oftentimes overemphasized necessity of holiness on earth (in 
Christianity) in order to reach heaven, undoubtedly, tends to “drive a wedge between the 
sacred and the secular, the former representing God, the latter the world, as if the latter 
had no real value in relation to the former.”131 The Etche and West African world-views 
rather conceive the universe in sacramental terms and that the whole of life and indeed, 
all of reality, are to be seen in the light of God’s relational love and engagement with 
humanity and the world. To be sure, the “unseen powers are held to be active also in the 
natural world.”132 This understanding dethrones abstract absolutism. Beyond monism, 
dualism, universalism/ uniformism that disregards the dignity of equality-in-difference, 
reality is composed of a dynamic, fluid complex unity. This relational conception of 
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reality has its source in the relational sovereignty of God whose dynamic rather than 
static hierarchy allows for the devolution of power to the divinities, spirits, and 
ancestors. Within this God’s relational dynamic sovereignty, the wide dispersal of power 
allows for “power-with,” plurilateral collaboration, participation, and hence, for 
solidarity and freedom rather than a unidimensional consumerism. In this relational 
framework which creates space for pluriversality, flexibility, and multiplicity, the 
multiplicity of spirits speaks to God’s manifold ways of executing or fulfilling his 
universal salvific purpose andthe actualization of destinies in life with regard to the 
wellbeing of humanity and all creation.        
 The Etche/West African cosmo-religious conception of God’s dynamic 
sovereignty and diffusion of power, in a way, preserves God’s hiddenness or 
transcendence. God’s presence is neither experienced as a direct presence nor is it 
limited to any particular privileged place but rather pervasive. God’s mode of relating to 
humans and the world is experienced as a presence-absence or a transcendence-
immanence. God who is pervasively present through the Universal Spirit is at the same 
time distant. This way of conceiving God preserves the divine mystery without reducing 
God to an idol contrary to the early missionary impulse and to the current fulfillment 
paradigm of the Catholic Church (which tends to suggest that we can control or 
manipulate where or not God is to be fully present). If God’s love and infinite goodness 
is made available to everyone and to all peoples, then ATR is no exception. The human 
orientation to the divine which, of course, is always originally initiated by the divine 
itself, is no prerogative of any group or tradition. As Bernard Lonergan puts it: “it is the 
grace that God offers to all humans that underpins what is good in the religions of 
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humankind….”133 Perhaps it is worth stressing that this pervasive presence of God’s 
immanence in the world mediated by the Spirit is, in all circumstances, a saving grace.
134
 
An awareness of the pervasive availability of saving grace allows for openness to 
plurality and collaboration in the understanding of the fulfilling of divine economy. Such 
a relational understanding projects an African matrix that internally constitutes not only a 
rich repertoire of wisdom, knowledge, deep mystical and spiritual experience, but also a 
vital space for welcoming otherness and diverse modes of reasoning, creativity and other 
perspectives from without. Furthermore, the hiddenness of God allows for the 
actualization of human destiny and responsibility, as well as for the translatability and 
reconfiguration of narratives in the light of the encounter with other cultures in a 
dynamic and pluralistic context.       
 With regard to human destiny, the Etche and other West African anthropological 
assumptions present an interesting perspective. An important concept in the Etche 
anthropological framework is what is known as chi. Chi, as indicated in Chapter 2,
135
 is a 
term which captures, among others, all that God has in store for each person from 
conception: gifts, talents, fortune, plans, and indeed, destiny.  However, even though a 
person is assigned a unique chi (as destiny) at conception, the Etche also believe that 
God equally sends his own spirit (that is, chi as guardian-spirit) to indwell that person in 
order to guard, administer, activate, and implement God’s plans and destiny for that 
person. The guardian-spirit as chi, without seeking to conflate all persons into sameness, 
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rather activates and empowers each particular person to actualize his/her own distinctive 
possibilities, peculiar gifts, talents, and indeed, specific destiny. Chi is thus the symbol of 
individual creativity. Individuals are the architects of their own destiny, albeit, in 
collaboration with their guardian-spirit, for “onye kwe chi ya ekwe” (by implication, if 
one is not ready to actualize one’s destiny, neither will one’s chi do otherwise), and one 
can actually bargain or negotiate with one’s chi. The upshot is that the guardian-spirit 
mobilizes each person to use his/her actualized particular destiny for the service of others 
and the community. Put another way, destiny realization always has a social orientation. 
Again, it is also interesting to note that the divinities and other spirits, depending on their 
area of competency, can mount or possess certain individuals in order to call them to 
special vocations, for example, as dibias, priests/priestesses, diviners, and healers. Such 
vocations usually require some form of apprenticeship over a period of time in order to 
be equipped through the actualization of such vocation and to in turn use it to serve 
others.
136
 By and large, the spirit engenders persons to go beyond themselves and to 
dissipate themselves for others; to use their actualized destinies to defend and promote 
life, and to dislodge all evil and death-dealing forces; and to ensure wholeness and 
cosmic harmony in our interconnected world. Each person is therefore, considered to be 
of value and with actualized destinies that have a social and cosmic orientation.   
 Additionally, an Etche apothegm says: “chi abughi otu” meaning that chi is not 
one but that there is a multiplicity of chi in the sense that each person is uniquely and 
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differently gifted and endowed by God.  Through the modality of beyondness and self-
dissipation for others, everybody and the community benefit from actualized individual 
particular destinies.If one of the ways to the divine is by prayer, self-sacrifice, and love 
of one’s neighbor (including the stranger, Oghaghaa), then one might even describe 
these as acts of faith insofar as they are oriented to the Mystery who is both love and awe 
(tremendum et fascinans).
137
 Faith, as Lonergan suggests, is “the eye of religious love, an 
eye that can discern God’s self-disclosure.”138 Through the actualization of destiny, a 
person becomes oriented toward love of others and God particularly in the case of the 
Oghaghaa as revelatory of Divinity. Thus love of God is inseparable from love of others. 
The actualization of destiny enables love through self-transcendence and self-dissipation. 
Since one of the fruits of the Universal Holy Spirit is love, then one here discovers or 
rather discerns in Etche/West African religious space, evidence of the presence or 
working of the Holy Spirit and what is truly of God because God is love. John, in his 
Epistle is right on target when he writes: “‘let us love one another, for love comes from 
God. Everyone who loves has been born of God and knows God. Whoever does not love 
does not know God, because God is love.’ ‘No one has ever seen God; but if we love one 
another, God lives in us and his love is made complete in us.’ ‘God is love. Whoever 
lives in love lives in God, and God in him’” (1 Jn 5:7-8,12,16). At the heart of Etche 
religious universe, therefore, is self-transcendence obtained through destiny realization 
for love of God and neighbor. Although there may be aberrations sometimes, such do not 
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detract from the positive use of destiny. Destiny realization thus promotes relationality 
and diversity which lie at the core of human-divine confrontation. When individuals in a 
community or society realize their destinies and put them at the service of all, then, the 
society itself, by so doing, realizes its collective destiny especially under the guidance of 
good leadership.         
 In the light of these excellent qualities of spirit-experience in Etche/West African 
cosmo-religious matrix, an authentic African Christian pneumatology will not be 
complete without appropriating and cross-fertilizing itself with them. One sees in such a 
pneumatology a rich source for renewing the church, a church that will become an agent 
of social transformation and the re-envisioning and building of a new and healthy 
African society. If chi is a symbol of destiny, creativity, and resourcefulness for 
reinventing our future, and if we are all endowed with it, what then has been stifling our 
creativity as Africans? Could it be that the radical value and core tenet of relationality 
has been eroded away by the onslaughts of neoliberal individualism and the tyranny of 
enduring coloniality and corruption? What can we do to overcome all the forces of evil, 
death, and decay that have been stifling our creativity in order to transform our societies? 
How can the church be instrumental toward this needed change and transformation? In 
what follows, these questions will guide our exploration in the light of the relational 
Creator Spirit and Giver of life who is as well the resistant and prophetic God’s Holy 
Spirit. It should be clear at this point that from an African Christian pneumatological 
perspective, the excellent qualities discernible in Etche/West-African spirit experiences 
are assimilated and reworked into the work of the Universal Holy Spirit who has been 
operative in different cultures in manifold ways even before the coming of Christ. But as 
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Christians, the Holy Spirit leads us to Christ, and through him we have access to the 
Father; indeed, “it is through the Spirit that one experiences the Son and the Father.”139 
She is the relational Spirit of communion. And as the Spirit of communion, she does not 
nullify diversity and difference. Indeed, communion is possible because of difference. To 
be sure, what the Spirit of communion engenders is equality-in-difference just as she is 
the principle of communion in the Tri-unity. The ecclesiological implications of this for 
the African church in general and the Nigerian local church in particular cannot be 
overemphasized. In order to avoid speaking too generically, I will focus more on the 
Nigerian context here as a case in point. The following points to be made would serve 
both as a highlight of the issues as well as my suggestions as to a way forward.  
 Areas of Progress: The Nigerian local church that would bear authentic witness 
and be a prophetic instrument for the Spirit the Giver of life in the Nigerian milieu, to my 
mind, has to necessarily actualize its own destiny. There is no question that in the 
aftermath of the recovery of the place and theology of the local church during the Second 
Vatican Council, the Nigerian church has made some progress toward becoming a truly 
local church. I have dealt with this issue elsewhere.
140
 Other areas include the role of 
Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Nigeria (CBCN) in speaking out through a series of 
communiqués in defense of democracy and human rights especially during the 
oppressive military dictatorships in Nigeria; and in the face of ethnic and religious 
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violence and hostility.
141
 These and more are indeed signs of hope for a local church that 
is evolving to become truly viable and relevant to the local concerns and needs of 
Nigerian Christians. However, in certain important and core areas of church life, the 
Nigerian church does not seem to be too ready to radically and boldly become truly a 
local church. Some of those areas and what needs to be done would be highlighted in 
what follows.           
 Ecclesial Structures and Authority: One of such core areas has to do with the 
leadership and power structure of the Nigerian church. Notwithstanding the 
achievements of Vatican II, the pyramidal structure of the Nigerian church (and other 
West African churches) modeled on colonial Christianity, has been, the greatest 
impediment to the emergence of a dynamic adult local church. Aylward Shorter rightly 
avers: “The [African] churches seem to be very reluctant to change, operating as they do 
through outmoded authoritarian structures and impersonal law systems”142 bequeathed as 
colonial Christian legacies. It is not an overstatement that the Nigerian church hierarchy 
or leadership is too power and authority conscious and operates according to a command 
structure that remains faithful to European feudalistic Christianity with no sign of 
readiness for change by de-cloaking itself of such enervating garb. This is a reminder 
that coloniality is still well and alive everywhere and in our time. Such a structure 
continues to stifle local creativity, initiative, critical thinking, and responsibility—in 
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order to keep in step with doctrinal assertions
143
 that oftentimes have not the 
African/Nigerian contexts in mind in their phraseology—without which a dynamic and 
mature local church may not emerge. All this is in a bid to be more in conformism to 
Rome than a bold effort to confront the local situation. Hence, Roma locuta est causa 
finita appears to be the lodestar as the Nigerian church leadership tends to cling to an 
uncritical conservatism and traditionalism
144
 at the expense of new interpretations and 
radical reworking of an inherited post-Western Christianity that is increasingly becoming 
a World Christianity. The Nigerian church appears to have taken refuge in conservatism 
perhaps as the only way to preserve the unity of the church. What is eliminated from 
view is that “the role of the church is not to preserve unity at all costs”145 but to preach 
and stand by the liberating good news at all costs, and sometimes at the cost of unity 
(especially imposed unity that has no relevance to a local context). After all, Jesus was 
not concerned to preserve unity at all costs: “Do not suppose that I have come to bring 
peace to the earth. I did not come to bring peace, but a sword. For I have come to turn a 
man against his father, a daughter against her mother, a daughter-in-law against her 
mother-in-law; a man’s enemies will be the members of his own household” (Matt 
10:34-36). Jesus did not ignore the status quo in order to preserve unity at all costs. How 
can a truly local church emerge and actualize its own destiny if it does not take a bold 
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step to unleash its own creative imagination and unsubjugate its own epistemic potential 
that have been subalternized for too long? Decolonizing church structures in the Nigerian 
church today remains, according to Chukwudum Okolo, an imperative.
146
   
 Perhaps it might be helpful to suggest that for the church in Africa on the whole 
and in Nigeria in particular to bear credible prophetic witness to Christ and to be 
instrument for the life-giving Spirit, it needs to seriously reform its leadership structures 
especially in the light of traditional African leadership structures.
147
 Besides, to my mind, 
church structures would benefit from the dynamic, relational, pluralist, dispersed, and 
collaborative model as I have delineated in Etche/West African cosmo-religious 
universe. For a church that must contribute to the transformation of the legacy of the 
coloniality of power which has simply metamorphosed into neocolonial autochthonous 
oppressive elitism in Nigeria and Africa; for a church that must be instrumental in 
working out an alternative for the building of a new African society, transforming its 
own authoritarian and power conscious structures is a necessity.      
 Autonomy and Financial Self-Reliance: Another core area where the Nigerian 
church has been failing to grow into an adult status as a local church is in the aspect of 
financial self-reliance. Recognizing the paramount importance of this with regard to 
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autonomy, it is no wonder that the church of East Africa, for instance, under the auspices 
of Association of Member Episcopal Conferences of East Africa (AMECEA) made a 
resolution to groom their own autonomy expressed in a three-point initiative: to become 
a responsible church that would be self-ministering, self-propagating, and self-
supporting. It is not surprising that the East African church has made more progress in 
terms of reworking Christianity in the light of local needs. Apart from more inculturation 
and theological exploration taking place there, one of the areas of serious progress 
include the establishment of Small Christian Communities (SCCs) in 1976 for grass-
roots mobilization of the church. But this very initiative is also imperiled by the problem 
of clerical exercise of power and control.  A lot more is required not only for the 
Nigerian church but for all African churches. The veracity of the maxim that “he who 
pays the piper dictates the tune” cannot be truer in the Nigerian, and for that matter, the 
African context. I have equally treated elsewhere the issue of the funding of all African 
bishops entirely by the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples and its 
implications for the local church.
148
 It only needs to be said that “this type of scenario 
undoubtedly creates a vicious circle of dependency which saps the African church 
leadership of the nerve for boldness, self-confidence, and for standing its ground in the 
face of contentious issues”149 as well as in engaging African creative imagination in 
experimenting in order to give Christianity a true and not artificial African face. The 
Nigerian/African church cannot contribute effectively in fashioning a new destiny for the 
African society if does not first of all reform its own structures and take control of its 
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own creative ingenuity and power of imagination.      
 Therefore, we suggest that the Nigerian church should seek for ways to become 
more self-supporting in order to overcome the whole mentality of mendicancy and logic 
of extroversion (always looking outward for the scraps falling from the master’s table). It 
needs to achieve a certain level of self-reliance for its normal organization and for the 
task of promoting every aspect of its catechesis and overall evangelization without 
looking outward. I do not intend here to suggest that not looking outward is antipathetic 
to relationality or the “beyondness” inspired by the relational Spirit. Rather, it is a way of 
insisting that any outward orientation has to be about solidarity of others—which is 
devoid of any form of paternalism that creates dependency—necessary to engaging in 
such relationships genuinely within the matrix of equality-in-difference. Undoubtedly, 
genuine friendship is only possible within a framework of a balance of power, lest it 
degenerates into an ideology, domination, and totalization. It is understandable in times 
of emergency that the church can receive from elsewhere and perhaps for special tasks; 
but not for Nigerian/African bishops to rely or depend greatly on the outside by carrying 
caps in hand begging Rome and the churches in Europe and North America for its 
funding. Until the Nigerian church becomes financially self-reliant, the leadership will 
continue to be timid and fearful of making bold and radical attempts in carving a niche 
for its own contextual theologies (as it seeks to understand and express its own concrete 
lived faith experiences), church life, structures, catechesis, spirituality, and so forth. It is 
time to start resisting and rejecting the disguised ecclesiastical economic structures that 
support the coloniality of power with its production of knowledge about Africa as a 
perpetual mission territory. As Matthew Kukah has admonished, we must not “continue 
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to pretend that we can found an African church without proposing a comprehensive 
programme of economic survival in Africa.”150 This must be the course of action in order 
to liberate African churches from the clutches of paternalism and to break the cycle of 
dependency. The African churches will continue to be emasculated and their dignity and 
self-respect remain elusive until they attain a certain level of economic self-reliance. Kä 
Mana is right in saying that when a people, and for that matter, a church, fails to 
actualize its own destiny and claim its autonomy, then no one takes it seriously: “When a 
people exhibits a lack of faith in their own worth, they devalue themselves and are 
reduced to an inferior status where they receive and do not give in return. This gives 
others the impression that they have nothing to offer or that what they have to give is so 
insignificant that it does not add any value to their presence in the world.”151 It is 
difficult to disagree with Marx that the one who controls the material or economic power 
(structure) also controls the spiritual power.       
 Unless the Nigerian church is able to actualize its own destiny which fosters its 
own autonomy, it would not be able to go beyond itself to adequately help others to 
actualize theirs. It is only by striving to attain certain level of self-reliance that the 
Nigerian local church can become a giving church to other local churches in more need. 
The church will be hampered or will fail to bear authentic prophetic witness especially in 
the current Nigerian situation where people are confronted with the dead-dealing forces 
of corruption, hunger, poverty, and other spiritual malaise in need of healing and 
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wholeness without becoming self-reliant and self-reforming. A church that actualizes its 
own destiny is not afraid of engaging in prophetic witness. The outpouring of the Spirit 
is for boldness, not timidity, and to jolt the church to move beyond itself to reach out and 
to dissipate itself for others, to proclaim salvation and liberation in continuation of the 
mission and in imitation of Jesus who was anointed and sent by the Spirit to preach the 
good news to the poor, liberty to captives, freedom to the oppressed, and to give away 
himself completely for others.         
 Middle-Class Image and Alignment with Power: Because of the inability of the 
Nigerian church to attain a certain level of self-support, among other things, there have 
been, not infrequently, cases of recourse to politicians who dole out fat cash and material 
gifts to churches; the same duplicitous politicians who embezzle public funds meant for 
the development and wellbeing of their people. Perhaps a certain prestige and other 
fringe benefits that come with forging such unwholesome ties with those in the corridors 
of power may have been stifling the churches’ prophetic power to subvert life-denying 
forces. This remains a part of the legacy of coloniality which goes back to the colonial 
times when the missionary churches “often worked closely with the colonial government 
in various areas….”152 In connection with the alignment of most of those missionaries of 
Africa and the colonial powers, Shorter observes with candor “that the flag followed the 
cross in the initial process of colonization.”153 Although active colonialism is ended, and 
today, we have historic churches led by African church leaders; the truth of the matter 
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remains that there still has been, according Dickson, “a tendency, consciously or 
unconsciously, to perpetuate something of that colonial era alignment between the 
church and the ruling powers. For one thing the church in Africa tends to have a middle-
class image.”154          
 In our post-colonial times, the Christian church today, particularly in Nigeria, 
continues to perpetuate the coloniality of power that characterized the church in the 
colonial situation.
155
 It is not surprising that beyond denunciations in communiqués by 
the Nigerian church leadership, prophetic witness, in the face of injustice and 
unacceptable poverty in the midst of plenty, is negligible if not nonexistent. It is also not 
surprising that certain church officials sing the praises of politicians instead of standing 
up practically and prophetically against their political abuses. Whatever constitutes 
obstacles in the way of people’s actualizing their God given destiny and wellbeing must 
never be tolerated by the church. If the Nigerian church must become an instrument for 
the life-giving and resistant Spirit, then it must go beyond mere verbal communiqué
156
 
denunciations to a more active commitment in the struggles of the people. Most church 
officials, because of the structure or mechanism through which they are provided for, are 
shielded from the actual quotidian experiences of their poor flock in the society. In point 
of fact, it has been noted that “Some bishops have actually ceased to be pastors and ‘have 
become mini governors [as in a political sense], ruling vast conglomerate of agencies and 
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offices and schools….’”157 Church leaders as shepherds must realize that they are called 
to serve and to give away themselves totally for others rather than to be served or be self-
serving. For self-interest and aggrandizement, church leadership—either in the church 
itself, in Religious Houses and Congregations, or in other ecclesiastical institutions—has 
not infrequently been enmeshed in the throes of dirty politics in the church all in a bid to 
cling to power. In this way, it cannot bear effective prophetic witness that would 
transform society. If the Nigerian church must be a credible witness then, we suggest, it 
must not only be a church of the poor but also a church on the side of the poor, the 
marginalized, and the powerless and voiceless by sharing much more intimately in their 
miseries and sufferings. The Nigerian church leadership, to be credible, must “have a 
fuller understanding of living in the Holy Spirit, for this also means being committed to a 
lifestyle of solidarity with the poor and oppressed and involvement in action with 
them.”158 This is what it means to say that the church is the “Flesh of Christ,” the 
sacrament of Christ, as aforementioned.       
 The Challenge of Holistic Gospel: The Nigerian church must appropriate the 
values of ATR and as assimilated by AICs. ATR has a more holistic view of life and 
reality in the sense that religion is not limited to the supernatural but actually 
interpenetrates every segment of life and creation as a sacramental universe. This saves 
ATR and AICs from Marx’s indictment of religion as the opium of the masses. As Jean-
Marc Èla has put it succinctly: “Here religion is not reducible to a relationship with the 
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supernatural. It emerges as a social force as well. It provides the wherewithal for a 
protest against the established order.”159 It is in this way that the Nigerian church 
becomes a leaven. In order for the church’s prophetic denunciations to be valid, incisive, 
effective, and to not be reduced to mere hollow booming gongs, then they must emerge 
truly and “only from within the heart of the struggle for a more human world.”160 Only 
by sharing intimately in the sufferings of the people and participating deeply in their 
struggles against oppression, domination, poverty, and injustice “can we understand the 
implications of the gospel message and make it have an impact in history. The preaching 
of the word will be empty and ahistorical if it tries to avoid this dimension.”161 Donatus 
Udoette is right on the mark when he underlines: “If the message of the Gospel is to be 
good news to the poor it has to be accompanied by practical solutions to the problems of 
the poor. In fact, verbal preaching of the good news and its concrete realization by way 
of alleviating the deplorable human conditions of the poor are inseparable.”162 Again, the 
church has often taken refuge in rituals, liturgy, and sacramental celebrations that are 
divorced from the hard realities of quotidian experiences of the people. Did not the Old 
Testament prophets repudiate and “confront the religious establishment of their own time 
with the irrelevance, emptiness, and even the blasphemy of their sacrifices and 
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ceremonies”163 while being blind to injustice and lack of right judgment? (cf. Isa 1:11-
17; 58:1-12; Jer 6:19-20; Amos 5:21-24). The church engages in this role in society not 
because it (the church) is an alternative to political structure and power but simply as a 
part and parcel of its mission in service of the public good. In a very fascinating and 
reassuring way, the post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation, Africae Munus captures it all 
when it states that in faithfulness to the lesson of life Christ taught us (which includes not 
only the gift of abundant life through the Spirit but also the prophetic resistance to 
whatever diminishes that life), the church in Africa:  
feels the duty to be present wherever human suffering exists and to make heard 
thesilent cry of the innocentwho suffer persecution, or of peoples whose 
governments mortgage the present and the future for personal interests. Through 
her ability to seethe face of Christ on the face of children, the sick, the needy and 
those who suffer, the Church is helping slowly but surely to forge a new Africa. 
In her prophetic role, whenever peoples cryout to her: “Watchman, what of the 
night?” (Is 21:11), the Church wants to be readyto give a reason for the hope she 
bears within her (cf. 1 Pet 3:15), because a new dawn is breaking on the horizon 
(cf. Rev 22:5). Only by rejecting people’s dehumanization and every compromise 
prompted by fear of suffering or martyrdom can thecause of the Gospel of truth be 
served.
164
   
      
This very important statement has profound implications for the Nigerian and 
African church. The lesson of life which Jesus taught us is, among others, that he 
matched his words with deed/action. He did not speak in one way and act another way. 
He spoke out in defense of the subaltern, the oppressed, the marginalized, the silenced, 
and the rejected of the society in his time from both social and especially religious 
oppression and suppression (in the name of purity of religious traditions of the system of 
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purity and holiness). Indeed, “Jesus identified himself with the victims of oppression, 
thus exposing the reality of sin. Liberating them from the power of sin and reconciling 
them with God and with one another, he restored them to the fullness of their 
humanity.”165 One of the reasons for his martyrdom was not only his predilection for the 
poor, the so-called sinners, and the excluded, but more so because of his solidarity and 
total identification with them. This brought him into conflicts with the establishment and 
the powers that be. To be sure, “what brought Jesus to his death…is precisely the 
coherence [of his] message and commitment.” 166 Martyrdom today entails the church 
leadership dying to itself, dissipating itself, and not merely in predilection for the poor 
and the oppressed suffering, but in actual concrete gesture of standing up for the poor 
against the established order even to the point of death. Unless and until church 
shepherds, in imitation of Christ, are ready to die in defense of the poor and oppressed in 
the power of the Spirit, as well as inextricably engaged in the mission “for the realization 
of the wholeness of the human person,”167 the transformation of African society will keep 
receding from the horizon.  The fear of martyrdom or suffering, we suggest, must not 
make the church balk at preaching the good news and announcing the reign of God with 
all its scandal. The Gospel message should prophetically unveil sin that lies at the roots of 
social evils and injustice, and call it by its name as well as its perpetrators. This is what 
the church is empowered by the prophetic and resistant Spirit to do in order to unearth 
and perhaps to overcome the alienations that rupture our koinonia as the adopted children 
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of the one Father. For without doing this, then the perpetrators will carry on oppressing 
and exploiting, and the apathy of those who sin by doing nothing will go on 
unchallenged.         
The Challenge of Diversity and the Empowerment of the Laity: From a 
relational pneumatological vantage point, the Nigerian church is invited to recognize 
difference and diversity. This applies both ad intra and ad extrain relation to the church. 
Internally, the Spirit of communion invites a model of being church in which both the 
institutional and charismatic aspects and gifts which are both coinstituted by Christ and 
the Spirit are organized and put at the service of the community. The outpouring of the 
Spirit anoints and empowers all for service to the common good.  As Apostle Paul says it: 
“Now there are varieties of gifts, but the same Spirit; and there are varieties of service, 
but the same Lord; and there are varieties of working, but it is the same God who inspires 
them all in every one. To each is given the manifestation of the Spirit for the common 
good” (1 Cor 12:4-7). Nigerian church leadership must come to appreciate the 
significance of this biblical teaching coupled with the African relational understanding of 
reality as has been amply x-rayed in this corpus: “I am because we are and we are 
because I am.” We all need the gift of each other for the good of all. This means also that 
“One can never be a Christian alone. The gifts given by the Lord to each – bishops, 
priests, deacons and religious, catechists and lay people – must all contribute to harmony, 
communion and peace in the Church herself and in society.”168 This also means that each 
person, especially the lay faithful must be given the opportunity to actualize and use their 
own gifts maximally in the building up of the church without the clergy feeling 
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threatened and clamping down on them. While proper discernment must not be neglected, 
ulterior motives must not be disguised to quench the Spirit. Rather, wherever and in 
whomever the Spirit is at work, the church is invited to join in and celebrate it. A 
Nigerian local church of the future that would be viable and stand the test of time is a 
church that harnesses the talents of all the members especially the lay faithful by 
involving them at the level of church decision-making and implementation as well as in 
the very process of defining what authentic Christian faith is about, rather than being 
treated as mere spectators of the clergy. Vatican II is right in designating the church the 
“people of God” which includes both clergy and the laity. The model of the church as the 
people of God invites that sensitiveness and respect must be shown to the human dignity 
and equality of all the people in the church by virtue of the common baptism of all in 
Christ. The Nigerian church is challenged to become a family of God expanded beyond 
kinship ties by the Holy Spirit through whom we have become the adopted daughters and 
sons of the one Father in Christ; a family where everyone is made welcomed in spite of 
our differences.          
 In addition, part of the empowerment of the laity that would foster a virile 
Nigerian local church is for the leadership of the church to educate the laity on their 
rights both ecclesiastical/canonical rights as well as civil rights. Our lay men and women 
who are not schooled in the seminary have no clue to what their rights and obligations as 
enshrined in canon law are all about. Many of us who never passed through law schools 
and colleges in Nigeria are ignorant of what our constitutional and civil rights are because 
they are not taught in our primary and secondary schools at least even rudimentarily. In 
this way, our people perish for lack of knowledge as both the clergy and the political 
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elites take advantage of this ignorance to be insensitive to the dignity of the people. The 
onus rests on the church leadership to educate the faithful properly to their rights 
(canonical and civil). Catechesis and evangelization should go beyond mere 
memorization of catechism and doctrines, beyond mere verbal preaching to enabling the 
people to discover their own ability and agency to organize themselves, protect their own 
basic rights, and take control of their own future by holding their leaders, ecclesiastical 
and civil, accountable.
169
         
 In the face of today’s circumstances, for the Nigerian church to become a virile 
local community, pastoral agents must confront the issue of empowering the people. 
Everything we do must involve conscientizing and convincing “the people that they can 
change their situation, and…restore their power”170 to resist oppression and injustice.  
Civic education (not necessarily formal) is a key avenue that can bring about this needed 
change. An educated faithful would be an asset to the church to the society. Another 
aspect of this empowerment and education of the faithful is for pastoral agents to 
incorporate a program aimed at transforming the imagination of Nigerians with 
alternative narratives. The Nigerian imagination is one that has been battered and warped 
so much by corruption, beginning from the colonial times through the long regimes of 
military dictatorships to the dawn of duplicitous neocolonial political elites, that it has 
become a tragic evil. The cankerworm that Kä Mana describes as “the dictatorship of the 
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belly” 171has come to have a firm grip on the Nigerian psyche. Men and women in both 
public and private service are ready to devalue themselves and accept the unacceptable in 
view of the quest for quick wealth. This is, of course, what the people see the politicians 
do everyday as they cart away public funds in bags to stash away and to line their private 
pockets. The abnormal has become normalized as most people no more appear to take 
objection to such an anomaly. Rather, most people strive to become politicians or to be 
affiliated to a politician so as to get a piece of the national cake as the shortest path to get 
rich quick. That is why some communities are ready to reward a politician from their 
constituency with chieftaincy titles for embezzling from the public coffer and not 
necessarily because of what he has done for his community in terms of development.  
 This devaluation of values has assumed astronomical proportions and the 
degeneration is no longer excusable. Such traditional values as hardwork, honor, and the 
reward for hardwork seem to have had the epitaph laid on their grave a long time ago. 
Because the imagination is so distorted and the people are not ready to hold their leaders 
accountable, little wonder they are ready to allow dubious politicians who only think and 
care about their selfish interest to deceive them with paltry gifts of money to shortchange 
their only power for change, their right to vote. At other times, the same politicians who 
want to grab the reins of power either by hook or by crook, resort to politicizing religious 
and ethnic differences for cheap political gains and get away with it at all times. Not 
surprisingly, the Cameroonian philosopher-theologian, Eboussi Boulaga rightly says: “the 
people have the leaders they deserve.”172 The same people who go to churches on Sunday 
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are some of the people who on Monday morning accept bribe in their offices in order to 
render service to someone. Meanwhile, they still receive their salary at the end of the 
month. It is even worst in the educational sector as teachers would not pass students be 
they most brilliant in the class except if they give him bribe and buy his handouts. The 
virus is everywhere in every sector. The driving factor behind all this, to my mind, is the 
quest for quick wealth without hardwork. It is this very dictatorship of the belly that is 
also behind the terrible phenomenon of 419 (obtaining by trick) that has sadly given 
Nigeria a bad image in the world. Because of 419 more so than any other, Nigeria is as 
one the countries on the United States’ FBI crime list. The Nigerian church has enormous 
responsibility to begin a program of transformation of imagination by educating 
especially the young and the next generation on the importance of values and virtues such 
as relationality, hardwork, faith in oneself and the courage to be oneself, promotion of 
human dignity and creativity, the courage to dream big and for the long term, rectitude, 
patience and perseverance shunning shortcuts, the courage to think beyond oneself (to 
think of how one’s actualized destiny may benefit others and ones country), hospitality 
and friendship, respect for difference, respect for the rule of law, and above all, love of 
God and neighbor. This is a death-dealing situation that invites an urgent attention and 
the sooner the Nigerian church leadership recognizes it and rises to the occasion, the 
better for the society. Emphasis on narratives that embody virtues such as those 
enumerated above would go a long way to help in unlearning these bizarre habits and 
transforming the imagination. This situation calls for the church to become an instrument 
for the life-giving Spirit, to become a catalyst for changing lives and a ferment for 
bringing to birth a new society. The Nigerian imagination is groaning in birth pangs, 
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waiting for liberation and to be recreated anew by the Creator and life-giving Spirit. “Let 
anyone who has ears listen to what the Spirit is says to the churches!” (Rev 2:7). The 
church is urgently summoned to this task of building a new Nigeria, and a new African 
society.      
The Challenge of Interreligious Dialogue and Ecumenism: Ad extra, the 
Nigerian church will become truly a local church and find its own identity only by 
engaging other faith perspectives both in ecumenical and interreligious encounter. From 
colonial times Nigeria has been home to different Christian traditions as they were 
transplanted from Europe in their splintered conditions and groupings. Ever since then, 
numerous other Christian groups initiated in Africa (AICs) have also emerged on the 
scene. Islam has also been there and, as a matter of fact, preceded the advent of 
Christianity in Nigeria.
173
 Nevertheless, there are still many in Nigeria who practice ATR 
and those who have no religious persuasion whatsoever. However, as we have established 
above, the Universal Holy Spirit is operative in the whole world as well as in non-
Christian religions. It becomes an invitation to the Nigerian church to become truly local 
by discovering how to live and witness to its own Christian faith in the context of such a 
religious plurality in Nigeria. This calls for mutual respect, cooperation, and solidarity of 
others in the common action of working to resist oppression, injustice, poverty, and the 
transformation of society. The church has a lot to learn from ATR through cross-
fertilization. One such great quality is the value of tolerance, flexibility, and openness to 
plurality characteristic of God’s dynamic hierarchy.      
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 In Etche and other West African cosmo-religious narratives, there exists no 
theogony or theomachy such as is the case in the Mesopotamian myth of the violent war 
between the gods Marduk  and Tiamat or the Roman myth recounted by James Frazer 
about the god Virbius, the king of the Wood and a lover of Diana the goddess of hunt, 
who possessed the wood by killing the previous king. It becomes glaring that underneath 
“the surface of the culture we like to think civilized,” lay violence and barbarism.174  In 
Etche/West African cosmologies, albeit God enjoys unparalled sovereignty as the Creator 
of all, God is, nonetheless, conceived to be tolerant of and congruous and compatible 
with the coexistence of a multiplicity of other divinities and spirits who participate in his 
devolved and dispersed power. The Supreme God is thus projected as accommodating of 
other deities without usurping their relative independence. It is also this quality of 
welcoming and accommodating that, among others, made ATR to be open to tolerating 
other religions. As Turaki rightly argues: “the ready acceptance of Western civilization, 
Christianity…and Islamic influence proves the fact that the [Nigerian traditional cosmo-
religious and cultural space] was accommodative to others and should not be viewed as 
primitive or inferior.”175 In fact, Sanneh is on target when he presses home the point that 
“Africans best responded to Christianity where the indigenous religions were strongest, 
not weakest, suggesting a degree of compatibility with the gospel;”176 even though Islam, 
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like colonial regimes, was suppressive of indigenous religions with brutal force. Different 
groups may have been involved in conflicts but there was never war in the name of the 
Supreme God of ATR. The whole question of Jihad, holy wars, and Crusade in the name 
of God—which is not only strange but also a scandal to ATR’s concept of a relational 
dynamic sovereignty of God—was introduced by Islam and Christianity with each 
fronting a universal claim to exclusive possession of the only true God. Such an attitude 
dangerously modifies the image of ATR’s God. It also smacks of religious chauvinism 
and hubristic triumphalism which is not only disrespectful and exclusive of otherness, but 
also reduces God to an idol. The unspeakable loss of life and property stemming from a 
series of dastardly Islamic-Christian conflicts in Nigeria has been of epic proportion. A 
proper African Christian inculturation of ATR’s experience of a relational God should 
tame the concept of the god of war prevalent in Islam and the Christian inherited Hebrew 
Scriptures with its narratives of wars and gruesome decimations of whole populations in 
the name of the one true god. This agonistic tendency is still been espoused today, albeit 
in a different form, especially in the militant rhetoric of Nigerian neo-Pentecostalism.
177
 
However, the perennial significance of the Igbo aphorism cannot be underestimated, 
which says: “egbe bere ugo bere; nke si ibe ya ebela, nku kwaa ya” meaning “may the 
eagle perch and may the kite perch; let the one that denies the other the right to perch 
have its wings dislocated.” This is about justice, it is about respect for otherness, it is 
about recognition of difference, it is about hospitality, friendship, and harmonious living. 
Despite their differences, both the eagle and the kite all have their space on the same tree. 
Each has a right to be. It is a reminder that relationality is always the matrix in which 
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difference and identity are constructed, negotiated, and reconstructed. There is little doubt 
that a people who espoused such a wisdom emanating from their lived experience and 
knowledge would be welcoming to other perspectives. The Nigerian church would 
benefit from these values by assimilating and translating them into Christian practice in 
terms of relating with the religious other who is different. Relational pneumatology 
requires that all manner of proselytizing that demonizes another religious perspective (the 
kind espoused by neo-Pentecostalism) in order to win a case for God as though, the 
whole world does not already belong to God, is to be discountenanced. Since West 
African cosmo-religious world-views present a holistic view of interconnected reality, the 
relational Spirit also invites respect for creation and the ecosystem. This issue will be 
taken up in a later work.         
 The Challenge of Deeper Mystical and Spirit Awareness: One more implication 
of relational pneumatology for being church in Nigeria and Africa is that a 
pneumatological vantage point resonates with West African cosmo-religious spirit 
experience. Whether it is as chi or through spirit possession, the notion of spirit in 
Etche/West African experience brings to mind the nearness of God who is approached as 
Spirit. The essence of spirit possession or the bestowal of chi is for the actualization of 
destiny, for human divinization, wellbeing, health, and wholeness in the cosmic 
community as we have illustrated above.  As already noted, health and wholeness are 
important aspects of West African world-view. Health which entails healing, is not 
merely limited to individual but also to social, communal, and cosmic (which embraces 
both creation and the supernatural) relations. Mystical power, as we have seen, is in and 
of itself neutral. But it can be used either negatively to diminish and harm life 
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orpositively to promote life. To the former belong witches, sorcerers, who employ power 
for destructive purposes. To the latter, on the other hand, belong mediums, dibias, 
babalawos, medicine men/women, priests/priestesses, diviners, seers, healers, bone-
setters, and so on. The dibias are mounted by the spirit and empowered to bring healing 
of illnesses, diagnose their root causes (especially those linked to witchcraft, sorcery, nsi 
or poison), and prescribe measures for healing relations with the community, the 
environment, and the supernatural in order to restore harmony. World Christianity in its 
West African repackaging is taking this spirit experience seriously. As Bediako, who has 
always endeavored to put developments in African Christianity and theology within the 
framework of the historical continuum which has always given birth to Christian thought 
in the New Testament through the early church, writes: “An authentic tradition of literary 
Christian scholarship can exist only where a living reality of Christian experience is, and 
is felt to be, relevant to daily life.”178 The experience of the impact of the negative use of 
power for evil purpose as well as the possibility of counteracting such evil through the 
mediation of diviners, dibias, ngangas, has come to play into the narrative of African 
Christian understanding of Jesus’ healing ministry in the Bible. The image of the dibia or 
nganga with regard to holistic healing, liberating power, and restoration of diminished 
human life has been assimilated into African Christianity. Such image and other similar 
concepts open new avenues as they allow a privileged access to African understandings 
of the meaning and relevance of Jesus and God’s Holy Spirit in relation to sin/evil, 
salvation, and liberation. African mystical and spiritual experience constitutes a locus 
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theologicus that calls for critical reflections in order to nurture an authentic local or 
contextual theology.          
 Among West Africans, albeit many have become Christians, the experience of the 
harmful effect of the negative use of mystical power is one that still looms large in their 
consciousness. This is helpful in appreciating the mission of Jesus in the power of the 
Holy Spirit as the Savior, liberator, and healer par excellence in African Christianity. The 
Spirit as the Giver of life anointed Jesus as Savior and as the one who brings integral 
liberation. Thus, during his ministry, Jesus’ mission of liberation included, among others, 
forgiveness of sins, casting out demons, healing the sick, welcoming the excluded, and 
restoring or reintegrating them into the community. Did Jesus not actually stretch out his 
hand to touch and heal lepers who were ostracized and stigmatized (because ritually 
unclean) in the name of purity of tradition and sent them to go and show themselves to 
the priest for reintegration into the community? (cf. Matt 8:1-4; Mk 1:40-44; Lk 5:12-14; 
17:11-14; see Lev 13:1-2,44-46). It is also legitimate to contend that the gesture of Jesus 
stretching out his hand to lepers designated as untouchables without fear of becoming 
ritually unclean himself is a symbol of restoration of friendship and transforming 
exclusive boundaries into sites for hospitality and love. In this way, Jesus did not only 
heal people from their physical, spiritual, and psychological brokenness but also healed 
broken social relationships by restoring the silenced and ultimately, engendering 
reconciliation with God. This is holistic liberation. Perhaps at this point I need to stress 
the fact that Jesus was not merely a miracle or wonderworker. Nor did he simply settle 
for the miraculous. Rather, the miracles, the healings, and exorcisms, were signs as well 
as parts and parcel of his overall mission as the one who definitively inaugurates in 
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history the dawn of the reign of God with its scandals and unmaskings as elaborately 
articulated in Chapter 3. Therefore, it is difficult not to be in agreement with Canadian 
theologian, Diane Stinton, when she writes: “the holistic approach to healing in African 
tradition may foster insight into biblical affirmations regarding Jesus’ healing ministry as 
signifying the inauguration of the kingdom of God in all its individual, corporate, and 
cosmic dimensions.”179         
 Beyond the limitations of modern medical science (without discounting its 
usefulness and advantages) which shows no interest in the social, spiritual, moral, and 
environmental dimensions of integral healing, dibias and healers in African tradition not 
only look at possible physical causes of sickness but also consider the spiritual, 
psychological, social, and cosmic aspects in order to bring about holistic healing. 
Moreover, the traditional conception of the interconnectedness of reality and the 
continual traffic between the invisible and the visible realms engender the belief among 
West Africans that what happens in the physical, social, economic, and political order can 
be influenced spiritually through the manipulation of mystical powers for evil ends. This 
African conception is by no means misplaced. It resonates with the Pauline conception of 
the powers, dominions, thrones, principalities that incarnate physically in political and 
economic structures, institutions, and systems that oppress, dominate, and diminish 
human lives. Walter Wink, Professor of New Testament Interpretation, in his trilogy, has 
labored for years to prove this fact through a painstaking work of getting to the meaning 
of this Pauline theology of powers; he argues that Jesus’ approach to dealing with such 
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evil powers was to name, unmask, and engage them in order to dislodge their 
stranglehold on their victims, however, non-violently.
180
 In African Christianity today, all 
of these qualities are now valorized and assimilated into Jesus as the only one who carries 
them infinitely further in every ramification in the power of the Spirit, and hence, the 
healer and liberator par excellence, and the true giver or restorer of abundant life and 
wholeness wherever they have been diminished. One frequently hears, for instance, 
Nigerian Christians in their prayers address Jesus as: “Dibia ka dibia” meaning “the 
healer, the divine physician or medicine man who is greater than the ordinary medicine 
man because he is God;” or “ogwo mgbe onyiri dibia” meaning “He (Jesus) who cures 
the sickness that the medicine man or doctor is unable to cure.”  In expressions like these, 
the image of the dibia, valorized and assimilated into Jesus truly functions in a 
meaningful way for African Christians in the very “substratum of vital Christian 
experience and consciousness.”181 While this basic African ancestral spiritual and 
mystical assumption functions meaningfully in African Christian experience, at the same 
time, some of those same Christians do not want to be associated with such words as 
dibia, nganga, medicine man, and so on. For such Christians, these words are linked to 
the devil, demons, the occult, juju, superstition, idolatry, syncretism, and so forth. These 
are Christians who have been influenced significantly and, of course, uncritically, either 
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by the domination of the languages of colonial and missionary Christianity or neo-
Pentecostalism. History, however, testifies to the distortion and hostility of colonial 
regimes, Western anthropologists/ philosophers in their evolutionary thought, and 
missionary Christianity toward African traditional values. Everything, including 
traditional healing mechanisms, was dismissed as fetish, devilish, demonic, superstitious, 
idolatrous, black magic, and with an only option to discard it all. This colonial and 
missionary stance imposed a Manichean dualism that is strange to Etche/West African 
religious space which lacks any conception of the Devil as the arch-rival of the Supreme 
God. Rather, God’s dynamic hierarchy and sovereignty is tolerant of the other spirits and 
divinities who share in his dispersed power for the wellbeing of humanity and cosmic 
harmony. It is therefore, not surprising that such African Christians who, unfortunately, 
are still held sway by the continued dominance of such colonial and missionary 
vocabularies and languages aimed at inferiorizing all that is African have continued to 
resent the need to come to terms with their own local memories/histories; and the dignity 
of difference, by a continual use of such words in those negative connotations. At any 
rate, the existence of numerous healing and deliverance Christian ministries and 
churches, Charismatic Renewals and priest-healers in West Africa today, speaks volumes 
about the living and vibrant faith experiences of African Christians with regard to the 
operation of mystical powers. All this is in realization that Jesus through the power of the 
Holy Spirit is the one who has the overall power that conquers all evil, brings total 
healing, restores diminished lives, and ultimately brings salvation to all. This sustains the 
faith and hope of African Christians in their struggles in the face of suffering, 
exploitation, and oppression.          
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 While it is important to acknowledge the interest aroused with regard to 
deepening theological reflection in this aspect of vital African Christian experience as a 
right step in the right direction, it is equally necessary to call for caution to watch out for 
the tendency to undue emphasis on faith healing and the reduction of the missions of 
Jesus and the Holy Spirit to the miraculous. It is the task of critical theological thinking 
and reflection to correct and purify such a tendency. What must be kept in mind is that 
miracles and the miraculous were only part of Jesus’ overall mission of inaugurating the 
reign of God. Upon his announcement of the dawn of the reign of God, Jesus invited the 
people to metanoia, to turn away from sin and give their hearts to love of God and love of 
neighbor. Why change of heart? As Jesus says: “For out of the heart come evil thoughts, 
murder, adultery, sexual immorality, theft, false testimony, slander” (Matt 15:19-20). It is 
these things that Apostle Paul calls the works of the flesh; murder, greed, theft, idolatry, 
dissension, exclusion, and so on. To indulge in them is to reject God and koinonia with 
fellow human beings. Thus, as one anointed and empowered by the Spirit, Jesus’ mission 
entails not only getting to the root of sin and healing the human heart from the inside out, 
but also to prophetically confront the incarnations of sin in its manifold manifestations in 
dehumanizing and oppressive religio-cultural, socio-economic, and political structures 
and institutions. Hence, we can understand Jesus’ predilection to stand in solidarity with 
the weak, the poor, the oppressed, the excluded, and those silenced and pushed to the 
margin and bottom of society in name of purity of tradition. It is in giving himself away 
completely for their sake and for daringly and prophetically speaking from a subaltern 
epistemic location outside the coloniality of power when he should be silent, that Jesus 
runs into conflicts with the domination and totalizing system at his time which will lead 
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to his murder (martyrdom). But his death has validity for all humanity. Therefore, any 
treatment of holistic healing in the African Christian experience which appropriates and 
assimilates the sterling traditional qualities to Jesus but ignores this aspect of the socio-
political structures that diminish life by inflicting crushing and unspeakable poverty to 
the vast majority of the people is not holistic.       
 It is not surprising that many Christians resort to faith healing and turn to the 
miraculous when they are sick because of grinding poverty and thus, their inability to 
afford health care costs which only the rich can get. What does one expect a number of 
poor African Christians living in many communities (rural, for example) with lack of 
functional hospitals, health centers, basic drugs, as is the case in Nigeria, to do when they 
are sick or in emergency? Many, not surprisingly, get sick because of poor living and 
sanitary conditions, overcrowding, lack of drains and sewers, lack of potable water, 
unemployment, illiteracy, poor nutrition, politically induced famine and hunger due to 
politically motivated socio-cultural and ethnoreligious conflicts, and so on.
182
 Meanwhile, 
the rich, politicians and the clerical class alike, often have the means to fly out to Europe, 
America, or Asia to get the best treatment when they are sick. Why do they not stay back 
in Nigerian and other African hospitals for treatment? They desire the best for themselves 
but not for the poor masses who are left to their fate. The political class has failed to 
utilize public funds to make basic institutions work in Nigeria. It is the mission of the 
church, as instrument for the Spirit to prophetically speak out and side with the poor in 
concrete commitments to hold leaders accountable and to overcome the root causes of 
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injustice. If there are demons to be exorcized, certainly, the greatest of them must be the 
powers that have incarnated themselves in religious, social, and political structures that 
diminish human life and dignity, deprive human rights, and preclude the actualization of 
people’s destiny and potentials. Therefore, the life-giving and resistant Spirit calls the 
churches to show solidarity with the weak, the broken, the poor, and the traumatized, by 
following the vision of Jesus in preferentially opting for the poor and oppressed to restore 
their full humanity. In a particular way, this holistic liberation embraces the emancipation 
of women in Africa from exclusion and marginality, and giving them their rightful place 
in both church and society. To reduce the ministry of Jesus to faith healing, casting out 
demons, and to the miraculous is to simply turn Jesus into a dues ex machina (who does 
everything miraculously or even magically), and it is to shy away from dealing with and 
fighting to remove the structures that institutionalize and perpetuate poverty, oppression, 
misery, ignorance, and injustice.
183
 Such a stance would also fail to empower the people 
to take control of their future, to struggle for their rights to decent living conditions, for 
their integral development, and human promotion. In the present state of the dislocation 
of Africa, the church must bear a prophetic witness in word and in praxis that Jesus is 
truly the Savior and liberator, and that God’s Holy Spirit is frankly the Lord and Giver of 
life to African “men and women who live in situations close to death.”184 When all is said 
and done, the church must not forget, however, that the victory that Jesus has already 
won for us has an eschatological dimension. It is this eschatological hope that should 
                                                 
      
183
 Ibid. 
      
184
 Èla, My Faith as an African, 11. 
  
457 
 
sustain our struggle for an alternative, better, and just world. This way, the church will 
become instrumental in the social transformation and building of a new African society.  
5.8 African Christian Theology in World Christianity: A Way  
     Forward 
           
 Beyond Christendom, beyond Global Christianity/church, African Christian 
theology locates itself within the borders of World Christianity/church. Perhaps it might 
be helpful to establish a distinction between these concepts. Global Christianity 
implicates and embodies the faithful replication and transplantation of a particular 
epistemic and cultural framework as well as Christian forms and patterns as they are 
developed in Western Christianity to other parts of the world. It represents the view that 
Europe is Christianity and Christianity is Europe which was characteristic of the colonial 
missionary impulse. Global Christianity thus suggests: “that growing communities of 
professing Christians around the world…and…that churches everywhere are a religious 
expression of Europe’s political reach, or else a reaction to it.”185  
 Understood in this sense, Global Christianity embodies the vestiges of 
Christendom which refers to when the church became a domain of the state as an 
imperial Christianity and a Christian empire with imperialistic propensities to enforced 
uniformity, universalism, and autarchic unilateralism. This is a clear case of the 
expression of the coloniality of power. World Christianity, unlike empire which operates 
on an ideology of unquestioning totalizing linearity that is intolerant to complexity, 
pluriversality, or the seemingly contradictory (which may not necessarily be false), 
suggests a framework or space that embodies diverse epistemic centers, pluriversal 
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macronarratives, a variety of faith expressions, and Christian forms and shapes, with 
local or indigenous characteristics. World Christianity displays a plurifocal cultural flow 
not only from the West to the rest (as in passive recipients) but also from the South to the 
North especially through migration facilitated by globalization process.
186
 Accordingly, 
“‘World Christianity’ is the movement of Christianity as it takes form and shape in 
societies that previously were not Christian…. World Christianity is not one thing, but a 
variety of indigenous responses through more or less effective local idioms, but in any 
case without necessarily the European Enlightenment frame.”187 Because World 
Christianity allows for the simultaneous existence of plurality of particular epistemic 
locations, local expressions and models of faith, indigenized Christian practices, as well 
as the inhabitation of multiple relationships, Sanneh is right on target when he asserts that 
“Indigenizing the faith meant decolonizing its theology, and membership of the 
fellowship implied home rule.”188 Decolonizing our theology means that it must be a 
critical and reasoned reflection on the faith experience and confrontation with the divine 
in our geographical location and in the light of Scriptures but in such a way that its 
outcome is not limited to our space. That is to say, World Christianity is welcoming of 
equality-in-difference, diversity, and indeed, pluriversality in a way that enriches and 
enhances communion. It is against this background that African theology in World 
Christianity/church, emerges as a border thinking from the colonial wounds to foreground 
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and legitimate African silenced and subalternized epistemic potential in articulating 
Africans’ faith experiences. This rearticulation of the African faith experiences should be 
given a hearing and no longer silenced. Nevertheless, one is not under any illusion that 
the coloniality of power is still at work. But this must not stop the African churches from 
growing and transforming themselves in order to become a leaven to contribute to the 
transformation of the African society.       
 Above all, the whole question of pluriversality that enriches communion has been 
greatly endorsed by the 1994 Synod of Bishops for Africa which proposed the metaphor 
of the church as the family of God. The African Synod recognizes that “it is in the power 
of the Spirit of the same risen Jesus that we are built into the body of Christ, God’s 
household, and participants in Christ (cf. Heb 3:1, 6, 14; 1 Cor 12:27; Col 1:18, 24) to 
become therefore, the one undivided family of God in the image of the Trinitarian 
Family.”189 The family of God is not strictly biological but mystical. To be sure, the early 
Christian community understood itself as the family of God. This adopted metaphor is 
aimed at introducing into ecclesial life such qualities of the African family as: “care for 
others, solidarity, warmth in human relationships, acceptance, dialogue, and trust.”190 In 
our church-family, we have the same blood (of Christ) coursing in our veins. And we are 
sisters and brothers because we have the same Mother (the church – the Spouse of Christ) 
and the same Father.
191
 In this new Trinitarian family, relationships transcend ethnic 
frontiers. Through the Holy Spirit who indwells all the baptized, members of the Family 
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of God are mystically linked to one another and ontologically linked to God just as has 
been demonstrated in the Etche African relational notion of person. The Spirit of Jesus 
who reigns in this family bestows diverse gifts to each individual and to each community 
in the Christian commonwealth (à la Tertullian) for the upbuilding of the body of Christ 
(1 Cor 12; Rom 12:4-8). The metaphor of the church as the Family of God imaged on the 
Trinitarian Family underscores the need to promote mutuality, respect for otherness, 
solidarity, interdependence, and recognition of equality-in-difference. Genuine 
communion is only possible where the dignity of each is recognized and upheld. Hence 
the African synod avers:           
Christ has come to restore the world to unity, a single human Family in the  
 image of the Trinitarian family. We are the family of God…. It is for the 
 Church-as-Family that the Father has taken the initiative in creation of Adam. 
  It is the Church-as-Family which Christ, the New Adam and Heir to the nati-
 ons, founded by the gift of his body and blood. It is the Church-as-Family  
 which manifests to the world the Spirit, which the Son sent from the Father 
  so that there should be communion among all.
192
   
Therefore, just as individuals are graced, all communities and local churches have also 
been graced by the Spirit of Christ with their particular gifts which they are to harness 
and be allowed to bring to the communion of churches. By and large, conceiving the 
church as the Family of God imaged on the Trinitarian Family provides a paradigm for 
living out the relationality engendered by the Spirit of Jesus Christ both within and 
beyond the Christian community. There is no gainsaying the fact that a self-reliant 
African church would serve as a leaven in the social transformation of the African 
society.     
                                                 
      
192
 African Synod of Bishops, 1994, §§ 25, 24. 
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5.9 Conclusion         
 The burden of this chapter has been to construct an authentic African relational 
pneumatology. An understanding of the dimension of spirit experiences in West African 
world-views paved the way for us to gain new understandings of the Universal Holy 
Spirit. The relational Spirit empowers the African churches to become church in new 
ways that would be relevant and responsive to the genuine aspirations of the African 
people toward the realization of their full humanity and destinies. By attaining a more 
adult status, the African churches would become a leaven for the social transformation of 
Africa. 
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Conclusion         
 The purpose of this work has been to reinterpret the Third Article of the Niceno-
Constantinopolitan Creed (381) which affirms the Holy Spirit as the “Lord and the Giver 
of Life” in the light of African context. The objective has been to recover the relational 
quality of the Spirit (as enshrined in the Scriptures) that has been lost sight of during the 
long sojourn of Christianity in the West. The consequences of the loss of the category of 
relationality particularly with regard to the question of differences are hard to overlook. 
Hence, in this work, I have tried to utilize relationality which is a core tenet of West 
African world-views as an interpretive framework to accomplish the task I set my self 
herein.           
 It has been amply demonstrated in this work that the making of the 
modern/colonial world system brought about the classification of the populations of the 
planet into essentialized categories on the basis of European local cultural, historical, and 
epistemological normativity. Whereas European humanity and historicity were viewed as 
the apex and norm of history and humanity, those who fall outside this norm, particularly 
Africans, had, according to this reasoning, to be colonized and enslaved as a way of 
bringing them the torch of civilization. In this very process, Africans were not only 
treated as subhuman and savage, but also exploited, oppressed, and their epistemic 
potential suppressed and silenced, discredited as unscientific, inadequate, trivial, and only 
worth discarding.            
 This explains why the overall goal of this work has been to utilize the category of 
relationality to reinterpret and reconceptualize the Spirit as the Creator and Sustainer of 
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differences in a way that allows or rather compels us to strive to live together in spite of 
our differences. The urgency of this challenge comes to the fore in the present 
circumstances of the ambivalence of globalization. The process of globalization, no 
doubt, has turned the world into a global neighborhood of interconnectedness, yet it is 
fraught with experiences of fragmentation and dislocation. Thus, the Creator Spirit is not 
only the Giver of life but also the defender of that life as the Prophetic Spirit.   
 It is in this sense that the Spirit anointed Jesus as the Messiah who defends the 
defenseless and speaks for the voiceless who are oppressed, exploited, subalternized, and 
silenced by the social and religious structures of his time. In doing this, Jesus embodied 
the hospitality and friendship of God toward the excluded by restoring their humanity and 
including them in the koinonia of God’s kingdom. The reign of God which Jesus 
proclaimed necessarily entails a preferential option for the poor and the denunciation of 
the ways of the powers that be and the establishment. This stance, of course, brought him 
into conflicts with the status quo and eventually led to his death.    
 As in the case of Jesus, the church as the “flesh of Christ” (body of Christ) has 
equally been empowered by the relational Spirit to embody the hospitality of God to 
others, especially the poor, the oppressed, and the suppressed. However, from what we 
have x-rayed so far in this work, it is evident that the church fails in her weakness, in this 
mission of preaching the good news which entails liberating the oppressed, by sometimes 
colluding with oppressive powers and stifling the movement of the Spirit. Hence, the 
“Discussion of the Seventh Assembly” of the World Council of Church is ad rem: “In our 
world, the powerful dictate how things are to be, might is right and truth is determined by 
coercive force and violence. The churches, more often than not, seek to accommodate 
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themselves to the prevailing order out of concern for institutional survival.”1 This is so 
true, that oftentimes, in a bid to preserve institutional survival, unity, and purity of 
tradition, absolutizing canons and interpretations have been imposed on all regardless of 
social locations, local contexts, histories, and epistemic frameworks and meaning making 
systems (at times with political force, as in Christendom). Sadly enough, such coloniality 
of power is still alive and well today in many aspects of the church’s life. What must 
never be eliminated from view is that Jesus never sacrificed human liberation in order to 
preserve unity or purity of tradition at all costs. This fact has been amply demonstrated in 
this work.          
 A recovery of the relational quality of the Holy Spirit has serious implications for 
the church and particularly for the African church as illustrated in Chapter 5.
2
 In 
rearticulating an African Christian relational pneumatology, it allows us to gain new 
understandings of the person and work of the Holy Spirit and the implications for being 
church today. It challenges all absolutizing tendencies in our manner of theologizing and 
allows for the foregrounding and legitimizing of all subalternized and silenced epistemic 
potentials and loci as sites of divine revelation and encounter. Basically, relational 
pneumatology invites a recognition of the dignity of difference according to the manner 
of equality-in-difference. As Nigerian theologian, Theresa Okure puts it, there is need 
for: “A clearer awareness of the need for us to do a theology that is situated in life and is 
oriented towards the betterment of the quality of human life and environment. This is 
necessary if our theologizing is indeed to be at the service of the people of God and be 
                                                 
      
1
 Julio de Santa Ana et al., The Political Economy of the Holy Spirit (Geneva: WCC, 1990), 7. 
      
2
 See Chapter 5, sec. 5.7: “African Relational Pneumatology: Ecclesiological Implications.” 
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authentically Christian.”3Authentic Christian theology is, therefore, necessarily 
pluriversal and multilingual. As Kwesi Dickson underscores: “the various authentic 
reactions to the same faith could be a means of arriving at a…greater vision of the Christ 
who, in the final analysis, is too big for our theologies. The church universal must be one 
whose diverse tongues complement one another as they express the Lordship of Jesus 
Christ.”4 The time of the naïve attempt to suppress the wealth and variety of faith 
experiences and to reduce them to the regime of sameness or to supplant them with 
absolute abstract summaries as in the days of the Summa in the production of knowledge, 
is long over.           
 The need for authentic theologizing, therefore, calls for the decolonization of 
African Christian theology. This present work is a contribution toward an authentic 
African Christian theology as a heterogeneous discourse emanating from the wounds of 
coloniality while instrumentalizing border thinking. Out of the colonial difference 
through border thinking emerges authentic theology which should not be discounted but 
recognized as an enrichment of the church universal which always remains a communion 
of churches. Let me end which a quote from Mercy Amba Oduyoye: “We…are 
confronted with this fact: those who were for a long time content to be consumers of 
theology have begun to be producers of theology and it is Christian theology. They are 
                                                 
      
3
 Theresa Okure, “A Theology for Social Transformation in the Nigerian Context,” The Proceedings of 
The Catholic Theological Association of Nigeria (CATHAN) Conference (Ibadan, Nigeria: 1992), 25. 
      
4
 Kwesi A. Dickson, Theology in Africa (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1984), 6. 
  
466 
 
widening the panorama of symbols, heightening the color of issues, and demanding 
commitment and action.”5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
      
5
 Mercy Amba Oduyoye, Hearing and Knowing: Theological Reflections on Christianity in Africa 
(Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1986), 76. 
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